This Week’s Big News: Supreme Court, Village Greens & The Statutory Incompatibility Test

You will remember the Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling that our Prime Minister had acted unlawfully in advising the Queen in August 2019 that Parliament should be prorogued?

Last week, in R (Lancashire County Council) v Secretary of State

R (NHS Property Services Ltd) v Surrey County Council and another (Supreme Court, 11.12.19), five Supreme Court justices were faced with a rather more difficult issue, where a unanimous ruling could not be achieved.

The principal issue was “the circumstances in which the concept of “statutory incompatibility” will defeat an application to register land as a town or village green where the land is held by a public authority for statutory purposes.”

It’s an important question, given the frequency with situations arise where land owned by public bodies may end up being used by local people for many years “as of right”. It is also somewhat of a legal conundrum due to the apparent inconsistency between the rights given by the Commons Act 2006 and the statutory regimes under which public bodies hold land for public purposes.

In R (Newhaven Port & Properties Ltd) v East Sussex County Council [2015] UKSC 7; [2015] AC 1547 (“Newhaven”) [the Supreme Court] held that the duty under section 15 of the Commons Act 2006 did not extend to an area held under the specific statutes relating to the Newhaven Harbour. We are asked to decide whether the same principle applies to land held by statutory authorities under more general statutes, relating respectively (in these two cases) to education and health services.”

The facts are summarised in my 5 May 2018 blog post We Are The Village Green Preservation Society, which covered the Court of Appeal’s decision to uphold registration. The Court of Appeal had distinguished the Newhaven case, holding as follows:

⁃ in relation to the land held by Lancashire County Council for educational purposes, that by “contrast with Newhaven Port & Properties, there were no ‘specific’ statutory purposes or provisions attaching to this particular land. Parliament had not conferred on the county council, as local education authority, powers to use this particular land for specific statutory purposes with which its registration as a town or village green would be incompatible.”

⁃ in relation to the land owned by NHS Property Services in Surrey, “the circumstances did not correspond to those of Newhaven Port & Properties. The land was not being used for any ‘defined statutory purposes’ with which registration would be incompatible. No statutory purpose relating specifically to this particular land would be frustrated. The ownership of the land by NHS Property Services, and the existence of statutory powers that could be used for the purposes of developing the land in the future, was not enough to create a ‘statutory incompatibility’. The clinical commissioning group would still be able to carry out its statutory functions in the provision of hospital and other accommodation and the various services and facilities within the scope of its statutory responsibilities if the public had the right to use the land at Leach Grove Wood for recreational purposes, even if the land itself could not then be put to use for the purposes of any of the relevant statutory functions. None of those general statutory functions were required to be performed on this land. And again, it is possible to go somewhat further than that. Although the registration of the land as a village green would preclude its being developed by the construction of a hospital or an extension to the existing hospital, or as a clinic or administrative building, or as a car park, and even though the relevant legislation did not include a power or duty to provide facilities for recreation, there would be nothing inconsistent – either in principle or in practice – between the land being registered as a green and its being kept open and undeveloped and maintained as part of the Leatherhead Hospital site, whether or not with access to it by staff, patients or visitors. This would not prevent or interfere with the performance of any of the relevant statutory functions. But in any event, as in the Lancaster case, the two statutory regimes were not inherently in conflict with each other. There was no ‘statutory incompatibility’.”

The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s ruling by a majority. In the majority judgment of Lord Carnwath and Lord Sales (with which Lady Black also agreed) it was held that the “test as stated is not whether the land has been allocated by statute itself for particular statutory purposes, but whether it has been acquired for such purposes (compulsorily or by agreement) and is for the time-being so held.”

Acquisition of land by a statutory undertaker by voluntary agreement will typically be by the exercise of general powers conferred by statute on such an undertaker, where the land is thereafter held pursuant to such powers rather than under specific statutory provisions framed by reference to the land itself (as happened to be a feature of the provisions which were applicable in Newhaven itself). That is also true of land acquired by exercise of powers of compulsory purchase. In relation to the latter type of case, the majority said in terms that “the 2006 Act does not enable the public to acquire by user rights which are incompatible with the continuing use of the land for those statutory purposes” (para 93). On our reading of the majority judgment, it is clear that in relation to both types of case Lord Neuberger and Lord Hodge took the view that an incompatibility between general statutory powers under which land is held by a statutory undertaker (or, we would add, a public authority with powers defined by statute) and the use of such land as a town or village green excludes the operation of the 2006 Act.

We do not find the construction of the 2006 Act as identified by the wider reasoning of the majority in Newhaven surprising. It would be a strong thing to find that Parliament intended to allow use of land held by a public authority for good public purposes defined in statute to be stymied by the operation of a subsequent general statute such as the 2006 Act. There is no indication in that Act, or its predecessor, that it was intended to have such an effect.”

“In construing the 2006 Act it is also significant that it contains no provision pursuant to which a public authority can buy out rights of user of a town or village green arising under that Act in relation to land which it itself owns…Again, it would be surprising if Parliament had intended to create the possibility that the 2006 Act should in this way be capable of frustrating important public interests expressed in the statutory powers under which land is held by a public authority, when nothing was said about that in the 2006 Act.”

The three justices stressed that what matters is the statutory powers for which the land is held, not how the public body may be using, or proposing to use, the land.

Lady Arden dissented from the majority judgment on that last issue (whilst shreeing that the appeals be allowed); in her view it “must be shown that the land is in fact also being used pursuant to those powers, or that it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used pursuant to those powers, in a manner inconsistent with the public’s rights on registration as a TVG.”

Lord Wilson dissented from the majority judgment more widely and would have dismissed the appeals:

It is agreed that, in their capacity as education authorities, local authorities, such as the appellant in the Lancashire case, can hold land only for specified statutory purposes referable to education; that health authorities, such as the appellant in the Surrey case, can hold land only for specified statutory purposes referable to health; and that, for example, in their capacity as housing authorities, local authorities can hold land only for specified statutory purposes referable to housing.

If public authorities which hold land for specified statutory purposes are to be immune from any registration of it as a green which would be theoretically incompatible with their purposes, the reach of section 15 of the Commons Act 2006 Act is substantially reduced. One would expect that, had such been its intention, Parliament would have so provided within the section. In the absence of any such provision, whence does justification for it come?

He disagreed with Lord Carnwath and Lord Sales that “incompatibility with statutory purposes should be assessed as a theoretical exercise rather than by means of a practical inquiry into interference with the authority’s existing or proposed future use of the land.

Adopting what I believe to be the correct, practical, approach to the assessment of incompatibility in relation to the present appeals, I agree with the Court of Appeal that neither the education authority nor the health authority has established that public use of its land as a registered green would be likely to be incompatible with its use of it pursuant to its statutory powers. In the Lancashire case the Inspector conducted the requisite practical assessment, which led her to reject the alleged incompatibility; and, like the Court of Appeal, Ouseley J in the Administrative Court found no fault with her reasoning. I discern no ground upon which this court might have concluded otherwise. In the Surrey case the Inspector, while recommending refusal of the application for a different reason later shown to be invalid, also rejected the alleged incompatibility on apparently practical grounds; and the error of law which Gilbart J in the Administrative Court perceived him to have made in assessing it practically rather than as a matter of statutory construction was in my view correctly held by the Court of Appeal to have been no error at all.

It was with complete passivity that, for no less than 20 years, these two public authorities contemplated the recreational use of their land on the part of the public. Their simple erection at some stage during that period of signs permitting (or for that matter prohibiting) public use would have prevented such use of the land being as of right: Winterburn v Bennett [2016] EWCA Civ 482, [2017] 1 WLR 646. In such circumstances it is hardly surprising that they both failed to establish its practical incompatibility with their own proposed use of it.”

