simonicity

CIL Life

One of the many frustrating aspects of the Community Infrastructure Levy regime is the confusing and limited nature of any right to appeal, which is particularly concerning given the varying interpretations given to the Regulations by different collecting authorities.

The first difficulty is working out what the appeal route in any particular situation is.

Appeals lie to the Valuation Office Agency in relation to:

⁃ Regulation 114 (where an interested person has asked the collecting authority for a review of the chargeable amount as is aggrieved at the decision on the review)

⁃ Regulation 115 (apportionment of liability)

⁃ Regulation 116 (charitable relief)

⁃ Regulation 116A (exemption for residential annexes)

⁃ Regulation 116B (exemption for self-build housing).

Recent VOA appeal decisions are here.

Appeals lie to the Planning Inspectorate in relation to:

⁃ Regulation 117 (decisions by the collecting authority to impose a surcharge)

⁃ Regulation 118 (determinations by the collecting authority of a deemed commencement date)

⁃ Regulation 119 (imposition by the collecting authority of a CIL stop notice).

Recent Planning Inspectorate appeal decisions are here.

A common theme in relation to the VOA and PINS appeals decisions is the frequency of misunderstandings as to the CIL regime on the part of those carrying out minor developments, the frequency of notices being missed or overlooked and forlorn attempts to avoid or reduce liability at a stage when development has already commenced and the horse has bolted.

Appeals can then proceed to the High Court if either of the parties considers that the decision of the VOA or PINS was wrong in law.

In relation to decisions of the collecting authority which are not listed above, for instance as to whether any exemption or relief should be granted other than charitable relief, the exemption for residential annexes and self-build housing – say social housing relief – the only possibility for challenge is for by way of an application to the High Court for judicial review. Not only is that a disproportionately cumbersome route for challenge when the issue could surely be dealt with by the VOA or PINS but, given that the possibility for claiming a relief or exemption is lost if it is not granted before development is commenced, few developers have the luxury of being able to wait for resolution of a disagreement over the relief or exemption before starting construction.

Surely all of this needs looking at again and simplifying as part of the Government’s current review.

I started thinking about all of this when reading what may be only the third High Court ruling in relation to CIL liability issues, R (Giordano Limited) v London Borough of Camden (Lang J, 13 December 2018). It’s a pretty straightforward case but I’m still not sure whether there was a VOA decision (and if not why the challenge was allowed to proceed) – maybe someone out there can help?

The issue was whether, in determining the relevant floorspace within the chargeable development, the test in Regulation 40 (7) (ii) was met as to whether there were “retained parts where the intended use following completion of the chargeable development is a use that is able to be carried on lawfully and permanently without further planning permission in that part on the day before planning permission first permits the chargeable development.” The floorspace represented by such parts wouldn’t attract CIL.

The claimant was intending to implement a planning permission for “change of use of third floor offices (class B1a) and vacant first and second floors (class B8) to create 3 x three bedroom flats.” Having received a liability notice for £547,419.09, it argued that the test was met because there was a previous planning permission which had been lawfully commenced for “change of use of third floor offices (class B1a) and vacant first and second floors (class B8) to create 6x two-bedroom flats (class C3), including rear extensions at first, second, third and fourth floors and associated external alterations.”

Under the previous (pre-CIL) permission, the rear extension and alterations to the elevations of the building had been completed, and steel beams refitted internally, but the first, second and third floors were just stripped out, unpartitioned floors and were not yet capable of being used for residential purposes.

The claimant was attempting to rely on the floorspace deduction provided for in Regulation 40 (7) (ii) because it couldn’t show that any part of the building had been lawfully occupied for at least six months in the previous three years.

Lang J found that because the floorspace was currently incapable of being used for residential purposes it did not meet the test – a “potential” future use was not sufficient.

Stepping back, I would say that was a pretty large windfall for the local authority!

The only other two High Court cases I’m aware of are:

R (Orbital Park Swindon Limited) v Swindon District Council (Patterson J, 3 March 2016), where the claimant succeeded in mitigating its potential CIL liability by securing two separate planning permissions for its proposed works to a retail store, one of which permissions, for the introduction of additional space by way of a mezzanine, was not liable for CIL.

Patterson J had no difficulty with the deliberate CIL mitigation strategy adopted:

“There is […] no manipulation of the system for any ulterior and/or illegal motive in accordance with the submissions of the defendant. Rather, the claimant has taken advantage of the legislative scheme which permits it to submit, in this case, two separate planning applications for each act of operational development that it wished to pursue. If it was not the intention of the legislature to permit that to occur then it is for the legislature to change it. At present, in my judgment, that is the consequence of the current statutory scheme.”

R (Hourhope Limited) v Shropshire Council (HHJ David Cooke, 2 March 2015), where the claimant failed in its submissions that the “in lawful use” requirement for deduction of floorspace would be met by anything less than actual use – it was not sufficient that the building (a former pub) was still available for lawful occupation, or that there was some residual storage of items left behind from when the pub had closed.

Is anyone aware of any others?

MCIL2

While talking about CIL, I thought it might be worth a brief post script about the Mayor of London’s MCIL2 (previously covered in part of my 9 November 2018 blog post An Update On CIL: Reform Promised, Meanwhile Continuing & Increasingly Expensive Uncertainties). The report of the examiner, Keith Holland, has now been published, recommending, with one minor modification, that the submitted charging schedule is appropriate, meaning that we can expect it to be adopted and take effect on 1 April 2019.

Despite the increasingly big question mark that there must be over whether Crossrail 2 (the basis for MCIL2) is politically deliverable at present (see my 1 July 2017 blog post Crossrail 2, Where Are You?) Mr Holland has no difficulty on that score:

“In 2016 the National Infrastructure Commission recommended that Crossrail 2 be taken forward as a priority with the aim of opening in 2033. Costings for the project have recently been subject to an independent review. The results of the review are not yet public and at this stage there is no formal government approval for Crossrail 2. However, the need for new infrastructure to support the region’s growth was endorsed by the Secretary for State for Transport in July 2017 and there is no doubt that an extremely strong case can be made for Crossrail 2. Moreover, there is general endorsement for Crossrail 2 from those making representations.”

Of course many of us want to see Crossrail 2 proceed. But what if it doesn’t? That’s a lot of money being raised without a defined objective as to the transport projects to which it is to be applied and surely it would be wrong for it to end up being used, for instance, to address cost overruns in relation to Crossrail 1?

Simon Ricketts, 15 December 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Charles Alfred Meurer, Still life with money, pipe and letters, 1914

Permitted Development: Painting By Numbers Versus Painting The Sistine Chapel?

Time now to look at some of the proposals to extend permitted development rights and to amend the Use Classes Order that are set out in the Planning Reform: Supporting the high street and increasing the delivery of new homes consultation paper published alongside the Autumn budget on 29 October 2018, and strongly criticised in Nick Raynsford’s final review of planning in England (November 2018):

“The government’s announcement of its intention to extend even further this permissive ‘shadow’ planning process appears to reflect its model for the future direction of the system; and this has real implications for people and for the nature of both planning and planners. This reflects the tension recorded in evidence presented to the Review as to whether planning is a form of land licensing, which implies one set of skills and outcomes, or the much more complex and creative practice of shaping places with people to achieve sustainable development. The former task is like painting by numbers; the latter is like painting the Sistine Chapel. The difference in outcomes for people is equally stark.”

I’m not sure that sort of language (describing traditional planning applications as equivalent to painting the Sistine Chapel, a spectacularly inapt comparison, or indeed TCPA interim chief executive Hugh Ellis’ language in the accompanying press release: “‘Permitted development is toxic and leads to a type of inequality not seen in the Britain for over a century.“) is helpful to the debate.

It seems to me that the two key issues which need to be addressed in relation to permitted development rights that enable additional residential development (whether by way of conversion or construction) are the need for some control at a national or local level over room sizes and the need to provide a proportion of affordable housing whether on site or by way of financial contribution. Aside from those obvious issues (not addressed in the latest consultation paper), what is wrong with the Government looking to streamline development management processes where appropriate? Surely the question is where is the appropriate dividing line. Surely deemed planning permission should be for types of development where, given the public benefit in seeking to encourage them, the local planning authority should not need to question the principle of what is proposed up to a defined scale at a particular location (with more general powers to restrict rights available by way of Article 4 Direction) and where wider issues do not arise that cannot be resolved within a 56 day period for prior approval of specified aspects which are, as far as possible, not open to differing subjective views? Don’t we need to define some sort of principle along these lines before then considering different common types of development?

“Allow greater change of use to support high streets to adapt and diversify”

The Government proposes that uses in classes A1 (shops), A2 (financial and professional services), and A5 (hot food takeaways) (as well as uses as betting shops, pay day loan shops and laundrettes) should be allowed to change to “office use (B1)” (do they mean “office use” or do they mean B1 which also encompasses light industrial and R&D?). Hot food takeaways will be allowed to change to residential use (C1) as is already the case with the other uses referred to. There would be the requirement for prior approval, as with existing change of use permitted development rights.

