Aside from the hot weather, what may well keep you awake at night (if you’re like me) is the fear of getting something wrong and that is particularly the case when there is the prospect of litigation. For a potential defendant or interested party, have we left some stone unturned (on a whole beach of small, sharp, often buried, stones) that may give rise to the opportunity for judicial review? For a potential claimant, have we missed a deadline such that any claim may be closed out?
(For ease I’m using the term “judicial review” in this post as a broad term covering statutory challenges as well but even that distinction isn’t a pedantic one in this rocky place: different rules apply to different forms of planning litigation).
Ignorance of the law is no defence, least of all for a lawyer, but the challenge of being on top of it all, and the consequences if not, only seem to increase. It’s not even straight-forward for my firm of 40 or so planning lawyers with constant knowledge sharing and a regular throughput of contentious matters. How much more difficult can it be for smaller teams, or local authority legal departments, or lay claimants seeking advice from non-specialists? (Oh and to state what should still be obvious: AI systems are a false friend: Cork v Smith (ICC Judge Mullen, 22 May 2026) – “legal professionals bear ultimate responsibility for their work and cannot outsource the process of legal research or of legal reasoning to an AI. It is a tool to be used with caution. AI has the potential to be wholly unreliable. AI may of course provide a jumping off point for research and legal reasoning but it does not, at least at present, do away with the need for proper research and thought on the part of a legal professional, even a very junior legal professional”).
I suspect that even many specialist planning lawyers read recent planning law cases like the following two with somewhat of a sense of “there but for the grace of God”:
R (Luton and District Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise) v Secretary of State for Transport (Court of Appeal, 21 May 2025)
From October 2025, the Civil Procedure Rules had been changed, reducing the time limit from 21 days to seven days for applying to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal against a High Court’s judgment in relation to a challenge to a nationally significant infrastructure project decision. The claimant group, presumably unaware of this change, sought permission within the old 21 day deadline but not within seven days. The change had been one detailed element of a wider package of reforms which had first been announced in January 2025 (see my 25 January 2025 blog post – at which stage that specific change hadn’t been included), in response to Lord Charlie Banner KC’s review into legal challenges of NSIPs (see my 28 October 2024 blog post).
The Court of Appeal considered the context of the change to the deadline, namely Parliament’s objective of reducing the timescales for processing DCO judicial reviews, and refused the extension of time and thus the application for permission to appeal.
Arun District Council v Secretary of State (HHJ Karen Walden-Smith sitting as a High Court Judge, 15 May 2026)
With section 288 challenges to inspectors’ appeal decision letters, within six weeks of the decision the claim not only needs to have been filed with the Court but a sealed version of the claim (and sealing by the court can take a few days, which is another story) has to have been served (in accordance with specific legal requirements) on the defendant (in practice the Government Legal Department) and on any interested parties. Here the claimant council purported to serve the interested party by emailing its planning consultant (without including all of the relevant documents and indeed relying on a “onedrive” link). The planning consultant did not confirm that he was authorised to accept service on behalf of his client. Correct service was finally effected, 32 days late. Again, the judge refused an extension and the claim was dismissed.
More changes ahead
On 20 May 2026 HM Treasury announced further restrictions on legal challenges to infrastructure project decisions in a policy paper, Getting Britain Building: Reforming judicial review for infrastructure as part of the government’s attempts to reduce delays to the delivery of nationally important infrastructure, not just continuing the direction of travel recommended in the Banner review but also in the light of the Fingleton review (Nuclear Regulatory Review 2025: enabling nuclear delivery through regulatory reform).
The paper states that in “response to the Fingleton Review, the Government has committed to two further areas of reform: developing a government-backed indemnification scheme to give developers greater financial certainty when facing legal challenge; and extending NSIP judicial review reforms to other major planning regimes, including those under the Town and Country Planning Act.”
There are also two radical proposals outlined in relation to judicial review:
“We are … proposing to introduce two optional mechanisms to the current process for consenting NSIPs – subject to detailed design and the passage of underpinning legislation – which would allow for proportionate protection from judicial review:
a. a parliamentary authorisation mechanism, which would be intended to provide the greatest degree of legal certainty for a narrow category of the most critical energy projects identified on a case-by-case basis by the Energy Secretary, and where Members of Parliament then judged this appropriate; and
b. a challenge window mechanism, which would allow Secretaries of State to respond in a more agile fashion to potential issues before finalising a planning consent, and limit the ability to raise other issues after the final consent was published.”
Under that first proposal, the House of Commons would be able to confirm the Energy Secretary’s determination that a particular energy project be designated as of “Critical National Importance”. “The normal process for submission and examination of the Development Consent Order (DCO) would then continue – but with the final decision put before the House of Commons again at the end of the process, and a further vote held. If approved, the DCO would be afforded a distinct statutory status specified in the underpinning legislation, akin to an Act of Parliament. As a result, the DCO would be protected from judicial review on issues other than human rights grounds.”
Under that second proposal, the “relevant Secretary of State would publish their draft decision, and as now a fixed window would then open during which any judicial reviews must be lodged. The Secretary of State would then have a period in which they could consider and address these issues before amending a final DCO. As a consequence, where any judicial reviews on the same grounds were subsequently pursued, the courts would have a clearer basis to refuse permission or relief – making use of the provisions already introduced via the Planning and Infrastructure Act on meritless claims. The law would also be changed such that the courts would refuse permission for a judicial review to proceed on any issues not brought up during the consent process or challenge window.“
These changes will not be quick: “The Government recognises these are significant reforms raising important legal, constitutional and practical questions, and will be engaging openly with the judiciary, developers, investors, legal practitioners, local authorities, and affected communities as the policy is developed and implemented.
We will set out further detail ahead of the necessary underpinning legislation being introduced.”
I suspect that what most of us are particularly interested to see is the extent to which recent and proposed changes may herald changes to judicial procedure in relation to planning decision-making more generally, outside the rarefied area of NSIPs. I have thought for a long time that in the case of decisions in relation to large development projects (where the actual permission may in practice only be issued months after resolution to grant), the system could be improved by treating the resolution to grant as triggering an initial deadline either for judicial review, or at least for service of a full pre-action letter, such that potential claimants would no longer have the ability to keep their powder dry until the planning permission has been finally issued and it is too late for the decision maker to remedy any potential issues of contention.
What is the appropriate balance to be arrived at as between, on the one hand, appropriate restraints on public bodies from acting unlawfully and, on the other hand, minimising unnecessary delays to administrative processes (whatever they may be) through ultimately unmeritorious legal arguments? Many of us could stay up all night arguing about that, for sure.
Simon Ricketts, 31 May 2026
Personal views, et cetera