Concluding remarks

The judgment gives public bodies a much stronger basis to resist application for registration of land which they hold in pursuance of statutory functions. Will we now indeed see applications to de-register village greens? Part of the reason for this legislative and judicial mess is because, as identified early on in the majority judgment, “there is no indication that the concept of a modern green, as it has been developed by the courts, was part of the original thinking under the Commons Registration Act 1965” – it was assumed that the 1965 Act was to be read as requiring 20 years’ use as a village green before the passing of that Act, rather than a period of 20 years back from the date of the application, but this was not how the test came to be interpreted by the courts and the opportunity was not taken to clarify the position when the Bill that led to the Commons Act 2006 passed through Parliament.

Applications for village green registration are a powerful weapon, often used with the purpose of opposing development, and a successful application will inevitably have that effect. The scope for such applications was much reduced by the introduction of a series of disqualifying “trigger events” in the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 and this Supreme Court ruling will serve to reduce their scope further.

Simon Ricketts, 14 December 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Unsuccessful Attacks On Guildford & Waverley Local Plans

Two recent salutary lessons from Surrey for campaigners tempted to resort to the courts, having failed to persuade the relevant local plan inspector.

Guildford local plan

In Compton Parish Council v Guildford Borough Council (Sir Duncan Ouseley, 4 December 2019), three separate claimants, Compton Parish Council, a Mr Julian Cranwell and Ockham Parish Council, “opposed the principle and extent of land which the submitted Plan proposed to release from the Green Belt, as well as the allocation for development of specific sites proposed for release from the Green Belt.

The main general issue (numbered 2 in the list used by the parties) was whether the Inspector had erred in law in his approach to what constituted the “exceptional circumstances” required for the redrawing of Green Belt boundaries on a local plan review. This had a number of aspects, including whether he had treated the normal as exceptional, and had failed to consider rationally, or with adequate reasons, why Green Belt boundaries should be redrawn so as to allow for some 4000 more houses to be built than Guildford BC objectively needed. The scale of the buffer did not result, it was said, from any consideration of why a buffer of such a scale was required but was simply the sum of the site capacities of the previously allocated sites. There were two other general issues (1) and (7): (1) had the Inspector considered lawfully or provided adequate reasoning for not reducing the housing requirement, leaving some needs unmet to reflect the Green Belt policy constraints faced by Guildford BC? (7) Did Guildford BC breach the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004 SI No.1633, in deciding not to reconsider what might be reasonable alternatives to the proposed Plan when, in 2018, the objectively assessed housing needs figure was reduced from 12,426 to 10,678, with housing land supply allocations totalling 14,602. It was submitted that it ought to have considered alternatives such as removing the development allocation in the Green Belt from one or more of the contentious large sites.”

But there were also site specific grounds of challenge. The first site specific issue, (4), relating to the former Wisley airfield, was the adequacy of reasons given by the Inspector in his report on the PE for reaching conclusions which, it was said, were inconsistent with the views expressed by an Inspector, accepted by the Secretary of State, on an appeal against the refusal of planning permission for a major residential development at the former Wisley airfield, taking up most of the Local Plan allocation there. The appeal Inquiry began before the PE and the decision emerged in the course of the PE. The second site specific issue at Wisley, (5a), concerned the extent of land removed from the Green Belt yet not allocated for development, termed “white land”; issue (5b) concerned the lawfulness and effect of the submission of the 2017 version of the Plan, when the further consultation on it was restricted to the 2017 changes, and did not encompass unchanged aspects of the 2016 version, upon which there had already been consultation in 2016. The third issue, (8), concerned the lawfulness of the approach by the Inspector to the air quality impact of the Wisley allocation on the Thames Basin Heaths Special Protection Area, the SPA. It was initially said that the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017 SI No.2012 required the decision-maker to leave mitigation and avoidance measures out of account; but the argument was refined so that it attacked the assessment that there would be no adverse effects, on the basis that there would still be exceedances of critical thresholds, even though the baseline levels of pollution would have reduced.

The site-specific issues raised in respect of the Blackwell Farm allocation were, (3), that the local exceptional circumstances relied on by the Inspector were not legally capable of being regarded as “exceptional”, and that strategic and local “exceptional circumstances” overlapped, leading to double counting of exceptional circumstances. The other issue at Blackwell Farm was, (6), whether the Inspector erred in law in the way he considered the new access road. This would have to climb the escarpment to link to the A31, and a section of which would pass through the part of the Surrey Hills Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, the AONB, which lay to the north of the A31. Should he have concluded that this would be “major development” in the AONB and so face a policy obstacle to its approval which could put the allocation at risk, or even prevent its being delivered? He should at least have taken this risk into account.”

After assessing the extent of local housing need the inspector concluded that there was “to strategic-level exceptional circumstances to alter the Green Belt boundary to meet development needs in the interests of the proper long-term planning of the Borough.

Some highlights:

Issue 1: did the Inspector consider and provide legally adequate reasons for his conclusion that the objectively assessed need for 10678 dwellings should be met in full, notwithstanding the consequent need for the release of land from the Green Belt?

There is no definition of the policy concept of “exceptional circumstances”. This itself is a deliberate policy decision, demonstrating that there is a planning judgment to be made in all the circumstances of any particular case; Calverton Parish Council v Nottingham City Council [2015] EWHC 1078 at [20], Jay J. It is deliberately broad, and not susceptible to dictionary definition.”

“”Exceptional circumstances” is a less demanding test than the development control test for permitting inappropriate development in the Green Belt, which requires “very special circumstances.” That difference is clear enough from the language itself and the different contexts in which they appear, but if authority were necessary, it can be found in R(Luton BC) v Central Bedfordshire Council [2015] EWCA Civ 537 at [56], Sales LJ. As Patterson J pointed out in IM Properties Development Ltd v Lichfield DC [2014] EWHC 2240 at [90-91 and 95-96], there is no requirement that Green Belt land be released as a last resort, nor was it necessary to show that assumptions upon which the Green Belt boundary had been drawn, had been falsified by subsequent events.”

“Mr Kimblin put forward Mr Cranwell’s contention that the supply of land for ordinary housing, even with the combination of circumstances found here to constitute exceptional circumstances by the Inspector, could not in law amount to “exceptional circumstances.” I cannot accept that, and I regard it as obviously wrong.”

“The Inspector has already considered the pressing needs, and the consequence of them not being met. Here he considers whether the consequence of those needs being met, through releases of Green Belt land, mean that they should nonetheless not be met. His conclusion is clear: there is no justification for applying a restriction on the quantity of development. His reasoning is clear and adequate: land can be found within the Green Belt, through boundary changes, with relatively limited impacts on openness, elaborated elsewhere in the Report, and without causing severe or widespread harm to its purposes. He also considered whether further land could be made available in the urban areas; IR 81-2; these had been thoroughly investigated; significant constraints existed; any extra yield from sites which could have potential not yet earmarked, “would fall a long way short of making the scale of contribution towards meeting overall development needs that would enable the allocated sites in the Green Belt to be taken out of the Plan.”

“I reject the Claimants’ first ground of challenge. This issue and whether a policy restraint should be applied to the OAN was considered and the Inspector’s conclusion that there should be no restraint below OAN was supported by ample reasoning.”

“Issue 2: Was the conclusion that there were exceptional circumstances justifying the allocations of housing land, released from the Green Belt, to provide headroom of over 4000 dwellings above the 10678 OAN lawful, and adequately reasoned?”

“…in my judgment, once meeting the OAN is accepted as a strategic level factor contributing to “exceptional circumstances”, as it has to be for the purpose of this Issue in the light of my conclusions on Issue 1, it follows that the provision of headroom against slippage and for flexibility to meet changes, “future-proofing” the Plan, as the Inspector put it, would also contribute to such circumstances.”

“...having read the strategic and Local-level exceptional circumstances, which have to be taken together, I had no sense of having read something illogical or irrational, or which strained the true meaning of “exceptional circumstances.” I can see that a different approach to the quantity of headroom might have commended itself, but that was plainly a matter of planning judgment.”

