People In Houses…

…really don’t want other people to have houses, do they?

FT, 19 June 2021
Times, 19 June 2021
Telegraph, 19 June 2021

The prime minister can hardly be surprised when the affluent home-owning constituents of Chesham and Amersham register a protest vote against his plans for change, thinking that in some way he is coming for their beautiful part of the country, even though it bristles with statutory protections from development. First there has been the insensitivity with which HS2 has been forced through the Chilterns AONB with the case for longer tunnelling rejected (see my 30 July 2016 blog post HS2: The Very Select Committee) and secondly, as hitherto loyal Conservatives, they will have taken the prime minister at his word when with typical hyperbole he said in his foreword to last August’s white paper:

“Thanks to our planning system, we have nowhere near enough homes in the right places. People cannot afford to move to where their talents can be matched with opportunity. Businesses cannot afford to grow and create jobs. The whole thing is beginning to crumble and the time has come to do what too many have for too long lacked the courage to do – tear it down and start again.

That is what this paper proposes.

Radical reform unlike anything we have seen since the Second World War.

Not more fiddling around the edges, not simply painting over the damp patches, but levelling the foundations and building, from the ground up, a whole new planning system for England.”

“And, above all, that gives the people of this country the homes we need in the places we want to live at prices we can afford, so that all of us are free to live where we can connect our talents with opportunity.

Getting homes built is always a controversial business. Any planning application, however modest, almost inevitably attracts objections and I am sure there will be those who say this paper represents too much change too fast, too much of a break from what has gone before.

But what we have now simply does not work.

So let’s do better. Let’s make the system work for all of us. And let’s take big, bold steps so that we in this country can finally build the homes we all need and the future we all want to see.”

How easy it must be for other parties and for campaign groups to scaremonger when such coarse analogies are used – war, tearing things down, levelling foundations, building from the ground up.

The paper itself was not nearly as radical as the foreword would suggest and we have seen no further detail since. And so he is now on the defensive:

The Independent, 18 June 2021

“What we want is sensible plans to allow development on brownfield sites. We’re not going to build on greenbelt sites, we’re not going to build all over the countryside.”

[What does this even mean? Of course there will continue to be green field development, and of course some green belt development – as there is under the current system].

This is such an unnecessarily controversial issue, carelessly caused, cynically amplified. The planning system doesn’t need to be torn up and was never going to be torn up. But where have the ministers been to explain, to persuade, to engage? Instead, a resounding, almost embarrassed, silence since that August 2020 white paper. The news vacuum as to the form that changes are likely to take has of course been filled with media speculation and campaigners’ characterisations which have now served to make the whole question more political than it ever needed to be.

We all know that what is needed is for the current planning system to work better, largely through clearer carrot and stick policies, through specific process improvements and simplifications – and with better resourcing. So as to deliver, yes, more homes, yes economic growth, yes in a planned way, yes meeting environmental and social, not just economic, goals. But none of that’s going to happen now is it? Because politics is all about retaining power, and planning is dependent on politics. So if you are relying on the planning system to enable you to move out of your parents’ house or out of an HMO; to start a family, or to grow a business, you know what? Your needs don’t matter. Not against the needs of a politician who doesn’t want to be the next Peter Fleet.

All this of course means that the current system needs to continue to work as best it can. The good news is that at least this week we had that Colney Heath appeal decision letter to demonstrate that the entire system is in fact not in total meltdown. If an area is without an up to date plan, with a severe unmet housing need, with need for affordable housing and for sites for self build homes, planning permission may be granted even if the land is, horror of horrors, politicians look away, green belt. My firm Town (well, my colleague Paul Arnett) was pleased to play at least a small role in the appeal as planning solicitors for the appellant, negotiating a section 106 agreement with the St Albans and Welwyn Hatfield councils that secured a commitment that 45% of the 100 homes proposed would be affordable housing and 10% would be self-build, delivering a strategy first formulated by Chris Young QC and developed and implemented at the inquiry itself by Zack Simons (who kindly brought us onto the team). Russell Gray at Woods Hardwick was the lead planning witness and coordinated the team.