Alongside this, the current “pop up” temporary permitted development rights to change the use from shops (A1) financial and professional services (A2), restaurants and cafes (A3), hot food takeaways (A5), offices (B1), non-residential institutions (D1), assembly and leisure uses (D2), betting shops and pay day loan shops to change to shops (A1) financial and professional services (A2), restaurants and cafes (A3) or offices (B1) will be extended from two years to three years. The temporary permitted development rights are proposed now to extend to changes to certain community uses, namely as a public library, exhibition hall, museum, clinic or health centre.

All of these proposals are put forward in the context of “supporting the high street” but no geographical limitation to the proposed changes is indicated that would prevent their application to any building in the relevant use, wherever it is located – shades of the original proposal in relation to the office to residential permitted development right, which was couched in terms of underused and empty office premises, when of course the right turned out not to have any such limitation. There is no indication of any floorspace cap. Might a department store, or supermarket, turn into an office? Nor indeed any cap on the proportion of any shopping area that might be converted to offices.

The document goes on to explore whether changes could also be made to the Use Classes Order, namely to:

⁃“simplify the A1 shops use class to remove the current named uses and allow for a broader definition of uses for the sale, display or service to visiting members of the public.”

⁃ consider whether there is “scope for a new use class that provides for a mix of uses within the A1, A2 and A3 uses beyond that which is considered to be ancillary, which would support the diversification of high street businesses. This would replace the existing A1, A2 and A3 and result in a single use class to cover shops, financial and professional services, restaurants and cafes. This would mean that movement between these uses was no longer development and not a matter for the planning system to consider. It would bring greater flexibility but reduce the ability of communities and local planning authorities to distinguish between shops and restaurant uses“.

I agree that these parts of the Use Classes Order potentially need reform (within boundaries – is it really workable for there to be no distinction at all between A1 and A3?) but can’t this be as part of broader reform of the Order? The B, C and D classes all give rise to equivalent issues in that the old distinctions between uses have become increasingly difficult to apply.

“A new permitted development right to support housing delivery by extending buildings upwards to create additional homes”

This idea has been around since February 2016 without civil servants arriving at draft legislation, which is surely going to be the practical test.

Looking back, I covered this proposal most recently on 13 October 2018 in my blog post The Up Right, before that in my 17 March 2017 blog post Permitted Development: À La Recherche Du Temps Perdu and before that in my 15 June 2016 blog post Permitted Development: What Next? However, this latest version of the proposals is certainly the most far-reaching.

The permitted development right would allow additional storeys to be built above buildings in a wide range of uses, including residential, retail and offices. The Government indicates:

“We want to explore whether there may also be other buildings whose use is compatible with the introduction of new homes. Given they are usually located in residential areas or high streets, would premises such as health centres and buildings used for community and leisure purposes be suitable for inclusion in the permitted development right? Out of town retail parks with a mix of shopping and leisure uses may also be suitable for upward extensions to provide additional homes.”

The consultation paper asks for “examples of how this permitted development right might be used in practice, and particularly of how the use of local design codes could help to encourage take up of the proposed right and improve the design quality and acceptability of upward extensions.”

It’s sounding complicated already. Then add the question of how far upwards the permitted development right could allow development to go. The consultation paper offers two alternatives, both of which could lead to significant factual disputes:

⁃ “A permitted development right could apply to the airspace above premises in a terrace of two or more joined properties where there is at least one higher building in the terrace. The roof of the premises extending upward would be no higher than the main roofline of the highest building in the existing terrace.”

⁃ “An alternative approach would be to permit upward extensions more widely to a height no higher than the prevailing roof height in the locality. While this may extend the proposed right to a greater number of properties, it would not be possible to define prevailing roofline in regulations. Therefore it would be a matter to be considered by the local authority as part of the prior approval. In doing so, the local authority would be able to define what it considered to be the prevailing roofline taking account of the local building types and heights and the extent of the area over which it should be determined.”

To add to the complications:

“Where premises are not on level ground the impact of adding additional storeys can be significantly greater on the amenity of neighbouring premises, for example from overlooking and overshadowing and on the character of the area. We would welcome views on how best to take account of the topography of specific areas.”

The consultation paper proposes that there should be a maximum limit of five storeys from ground level for a building once extended (so the extension could be up to four storeys!). But there would be an even broader permitted development right for purpose built, free standing blocks of flats of over five storeys. “The government would also like a permitted development right to apply to such buildings, and is interested in views, including whether there should be a limit on the number of additional storeys that could be added, for example 5”

The permitted development right would allow for the physical works required to construct or install additional storeys on a building. It could also, for instance, allow for “works within the curtilage where it is necessary for access to the additional new homes“.

The prior approval requirements would include appearance, ie “considering whether the proposed development is of good design, adds to the overall quality of the area over its lifetime, is visually attractive as a result of good architecture, responds to the local character and history of the area and maintains a strong sense of place, as set out in paragraph 127 of the National Planning Policy Framework. We expect prior approval on design to be granted where the design is in keeping with the existing design of the building.

Prior approval would also consider the impact of the development on the amenity of neighbouring premises, for example, from obscuring existing windows, reducing access to light or resulting in unacceptable impact on neighbours’ privacy from overlooking. It would also consider measures to mitigate these impacts, and enable the neighbours, including owners and occupiers of premises impacted, to comment on the proposal.”

This is asking a lot of the 56 day prior approval process – sounds like a job for a traditional planning application to me.

Finally, yet another extension of the previous proposals: “We are seeking views on whether the proposed right to build upwards to create new homes should additionally allow householders to extend their own homes.”

This all sounds like it’s on a collision course with what the Government has set in train with the establishment of the ‘Building Better, Building Beautiful‘ Commission.

“The permitted development right to install public call boxes and associated advertisement consent”

I may come back in a later blog post to the Government’s proposal to remove permitted development rights for the installation of public call boxes. Since earlier blog posts on the subject, I’m now off-side from commenting in detail due to acting for an electronic communications code operator, but I would briefly note that the need for additional apparatus is about enabling electronic communications both present (3G, 4G and wifi) and future (5G) rather than just being about the old phone box concept and in that respect the terminology in Part 16 and the references in the Control of Advertisements Regulations probably do need updating without throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

“Supporting housing delivery by allowing for the demolition of commercial buildings and redevelopment as residential”

Well this proposal dates back to October 2015! As with the upwards extensions proposal, is it simply too difficult to draft in legislative form? The wording in the consultation paper is certainly tentative:

⁃ “It may be that a right focused on smaller sites may be more practical...

⁃ Despite the Government having set its face against affordable housing requirements in relation to the office to residential permitted development right, with this right it is said that the Government “would be interested in views on how developer contributions expected towards affordable housing and other infrastructure could be secured.”

⁃ “We would welcome views as to the design of a right which could operate effectively to bring sites forward for redevelopment. The responses to these questions will inform further thinking and a more detailed consultation would follow.”

To be provocative, if additional storeys of residential development are to have deemed permission, and if new residential developments are to have deemed permission if they replace commercial buildings, what is the logic for not granting deemed permission for residential development on brownfield land more generally – what is inherently more complex or controversial arising from that than from the development that could come forward under these new rights? Why the prior complications with brownfield land, but not with these other rights, of land having to be placed by a local planning authority on a register before there is permission in principle?

The deadline for consultation responses is 14 January 2019.

Simon Ricketts, 8 December 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Is It A Listed Building? No Statuary Right Of Appeal

Or, before you sell your garden ornaments best to check that they aren’t listed buildings.

I missed the 50th anniversary, on 25 October 2018, of the enactment of the Town and Country Planning Act 1968. Part V of the Act introduced our modern system of listed buildings, and the prohibition on the demolition of any listed building, or its alteration/extension in any manner that would affect its character as a building of special architectural or historic interest, without listed building consent. The background to the provisions, which replaced a much weaker system of building preservation notices, is well described in an Institute of Historic Building Conservation blog post.

I was only reminded of the anniversary by an interesting ruling by the Court of Appeal, Dill v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 26 November 2018).

The facts are odd. Two early 18th century limestone piers, each surmounted by a lead urn, were moved to Idlicote House, a grade II listed building, in 1973 by the appellant’s father. The two sets of piers and urns were separately grade II listed in 1986. The appellant came into ownership of Idlicote House on 1993, didn’t appreciate that the items were listed and sold them abroad in 2009 for £55,000. He does not know where they are now. Stratford-On-Avon District Council found about this in 2014. Correspondence ensued. The appellant made an application for retrospective listed building consent to remove the items, which was refused in 2016. The council issued a listed building enforcement notice requiring their reinstatement and the appellant appealed against both the refusal and the notice.

An inspector dismissed the appeals and in so doing rejected submissions that it was open to him to conclude that they were not listed buildings. The decision was challenged and Singh J agreed with the inspector at first instance.

Singh J’s judgment (28 September 2017) contains some interesting additional factual context (as well as usefully quoting from most of the inspector’s report). These items had previously been at four other country houses before being placed at Idlicote House:

“The items were originally at Wrest Park in Bedfordshire. In 1939 Mr J G Murray sold Wrest Park and took various items of statuary, including these items, with him to Coles Park, Buntingford in Hertfordshire. In 1954-5, following the death of Mr Murray, the estate was left to a trust, with his grandson, Major R P G Dill, being a lifetime beneficiary. In 1955-6, under Major Dill, Coles Park was sold and the items went with him to the Dower House, Buntingford. Major Dill sold Dower House in 1962 and moved to Badgers Farm, Idlicote. Again the items went with him. He positioned them at Badgers Farm. The farmhouse at Badgers Farm was listed in 1966 but the list description makes no mention of the items.