Issue 7 Sustainability Appraisal”

“The Claimants contended, through Mr Harwood, that once the OAN was reduced from 12426 to 10678 as a result of the publication in September 2018 of the 2016 household projections, there should have been a further SA examining reasonable alternatives which matched allocations to the OAN figure of 10678, with the Wisley airfield allocation in mind in particular however.”

“I cannot accept these arguments. No complaint is made of the SA process before the effect of the 2016 household projections was considered. First, the objectives of the Plan had not changed; the objective was not the provision of 10,678 dwellings; it was not simply the provision of the OAN plus an appropriate buffer. I have set out how the objective was phrased in the earlier versions of the SA. An updated SA, confining itself to the provision of 10,678 dwellings, omitting any buffer, would not have been a reasonable alternative, as previous SAs concluded, and would have been for an objective other than that of the Plan.

The judgment that an OAN without any buffer was not a reasonable alternative, was a reasonable judgment for Guildford BC to make. It could only be attacked on rationality grounds; see Spurrier and Others v Secretary of State for Transport and Others [2019] EWHC 1070 (Admin) at [434]. That would be untenable.

Second, whether the effective increase in the headroom or buffer, but without change to the level of housing allocation, was a significant change or one likely to have significant effects was a matter for the judgment of Guildford BC, as the decision-maker. It is clear that the overall level of housing supply was within the range already considered. All the housing allocations had already been evaluated. The judgment that the change was not significant or likely to have significant effects which had not already been considered, was reasonable.

Third, the only point in considering further alternatives would have been whether one or two large sites should be removed from the allocations. The smaller, sequentially less preferable Green Belt releases around villages, totalling 945 dwellings, could not have been omitted from any reduced buffer because of their importance in meeting the five-year housing supply in the early years of the Plan after adoption. Guildford BC and the Inspector did in fact consider whether the increased level of buffer in the same total supply, with a reduced OAN, was appropriate. They each concluded that it was, and that no large Green Belt site allocation should be now omitted. The arguments for deleting one or more of the 3 large sites were raised; indeed there was an obvious issue about whether that would be an appropriate response. Guildford BC and the Inspector considered it. Guildford BC was entitled to conclude that a further round of SA was quite unnecessary. The Inspector agreed, in his Report. There was no misdirection as to the law; it was for Guildford BC to judge whether there had been a change in circumstances or in the plan which warranted a further SA. This judgment can only be challenged on public law grounds; the only one available would be irrationality. There was no irrationality in the decision.”

Even if there had been an error, and assuming that the omission of one or two of the large sites would have been a reasonable alternative to consider, it is perfectly obvious that the allocations in the adopted plan would have been the preferred choice. That issue was considered by both Guildford BC and by the Inspector. Omission of a further SA would have been a procedural error causing no prejudice, let alone substantial prejudice to anyone. Even if one going to vires, I would have exercised my residual discretion to take no action, given that it is perfectly obvious that it could have had not the slightest effect on the outcome of the Plan.”

“Issue 4: the Wisley airfield appeal decision and the way in which the Inspector dealt with it.”

“I do not consider that it was necessary for the LP Inspector to take the AIR and analyse all its views against his views on the various topics. There is perhaps a difference in emphasis in the LP IR comments on the Green Belt releases in general “relatively limited impacts on openness” and their not causing “severe or widespread harm”, and the AIR comment that there would be “very considerable harm” to the Green Belt from the Wisley allocation. However, as IR 182 makes clear, on a comparative basis, the Wisley site was of medium sensitivity. Its development would avoid putting pressure on other Green Belt areas of greater sensitivity. This comparative exercise, underpinned by the Green Belt and Countryside Study, was not a task which the appeal Inspector could undertake or attempted to undertake; but was essential for the LP Inspector. The same applies to the assessment of the degree of visual prominence: the LP IR comments on the allocation as “fairly self-contained visually,” being on a plateau and not prominent, whereas the AIR thought it visible along its length to highly sensitive receptors, though quite well screened in certain respects. But the sites they consider differed in an important respect and with an adverse effect for the appeal scheme. It is obvious from the AIR that the narrowness of the appeal site exacerbated the prominence of the appeal development. The LP Inspector also considered that specific design objectives, should be in the Plan, via a Main Modification, Policy A35.The effect on the character of the area is referred to in IR 181, but is a factor outweighed by the compelling strategic-level exceptional circumstances. The LP Inspector obviously considered the appeal decision, but found the circumstances he had to deal with, compelling.”

“Accordingly, I reject the contention that it is not possible to see why the LP Inspector reached the conclusion he did, having considered, as he obviously did, what the AIR and Secretary of State had to say. In the circumstances known to all participants about the differing tasks, the reasons are sufficient. There was no need to identify, issue by issue, where the LP Inspector did or did not, to some degree, agree or disagree with the appeal Inspector. Such differences as there may be are explained by the different focus of their tasks and the different cases they were considering.”

Issue 8: The air quality impact of the allocation at the former Wisley airfield”

“It is perfectly clear, in my judgment, that Guildford BC, whose task it was to undertake the HRA, did consider whether significant adverse effects were likely from the development proposed in the Local Plan; it then undertook an appropriate assessment to see whether there would be no adverse effect on the SPA. That could not be answered, one way or the other, by simply considering whether there were exceedances of critical loads or levels, albeit rather lower than currently. What was required was an assessment of the significance of the exceedances for the SPA birds and their habitats. Guildford BC did not just treat reductions in the baseline emissions or the fact that with Plan development, emissions would still be much lower than at present, as showing that there would be no adverse effect from the Plan development. The absence of adverse effect was established by reference to where the exceedances of NOx and nitrogen deposition would occur, albeit reduced, and a survey based understanding of how significant those areas were for foraging and nesting by the SPA birds. The approach and conclusion show no error by reference to the Regulations or CJEU jurisprudence. I have set out the 2019 HRAs at some length. The judgment is one for the decision-maker, as to whether it is satisfied that the plan would not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned; the assessment must be appropriate to the task. Its conclusions had to be based on “complete precise and definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt as to the effect of the proposed works on the protected site concerned”; People Over Wind. But absolute certainty that there would be no adverse effects was not required; a competent authority could be certain that there would be no adverse effects even though, objectively, absolute certainty was not proved; R (Champion) v North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52 at [41], and Smyth v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 174 at [78]. The same approach applies, following the Dutch Nitrogen case, to taking account of the expected benefits of measures not directly related to the plan being appropriately assessed.”

Issue 6: The access road at Blackwell Farm and major development in the AONB

“The issue before me was whether the Inspector reached a conclusion on whether the access road was “major development” in the AONB, to which NPPF [116] applied; a contrary conclusion was said to be irrational. If he had reached no conclusion, he ought to have considered the risk to the allocation, and hence to its deliverability, which would arise when a planning application was made, and a decision could be reached that it was indeed “major development”, with all the weight, adverse to the development, which would have to be given to such a conclusion.”

“I can see the force in the argument from Mr Findlay and Mr Turney that the Inspector has in substance concluded that, with the Main Modifications, the means have been provided for the access road to be constructed in such a way that it would not constitute “major development.” However, he has not expressly so concluded, and it would not have been for him to express the decisive view on the point, or to do so in advance of the detailed design of the road. He has reached the view that the road would not inevitably be “major development”, and that it could be designed and landscaped so that the risk of a significant hurdle to the delivery of the allocation is minimised. I do not consider that he needed to go further. In effect, the degree of risk, with the modification, was not such that it made him find the allocation to be unsound. He considered the issue; his language makes his view clear that he sees no significant risk, and is adequately reasoned.

But it cannot be ignored that he has included an extent of headroom, complained of by the Claimants, in part because he recognised the difficulties which larger sites face. This issue was not expressly part of his consideration of the justification for the headroom, but hurdles and delays in the way of approving infrastructure would have been well within his contemplation of the sort of problems which larger sites face.”

Three days in court, eleven barristers, all claims rejected.