Inspector Christa Masters determined that the following were “very special circumstances” that justified inappropriate development in the green belt:

provision of market housing

“I am aware of the Written Ministerial Statement of December 2015 which indicates that unmet need is unlikely to clearly outweigh harm to Green Belt and any other harm so as to establish very special circumstances. However, in common with the appeal decision referred to, I note that this provision has not been incorporated within the Framework which has subsequently been updated and similar guidance within the Planning Practice Guidance has been removed. I can therefore see no reason to give this anything other than little weight as a material consideration.

It is common ground that neither SADC or WHBC can demonstrate a five year supply of deliverable homes. Whilst there is disagreement between the parties regarding the extent of this shortfall, the parties also agreed that this is not a matter upon which the appeals would turn. I agree with this position. Even taking the Councils supply positions of WHBC 2.58 years and SADC at 2.4 years, the position is a bleak one and the shortfall in both local authorities is considerable and significant.

There is therefore no dispute that given the existing position in both local authority areas, the delivery of housing represents a benefit. Even if the site is not developed within the timeframe envisaged by the appellant, and I can see no compelling reason this would not be achieved, it would nevertheless, when delivered, positively boost the supply within both local authority areas. From the evidence presented in relation to the emerging planning policy position for both authorities, this is not a position on which I would envisage there would be any marked improvement on in the short to medium term. I afford very substantial weight to the provision of market housing which would make a positive contribution to the supply of market housing in both local authority areas.”

⁃ provision of self-build

“In common with both market housing and affordable housing, the situation in the context of provision of sites and past completions is a particularly poor one. To conclude, I am of the view that the provision of 10 self build service plots at the appeal site will make a positive contribution to the supply of self build plots in both local planning authority areas. I am attaching substantial weight to this element of housing supply.”

⁃ provision of affordable housing

“The uncontested evidence presented by the appellant on affordable housing for both local authorities illustrates some serious shortcomings in terms of past delivery trends. In relation to WHBC, the affordable housing delivery which has taken place since 2015/16 is equivalent to a rate of 23 homes per annum. The appellant calculates that the shortfall stands in the region of 4000 net affordable homes since the 2017 SHMA Update, a 97% shortfall in affordable housing delivery. If the shortfall is to be addressed within the next 5 years, it would required the delivery of 1397 affordable homes per annum. In SADC, the position is equally as serious. Since the period 2012/13, a total of 244 net affordable homes have been delivered at an average of 35 net dwellings per annum. Again, this equates to a shortfall also in the region of 4000 dwellings (94%) which, if to be addressed in the next 5 years, would require the delivery of 1185 affordable dwellings per annum.

The persistent under delivery of affordable housing in both local authority areas presents a critical situation. Taking into account the extremely acute affordable housing position in both SADC and WHBC, I attach very substantial weight to the delivery of up to 45 affordable homes in this location in favour of the proposals.”

I recommend Zack’s 15 June 2021 blog post Notes from the Green Belt: what’s so very special about Colney Heath?

I also recommend Chris’ earlier paper Winning an inquiry: it’s the benefits, stupid.

More decisions such as Colney Heath are inevitable where authorities, admittedly struggling at times with a sclerotic local plans system, fail to deliver, which of course makes this scaremongering about a new planning system so nonsensical.

Topically, at 6pm this Tuesday 22 June our Clubhouse Planning Law, Unplanned theme is “How can we build enough, affordable, housing?”. Our special guests are Chris Young QC, Nick Walkley (ex Homes England chief executive), Claire Dickinson (director, Quod) and Ric Frankland (founder, wudl.). Please join us. A free link to the app and event is here.

Simon Ricketts, 19 June 2021

Personal views, et cetera

I’m Sorry I Haven’t A CLEUD

Certificates of lawfulness are very useful, but care is still needed, as two recent cases illustrate.

But first, to explain about the two types of certificate provided for under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the consequent jargon about CLEUDs and CLOPUDs.