In 1973 Major Dill sold Badgers Farm and bought Idlicote House. These items followed him. These two items were positioned on either side of a path in the gardens which had served as the front drive to the house since the 1820s. No alteration was made to the garden design to accommodate the items.”

Back to the Court of Appeal. The judgment of Lord Justice Hickinbottom goes through the statutory regime, noting that “building” isn’t defined in the Listed Buildings Act but rather in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. It “includes any structure or erection, and any part of a building, as so defined, but does not include plant and machinery comprised within a building“.

Hickinbottom LJ agrees with the inspector and Singh J: the decision-maker cannot determine that something on the list is not in fact a building. The list is determinative. Whilst the question as to whether something is a building does involve questions as to the purpose and degree of annexation to the land or property, such issues eg as to the application of property law concepts (see London Borough of Tower Hamlets v London Borough of Bromley (Norris J, 8 July 2015) – the Henry Moore’s Old Flo statue case) or the approach taken to what was part of a building in other rating and planning cases (eg see Skerrits of Nottingham Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 22 March 2000) – marquee in grounds of listed building) were not relevant here. He separates out the three ways in which something may qualify as a listed building:

⁃ by being listed in its own right, as here.

⁃ by being an object or structure fixed to a listed building.

⁃ by being an object or structure which lies within the curtilage of a listed building.

So, Mr Dill now has a problem. How to comply with a listed building enforcement notice, and potential criminal sanctions, when no one knows where in the world these objects now are.

The case is a reminder of a couple of things:

⁃ The absence of a time limit for service of listed building enforcement notices, which when taken with the criminal offence arising from doing works without listed building consent, leads to complications for those of us carrying out legal due diligence in relation to transactions concerning listed buildings.

⁃ The curiosity of the definition of “building” which enables a wide range of structures or erections to become “listed buildings“.

By coincidence DCMS on 19 November 2018 updated its principles for selection of listed buildings. More on that in due course perhaps (particularly on the implications for modern buildings) but in the meantime the advice in paragraph 5 is relevant to this blog post:

“For the purposes of listing, a ‘building’ includes any structure or erection and a ‘listed building’ includes any object or structure: (a) fixed to it; or (b) within its curtilage which, although not fixed to it, forms part of the land and has done so since before 1st July 1948, unless the list entry expressly excludes such things. In some cases, such as for works of art or sculptures, it will be necessary to consider the degree and purpose of annexation to the land or building to determine whether it may be listed under the 1990 Act.”

The Dill case reminds us that in practice the stage to argue that something is not a “building” is obviously when listing is being considered, not when you are facing enforcement or making a listed building consent application. Surely listing of such itinerant objects, with no historical connection with Idlicote House, would not have been an obvious procedure to follow? Of course applications for de-listing can also be made when it is considered that the listing was in error in some way, but the Historic England guidance warns that applications for de-listing will not normally be considered when enforcement is in hand – so perhaps not an easy route for Mr Dill.

Simon Ricketts, 1 December 2018

Personal views, et cetera

A Helpful Case On The Scope Of Section 73

I was pleased to read Finney v Welsh Ministers (Sir Wyn Williams, 15 November 2018), or the Rhydcwmerau wind turbines case, as I hope we’ll call it for ease.

Sir Wyn Williams provides the answer to a question I raised in my 3 March 2018 blog post, A Change Is Gonna Come (But Should It Really Need A Fresh Planning Permission?): can you use a section 73 application when the changes to conditions that you are seeking also entail a change to the description of development on the previous permission?

The implied answer from Singh J in R (Wet Finishing Works Limited) v Taunton Deane Borough Council (20 June 2017) was yes but the point was not specifically addressed in his judgment. Sir Wyn Williams has to deal with the point head-on as it was one of the two grounds of challenge.

In the Rhydcwmerau wind turbines case there was a planning permission granted where the description of the development that was thereby approved was as follows:

“Installation and 25 year operation of two wind turbines, with a tip height of up to 100m, and associated infrastructure including turbine foundations, new and upgraded tracks, crane hardstandings, substation, upgraded site entrance and temporary construction compound upon a site situated to the north of the village of Rhydcwmerau, Carmarthenshire”

The description of development appears simply to have been incorporated in the permission by reference to the description of development on the application form, but I don’t think anything turns on that.

The permission was subject to a number of conditions. Condition 2 provided that the development was to be carried out in accordance with a number of approved plans and documents which were specified. One such was a “figure” described as “3.1 Typical Wind Turbine Elevation 1:500 @ A3“. It is common ground that this showed a wind turbine with a tip height of 100m.”

The promoter of the project then made an application under section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to substitute plan 3.1 with a plan showing a wind turbine with a tip height of 125m. The local planning authority treated the application as valid but refused it. An inspector allowed the promoter’s appeal.

The claimant challenged the inspector’s decision:

“It is argued that the Inspector should not have allowed the appeal because she had no power under section 73 to amend a condition pursuant to which a prior planning permission had been granted which had the effect of directly contradicting the description of the development permitted in that earlier permission. Further or alternatively, the Claimant asserts that the Inspector failed to consider at all (as she should have done in accordance with established legal principles) whether the application before her constituted a “fundamental alteration” of the prior permission“.

On the first ground of challenge, Sir Wyn Williams held that “the only proper interpretation of the judgment in Wet Finishing Works, is that a variation pursuant to section 73 can be lawful notwithstanding that it may necessitate a variation to the terms of the planning permission which preceded the section 73 application.” The section 73 permission was not unlawful simply because necessarily the permission entailed a change to the original description of development which had referred to a tip height of 100m rather than 125m.

He also referred to the test formulated by Sullivan J in R v Coventry City Council, ex p. Arrowcroft Group plc (2001): “the council is able to impose different conditions upon a new planning permission, but only if they are conditions which the council could lawfully have imposed upon the original planning permission in the sense that they do not amount to a fundamental alteration of the proposal put forward in the original application.”

Applying that test to the decision letter:

“Although I am not entirely convinced that the Inspector had in mind that it was necessary for her to consider in terms whether the variation sought would create a fundamental alteration to the original proposal I am prepared to conclude, on balance, that she was aware of that obligation and considered it.”

But even if she had not, it was highly likely that the decision would have been the same. “I have no doubt that had the Inspector considered whether the variation to the condition would have constituted a fundamental alteration to the original proposal she would have concluded that it did not. The whole tenor of her decision letter leads inexorably, in my judgment, to that conclusion as a careful reading of it makes abundantly clear.”

So, a pretty clear signpost for us all to follow – particularly a number of local planning authorities which presently take a plainly too restrictive approach to the use of section 73.

Simon Ricketts, 24 November 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Town Library, New Wing: Decision Letters

Town announcement

One of the joys of starting up Town Legal with colleagues has been the opportunity to play with technology so as to see how up to date information relevant to planners and planning lawyers can be made more readily available, with a little bit of focus on where the gaps are. We have constantly asked ourselves what may be useful to increase people’s understanding and ability to predict outcomes, but which may not be fully accessible?

That was the rationale for the Planning Court Judgments weekly update (with its click through to a full, searchable, list of Planning Court judgments since 2014), announced in my 2 August 2018 blog post . The update now has around 370 subscribers. The latest update, for the week ending 16 November 2018, is at this link. Free subscription is still available via this link. I am really grateful for the hard work of Susie Herbert and other Town associates in preparing, to a weekly deadline, the various case summaries.

We can now announce another Town Library service: a weekly list of decision letters issued in the preceding week by the Secretary of State or Planning Inspectorate. The list comprises section 77 and 78 appeals in relation to proposals for major development that have been determined following a public inquiry, rather than informal hearing or written representations. The latest update, for the week ending 16 November 2018 is at this link. Free subscription is available via this link.

This latest service goes beyond the Planning Court judgments service in that it is fully automated. It was again devised by us in association with legal engineers Wavelength Law, drawing upon the Planning Inspectorate’s website. We are grateful to the Planning Inspectorate for its online service and hope that our weekly updates will assist people both in accessing its content and in generally gaining a better understanding of likely appeal outcomes. Not part of the free update service but with Wavelength’s help we can re-cut the PINS data (which we have in a searchable database going back to 2012) in all manner of ways for individual requirements – if this would be useful for a particular project that we are acting on do let me know – or another Town partner.

Please bear with us as we continue to experiment with update formats and continue to iron out various issues but, as always, comments and suggestions are very welcome. We have plenty more strands of development underway.

I have always loved libraries.

Simon Ricketts, 22 November 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Big EU News! (Latest CJEU Case on Appropriate Assessment & A Draft Withdrawal Agreement)

The European Court of Justice is certainly turning the screws this year via various cases in relation to the Republic of Ireland, with now three rulings against its Planning Board, An Bord Pleanála. Following People Over Wind (see my 20 April 2018 blog post EU Court Ruling: Ignore Mitigation Measures In Habitats Screening) and Grace, Sweetman (see the second half of my 18 August 2018 blog post What Is Mitigation?) we now have Holohan (CJEU, 7 November 2018).