Waverley local plan

In CPRE Surrey v Waverley Borough Council (Court of Appeal, 31 October 2019) CPRE Surrey and POW Campaign were appealing against the dismissal of their applications at first instance which had sought to challenge the adoption of the Waverley local plan. They contended that “the council erred in law in adopting the Local Plan Part 1 because the inspector who carried out the examination of it under section 20, when identifying the objectively assessed need (“OAN”) for housing in the borough of Waverley, took an unlawful approach to the treatment of the unmet housing need in the neighbouring borough of Woking. CPRE Surrey also complain that the relevant reasons in the inspector’s report were inadequate. The crucial point, common to both appeals, concerns the inspector’s recommended Main Modification 3, which the council accepted, whose effect was to increase the annual housing requirement figure in Waverley by 83 dwellings per annum – 1,575 dwellings over the whole plan period – to address unmet housing need in Woking.

There were four issues: “first, whether the inspector’s approach to the assessment of unmet housing need in Woking was unlawful and his conclusion unreasonable; second, whether his assessment was vitiated by a failure to seek further information; third, whether he was obliged to recommend a review of the Local Plan Part 1; and fourth, whether his reasons were inadequate”.

At paragraph 35 of his judgment Lindblom LJ sets out the principles applying where there is a challenge to a planning decision-maker’s assessment of housing need, by reference to the relevant case law.

He addresses the claimants’ arguments that the inspector had adopted an incorrect approach in failing to assess Woking’s objectively assessed need before deciding to increase Waverley’s housing requirement figure:

“I cannot accept those submissions, skilfully presented as they were. The fatal weakness in such arguments is that they draw the court beyond the line dividing the role of the judge from the role of the planning decision-maker – territory where the court will not intrude. In my view the judge’s analysis is consistent with the general principles recognized and applied in the authorities. As she held, the inspector’s approach to the issue of unmet housing need in Woking was lawful, and his conclusion did not exceed the range of reasonable planning judgment.”

“In the circumstances he was entitled to conclude, as a matter of planning judgment, that it was reasonable to calculate the necessary uplift to Waverley’s OAN by taking 50% of “the figure for unmet need identified through the [2015 SHMA] process”. This conclusion entailed not merely his judgment on the appropriate proportion, but, in effect, a composite judgment on both amount and proportion: hence the figure of 83 dwellings per annum. Another inspector might have reached a different conclusion on the same evidence, but this does not mean that the conclusion he did reach was legally bad. The conclusion that the appropriate proportion was 50% – rather than, say, 60% or 70% or 75% – was comfortably within the bounds of reasonable planning judgment. In judging this to be the appropriate proportion, the inspector took care not to overstate the amount of Woking’s unmet need that should be met in Waverley. This was a cautious judgment, which deliberately allowed for the uncertainties to which he had referred. The ingredients of the calculation itself were clear. They had been identified at the examination, and were explained in the inspector’s conclusions (paragraphs 26 and 29 and footnote 9). And the figure it produced was specific enough for its purpose. It was not unreasonably approximate.”

As for the attack on the adequacy of his reasons:

Generally at least, the reasons provided in an inspector’s report on the examination of a local plan may well satisfy the required standard if they are more succinctly expressed than the reasons in the report or decision letter of an inspector in a section 78 appeal against the refusal of planning permission. As Mr Beglan submitted, it is not likely that an inspector conducting a local plan examination will have to set out the evidence given by every participant if he is to convey to the “knowledgeable audience” for his report a clear enough understanding of how he has decided the main issues before him.

But the crucial point here is that the inspector explained sufficiently why he had concluded that 50% of Woking’s unmet housing need should be planned for in the Local Plan Part 1. His reasons leave no room for sensible doubt on that issue. He did not have to set out the representations in which various possible conclusions – a wide range of them – were put forward, or summarize the relevant evidence. Participants in the process were familiar with the submissions and evidence. The inspector’s reasons had only to set out the main parts of his assessment and the essential planning judgments in it. They did that.”

That reasoning is clear, adequate and intelligible. Nothing that ought to be there is left out. Nothing is obscure. The appellants disagree with the outcome of the inspector’s assessment. But they cannot say that the reasons he gave in those four paragraphs of his report left them unable to see why he concluded as he did.

Simon Ricketts, 6 December 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Image courtesy of Surrey Life

Can’t Buy A Thrill: Evenings In High Streets

We’re hosting a workshop for London First this week, as part of its London’s Transforming High Streets programme.

Usual mistake of agreeing to say a few words and then reading what it’s about:

The aim of the workshop is to bring together London First members and stakeholders to investigate the barriers to town centre transformation thrown up by the licensing system, and whether there is a disconnect between the places envisioned by the planning system and the permissions given to operators through licensing. Too often we hear examples of businesses trying to create the kind of vibrant live-work-eat-play, 24h places that consumers increasingly demand, only to be actively shut down through licensing. Or developers berated for not incorporating bold design into their regeneration plans, knowing full well the suggested outdoor spaces would never get permission to be used for anything mildly interesting. Are there good examples of where licensing is actively enabling change and growth, and how can we make sure this becomes standard practice to support our a fast-changing retail and hospitality sector?

This is all close to my heart. Opportunities for socialising and cultural activity, theatres, live music, all make London what it is. I walked through the latest phase of Argent’s Kings Cross development last night, the area already buzzing with people enjoying the spaces and venues. And, whilst some change is always inevitable, even more important are London’s existing pubs and venues, under threat by any combination of the five Rs: rents, rates, regulation, residents and redevelopment.

But I realised how much a planning lawyer like me operates in a professional silo, trained to think of the statutory regimes for alcohol and entertainment licensing, just like Building Regulations, as “not planning law”.

Which is a bit odd.

If town and city centres are to retain their central economic and social role they have to be about more than working and shopping. And that needs legislation and policy to be focused on common objectives.

See this BBC piece The growing importance of the night-time economy (17 November 2019). The “live music” sector alone made a contribution of £1.1 billion to the UK economy in 2018, according to UK Music’s Music By Numbers 2019 (20 November 2019).

I can only talk first hand about London.

When becoming London Mayor in May 2016, one of Sadiq Khan’s early steps was to appoint Amy Lamé as London’s “night czar”. Aside from presenting her excellent Sunday afternoon BBC6 Music show (at a time when even I am still awake), she has played an active role in encouraging all aspects of London’s night time economy and the Mayor has made steady progress, including on TfL’s important night tube strategy. Could more have been done? I would be interested to hear views.

As announced in the Mayor’s 31 January 2019 press release London’s night-time economy can help save the high street, London’s Night Time Commission published its report Think Night: London’s Neighbourhoods from 6pm to 6 am with its ten recommendations:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The Mayor should put the night at the heart of London policy- making. He should introduce a Night Test for all new policies to rate their impact on London’s culture, sociability, wellbeing and economy at night.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The Mayor should produce Night Time Guidance for boroughs. This will help them develop holistic Night Time Strategies that go beyond the night time economy and cover all aspect of their town centres and other areas between 6pm and 6am.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The Mayor should set up a London Night Time Data Observatory. This central hub of data on the economy, transport, licensing, infrastructure, safety and health would help boroughs create their Night Time Strategies and inform local decision making

RECOMMENDATION 4: The Mayor should publish an annual report on London at Night. It should include a series of night time metrics that show his progress in implementing the Night Time Commission’s recommendations and achieving the ambitions of his 24-Hour City Vision

RECOMMENDATION 5: The Mayor should establish a Night Time Enterprise Zone fund that boroughs can bid into, starting with a Pathfinder Zone in 2020

RECOMMENDATION 6: The Mayor should carry out research to establish the case for longer opening hours across London

RECOMMENDATION 7: The Mayor, should help establish new partnerships across the capital to improve safety, reduce violence and make London welcoming for everyone at night

RECOMMENDATION 8: The Mayor should develop guidance to help boroughs, landowners and developers create welcoming, safe and vibrant public spaces at night