The “certificate of lawfulness of existing use or development” (“CLEUD”) procedure, under section 191 of the 1990 Act:

“(1) If any person wishes to ascertain whether—

(a) any existing use of buildings or other land is lawful;

(b) any operations which have been carried out in, on, over or under land are lawful; or

(c) any other matter constituting a failure to comply with any condition or limitation subject to which planning permission has been granted is lawful,

he may make an application for the purpose to the local planning authority specifying the land and describing the use, operations or other matter.”

“(4) If, on an application under this section, the local planning authority are provided with information satisfying them of the lawfulness at the time of the application of the use, operations or other matter described in the application, or that description as modified by the local planning authority or a description substituted by them, they shall issue a certificate to that effect; and in any other case they shall refuse the application.”

“(6) The lawfulness of any use, operations or other matter for which a certificate is in force under this section shall be conclusively presumed.”

The “certificate of lawfulness of proposed use or development” (“CLOPUD”) procedure, under section 192 of the 1990 Act:

“(1) If any person wishes to ascertain whether—

(a) any proposed use of buildings or other land; or

(b) any operations proposed to be carried out in, on, over or under land,

would be lawful, he may make an application for the purpose to the local planning authority specifying the land and describing the use or operations in question.”

“(2) If, on an application under this section, the local planning authority are provided with information satisfying them that the use or operations described in the application would be lawful if instituted or begun at the time of the application, they shall issue a certificate to that effect; and in any other case they shall refuse the application.”

“(4) The lawfulness of any use or operations for which a certificate is in force under this section shall be conclusively presumed unless there is a material change, before the use is instituted or the operations are begun, in any of the matters relevant to determining such lawfulness.”

Section 193 (7) “A local planning authority may revoke a certificate under either of those sections if, on the application for the certificate—

(a) a statement was made or document used which was false in a material particular; or

(b) any material information was withheld.”

There is discussion about the distinctions between the two procedures, CLEUD and CLOPUD, in the Government of the Republic of France v Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (Court of Appeal, 12 June 2017) but basically a CLEUD certifies that the development that has already taken place was lawful (i.e. had the benefit of any necessary planning permission) and a CLOPUD certifies that proposed development would be lawful (i.e. would not require any further planning permission).

Either certificate may be revoked by a local planning authority if it was granted on the basis of false information or if material information was withheld. CLOPUDs carry the additional risk that they may no longer be able to be relied upon as determinative of lawfulness if “there is a material change, before the use is instituted or the operations are begun, in any of the matters relevant to determining such lawfulness”.

R (Ocado Retail Limited) v London Borough of Islington (Holgate J, 7 June 2021) concerned the revocation by Islington Council of a CLEUD granted on 26 April 2019 to Telereal Trillium. The effect of the CLEUD was to certify that four of Telereal’s units on an industrial date were in lawful use for storage or distribution purposes, given that they been used for those purposes for at least the last ten years in breach of a condition on a previous planning permission. As is usually the case, the certificate application had been determined without public consultation and by delegated powers. Only when Ocado then made a planning application for works to the property so as to be able to use it as one of their distribution facilities did local residents find out that the certificate had been issued. They provided information to the council which caused it to make the revocation order, relying on the following reasons set out in an officer’s report:

“(i) Telereal’s application had relied on units A-D as “four interlinked units” forming a single planning unit, without mentioning a lack of interconnection between units B and C (paras. 11, 13 and 19);
(ii) Telereal had not referred to a statement in the 2011 planning application that units C-D were unused at that time and, being surplus to requirements, had been marketed since 2006 as a separate unit. Telereal had not produced photographs taken in 2011 showing the empty units. This information contrasted with the false statement in the application that between 1992 and 2013 units A-D had been fully operational as a warehouse and also with the reliance placed upon photographs taken in 2006 produced by Mr. Molony. This was not a case where units had simply not been used to capacity (paras. 11, 17 and 18);
(iii) The statutory declaration had been false in stating that since 1992 the whole site had been in use as a warehousing/storage depot, that the use had been continuous throughout, and that the photographs submitted were “typical of the uses” (para. 18);
(iv) The statutory declaration had withheld the fact that Mr. Molony, who was professing to give first-hand evidence, had not visited the site during Royal Mail’s lease[3] and so could not attest to its use during that period (para.18);
(v) The application had failed to refer to Royal Mail ceasing to use the premises by, at the latest, 2015 (paras. 11 and 17);
(vi) The application and the decision in 2019 had proceeded on the incorrect legal basis that the issue was whether there had been a 10-year period of continuous use in breach of condition at any time in the past, without that lawful use being subsequently abandoned or suspended. Instead, the law had been correctly stated in Ellis (para.22). In any event, even applying “the wrong legal tests” relied upon by Telereal, the applicant had been required to provide an accurate factual account of the use over time. The false statements and withholding of information were still material to that issue (para.23);
(vii) The false assertion about the interlinked nature of units A-D, as well as the lack of use and the separate marketing of units C and D, were relevant to the identification of the correct planning unit (para.28);

(viii) On the exercise of the discretion to revoke the CLEUD, the legislation assumes the provision of “correct and complete material information.” Had the false statements not been made and/or material information withheld, Islington “would have been alerted to the need to carry out further investigations in particular as to the planning unit” and “could have come to a different decision” (para.8).

Ocado challenged the revocation by way of judicial review on a series of grounds, a number of which raise interesting and difficult planning law issues, but for the purposes of this blog post it is sufficient to say that the claim failed. Holgate J held that the council was within its powers in deciding to revoke the certificate on the basis of applying the test in section 193 (7).

It is an important judgment for anyone dealing with certificate applications, with some helpful judicial pointers.

As to the drafting of a statutory declaration in support of a certificate application:

“Care needs to be taken in the drafting of any statutory declaration in support of an application for a certificate under s.191 (or s.192). Such a document is intended to have a formal and solemn status in a non-judicial process where oaths are not administered. It is an offence for a person knowingly and wilfully to make a statutory declaration containing a statement which is false in a material particular (s.5 of the Perjury Act 1911). This offence is “triable either way” and so there is no specific time limit on the bringing of a prosecution. Whether or not a statutory declaration is used to provide evidence to a local planning authority, s.194 makes it an offence for a person, for the purposes of obtaining a decision on an application under s.191 or s.192, to make a statement knowingly or recklessly which is false or misleading in a material particular or, with an intent to deceive, to use any document which is materially false or misleading or to withhold material information. In s.194(3) Parliament has expressly disapplied the normal 6-month time limit in s.127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 for the bringing of a prosecution in respect of a summary only offence. Section 194(3) is all of a piece with the power of revocation in s.193(7), which is exercisable at any time after the grant of a CLEUD.

To enable an authority to assess the weight to be placed upon a statutory declaration or witness statement, it is good practice for the author to make plain which matters are within his own personal knowledge and, unless it is obvious, how that knowledge was obtained. For each matter outside his own knowledge, he should identify the specific source relied upon. These are essentially the principles applied to witness statements in civil litigation (CPR PD32 para.18.2) and it is difficult to see why the approach should be any less rigorous in the context of s.171B where a declaration may be dealing with continuity over a long period of time.

As to whether certificate applications should be publicised:

“It is beneficial to the quality of decision-making on s.191 applications, which deal with past events, that persons or bodies with relevant information on the grounds for seeking a CLEUD should be able to be involved, whether supporting or opposing an application. If they are not, there is potentially an increased risk of any certificate granted becoming the subject of an application for judicial review, or revocation under s.193(7), with consequential delays for a landowner wishing to rely upon that decision. If, on the other hand public participation results in the refusal of a CLEUD, the applicant is entitled to pursue the matter on appeal, where the evidence can be examined and tested.