In basic summary:

People Over Wind has removed the ability for the competent authority to screen out the need for appropriate assessment, under the Conservation of Habitats Regulations 2017, on the basis that a significant effect on a Special Protection Area or Special Area of Conservation is unlikely, where that conclusion is reliant on proposed mitigation measures. The result has been far more projects and plans requiring appropriate assessment to ascertain that they will not adversely affect the integrity of the relevant SPA or SAC.

Grace, Sweetman has removed the ability for the competent authority to reach a conclusion at appropriate assessment stage that there will be no adverse effect on integrity, where mitigation measures are relied on that in reality amount to compensatory measures for the loss of habitat.

Holohan now imposes more detailed requirements on the competent authority at appropriate assessment stage:

1. […] an ‘appropriate assessment’ must, on the one hand, catalogue the entirety of habitat types and species for which a site is protected, and, on the other, identify and examine both the implications of the proposed project for the species present on that site, and for which that site has not been listed, and the implications for habitat types and species to be found outside the boundaries of that site, provided that those implications are liable to affect the conservation objectives of the site.

2. […] the competent authority is permitted to grant to a plan or project consent which leaves the developer free to determine subsequently certain parameters relating to the construction phase, such as the location of the construction compound and haul routes, only if that authority is certain that the development consent granted establishes conditions that are strict enough to guarantee that those parameters will not adversely affect the integrity of the site.

3. […] where the competent authority rejects the findings in a scientific expert opinion recommending that additional information be obtained, the ‘appropriate assessment’ must include an explicit and detailed statement of reasons capable of dispelling all reasonable scientific doubt concerning the effects of the work envisaged on the site concerned.”

If you are relying on an appropriate assessment in relation to a project or plan, I suggest that you urgently check that it addresses these three requirements. An decision taken in reliance upon an appropriate assessment which does not cover off these points will be susceptible to legal challenge. If caught at the right time, deficiencies should be able to be addressed by some extra work. But it will be too late to rectify matters once the appropriate assessment is reached and the decision taken.

These CJEU rulings are unambiguous in their stated conclusions on the law, very different from our common law approach.

They are also likely to continue to be relevant, regardless of what happens with Brexit. After all, as set out in my 18 September 2018 blog post Planning, Brexit, Michael Gove as Secretary of State for Environment, Fisheries and Rural Affairs has committed that:

“Where environmental principles are contained in specific pieces of EU legislation, these will be maintained as part of our domestic legal framework through the retention of EU law under the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. Any question as to the interpretation of retained EU law will be determined by UK courts in accordance with relevant pre-exit CJEU case law and general principles, subject to the other exceptions and restrictions within the Bill. For example, CJEU case law on chemicals, waste and habitats includes judgments on the application of the precautionary principle to those areas. This will therefore be preserved by the Bill“.

As set out in that blog post, we are still waiting for the draft Bill, required by section 16 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act to be published by Boxing Day 2018, that will set out the environmental principles to be applied post Brexit and the body that will enforce them.

What we now have seen of course is the draft withdrawal agreement published on 14 November 2018. Who knows whether it will be concluded but it envisages that the CJEU will continue to have jurisdiction in any proceedings brought against the UK during the transition period to 31 December 2020.

In the event of the backstop being triggered at the end of the transitional period if the Irish border issue hasn’t been settled, a series of commitments in relation to environmental protection will kick in, as set out in Part 2 of Annex 4 to the Protocol on Northern Ireland/Ireland (pages 356 to 360 of the overall draft agreement). The commitments include:

– Non-regression in level of environmental protection subsisting at the end of the transitional period.

– The principles to be reflected in legislation:

a) the precautionary principle;
b) the principle that preventive action should be taken;

c) the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source; and
d) the “polluter pays” principle

– The Joint Committee shall adopt decisions laying down minimum commitments for:

a) the reduction of national emissions of certain atmospheric pollutants;
b) the maximum sulphur content of marine fuels

c) those best available techniques, including emission limit values, in relation to industrial emissions

– Commitment to meet international obligations as to addressing climate change

– Commitment to carbon pricing and trading of allowance consistent with EU system

– Finally, although much of this is already in hand via section 16 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act and/or the subject of other international obligations, a commitment to effective enforcement of environmental laws as well as the following:

“The United Kingdom shall ensure that administrative and judicial proceedings are available in order to permit effective and timely action by public authorities and members of the public against violations of its laws, regulations and practices, and provide for effective remedies, including interim measures, ensuring that any sanctions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and have a real and deterrent effect.

The United Kingdom shall implement a transparent system for the effective domestic monitoring, reporting, oversight and enforcement of its obligations pursuant to this Article and to Article 2 by an independent and adequately resourced body or bodies…

The independent body shall have powers to conduct inquiries on its own initiative concerning alleged breaches by public bodies and authorities of the United Kingdom, and to receive complaints for the purposes of conducting such inquiries. It shall have all powers necessary to carry out its functions, including the power to request information. The independent body shall have the right to bring a legal action before a competent court or tribunal in the United Kingdom in an appropriate judicial procedure, with a view to seeking an adequate remedy.”

Professor Colin Reid’s 15 November 2018 blog post Environmental Commitments in the Withdrawal Agreement is a very good commentary on all of these provisions.

Finally, fabulous timing on the part of UKELA to have secured for next week’s annual Garner lecture Professor Juliane Kokott, Advocate General at the CJEU (who has been at the centre of so much EU case law, including the People Over Wind and Holohan cases referred to above). It will be fascinating to hear her perspective.

Simon Ricketts, 16 November 2018

Personal views, et cetera

PS David Elvin QC has since reminded me that the CJEU also on 7 November handed down its judgment in the Dutch Nitrogen Deposition case, which also contains important rulings in relation to appropriate assessment, for instance the extent to which agricultural activities amount to a “project”, as well as the extent of certainty required if conservation measures are to be relied upon as mitigation. See James Maurici QC’s blog post.

An Update On CIL: Reform Promised, Meanwhile Continuing & Increasingly Expensive Uncertainties

Well done for getting past the heading.

Someone recently asked me whether the Government ever changes its proposals as a result of a consultation process. For an example of just such a thing, I was able to point to the Government response to supporting housing delivery through developer contributions: a summary of consultation responses and the Government’s view on the way forward (29 October 2018). The proposals set out in the Government’s March 2018 consultation paper (summarised in my 10 March 2018 blog post Developer Contributions, CIL, Viability: Are We Nearly There Yet?) have been modified significantly as a result of consultation, mostly for the better in my view at least.

This blog post focuses on the changed proposals and then looks at some looming issues facing phased developments in areas where charging authorities are looking to increase rates (I’m focusing on the Mayor of London’s MCIL2 but I’m sure the issue is of wider application).

The Government response

The document acknowledges some of the flaws of the current system:

“The complexity and uncertainty of the current system of developer contributions is acting as a barrier to the delivery of housing. The system does not react quickly to changes in market conditions or allow local authorities to effectively secure the contributions needed to support new development. It is also not as transparent as it should be; local communities are not clear what infrastructure is provided alongside new development. And the current system could also be more effective in securing funding towards strategic infrastructure and supporting cross boundary planning.”

The Government intends to consult on draft regulations “later this year” to implement the changes set out in the March 2018 consultation document, as now modified. It is important to note that the Government will “also consider whether changes could be made to the Community Infrastructure Levy to incentivise the build out of developments.” (perhaps something that Sir Oliver Letwin might have looked at but…).

The Government has now modified its proposed changes as follows:

1. The previous proposal to replace charging authorities’ current statutory consultation requirements, in relation to proposed charging schedules, with self-certification as to whether it has sought “an appropriate level of engagement” has been amended. The Government “intends to take forward a modified proposal to ensure that regulations continue to require charging authorities to consult on draft charging schedules, whilst removing the current statutory requirement for two separate rounds of consultation in every circumstance.”

2. The pooling restriction will now be removed in its entirety in all areas. Hooray! Although of course there is the risk that tariff-type section 106 contribution requirements will again become more prevalent, in my view the pooling restriction led to many unnecessary problems and uncertainties, which would have continued under the Government’s March 208 idea of only removing the restriction in in areas where specified criteria were met.

3. The Government had intended to introduce a two month grace period for developers to submit a commencement notice in relation to exempted development, to address disproportionately severe problems arising for eg self-builders who, if they fail to meet procedural requirements, find not only that they fail to qualify for any exemption but that all CIL due has become immediately payable. The Government will not now introduce the grace period (which local authorities considered could lead to practical complications) but instead will be “making changes to the penalties associated with the failure to submit a Commencement Notice prior to development being started. This will ensure that any penalty is set at a proportionate level and will not result in the whole liability becoming payable immediately.”

There may also be more guidance as to potential exemptions: “A number of responses sought additional exemptions to address the unintended viability impacts of Levy liabilities on particular forms of development. The Government will consider how guidance could be used to manage these effects by encouraging authorities to take account of these issues when setting Levy rates and choosing how they use existing powers for discretionary social housing relief. In addition, the Government has already committed to bring forward legislation to exempt Starter Homes from the Community Infrastructure Levy.”