RECOMMENDATION 9: The Mayor should set up a Late Night Transport Working Group to ensure that workers, visitors and customers can get around London quickly and safely at night. The group should consider extending night services, introducing a ‘Night Rider’ fare that allows workers to move between bus, tube, train, DLR or tram in a single fare, and encourage more use of TfL’s land and buildings at night

RECOMMENDATION 10: The Mayor should extend the remit of London & Partners so that they can promote London’s night time offer to Londoners

The Mayor’s responses to the recommendations have included:

• The Night Czar convening a quarterly 24-hour London delivery group at City Hall to assess the impact of policies on London at night

• The Night Czar and Night Time Borough Champions Network working together to produce guidance for boroughs to develop night-time strategies

• Creating a Night Time Data Observatory to build a full picture of the capital at night

• Reporting progress on the Commission’s recommendations as part of the Mayor’s Annual Report

• Creating a Night Time Enterprise Zone pilot scheme to help a borough develop its night-time offer

• Conducting research into the benefits of longer opening hours across London

• Championing partnerships across the capital that support the night-time economy and investing in the creation of the Safer Sounds Partnership

• Including guidance on improving public spaces at night as part of the work to develop borough night-time strategies

• Establishing a Late-Night Transport Working Group to ensure transport meets the needs of London’s night workers

• Continuing to support London & Partners in their work to promote the capital’s 24-hour tourism offer

In June the Mayor launched a bidding process to select a pilot Night Time Enterprise Zone, as well as establishment of the Safer Sounds Partnership, led by the music industry and part of the Safer Business Network, aimed at developing better liaison between venue operators and event organisers with police and council licensing teams, together the night czar (see his 7 June 2019 press release).

On 10 September 2019, the Mayor announced that Walthamstow High Street had won the bidding process to be London’s first Night Time Enterprise Zone. According to the Mayor’s press release:

The pilot, which runs from October to January, will see Waltham Forest try out a range of proposals for the high street, including:

 

•          Offering entrepreneurs low-cost and flexible business spaces to hire in the evenings

•          Establishing a new fund to help business and community groups host events after 6pm

•          Running a ‘shop local late’ campaign

•          Hosting a ‘reclaim your high street event’ with activities for all ages

•          Creating a step-by-step guide for night-time businesses to help them apply for planning and licensing approval

•          Encouraging late shopping with a new evening map and events listings

•          Encouraging local people and night-time workers to have their say on how to make Walthamstow work better for them after 6pm.”

I would be interested to hear how all this going. There is relatively little on line – and no sign yet of the “step-by-step guide for night-time businesses to help them apply for planning and licensing approval”.

The draft London Plan has policy HC6 (“supporting the night-time economy”):

HC6

• Boroughs should develop a vision for the night-time economy, supporting its growth and diversification, in particular within strategic areas of night-time activity (see Table A1.1 and Figure 7.7), building on the Mayor’s Vision for London as a 24-Hour City.

• In Development Plans, town centre strategies and planning decisions, boroughs should:

1. promote the night-time economy, where appropriate, particularly in the Central Activities Zone, strategic areas of night-time activity, town centres, and where public transport such as the Night Tube and Night Buses are available

2. improve inclusive access and safety, and make the public realm welcoming for all night-time economy users and workers

3. diversify the range of night-time activities, including extending the opening hours of existing daytime facilities such as shops, cafés, libraries, galleries and museums

4. address the cumulative impact of high concentrations of licensed premises and their impact on anti-social behaviour, noise pollution, health and wellbeing and other impacts for residents, and seek ways to diversify and manage these areas

5. ensure night-time economy venues are well-served with safe and convenient night-time transport

6. protect and support evening and night-time cultural venues such as pubs, night clubs, theatres, cinemas and music and other arts venues.

• Promoting management of the night-time economy through an integrated approach to planning and licensing, out-of-hours servicing and deliveries, safety and security, and environmental and cleansing services should be supported. Boroughs should work closely with stakeholders such as the police, local businesses, patrons, workers and residents”

But how effective is this in the short-term, given how long it will take for the policy to be reflected on borough plans/licensing policies, and the various planning policies at all levels (national, London-wide and borough) that point in potentially conflicting directions?

I would be interested to hear how joined up, or not, boroughs’ planning and licensing strategies are, in practice, at present. Operating hours for a development will often for instance be set down in planning conditions, only for a different set of hours to be set out in the eventual premises licence – or detailed operating strategies required which should be the domain of the licensing process.

The formal procedures and statutory criteria to be applied are certainly very different.

The Home Office’s guide to alcohol licensing under the Licensing Act 2003 covers the three types of licence required, namely

“ •any business or other organisation that sells or supplies alcohol on a permanent basis needs to apply for a premises licence

• anyone who plans to sell or supply alcohol or authorise the sale or supply of alcohol must apply for a personal licence

• qualifying members’ clubs (such as the Royal British Legion, working men’s clubs and rugby clubs) need to apply for a club premises certificate if they plan to sell or supply alcohol

The DCMS guide to entertainment licensing, sets out the licensing process required, since the coming into force of the Live Music Act 2012, for:

• “anyone that provides any entertainment between 11PM and 8AM;

• anyone that provides amplified live or recorded music to an audience of more than 500 people;

• anyone that provides recorded music to an audience on premises not licensed for the sale or supply of alcohol;

• anyone that puts on a performance of a play or a dance to an audience of more than 500 people, or an indoor sporting event to more than 1,000 spectators

• anyone that puts on boxing or wrestling

• anyone that screens a film to an audience

The Home Office has published guidance (April 2018) as to how licensing authorities are to discharge their functions.

There are four licensing objectives:

• The prevention of crime and disorder;

• Public safety;

• The prevention of public nuisance; and

• The protection of children from harm.

The guidance goes on to explain that “the legislation also supports a number of other key aims and purposes. These are vitally important and should be principal aims for everyone involved in licensing work. They include:

• protecting the public and local residents from crime, anti-social behaviour and noise nuisance caused by irresponsible licensed premises;

• giving the police and licensing authorities the powers they need to effectively manage and police the night-time economy and take action against those premises that are causing problems;

• recognising the important role which pubs and other licensed premises play in our local communities by minimising the regulatory burden on business, encouraging innovation and supporting responsible premises;

• providing a regulatory framework for alcohol which reflects the needs of local communities and empowers local authorities to make and enforce decisions about the most appropriate licensing strategies for their local area; and

• encouraging greater community involvement in licensing decisions and giving local residents the opportunity to have their say regarding licensing decisions that may affect them.“

Each licensing authority must publish a statement of its licensing policy at least every five years. Here, by way of example, is Camden’s statement of licensing policy 2017 – 2022, with much detail as to its expectations of operators, examples of licensing conditions for different kinds of venues and framework hours. How many of us, or our clients, get involved in this process?

Licensing applications are publicised and consultations take place with the police and other bodies. Contested applications are likely to go to a hearing before a licensing sub-committee, with appeals heard by the Magistrates’ Court.

A practitioner recently explained to me some of the differences that he sees. For instance:

⁃ a premises licence is automatically granted where there are no objections. Imagine the planning system working like that!

⁃ the grant of a premises licence is a material consideration in the determination of a planning application, but not vice versa.

⁃ there is a greater focus at premises licence hearings on evidence of actual, rather than potential, impact.

⁃ There is ongoing regulatory control as to a premises licence – not a once and for all event in the way that the grant of planning permission is.

⁃ Licensed premises form only a small part of planning officers’ workload (especially outside central London) and there can be little knowledge of the detailed ways in which the licensing regime works, often leading to a “belt and braces” approach.

Fair points?

A House of Lords Select Committee considered the operation of the 2003 Act licensing regime in an April 2017 report.