It could be said to be unsatisfactory that whether consultation takes place should depend upon the exercise of discretion by individual planning officers, rather than there being a uniform national procedure. Similar concerns were raised by Collins J in Sumption v London Borough of Greenwich [2008] 1 P&CR 20 at [8]. The point is illustrated by paragraph 008 of the relevant part of the National Planning Practice Guidance, which states that “it may be reasonable for a local planning authority to seek evidence from other sources e.g., parish councils or neighbours, if there is good reason to believe they may possess relevant information about the content of a specific application”. The difficulty is that an authority is unlikely to be able to identify all situations in which members of the public have something material to contribute, either on the decision whether to grant a certificate or the precise scope of any certificate.”

As to the extent of the power to revoke a certificate:

“A CLEUD or a CLOPUD may only be revoked by a local planning authority on the grounds set out in s.193(7). The power of revocation may not be used, for example, because the authority wishes to revisit the merits of the application, or has changed its mind about the findings of fact it has made or the inferences or conclusions it has drawn from the material submitted.

As to other matters to take into account in deciding whether to revoke:

“By way of example, the local planning authority might take into account the effect of revoking the certificate on affected landowners, particularly if time has elapsed and successors in title demonstrate the harm they would suffer. In that event, it could also be relevant to consider whether a successor in title was involved in, or aware of, the application for a certificate, particularly if it intended to rely upon any certificate granted. Where a local authority has reason to conclude that material information was deliberately withheld at the application stage, or that there has been material concealment of information after the certificate was issued, those matters could be taken into account as weighing in favour of revocation. Although the planning merits of a development or a legitimised breach of condition are irrelevant to whether sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) of s.193(7) are satisfied, a local authority may have regard to that aspect when exercising its discretion whether to revoke a certificate. But it is entirely a matter for the authority whether to consider planning benefits or harm at all and, if so, to what extent, subject only to review on the grounds of irrationality.”

I mentioned the additional risk, with CLOPUDs, that they lose their effect if there is a material change, before the use is instituted or the operations are begun, in any of the matters relevant to determining the lawfulness of the proposed development. There was discussion about this in Croyde Area Residents Association) v North Devon District Council (Lieven J, 19 March 2021).

The case concerned an application for judicial review to quash the grant of planning permission on 27 January 2014 for the use of lodges, static caravans and touring caravans at Ruda Holiday Park, Croyde, Braunton Devon. The judge allowed such a late challenge to be brought, applying the principles in R (Thornton Hall Hotel Ltd) v Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council (Court of Appeal, 30 April 2019) (covered in my 18 May 2019 blog post Slow Claim Coming: Limiting JRs) but much of the discussion in the case concerned a CLOPUD which was subsequently granted on appeal on 21 February 2020 once a dispute had arisen as to the extent of land which had the benefit of the planning permission, due to a mistake in the way in which the boundaries of the application had been shown (“…roughly 22 hectares of land were included within the red line which before 2014 had no permission for caravans or lodges to be stationed”).

There is an absolute statutory bar on challenging the validity of certificates granted upon appeal after six weeks but challenges can of course be brought to planning permissions granted by local planning authorities outside that six weeks period (on the principles set out in that Thornton Hall Hotel case). That was why this was just a challenge to the January 2014 permission. The land owner, represented by James Maurici QC, sought to argue that to allow a late challenge to the planning permission, as argued for by the claimant, represented by Richard Turney, would undermine the absolute bar on any legal challenge to the CLOPUD. The judge disagreed:

“I am concerned that Mr Turney’s argument does result in the undermining of the LDC, and therefore might be said to undermine the purpose of the statutory provision. However, in my view there are two answers to this. Firstly, it is clear from Challinor and from s.192(4) that the LDC does not create absolute certainty of the lawfulness of the use going forward in any event. The statute envisages that there may be a material change which removes the certified lawfulness and I see no reason why the subsequent quashing of a planning permission should not be such a material change. Secondly, the mischief that Mr Maurici relies upon can in my view be dealt with by the exercise of the court’s discretion not to quash if on the facts of the case that is the appropriate response. It would be a highly unusual, if not exceptional, situation where the court would quash a planning permission where the effect was to remove the benefit of an LDC. As I explain below, I consider this to be such an exceptional case. However, in the vast majority of cases the existence of the LDC will be an overwhelming reason not to quash the planning permission.”