4. The complicated proposal in the March 2018 consultation document that charging schedules might be set with reference to the existing use of land has been dropped. “However, the Government has reviewed this proposal and considers there are existing flexibilities in the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations that, through the use of differential Levy rates, will allow local authorities to go some way towards achieving the objective of the proposed reform. The Government therefore proposes to make changes to guidance to support local authorities to set differential rates more effectively.”

5. At the time that it publishes the draft amendment regulations, the Government intends to “consult on changes to indexation of Levy rates and the way in which it would be implemented“. Its current preference is to index CIL rates “for residential development to the House Price Index using local-level data on an annual basis” and to index rates for non-residential development to the Consumer Price Index. It recognises the transitional issues that will arise.

6. The Government still intends to remove the restriction in relation to section 106 obligations that relate to an infrastructure project or type of infrastructure that is set out in the authority’s Regulation 123 list. “New reporting standards, which are set out in the Infrastructure Funding Statement, will address concerns about double dipping by ensuring that there is transparency over how developer contributions from both CIL and section 106 planning obligations are being used, rather than by placing formal restrictions in regulations.” We need to watch this one with care!

In relation to one specific issue that often leads to wrangles: “The Government also recognises the need to address existing uncertainty around using section 106 planning obligations to collect monitoring sums. The Government therefore intends to take forward proposals to make clear that local authorities can seek a fee from applicants towards monitoring planning obligations. In developing these proposals, the Government will consider how best to ensure that monitoring sums are set at an appropriate level.”

7. The Government had intended to give combined authorities and joint committees with strategic planning powers the ability to charge a Strategic Infrastructure Tariff. “The Government has decided to take forward a modified proposal, to enable Combined Authorities with strategic planning powers to take forward a Strategic Infrastructure Tariff, and to encourage groups of charging authorities to use existing powers to more effectively support the delivery of strategic infrastructure through the pooling of their local Community Infrastructure Levy receipts. In the longer term, the Government will bring forward proposals for allowing joint planning committees to charge the tariff, and will review options for giving other groups the power to levy a Tariff.”

The Government had also included a final “catch all” question seeking any other comments. Particular issues that were raised in responses included “the definition of gross internal area, implementation of the Levy in particular circumstances (such as in relation to development that takes place in a number of phases or there is a change of use), and the operation of exemptions and reliefs, indexation and in-kind payment.”

Issues such as these are indeed causing much uncertainty.

The implications of increased rates/MCIL2

Whilst we wait for eventual reform of the system, of more immediate focus are the implications of gradual increases by charging authorities in CIL rates.

In London, the Mayor of London is waiting for the inspector’s report following the examination into the draft charging schedule for MCIL2. MCIL2 is proposed to part-fund Crossrail 2, in the way that MCIL1 (together with a related policy of seeking section 106 contributions in relation to some areas and types of development) is part-funding Crossrail 1.

The charging schedule for MCIL1 was adopted on 1 April 2012 (which is why there are many section 106 agreements and permissions dated March 2012, as developers and boroughs scrambled to ensure that permissions were not subject to the levy!).

This table sets out borough by borough the significant sums of money that MCIL1 has now raised:

The section 106 contributions policy for Crossrail (set out in the Mayor’s Crossrail Funding SPG, updated March 2016) predated MCIL1 and provided for section 106 contributions based on the following table and plans:

The standardised wording included in relevant section 106 agreements provides that any MCIL1 which is payable reduces the contributions which are required to be made under the relevant section 106 agreement.

As long as the inspector’s report is received on time and gives it a clean bill of health, MCIL2 will be adopted on 1 April 2019. The changes in rates, compared to where the 2012 rates currently sit with indexation applied, are mostly not huge, but they are significant in some areas. In areas where the increases are material, I am sure we will see a similar rush to beat the deadline.

One uncertainty is of course whether the examination inspector will accept a charging schedule that is predicated on Crossrail 2 coming forward. Little has progressed on the project since my 1 July 2017 blog post, Crossrail 2: Where Are You? We are all still awaiting outcome of an independent affordability review being chaired by Mike Gerrard. The Mayor is hedging his bets, simply indicating:

“Should the Crossrail 2 project not be taken forwards, the Mayor would be able to apply the MCIL 2 proceeds to fund other strategic infrastructure.”

Assuming that MCIL2 is waved through and the charging schedule is adopted on 1 April, the relevant point at which it takes effect is determined by everyone’s least favourite phrase in the CIL Regulations: “at the time planning permission first permits the chargeable development“.

For a non-phased permission, this is the date of the permission – easy.

For a phased outline permission, this is either “the date of final approval of the last reserved matter associated with that phase” or “if earlier, and if agreed in writing by the collecting authority before commencement of any development under that permission, on the day final approval is given under any pre-commencement condition associated with that phase“.

For a phased full permission, this is either “the day final approval is given under any pre-commencement condition associated with that phase” or “where there are no pre-commencement conditions associated with that phase, on the day planning permission is granted“.

It will be seen that (1) the revised charging schedule is liable to bite in respect any phase of an existing phased permission if sufficient progress has not been made in relation to reserved matters or discharging pre-commencement conditions in relation to that phase and (2) that there are inherent uncertainties in the drafting, eg

⁃ What does “associated with that phase” mean?

⁃ Does “any” mean “any” or, in fact, “all“?

As a final example of the inadequacies of the legislation: where there is a phased permission and a revised charging schedule is subsequently adopted, the only indexation that applies is of the amount arising from the initial charging schedule up to the end of the year prior to the date of the permission. There is no further indexation through to commencement of development or any indexation of the revised charging schedule insofar as it applies to the phases! Would it not be simpler and more predictable if indexation were not to stop at the initial grant of the permission and instead to continue through to final approval (or even commencement of development) in relation to each phase, but if the potential application of revised charging schedules were removed?

In case anyone has made it down this far…

In conclusion:

⁃ the proposed reforms, and most recent proposals, look to be mainly positive

⁃ but the whole regime really does still need simplifying: to state the obvious, significant liabilities can unexpectedly arise for the unwary – and large sums of money can turn on uncertain issues of interpretation.

Simon Ricketts, 9 November 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Oliver’s Twist: Letwin’s Proposals For Large Housing Sites

Sajid Javid had given Sir Oliver Letwin the following terms of reference for his review into the “build out of planning permissions into homes” that was announced in the Autumn 2017 budget.

“The Review should seek to explain the significant gap between housing completions and the amount of land allocated or permissioned in areas of high housing demand, and make recommendations for closing it. The Review should identify the principal causes of the gap, and identify practical steps that could increase the speed of build out. These steps should support an increase in housing supply consistent with a stable housing market in the short term and so that over the long-term, house prices rise slower than earnings. The review will provide an interim report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government in time for Spring Statement 2018 and a full report for Budget 2018.”

Has Letwin’s final report (published alongside the budget on 29 October 2018) twisted itself away from the examination question that he was set? In my view, read as a set along with the previous two stages of his work, it is pretty clear how his thinking has developed. But he has ended up making a surprisingly radical and, to my mind, impractical, set of recommendations that surely will not find traction with this Government and which on any reflection would surely not increase the “speed of build out“. Perhaps due to the deadline he was set, the recommendations in the final report are not accompanied by any evidence. They are also set out in some detail (see for example the tables embedded in a later part of this blog post) at the expense of any commentary on, for example, the proposals to encourage timely delivery that were set out in the February 2017 white paper.

Dear Philip and Sajid

There have been three stages to his work. In his 9 March 2018 letter to the Chancellor and Secretary of State he provided this initial analysis:

“The fundamental driver of build out rates once detailed planning permission is granted for large sites appears to be the ‘absorption rate’ – the rate at which newly constructed homes can be sold into (or are believed by the house builder to be able to be sold successfully into) the local market without materially disturbing the market price. The absorption rate of homes sold on the site appears, in turn, to be largely determined at present by the type of home being constructed (when ‘type’ includes size, design, context and tenure) and the pricing of the new homes built. The principal reason why house builders are in a position to exercise control over these key drivers of sales rates appears to be that there are limited opportunities for rivals to enter large sites and compete for customers by offering different types of homes at different price-points and with different tenures.

When a large house builder occupies the whole (or even a large part) of a large site, the size and style (and physical context) of the homes on offer will typically be fairly homogeneous. We have seen examples of some variation in size, style and context on some large sites; but the variations have not generally been great. It has become apparent to us that, when major house builders talk about the absorption rates on a large site being affected by “the number of outlets”, they are typically referring not only to the physical location of different points of sale on the site, but also and more importantly to differences in the size and style (and context) of the products being offered for open market sale in different parts of the site. Even these relatively slight variations are clearly sufficient to create additional demand – and hence additional absorption, leading to a higher rate of build out.