One of the Select Committee’s main areas of focus was whether the licensing and planning regimes should be better integrated:

In our call for evidence we asked: “Should licensing policy and planning policy be integrated more closely to shape local areas and address the proliferation of licensed premises? How could it be done?” An overwhelming majority of respondents criticised the current lack of coordination between licensing and planning, and thought that there should be better integration. We were given numerous examples of the absurdities caused by the separation of the systems, especially for applicants for new premises which need permission for both planning and licensing, and for whom permission for one without the other is of no use.

This example given to us by the London Borough of Hounslow is just one illustration:

“One recent problem is a restaurant who built a structure in their garden without planning permission. Planning permission was subsequently applied for and refused. There was fierce opposition to the structure from local residents and in our view the concerns of the residents were valid. The owners have also applied for a premises licence which includes the structure. Planning could not object because the regimes are supposed to be separate and the licence was subsequently granted with restrictions. We now have a situation where the planning permission is refused and the licence is granted. Residents have commented on their confusion and the premises licence holder has received an approval and a refusal for the same structure from the same local authority.”

Their conclusion was: “The whole process is confusing for our residents and we would support a change in the position so that planning permission can be considered when determining licence applications.”

The Select Committee concluded:

If, as we think, it is not only permissible but logical to look at licensing as an extension of the planning process, it would have been sensible for the Licensing Act to transfer the powers of licensing justices to the planning committees of local authorities, rather than set up a new and untried system of licensing committees with a new and different procedure, new staffing, and a new appellate process. Instead the result has been that each local authority has been able to deal with all aspects of land use through a planning committee with the single exception of licensed premises, which require a separate committee and a separate mechanism. Now that the system has been in operation for 11 years, we believe that this can be seen to have been a mistake and a missed opportunity.

We recognise that a suggestion that licensing committees should be abolished and their work amalgamated with that of planning committees is a radical one. It is not a change which should be made without first being trialled over a small but representative sample of local authorities over perhaps two years.”

The Government pretty much rejected the recommendation out of hand in its August 2017 response:

“While the Government rejects some recommendations and conclusions, there are several recommendations which are a spur to further work, particularly in respect to how the system of licensing can be made to function more effectively and the lessons that can be learned from the planning system.”

We accept that improvements could be made in some local areas and that the synergies between planning and licensing should be part of an ongoing discussion about how we can support local improvements. Instead of transferring the functions of licensing committees to planning committees, we are focusing on improving training and providing stronger guidance on how licensing hearings should be conducted.

The basic structures of the planning and licensing system are similar and our focus will be on improving how the two regimes communicate and interact at local level. There is good practice in many local areas that we will disseminate and build on, for example whether there is additional support that local residents could be given to frame and present their concerns about a licensing application to the committee effectively.”

Will this separation hold firm? Is it sensible for statements of licensing policy to be prepared separately from local plans? Is it sensible for licensing and planning matters to be dealt with by different committees and sub-committees? Is this efficient and understandable both by potential users of the systems, by local authority officers and members, and by local residents? Is there another way of reconciling the desirability of encouraging the night-time economy with legitimate local concerns as to amenity?

You tell me.

Simon Ricketts, 30 November 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Detail from Port of London, Night by Maximilien Luce, 1894

Community Benefits: Supreme Court, Resilient

Examination question: Was the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wright v Resilient right or resilient?

The problem is a practical one, and frequently arising. If an applicant promises that it will provide specific benefits for a community if it secures planning permission, and the decision maker takes into account those promises in approving the application, is any subsequent planning permission unlawful?

This was the issue for the Supreme Court in R (Wright) v Resilient Energy Severndale Ltd & Forest of Dean District Council (Supreme Court, 20 November 2019).

I covered the Court of Appeal ruling and the issues more generally in my 2 June 2018 blog post Community Benefits.

It is a difficult tight rope for developers – in promoting an unwelcome scheme they may be facing suspicion or even anger from local residents, and may be quite prepared to make funds available so as to be “seen to be doing the right thing”, to be “good neighbours” or simply reduce the extent of objection. But is this likely to lead to the risk of legal challenge?

In Resilient, an application was made for planning permission for a wind turbine.

In its application for planning permission, Resilient Severndale proposed that the wind turbine would be erected and run by a community benefit society. The application included a promise that an annual donation would be made to a local community fund, based on 4% of the society’s turnover from the operation of the turbine over its projected life of 25 years (“the community fund donation”). In deciding to grant planning permission for the development the Council expressly took into account the community fund donation. The Council imposed a condition (“condition 28”) that the development be undertaken by a community benefit society with the community fund donation as part of the scheme.”

There would also be “the opportunity for individuals in the community to invest in the project by subscribing for shares in the proposed community benefit society, with estimated returns of 7% pa”.

There is Department of Energy and Climate Change best practice guidance from October 2014 in relation to “community benefits from onshore wind developments”, encouraging arrangements of this nature, albeit on a voluntary basis.

Mr Wright, an objector to the project, challenged the grant of planning permission on the grounds that the promised community fund donation was not a material planning consideration and the Council had acted unlawfully by taking it into account.

Lord Sales’ judgment follows the position of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in quashing the permission.

He takes a conventional route through the case law. To simplify:

“… the conditions imposed must be for a planning purpose and not for any ulterior one, and … they must fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted. Also they must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed them …” (Viscount Dilhorne in Newbury District Council v Secretary of State, House of Lords, 1981).

“…a planning purpose is one which relates to the character of the land”. (Lord Scarman in Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates plc (House of Lords, 1985).

Lord Sales:

A principled approach to identifying material considerations in line with the Newbury criteria is important both as a protection for landowners and as a protection for the public interest. It prevents a planning authority from extracting money or other benefits from a landowner as a condition for granting permission to develop its land, when such payment or the provision of such benefits has no sufficient connection with the proposed use of the land. It also prevents a developer from offering to make payments or provide benefits which have no sufficient connection with the proposed use of the land, as a way of buying a planning permission which it would be contrary to the public interest to grant according to the merits of the development itself.”

The question of whether something is a material consideration is a question of law. Lord Sales referred to the statement by Lord Hodge in Elsick Development Company Limited v Aberdeen City and Shire Strategic Development Planning Authority (Supreme Court, 25 October 2017): “The inclusion of a policy in the development plan, that the planning authority will seek … a planning obligation from developers [to contribute money for purposes unconnected with the use of the land], would not make relevant what otherwise would be irrelevant”. Lord Sales applied the same principle to the DECC guidance.

Lord Sales:

In the present case, the community benefits promised by Resilient Severndale did not satisfy the Newbury criteria and hence did not qualify as a material consideration within the meaning of that term in section 70(2) of the 1990 Act and section 38(6) of the 2004 Act. Dove J and the Court of Appeal were right so to hold. The benefits were not proposed as a means of pursuing any proper planning purpose, but for the ulterior purpose of providing general benefits to the community. Moreover, they did not fairly and reasonably relate to the development for which permission was sought. Resilient Severndale required planning permission for the carrying out of “development” of the land in question, as that term is defined in section 55(1) of the 1990 Act. The community benefits to be provided by Resilient Severndale did not affect the use of the land. Instead, they were proffered as a general inducement to the Council to grant planning permission and constituted a method of seeking to buy the permission sought, in breach of the principle that planning permission cannot be bought or sold.”

Judicially, that is the final word on the issue until such time as there is a change in legislation. I hold to the practical, but not risk-free, suggestions set out in my June 2018 blog post as to how community benefits may safely be provided.

However, in my slow brain, the position remains unsatisfactory. The Supreme Court pretty much slapped down the submission by Martin Kingston QC for Resilient Energy that the meaning of “material consideration” is always being updated in line with changing government policy. Why wasn’t he right? I have read the ruling a few times and don’t understand the distinction the court draws with the case law establishing that material considerations can include, for instance a requirement to provide affordable housing or a requirement that there should be local procurement. Similarly the submissions by Richard Kimblin QC for the Secretary of State (Richard has generously made public his skeleton argument via LinkedIn) that the court might “wish to restate and clarify the meaning of “for a planning purpose” (or, “in planning terms”) in a manner which is fitting to modern planning circumstances”.