So the judge assumes that the quashing of the planning permission will amount to a material change in a matter that was relevant to determining the lawfulness of the development certified in the CLOPUD. It is not clear from the judgment whether the development described in the CLOPUD had subsequently already been started – that would of course preclude the operation of section 192 (4). (NB I understand that permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal has been sought).

Lessons:

– Be scrupulously accurate when submitting any application for a CLEUD or CLOPUD, and do not withhold any material information. Otherwise, it may come back to bite you or your successor, by operation of section 193 (7).

⁃ In relation to CLOPUDs, be wary of any potential material changes that may come to undermine your certificate. You are at risk until “the use is instituted or the operations are begun”.

Simon Ricketts, 12 June 2021

Personal views, et cetera

It was a busy Clubhouse Planning Law Unplanned week! Many of you will have tuned into our session on Tuesday in relation to the Lichfields Taking Stock report and/or Thursday’s event arranged at about eight hours’ notice when Duncan Field and Zack Simons led a session on the HCLG Committee’s report on the future of the planning system. This Tuesday 15 June at 6pm we have another amazing session, this time about starting new consultancies, firms and practices, with a series of founders’ stories, including Roger Hepher (hgh Consulting), Paula Carney (CarneySweeney), Kelly Ryder (The Planning Lab), Mark Gimingham (i-Transport), Claire Dickinson (Quod), Rachel Naylor & Abbey Musker (Trium Environmental Consulting LLP ) and tax specialist Mitch Young (Fusion Consulting Ltd). Join us! Invite to app and event here.

“Our Number One Domestic Priority”: Taking Stock

I tweeted that yesterday was the 5th anniversary of my first simonicity blog post. 273 posts later and 496,000 words (War and Peace = 587,000 words) and to what effect?

As I also said, it can be deflating to look back. So many posts expressing frustration about the same topics, yes obviously CIL, but also the recurring debates as to how to address the country’s housing crisis and as to what the obstacles are: is it the planning system or are other factors at play? Something Must Be Done. But what?

Unpacking Use It Or Lose It (16 July 2016) was one of my first posts. It referred to that week’s House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee’s report, Building More Homes.

“Paragraphs 129 to 139 of the report’s section on Planning Reform set out the “criticism made of the large house builders…that they hold land suitable and with permission for building, yet build at a slow pace and thus maximise the profit from each development”.

The conclusion is arrived at:

“139.We recommend that local authorities are granted the power to levy council tax on developments that are not completed within a set time period. This time period should be negotiated when planning consent is sought and be varied according to the size and complexity of a development. To ensure that the local authority also has an incentive to accelerate the process, the clock should start to run only when the local authority has signed off all conditions and obligations“.”

The allegation that house builders hold unnecessarily large land banks, going slow to maximise profits, was considered in detail by Oliver Letwin in his 2018 review. Incidentally, a constant theme of my blog posts over the last five years has been reviews commissioned by the Government the recommendations of which it then ignores – my first ever post, on 3 June 2016, was about the recommendations of the CIL independent working group (sensible recommendations, ignored by Government) – and Oliver Letwin’s recommendations in his final report (summarised in my 3 November 2018 blog post Oliver’s Twist: Letwin’s Proposals For Large Housing Sites) were of course similarly ignored, but perhaps the findings in his earlier interim report (June 2018) were more interesting, where he rejects that land banking allegation:

“5.40 It is of course true that, although the land market can be highly volatile, land (unlike most assets) does not depreciate, and has generally tended to increase in value across the cycle, and has a ‘real option’ value. By holding rights over land that benefits from (or is soon likely to benefit from) some form of permission to build houses, the company which holds that land obtains a valuable ability to make profit by building on it at whatever time is thought likely to maximise the profitability of doing so. It would therefore be perfectly possible for financial investors of a certain kind to seek to make a business out of holding land as a purely speculative activity.