It is also clear from our investigation of large sites that differences of tenure are critical. The absorption of the ‘affordable homes’ (including shared ownership homes) and of the ‘social rented housing’ on large sites is regarded universally as additional to the number of homes that can be sold to the open market in a given year on a given large site. We have seen ample evidence from our site visits that the rate of completion of the ‘affordable’ and ‘social rented’ homes is constrained by the requirement for cross-subsidy from the open market housing on the site. Where the rate of sale of open market housing is limited by a given absorption rate for the character and size of home being sold by the house builder at or near to the price of comparable second-hand homes in the locality, this limits the house builder receipts available to provide cross-subsidies. This in turn limits the rate at which the house builder will build out the ‘affordable’ and ‘social rented’ housing required by the Section 106 Agreement – at least in the case of large sites where the non-market housing is either mixed in with the open market housing as an act of conscious policy (as we have frequently found) or where the non-market housing is sold to the housing association at a price that reflects only construction cost (as we have also seen occurring). If freed from these supply constraints, the demand for ‘affordable’ homes (including shared ownership) and ‘social rented’ accommodation on large sites would undoubtedly be consistent with a faster rate of build out. And we have heard, also, that the demand for private rented accommodation at full open market rents (the scale of which is at present uncertain) would be largely additional to, rather than a substitute for, demand for homes purchased outright on the open market.”

The interim report

His interim report in June 2018 then focused on three issues:

• what the build out rate on large sites in areas of high housing demand actually is;

• why the rate of build out on these sites is as it is; and

• which factors would be most likely to increase the rate of build out on these sites without having other, untoward effects.

The interim report is a solid document with strong analysis and a variety of conclusions, one of which being that “if either the major house builders themselves, or others, were to offer much more housing of varying types, designs and tenures (and, indeed, more distinct settings, landscapes and street-scapes) on the large sites and if the resulting variety matched appropriately the desires of the people wanting to live in each particular part of the country, then the overall absorption rates – and hence the overall build out rates – could be substantially accelerated. The policy levers required to bring this about without damaging the economics of individual sites or the financial sustainability of the major house builders are topics for the second phase of my work, on which I shall report at the time of the Budget.”

The final report

And this is precisely what he has sought in part to do in his final report, published alongside the budget on 29 October 2018. I say in part, as there is no real analysis as to whether his proposed policy levers would or would not damage “the economics of individual sites or the financial sustainability of the major house builders“.

Underlying his conclusions seems to be his scepticism as to whether the encouragement in the NPPF for “residential developments to have a mix of tenures, types and sizes which reflect local housing demand (as well as emphasising the importance of good design)“, together with the 2018 NPPF’s requirement for local authorities to encourage the sub-division of large sites, is sufficient to lead to less homogenous development or “the prospect of significant increases in the rapidity of build out on such sites“.

He gives no evidence for this assumption. Even the 2012 NPPF (as now revised) is, after all, still working through into plans and permissions.

Instead of trying to work with the grain of the existing system, he recommends that “the Government should adopt a new set of planning rules specifically designed to apply to large sites. The purpose of these rules should be to ensure that all sites in areas of high housing demand whose size exceeds a certain threshold are subject to an additional form of planning control that requires those owning such sites to provide a diversity of offerings on the site which are able to address the various categories of demand within the local housing market. This, in turn, should ensure that houses can be built at a greater rate than at present on such sites, because the absorption rate for each category of housing will be complementary, yielding, overall, a greater absorption of housing by the local market as a whole in any given period.”

Ahead of a new legislative structure (both primary and secondary legislation) and an annex to the NPPF (I suspect it would take more than an annex – he’s driving a coach and horses through the thing as far as large housing sites are concerned), he envisages that the new rules could first be brought in by a written ministerial statement, secondary legislation and the policy annex. “If, for example, the Government decides to adopt my recommendations at the end of 2018, I suggest that it should be made clear to the owners of existing large sites in areas of high housing demand, and to those who are taking such large sites through the current planning system before commencing works, that the new rules governing planning permission for large sites will come into force at the start of 2021, and will therefore govern any permissions granted for large sites on or after that date.”

The primary legislation would:

” • define large sites both in terms of a size threshold (which might, for example, be set initially at 1,500 units2) and in terms of boundaries (to ensure that a site which is allocated as a single entity in a local development plan qualifies, even if it benefits from a number of different outline planning permissions);

• require local planning authorities, when granting allocations, outline permissions or final planning permissions for any large site or any part of a large site in areas of high housing demand, to comply with the new secondary legislation and the new planning policy relating to large sites – and, in particular, to include within all outline planning permissions for large sites in areas of high housing demand a requirement that ‘housing diversification’ on such sites should be a ‘reserved matter’; and

• establish the principle that all permissions for reserved matters granted in relation to such large sites should contain diversi cation requirements in accordance with the new secondary legislation and the new planning policy for large sites.”

The secondary legislation would:

” • amend the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure)(England) Order 2015 to include type, size and tenure mix (alongside the current provision for prescription of access, appearance, landscaping, layout and scale) as characteristics that can be prescribed as reserved matters for large sites in areas of high housing demand; and

• require any applicant making an outline planning application for a large site or an application for final permission for a phase of a large site in an area of high housing demand to prepare a diversification strategy, specifying the types of diversity that will be exhibited on that site or in the part of the site to which the application refers.”

The new planning policy document would set out the diversification principles that are to apply to such large sites in areas of high housing demand in the future. By diversification, he means, for example, “housing of varying types, designs and tenures including a high proportion of affordable housing“, as well as “more distinctive settings, landscapes and streetscapes“. By all means strengthen the NPPF if further strengthening is needed (is it?) but how much of this is specific to schemes of 1,500 homes plus.

Then it really starts to get weird. Because there will be “scope for disagreement about whether a particular applicant has made a genuine effort to provide sufficient diversity to address multiple markets simultaneously and hence to increase the overall absorption rate and build out rate. Accordingly, in order to minimise recourse to appeal or litigation, I recommend that the Government should establish a National Expert Committee.

The primary purpose of this Committee should be to arbitrate on whether any application that causes a disagreement between the local planning authority and the applicant (and consequently comes to appeal) satisfies the diversification requirement, and is therefore likely to cause high build out rates.

The secondary purpose of the Committee would be to offer informal advice to any developer or local planning authority that was considering a large site application. I recommend that the Housing Secretary should guide local planning authorities to consult the National Expert Committee before approving any such large site application in an area of high housing demand.”

Why on earth would a new quango such as this be created?

For sites that will already have an outline planning permission before 2021, Letwin recommends that there should be financial incentives (ie government funding) for house builders to accept changes to their existing site plans. Developers would enter into a section 106 agreement to document their continued commitment to the diversity requirements. Letwin says that he has taken legal advice and is confident that the “voluntary transaction” that he proposes will prove to be lawful – perhaps, but it would certainly be unusual. Would the local planning authority be a party? Who would enforce?

One Step Beyond

He then goes “one step further” in relation to “large sites that have yet to be allocated within a local authority’s local plan“. He recommends “that the Government should, as part of the new primary legislation, introduce a power for local planning authorities to designate particular sites within their local plans as sites which can be developed only as single large sites and which therefore automatically become subject to the new planning rules for large sites. In addition, I believe that the local planning authority should be empowered to specify, at the time of designation, strong master-planning requirements including a strict design code as well as landscaping and full and specific infrastructure requirements.”

This in part appears to be a device to ensure that “the land value of those sites is not raised as far above the alternative use value as would be the case if a site were allocated in a local plan and subsequently obtained outline permission under our current rules“. But this can already be done by local planning authorities for good planning reasons, where comprehensive development is required for reasons of, for instance, sustainability or viability. Is Letwin going further than that?

What if there is no good planning reason why the site could not be sustainably be built out in parts? And what is indeed a single development? This will all prove hugely contentious. Particularly given that he goes on to indicate that to “ensure that a reasonable balance is struck between promoting the public interest through increased diversity and faster build out rates on the one hand, and proper recognition of the value of the land on the other hand, I recommend that the Housing Secretary (when issuing updated viability guidance alongside the new planning framework) should guide local planning authorities towards insisting on levels of diversity that will tend to cap residual land values for these large sites at around ten times their existing use value.”

No evidence is given as to why the level above which land values would be expropriated by the state without compensation (which, after all, would be the effect of the proposal) is set at 10 x EUV.

Letwin recognises that significant support will be needed from Homes England: “planning rules are by their nature passive and reactive. They can prevent things from happening (if they are properly enforced); but they can only do a very limited amount to encourage applicants to follow the spirit of the rules and hence to achieve fully the outcomes the rules have been created to achieve.”

He then goes on to visualise local authorities being empowered to bring forward sites themselves via a development vehicle, in one of two ways:

“(a) the local authority could use a Local Development Company (LDC) to carry out this development role by establishing a master plan and design code for the site, and then bringing in private capital through a non-recourse special purpose vehicle to pay for the land and to invest in the infrastructure, before “parcelling up” the site and selling individual parcels to particular types of builders/providers offering housing of different types and different tenures;”

(b) the local authority could establish a Local Authority Master Planner (LAMP) to develop a master plan and full design code for the site, and then enable a privately nanced Infrastructure Development Company (IDC) to purchase the land from the local authority, develop the infrastructure of the site, and promote a variety of housing similar to that provided by the LDC model described above.”