The final point to bear in mind is that of course this case concerned whether the offer of the proposed community benefits package was a “material consideration” which the decision maker could lawfully take into account (and a subsidiary issue as the lawfulness of a planning condition that sought to require that package to be delivered). If the arrangement had been secured by way of section 106 planning obligation, that would have engaged the even tougher test set out in regulation 122(a) of the Community Infrastructure Regulations 2010 – that the obligation is “necessary to make the development acceptable in planning terms” (part of Mr Kimblin’s case was that the court should bring the common law Newbury test into line with the statutory regulation 122 test).

In my previous blog post I referred to what may be at least part of the solution to this uncertainty, section 155 (still not yet switched on) of the Housing and Planning Act 2016:

Finally, the way in which all of this to be reported to committee will be tidied up as and when section 155 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 is brought into force, in that “financial benefits information” will need to be included in officers’ reports, including “a list of any financial benefits (whether or not material to the application) which are local finance considerations or benefits of a prescribed description, and which appear to the person making the report to be likely to be obtained” by the authority or third parties within a description to be prescribed, as a result of the proposed development, together with “in relation to each listed financial benefit, a statement of the opinion of the person making the report as to whether the benefit is material to the application” as well as any other prescribed information about each listed financial benefit.”

Simon Ricketts, 23 November 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Planning Or Politics? Significant London Planning Decisions 2019

Here is the skeleton of a presentation I am giving at the RTPI London Annual Summit 2019 on 20 November 2019. You’ll have to come along for the flesh, as it were.

I just wanted to do a basic trawl of what has been happening over the past year in terms of:

• Mayoral directions to refuse

 

• Mayoral directions that he is to be the local planning authority

 

• Secretary of State call-in decisions

 

• Secretary of State decisions on recovered appeals

 

Mayoral directions to refuse

 

Former Tesco car park, Conington Road/LB Lewisham

Affordable housing provision, viability review mechanism

Direction 9 March 2019

 

The Tulip/City of London

Urban design, historic environment (including Tower of London world heritage site), strategic views, pedestrian movement, cycle parking

Direction 15 July 2019

 

Harrow School/LB Harrow

Direction 29 November 2018 – no very special circumstances for development in MOL

Secretary of State allowed on appeal 31 October 2019, with costs award against Mayor

 

Mayoral directions that he is to be the LPA

 

Former Biscuit Factory, Bermondsey/LB Southwark – 1,342 build to rent units and other uses

Direction 7 May 2019 – housing and affordable housing

Public consultation on scheme amendments including to increase housing to 1,548 build to rent units and affordable housing from 27.5% to 35%

No representation hearing yet arranged

 

Osiers Road/LB Wandsworth – commercial with 168 resi units

Direction 10 June 2019 – housing and affordable housing

Raised AH offer from 39% habitable rooms to 100%

Representation hearing and planning permission 18 October 2019

 

100 West Cromwell Road/RB Kensington & Chelsea – 145 affordable housing units, 282 market residential units and other uses

Direction 1 July 2019 – housing and affordable housing

Revisions to scheme including increased quantum of affordable housing (427 total of which 186 affordable), reduced parking and improved community leisure offer. Increased height and other design changes

Representation hearing anticipated February 2020

 

Homebase site, Manor Road/LB Richmond-upon-Thames – 385 residential units and other uses

Direction 29 July 2019 – housing and affordable housing

No representation hearing yet arranged

 

Kidbrooke Station Square/LB Greenwich – new bus station interchange, commercial, 619 residential units – applicant Notting Hill Genesis & TfL

Direction 5 August 2019 – housing and affordable housing

Representation hearing was to be 31 October 2019

 

Kensington Forum Hotel/RB Kensington & Chelsea – hotel, service apartments, 46 affordable housing units (100%)

Direction 5 November 2018

RBKC JR, direction quashed by consent order 16 April 2019

2nd Direction 23 April 2019 – visitor economy, housing and affordable housing

Public consultation on scheme amendments including increase in residential units from 46 to 62

Representation hearing and planning permission 21 June 2019

2nd JR by RBKC, going to full hearing 21 November 2019

 

Secretary of State call-in decisions

 

No London call-in decisions in 2019 but:

 

Purley Baptist Church/LB Croydon – 106 residential units and other uses

Refused by Secretary of State by 3 December 2018 decision letter , following 12 April 2017 call-in

Quashed by consent of parties March 2019, back with Secretary of State for redetermination

 

Vauxhall Cross Interchange/LB Lambeth – hotel and 677 residential units

Called in by the Secretary of State, May 2019

Inquiry commences 17 December 2019

 

Holocaust Memorial, Victoria Tower Gardens/Westminster CC

Called in by Secretary of State, November 2019, at request of applicant following WCC non-determination

 

Secretary of State decisions on recovered appeals

 

Slade Green SRFI/LB Bexley & Dartford BC

Dismissed 7 May 2019, following inspector’s recommendations

 

1 Cambridge Heath Road/LB Tower Hamlets – replacement foodstore, 471 resi units and other uses

Dismissed 10 June 2019 against inspector’s recommendations

• Fails to meet NPPF’s aims of creating an inclusive place

• Harm from loss of daylight and sunlight

 

The Curve, Great West Road/LB Hounslow – up to 325 residential units and other uses

Dismissed 19 July 2019 against inspector’s recommendations

• Harm to setting of designated heritage assets

Decision subject to legal challenge, permission to proceed to a full hearing, no hearing date yet

 

Harrow School (see earlier)

 

Simon Ricketts, 15 November 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Pic courtesy of https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Colin/London .

LL Cool RJ

This is about Robert Jenrick’s 23 October 2019 announcement of the ‘most ambitious heritage preservation campaign for 40 years‘.

Whilst we are in political lock-down, there is time to look at it in more detail and in particular at the concept of locally listed buildings, central to the campaign that Jenrick laid out as Communities Secretary, jointly with the Culture Secretary Nicky Morgan.

The following initiatives were announced, now of course all on pause:

⁃ “The new campaign will challenge every single local authority across England to draw up lists of buildings of significant historical and cultural value to an area, ensuring important local monuments are no longer left neglected and unloved.”

⁃ “Local people will be empowered to nominate heritage assets which are important to them and reflect their local area and identity, supported by a team of heritage experts, funded by £700,000 to help 10 English counties identify areas which need protecting.

⁃ “Historic England will launch a national campaign on local identity getting the country talking about what defines our heritage.

⁃ “The Communities Secretary is taking the direct step of contacting every parish council in England to make sure they are conserving the buildings which have played a remarkable role in their local history and need our support.

⁃ “In addition, a local heritage champion will be appointed to spearhead the campaign and encourage councils to increase local listings.”

I was at the announcement on 23 October, made at a Policy Exchange and Create Streets breakfast event (my, I had imposter syndrome). The transcript of his speech makes interesting reading, particularly the passages I have emboldened:

“I want to encourage local communities and heritage groups to get far more involved in identifying the historic buildings in their area…

… so they can be at the heart of the process of recognising, defining and protecting the buildings they truly value.

Because we know that, where buildings are on local or national heritage lists, they are often shielded from development.

And that, again, builds consent for development and builds better communities.

Until now, this has mostly been the domain of our local planning authorities.

But only 50% of planning authorities even have these lists, and where they do, they are often out of date or incomplete.

This isn’t good enough.

Protecting the historic environment must be a key function of the planning system.

All local planning authorities must play a far more proactive role in supporting local communities and heritage groups to identify and to protect more historic buildings.

In the 1980s, Michael Heseltine reinvigorated our national heritage lists. And now I want to complete that work and to do the same at the local level.

As a first step, I am announcing, what I think will be the most ambitious new heritage preservation campaign since Michael’s work 40 years ago.

We will start with 10 English counties and support them to complete their local lists and to bring forward more suggestions for the national statutory lists as well.