5.41 But I cannot find any evidence that the major house builders are financial investors of this kind. Their business models depend on generating profits out of sales of housing, rather than out of the increasing value of land holdings; and it is the profitability of the sale of housing that they are trying to protect by building only at the ‘market absorption rate’ for their products. I have heard anecdotes concerning land owners who seek to speculate in exactly this way by obtaining outline permission many years before allowing the land to have any real development upon it – and I am inclined to believe that this is a serious issue for the planning system. But it is not one that is consistent with the business model of the major house builders.

And yet here comes the allegation again in an 8 May 2021 Local Government Association press statement: Over 1.1 million homes with planning permission waiting to be built – new LGA analysis. “The LGA is calling for councils to be given powers in a Planning Bill in the Queen’s Speech to incentivise developers to build housing more quickly. Latest figures show that 2,782,300 homes have been granted planning permission by councils since 2010/11 but over the same period only 1,627,730 have been built.”

And look at their proposal, which harks back (without reference to it) to the rejected idea in that 2016 House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee Report. They say:

While there will be in some cases legitimate reasons as to why development has stalled, and it is recognised that there is a time lag between permission being granted and homes being built, new build completions have only increased by just over half as much in that time. The LGA, which represents councils, says this shows that planning is not the barrier to house-building and that it is the housing delivery system that needs to be reformed.

To help councils get developers building more quickly, the Queen’s Speech should bring forward legislation that enables councils to charge developers full council tax for every unbuilt development from the point the original planning permission expires.”

Lichfields’ Matthew Spry rebuts the idea again in his 26 May 2021 blog post Use it or lose it: the taxing problem of undelivered homes.

The wider assertions in the Local Government Association press statement that sufficient planning permissions are already being granted to achieve the Government’s target of 300,000 net additional homes a year are tackled in Lichfields subsequent report, “Taking stock: The geography of housing need, permissions and completions”, published on 1 June 2021, commissioned by the Land Promoters and Developers Federation and the Home Builders Federation. Indeed they conclude that the necessary annual figure to achieve that target is 520,000.

The report represents the first stage of their work: “Analysis of how the number of homes with planning permission relates to housing need and delivery in different parts of the country through a comparison of housing need (either as per the standard method or recently adopted local plans), planning permissions and completions at a regional and housing market area level”.

We await stages 2 and 3:

“2. Assessing how the stock of permissions relates to housebuilder pipelines, rates of build out and the number of extra sites required to meet the government’s ambition; and

3. An analysis of what happens to the stock of permissions for a number of local authority case studies. This is a more in-depth ‘deep dive’ exploration on how the stock of permissions granted is linked to the number of homes completed within a given timescale by monitoring the land supply positions across the authorities over a five year period”

It is a great shame that MHCLG has not provided any detailed methodology to support the national target of 300,000 net additional homes a year. If anything it may be an under-estimate (see the 14 January 2021 House of Commons briefing paper Tackling the under-supply of housing in England) but surely it needs underpinning to avoid any assertion that it is too high. The background to the figure is mentioned in my 10 February 2018 blog post Nothing Was Delivered – the immediate context at the time being the first meeting of then prime minister Theresa May’s “housing implementation taskforce” (always good to have a taskforce). You recall Mrs May’s promise that the housing crisis would be her “number one domestic priority”? Roll forward three years: Theresa May leads Tory revolt over push for new housing (The Times, 12 May 2021).

What has got in the way of a sensible debate as to how we might resolve this country’s housing crisis since I started this blog? Politics. What might get us out of it? Action based on robust factual analysis.

Simon Ricketts, 4 June 2021

Personal views, et cetera

This week’s Clubhouse Planning Law, Unplanned discussion examines the Lichfields Taking Stock report. We will be joined by Lichfields’ Matthew Spry , together with the LPDF’s chairman Paul Brocklehurst, Lambert Smith Hampton’s Mary-Jane O’Neill, the BPF’s Sam Bensted, Blackstock Consulting’s Joshua Carson and our brilliant usual panel. Do tune in to join the discussion, or just to listen. This is a free invitation to the app.