He sees local authorities that use these vehicles being given “clear” compulsory purchase powers over the large sites that the authorities allocate and indicates that “it would also make sense to consider the possibility of giving local authorities such CPO powers in relation to large sites that have been allocated in their local plan in the past but which have not obtained outline permission after a long period has elapsed.”

Even when compulsory purchase compensation values have been reduced by the mechanisms requiring build out as a single site (query how that is defined in practice) and by increasing the required diversity until the 10 x uplift on EUV is not exceeded, will development (with the required diversity) be viable for a local authority to bring forward? Will any authority have the resources for the task? Will non-recourse lending really be available to the extent that would be required? Why would anyone start on the process of promoting a large site for development when it can be snaffled as part of a larger “single site” in this way?

The notions in the report could be read as moving to the public sector the role of strategic land promotion companies, which I suspect (for all that they are maligned) to be responsible for a high proportion of the major housing sites that do come forward at present. So, to misappropriate Kit Malthouse’s recent analogy that he applied to Homes England, we would lose some WD40 in the system: the companies with the incentive to identify sites, assemble them, identify and overcome infrastructure constraints, devise a viable and acceptable form of development, pursue allocation and permission, open up land with strategic infrastructure and dispose of parcels to house builders. And, going back to the original terms of reference, this will “increase the speed of build out“?

I appreciate that this report was delivered to a deadline, which it achieved, but (unlike the previous stages of Sir Oliver’s review) it seems to me to lack any robust evidential basis at all to justify the wholly new structure that it proposes for allocating, permitting and delivering schemes with 1,500 or more dwellings. Nor does the review interest itself with any more practical nudges that could be introduced into the current system. If it just goes on the “nice but radical ideas” shelf, another year will have been wasted, without any real progress towards making practical improvements that might improve build out rates. After all, Homes England is already playing a hugely positive role in unlocking large-scale housing development and indeed on 30 October 2018 published its strategic plan for 2018/2019 – 2022/2023, setting how it intends to go much further to use its “land, money, powers and influence to increase the pace, scale and quality of delivery“. When the Government responds to the Letwin report in early 2019 I will be looking to see whether any measures that are to be taken forward will pragmatically assist Homes England’s practical work – they are the ones rolling up their sleeves on all this.

Lastly, if as a consequence of implementation of these proposals we were to see the private sector focusing its attention on smaller sites, in preference to these sites which can really make a difference in terms of delivering at scale, that would in my view be inconsistent with the brief that was set.

Stick or twist?

Simon Ricketts, 3 November 2018

Personal views, et cetera

PS No sooner had I finished this post and poured some strong coffee than I saw this morning’s announcement that the Secretary of State has appointed Professor Sir Roger Scruton to chair a ‘Building Better, Building Beautiful’ Commission – no-one could criticise the current build out rate of MHCLG when it comes to reports and reviews.

LAMP lighter

MHCLG Consults On A Changed Basis For Assessing Local Housing Need & Other Urgent Repairs

I’m not sure anyone was expecting MHCLG to act quite so quickly to try to mend a number of problems that have been arising from the July 2018 NPPF (although perhaps problems of its own making).

Its technical consultation on updates to national planning policy and guidance (26 October 2018) invites comments by 7 December 2018 on the following:

Local housing need assessment

I referred in my 29 September 2018 blog post OAN Goal to the confusion caused by the publication by the ONS on 20 September 2018 of updated 2016-based household projections that resulted in the national minimum housing need calculated by the NPPF’s standard method falling significantly from data published in September 2017 which had been based on 2014 household projections.

There was widespread concern that the updated figures were not reliable. The Government had indicated that the figures would not lead to a reduction in the national 300,000 new homes target. A revision to the standard method was to be made so that the new household projections did not cause that target to be missed but in the meantime how were authorities to plan?

The consultation paper is unambiguous: the Government has decided that it is not right to change its aspirations and the ONS figures are indeed misleading due to the way that they only draw from two censuses (rather than previous projections based on five censuses) “which focuses it more acutely on a period of low household formation where the English housing system was not supplying enough additional homes“. In addition:

⁃ “Household projections are constrained by housing supply”

⁃ “The historic under-delivery of housing means there is a case for public policy supporting delivery in excess of household projections, even if those projections fall“.

⁃ “Other things being equal a more responsive supply of homes through local authorities planning for more homes where we need them will help to address the effects of increasing demand, such as declining affordability, relative to a housing supply that is less responsive“.

⁃ “The above factors have led to declining affordability…This indicates that the Government should not be less ambitious for housing supply“.

The Government has decided that the best way of responding to the ONS household figures is to ignore them completely, ie in its language:

“1. For the short-term, to specify that the 2014-based data will provide the demographic baseline for assessment of local housing need.

2. To make clear in national planning practice guidance that lower numbers through the 2016-based projections do not qualify as an exceptional circumstance that justifies a departure from the standard methodology; and

3. In the longer term, to review the formula with a view to establishing a new method […] by the time the next projections are issued.”

So for local plans submitted from 24 January 2019, the 2014-based household projections as per the September 2017 data are to be used but with current figures used for the calculation of the ratio of local median house prices to local median earnings (where the ratio exceeds four the standard method formula will continue to increase local need above household projections). This all provides authorities with welcome clarity – ignore the September 2018 ONS projections and no need to wait for tweaks to the methodology.

Housing land supply

The 2018 NPPF provides that in calculating how many years’ supply of housing land supply each authority has, the standard method for assessing local housing need is to be used as the baseline for housing land supply calculations where plans are considered to be out of date. The NPPF is to be amended (and updated planning guidance is to be published) so as to clarify that whilst in exceptional circumstances authorities can use a justified alternative approach to the standard method for calculating housing need, this only applies to plan making rather than in the calculation of need in the determination of applications and appeals where the scale of housing land supply is relevant.

The definition of deliverable

In order to determine whether an authority has a five year supply of deliverable sites, the definition of “deliverable” is critical. The Government has held its hands up: the definition of “deliverable” in the 2018 NPPF could be clearer. It proposes the following revised definition:

“To be considered deliverable, sites for housing should be available now, offer a suitable location for development now, and be achievable with a realistic prospect that housing will be delivered on the site within five years. In particular:

a) sites which do not involve major development and have planning permission, and all sites with detailed planning permission, should be considered deliverable until permission expires, unless there is clear evidence that homes will not be delivered within five years (for example because they are no longer viable, there is no longer a demand for the type of units or sites have long term phasing plans).

b) where a site has outline planning permission for major development, has been allocated in a development plan, has a grant of permission in principle, or is identified on a brownfield register, it should only be considered deliverable where there is clear evidence that housing completions will begin on site within five years.”

There will be further guidance in due course “to provide further information on the way that sites with different degrees of planning certainty may be counted when calculating housing land availability“.

Development requiring Habitats Regulations Assessment

The Government belatedly intends to address a problem that has arisen from the European Court of Justice’s ruling in People Over Wind (see my 20 April 2018 blog post EU Court Ruling: Ignore Mitigation Measures In Habitats Screening). The 2018 NPPF followed the 2012 NPPF in disapplying the presumption in favour of sustainable development where appropriate assessment is required, even though the effect of People Over Wind is that appropriate assessment is now routinely required in relation to proposed developments where mitigation will avoid any potential from harm, thereby removing the presumption in relation to many more development proposals than had previously been the case.

Paragraph 177 is now proposed to be amended to read:

“The presumption in favour of sustainable development does not apply where the plan or project is likely to have a significant effect on a habitats site (either alone or in combination with other plans or projects), unless an appropriate assessment has concluded that there will be no adverse effect from the plan or project on the integrity of the habitats site.”

So now the need for appropriate assessment will not be a bar to the presumption applying. The wording in fact now allows the presumption to apply to more schemes than was the case pre People Over Wind.

The Government could have dealt with this issue before the 2018 NPPF was published. It makes the rather weak excuse: “Although some consultation responses asked for an amendment to the Framework in the light of the ruling, there was not an opportunity for all interested parties to comment at the time.” Well, why was there not even a written ministerial statement to clarify the position? I’m sure I am not the only one to have lost a planning appeal partly due to the absurd position that arose.

The government also indicates that it is “considering what other changes to regulations and guidance may be necessary following the European Court’s ruling“.

In my view MHCLG should take some credit for trying to sort out all of these issues. It is also interesting that the previous approach of avoiding making running repairs to the NPPF has been abandoned – we can soon expect NPPF version 2.1.

Simon Ricketts, 26 October 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Planning Inquiries: Expert Witnesses & Success Fees

If you give evidence as an expert at planning inquiries, I recommend that you read the judgment of Holgate J in Gardiner and Theobald LLP v Jackson (VO) (Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), 3 August 2018).

In the superficially different context of a rating dispute, he sets down unambiguously the perils that await any expert witness whose remuneration is in any way contingent on the outcome of the dispute. This reflects the position in the RICS code of conduct.

The question I then asked myself is whether the position can be any less strict in relation to any planning dispute, where someone is giving evidence as an expert (most commonly a planning inquiry but in my view equivalent considerations apply where a report is provided, on the basis that it is to be relied upon as independent expert evidence, in other proceedings that may appear less formal, such as hearings, examinations and written representations procedures).