It will see local people coming forward to nominate the buildings and community assets they cherish – protecting them for future generations.

We’re backing this programme with £500,000 of government investment – giving counties the tools, funding and expertise they need to shift their approach to heritage and conservation up a gear.

To help us do this, we will appoint a National Heritage Advisor to support this vital work and to make sure that Government is actually delivering. I want to thank Marcus Binney, Simon Jenkins and the SAVE team for their input and inspiration for this initiative.

We hope this will help boost conservation efforts in these counties, enabling fresh engagement with local communities and heritage groups.

But our work doesn’t stop there.

We are also working with the Department for Culture and with Historic England on developing an entirely new heritage conservation programme. We are going to be supporting Historic England to develop a new process to enable faster community nominations of important heritage assets in the new Heritage Action Zones.”

If the new Government returns to this thinking, great care is needed in my view to manage the public’s expectations, in two ways:

1. What is local listing in the first place? It is not statutory listing.

2. What criteria are to be applied before buildings are locally listed.

Obviously, locally listed buildings do not qualify for the statutory protection that is given to listed buildings and conservation areas, either by way of additional consenting procedures or the specific policy tests to be met in relation to those statutorily designated heritage assets.

Locally listed buildings comprise non-designated heritage assets for the purposes of the NPPF.

The glossary to the NPPF defines “heritage asset” as follows:

A building, monument, site, place, area or landscape identified as having a degree of significance meriting consideration in planning decisions, because of its heritage interest. It includes designated heritage assets and assets identified by the local planning authority (including local listing).”

The NPPF policy test:

The effect of an application on the significance of a non-designated heritage asset should be taken into account in determining [a planning] application. In weighing applications that directly or indirectly affect non-designated heritage assets, a balanced judgement will be required having regard to the scale of any harm or loss and the significance of the heritage asset.”

Local plans and neighbourhood plans may well have more locally specific policies in relation to locally listed buildings.

The Government’s planning practice guidance explains how non-designated heritage assets (including locally listed buildings) are to be identified. I have emboldened the passages which are potentially in conflict with the approach identified by the Secretary of State:

There are a number of processes through which non-designated heritage assets may be identified, including the local and neighbourhood plan-making processes and conservation area appraisals and reviews. Irrespective of how they are identified, it is important that the decisions to identify them as non-designated heritage assets are based on sound evidence.

Plan-making bodies should make clear and up to date information on non-designated heritage assets accessible to the public to provide greater clarity and certainty for developers and decision-makers. This includes information on the criteria used to select non-designated heritage assets and information about the location of existing assets.

It is important that all non-designated heritage assets are clearly identified as such. In this context, it can be helpful if local planning authorities keep a local list of non-designated heritage assets, incorporating any such assets which are identified by neighbourhood planning bodies. (Advice on local lists can be found on Historic England’s website.) They should also ensure that up to date information about non-designated heritage assets is included in the local historic environment record.”

The content of Historic England’s advice on locally listed heritage assets is identified as “under review” (presumably linked to the Government’s announcement).

More detailed practical advice is contained within Local Heritage Listing: Historic England Advice Note 7 and within Civic Voice’s local heritage list guidance.

There is a lot of advice already out there! Is it just that the lack of local government resources over recent years has meant that too little attention has been given to local lists? Or is it that the Government is advocating a wholly new, “don’t listen to the experts, what buildings in your community do you cherish?” approach?

I do worry that Jenrick is in danger of overselling local listing by describing it as a process to seek to ensure that buildings are protected “for future generations” or that is likely to lead to them being “shielded from development”. Local listing is presently an objective but relatively light-touch process. The Government can’t have it both ways.

If the strategy is to let a million local listings bloom through a less objective, more community based process, plainly the policy tests to be passed, in relation to proposals that might affect them, need to be loosened: brownfield development will become even more difficult. Or if the strategy is to maintain the policy tests, surely we must ensure that that buildings are only locally listed on “sound evidence”?

And what do we think of the suggestion in the speech that this initiative “builds consent for development”?

Simon Ricketts, 9 November 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Heritage PS: Did you see that Yorkshire case, R (James Hall & Co) v Bradford MDC (HHJ Belcher, 1 November 2019), which confirmed that “negligible” or “minimal” harm still equates to “harm” for the purposes of the heritage tests in the NPPF? Thumbs up for the obviousness of the conclusion, to a question which has previously generated much learned London discussion. A bit of a “you can’t be negligibly or minimally pregnant” moment.

Law Altered On Altering Permissions: Court Of Appeal, Finney

Well I certainly tempted fate with the heading to my blog post A Helpful Case On The Scope Of Section 73 last November, which dealt with Sir Wyn Williams’ first instance ruling in Finney v Welsh Ministers.

Tear up that blog post. The ruling now been reversed by the Court of Appeal in a very short judgment (5 November 2019).

The point was a narrow one: can section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 be used to obtain planning permission not just with conditions differing from those on the original permission but with a changed description of development?

Sir Wyn Williams found that the answer was “yes”, following a previous ruling of the High Court in R (Wet Finishing Works) Limited v Taunton Deane Borough Council (Singh J, 20 July 2017).

However, the Court of Appeal, in a straight-forward judgment by Lindblom LJ has found that the answer to the question is in fact “no”.

Lewison LJ:

“The question is one of statutory interpretation. Section 73 (1) is on its face limited to permission for the development of land “without complying with conditions” subject to which a previous planning permission has been granted. In other words the purpose of such an application is to avoid committing a breach of planning control of the second type referred to in section 171A. As circular 19/86 explained, its purpose is to give the developer “relief” against one or more conditions. On receipt of such an application section 73 (2) says that the planning authority must “consider only the question of conditions”. It must not, therefore, consider the description of the development to which the conditions are attached.”

Lewison LJ states that Wet Finishing Works was wrongly decided, the judge on that case not having been referred to another High Court judgment, R (Vue Entertainment) v City of York Council (Collins J, 18 January 2017).

In Vue Entertainment, Collins J had referred to another High Court ruling, R (Arrowcroft) v Coventry City Council (Sullivan J, 2001) as doing no more than making “the clear point that it is not open to the council to vary conditions if the variation means that the grant (and one has therefore to look at the precise terms of the grant) are themselves varied.”

By “the grant”, Lewison LJ understood Collins J to be referring to the “operative part” of the permission ie the description of the development itself.

So we now have a clear position: any section 73 application is constrained by the scope of the description of development on the existing planning permission.

Of course all is not lost – if a fresh application for planning permission is not to be made, it is back to the faff of having first having to amend the description of development by section 96A, if the change to the description of development in itself can be shown to be non material, before then making the section 73 application.

In response to submissions as to what might be the implications of his ruling, Lewison LJ said this:

Nor do I consider that the predicament for developers is as dire as Mr Hardy suggested. If a proposed change to permitted development is not a material one, then section 96A provides an available route. If, on the other hand, the proposed change is a material one, I do not see the objection to a fresh application being required.”

Subject to the proposed change being within the scope of the description of development, the ruling does not change the principle that the relevant test for whether section 73 is available is whether the proposed change is less than a “fundamental alteration” to the approved scheme. The test set out by Sullivan J in Arrowcroft still applies:

“”… the council is able to impose different conditions upon a new planning permission, but only if they are conditions which the council could lawfully have imposed upon the original planning permission in the sense that they do not amount to a fundamental alteration of the proposal put forward in the original application.”

Lewison LJ’s ruling is likely to have practical implications for a number of current section 73 processes and will immediately influence the way that applicants may wish the description of development on a permission to be framed, so as not unnecessarily to constrain the potential for subsequent section 73 applications.

It may be legally correct, on the restricted wording of section 73 itself, and it may not be the end of the world, but what a shame now to lose the additional procedural flexibility that Sir Wyn Williams’ first instance judgment provided.

Simon Ricketts, 5 November 2019

Personal views, et cetera