The RTPI position is less explicit than that of the RICS (whose code equally applies to expert evidence in planning maters). I haven’t researched other professional codes of conduct (after finding that the Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation does not appear to have a code of conduct on-line I gave up on that line of research for a Saturday morning).

In reading the judgment, bear in mind of course that Holgate J is both President of the Upper Tribunal Lands Chamber and the Planning Court’s Planning Liaison Judge (ie head of the Planning Court).

The position in relation to expert evidence given in court proceedings is clear. Holgate J refers to the R (Factortame) v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 3 July 2002) case, which related to an attempt by accountants to recover, as part of a costs claim, success-related fees that they had secured from Anglo-Spanish fishing companies though their work in relation to judicial review proceedings stemming from a dispute as to entitlements to fish in British waters. One of the matters for the court to consider was the extent to which the fees related to work which the firm had carried out that could be categorised as giving expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal held on the facts that it was not, but said this:

“Expert evidence comes in many forms and in relation to many different types of issue. It is always desirable that an expert should have no actual or apparent interest in the outcome of the proceedings in which he gives evidence, but such disinterest is not automatically a precondition to the admissibility of his evidence. Where an expert has an interest of one kind or another in the outcome of the case, this fact should be made known to the court as soon as possible. The question of whether the proposed expert should be permitted to give evidence should then be determined in the course of case management. In considering that question the Judge will have to weigh the alternative choices open if the expert’s evidence is excluded, having regard to the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules.”

“To give evidence on a contingency fee basis gives an expert, who would otherwise be independent, a significant financial interest in the outcome of the case. As a general proposition, such an interest is highly undesirable. In many cases the expert will be giving an authoritative opinion on issues that are critical to the outcome of the case. In such a situation the threat to his objectivity posed by a contingency fee agreement may carry greater dangers to the administration of justice than would the interest of an advocate or solicitor acting under a similar agreement. Accordingly, we consider that it will be in a very rare case indeed that the Court will be prepared to consent to an expert being instructed under a contingency fee agreement.”

Holgate J identifies that whether the Factortame approach is to be applied by the Upper Tribunal is a question for the Upper Tribunal (or, on appeal, the Court of Appeal). There is the question, not previously conclusively determined, as to whether the existence of a contingency fee arrangement goes to the weight to be given to the evidence or whether it is to be admissible in the first place.

He sets out some of the potential advantages and disadvantages of each approach before concluding:

“These issues would need to be the subject of well-considered submissions following detailed research. We also raise them for consideration by, and discussion amongst, the Tribunal’s users and the various professional bodies involved. No doubt there will be other matters to consider which we have not identified.

However, one thing is certainly clear. Whatever approach this Tribunal decides to adopt on the issues raised by Factortame, it remains wholly unacceptable for an expert witness, or the practice for which he or she works, to enter into a conditional fee arrangement, without that fact being declared (and in sufficient detail) to the Tribunal and any other party to the proceedings from the very outset of their involvement in the case. The Tribunal will treat such a failure as a serious matter.”

In the Gardiner and Theobald case, the expert engaged by G&T had not disclosed to the Valuation Tribunal that whist he was not charging on a contingent basis for his expert witness role before the VTE, his firm would still benefit from success-related fees flowing from his previous work.

The judgment is pretty scathing in its terms. Nor was the expert able to hide behind any argument that it was all the fault of his firm’s standard terms of engagement:

“This aspect was not investigated during the hearing and so we make no finding about it. No doubt many surveyors and other experts, particularly those in larger practices, will operate on an assumption that standard form conditions will have been drafted by the practice so as to comply with the requirements of the tribunals before whom they appear and of the professional bodies to which they belong. In practice, an individual expert may not consider questioning the content of the standard conditions which are regularly used by the firm for which he or she works. But that cannot override or detract from the obligations which each individual expert personally owes, not only to the relevant tribunal or court, but also under any professional code of conduct. All these considerations only serve to emphasise the importance of a practice ensuring that its standard terms of engagement are drafted with care and clarity so that they do indeed comply with those obligations. Furthermore, individual experts must ensure that any specific terms agreed for individual cases, whether varying or supplementing the standard conditions of a practice, also meet the same requirements.”

Holgate J restates the principles that apply to expert witnesses, as set down in the Ikarian Reefer case:

“The expert’s duty to help the Tribunal, which overrides any obligation to the client (rule 17(1) of the 2010 Rules), connotes an obligation to act independently and without bias. The obligation is so similar to that in CPR 35.3 that it is helpful to refer to the related commentary in “Civil Procedure” (2018). Because this obligation is fundamental to the duty of an expert giving evidence in the Tribunal, it is appropriate to set out certain of the key principles summarised in the “Ikarian Reefer” [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 455: –

“1. Expert evidence presented to the Court should be, and should be seen to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation (Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246at p. 256, per Lord Wilberforce).

2. An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the Court by way of objective, unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise (seePolivitte Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. plc [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 379 at p. 386 per Garland J and Re J [1990] FCR 193 per Cazalet J). An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of an advocate.

3. An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions upon which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which could detract from his concluded opinion (Re J supra).

4. An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise.

5. If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is available, then this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one (Re J supra). In cases where an expert witness, who has prepared a report, could not assert that the report contained the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth without some qualification, that qualification should be stated in the report (Derby & Co. Ltd. v Weldon The Times 9 November 1990 per Staughton LJ).

6. If, after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on a material matter having read the other side’s expert’s report or for any other reason, such change of view should be communicated (through legal representatives) to the other side without delay and when appropriate to the Court.”

Holgate J stresses the importance of the statement of truth (which I will come back to):

“Any notion that, by way of example, the inclusion and signing of an expert’s declarations in his or her report is a mere formality, or something which may be dealt with perfunctorily, needs to be completely dispelled.”

So how does all of this apply to planning inquiries?

It seems to me that the position for chartered surveyors as expert witnesses is clear, in the light of RICS Practice Statement and Guidance Note: Surveyors acting as expert witnesses. The practice statement sets out the tribunals to which it applies, which includes evidence given to “inspectors, commissioners and reporters (for example, in planning proceedings, including inquiries, hearings, examinations in public – independent panels; independent examination and proceedings of the Infrastructure Planning Commission, and Planning and Water Appeals Commissions).”

As quoted by Holgate J, the practice statement deals with conditional fees in the following terms:

“10.1 You should not undertake expert witness appointment on any form of conditional or other success-based arrangement including where those instructing you are engaged on such a basis.

10.2 It is inappropriate to be remunerated by way of a conditional fee arrangement when acting as an expert witness but it may be an appropriate fee basis when acting as an advocate. When acting in a dual role as an expert witness and advocate, where permitted in lower tribunals, a conditional fee arrangement may be acceptable because it will be seen as attached to the role of advocate. Such a dual role improves access to justice by reducing costs and therefore a conditional fee payment can be supported in these limited and strict circumstances.

10.3 When acting in a dual role and where a conditional fee arrangement has been agreed, this must be declared to the tribunal.

10.4 It is unlikely that a dual role will be permitted in higher tribunal formats and consequently previously agreed conditional fees when the surveyor has appeared in a lower tribunal will, at the point of transferring to the superior or higher tribunal, need to be commuted and replaced by an hourly rate or fixed fee arrangement.”

The statement of truth that is required by the RICS to be included in expert reports includes: “I confirm that I am not instructed under any conditional or other success-based fee arrangement.”

It is interesting to note that the Planning Inspectorate’s Planning Appeals Procedural Guide does not include any advice on the question of success-related fees and the recommended wording, within Annex O, for the statement of truth, is simply:

“The evidence which I have prepared and provide for this appeal reference APP/xxx (in this proof of evidence, written statement or report) is true [and has been prepared and is given in accordance with the guidance of my professional institution] and I confirm that the opinions expressed are my true and professional opinions.”

As it happens, the RTPI recently updated guidance for its members, Practice Guidance September 2018, Planners as expert witnesses, but again there is nothing explicit on the question of success-related fees (although there is useful advice on, for example, the issues arising where evidence is given on behalf of the witness’s employer or, in the case of local authority planners, in support of a decision by councillors in the face of officers’ recommendations). Perhaps it will be said that it is implicit in one of the RTPI’s core principles: “Members must not make or subscribe to any statements or reports which are contrary to their own bona fide professional opinions, nor knowingly enter into any contract or agreement which requires them to do so.” But surely, particularly following that invitation from Holgate J to professional bodies, consideration should now be given to a much clearer statement? After all, situations inevitably arise where, even though the expert has no direct success-related fee arrangement, further work and fees will inevitably arise from a particular outcome, and where is the dividing line to be drawn?

So, I conclude, tentatively (do put me right, please) as follows:

There is no specific legal authority to support any proposition that expert evidence to a planning inquiry is inadmissible if the expert (or his or her firm) stands to gain in some way from a specific outcome from the proceedings. However, RICS members are subject to an express prohibition; members of other professional organisations may be under implied restrictions, and at the very least the decision maker is in any event liable to place significantly less weight on evidence which is given on a success-related fee basis – and such a basis should certainly be disclosed.

Simon Ricketts, 20 October 2018

Personal views, et cetera

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