Remitted Development: Sending Back Faulty Plans

What happens when a development plan, or one or more of its policies, is found to be unlawful? There have been two instances of this in 2020: in relation to the Leeds Site Allocations Plan (in the Aireborough case, the subject of three rulings by Lieven J between January and August this year) and in relation to the Harrogate Local Plan (in the Flaxby case, the subject of a ruling by Holgate J last week).

My firm acted for the claimant in both cases (alongside Jenny Wigley in Aireborough and Christopher Katkowski QC and Richard Moules in Flaxby). Aside from the substantive issues arising, the cases are interesting examples of the flexibility that the court has when it finds against the plan making authority. By virtue of the changes made to section 113 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase 2004 by the Planning Act 2008, the court no longer simply has to quash the plan, or relevant part of the plan (meaning that the authority would need to start again) but can “remit” the plan back to an earlier stage in its preparation so that decisions can be taken again, from the stage where the errors occurred.

I set out the relevant sub-sections of Section 113 as follows:

(7) The High Court may—

(a) quash the relevant document;

(b) remit the relevant document to a person or body with a function relating to its preparation, publication, adoption or approval.

(7A) If the High Court remits the relevant document under subsection (7)(b) it may give directions as to the action to be taken in relation to the document.

(7B) Directions under subsection (7A) may in particular—

(a) require the relevant document to be treated (generally or for specified purposes) as not having been approved or adopted;

(b) require specified steps in the process that has resulted in the approval or adoption of the relevant document to be treated (generally or for specified purposes) as having been taken or as not having been taken;

(c) require action to be taken by a person or body with a function relating to the preparation, publication, adoption or approval of the document (whether or not the person or body to which the document is remitted);

(d) require action to be taken by one person or body to depend on what action has been taken by another person or body.

(7C) The High Court’s powers under subsections (7) and (7A) are exercisable in relation to the relevant document—

(a) wholly or in part;

(b) generally or as it affects the property of the applicant.

Aireborough

There is a series of three judgments by Lieven J: Aireborough Neighbourhood Development Forum v Leeds City Council (Lieven J, 14 January 2020 – initial judgment on capacity of the claimant to bring the proceedings), Aireborough Neighbourhood Development Forum v Leeds City Council (Lieven J, 8 June 2020 – main ruling) and Aireborough Neighbourhood Development Forum v Leeds City Council (Lieven J, 7 August 2020 – remedies).

Judgment 1: Capacity of claimant

At an initial hearing Lieven J first considered arguments at by Leeds City Council and the two developer interested parties that as an unincorporated association the Aireborough Neighbourhood Development Forum did not have legal capacity to bring the claim. After a useful review of the caselaw on standing, the judge held that the Forum could indeed bring the claim: the “critical question in judicial review or statutory challenge is whether the claimant is a person aggrieved or has standing to challenge, which is not a test of legal capacity but rather one of sufficient interest in the decision not to be a mere busybody.

Judgment 2: substantive issues

There was then the main hearing, which lasted two days.

The Site Allocations Plan (SAP) had initially been promoted on the basis of housing need evidence prepared in accordance with Leeds City Council’s 2014 core strategy. The significant level of housing need identified by the core strategy was used as the basis for exceptional circumstances justifying green belt releases. However, the housing need requirement was reduced during the course of the SAP examination based on changes to the government’s standard methodology for assessing housing need, and a much lower housing need requirement was therefore promoted the city council as part of a selective review of the core strategy (CSSR) being promoted at the same time as the SAP.

The city council proceeded with the adoption of the SAP, in accordance with the examining inspectors’ recommendation, notwithstanding the claimant’s submissions that the case for exceptional circumstances had been undermined given the lower housing need.

The claim was successful on three grounds. The judge found that the material change of circumstances had been insufficiently considered and its consequences insufficiently explained by the examining inspectors. This amounted to a failure to provide adequate reasons, which had been contended in two grounds of challenge. The inspectors also made an error of fact amounting to an error of law in calculating housing need figures.

The defendant was found also to have breached the Strategic Environment Assessment Regulations by failing to consider and consult upon a “reasonable alternative” to continuing with the SAP in materially changed circumstances. However, relief was not granted in respect of this ground of challenge because the failure was found not to have been likely to have resulted in a different outcome.

For a good perspective on the judgment, see Lichfields’ 16 June 2020 blog post Successful legal challenge to Leeds Site Allocations Plan – a consideration of potential implications.

Judgment 3: remedies

Following hand down of the main judgment Lieven J then needed to consider the parties’ written submissions as to the relief to be granted to give effect to her judgment: whether to quash all or part of the document or to remit it back to the city council or Secretary of State.

The dispute between the parties was as to the appropriate remedy under section 113 and the scope of any remedy, i.e. whether it should apply across the whole of Leeds rather than just the area for which the claimant was the neighbourhood development forum. Applying University of Bath v North Somerset Council (HHJ Alice Robinson, 7 March 2013), the judge determined that remittal was the appropriate remedy, as she held that it was appropriate to go back to the stage where the error of law occurred rather than back to the very beginning of the local plan process.

The judge also held that the scope of the remedy should be all Green Belt allocations in Leeds, rather than just those in Aireborough. Although the claim was focused on Aireborough, the claim was never limited to only those sites. The grounds of challenge went to the Green Belt allocations in their entirety. In the face of submissions from the Secretary of State, the allocations were remitted back to the inspectors and the judge indicated that it would be for the council to consider what modifications if any to make.

Flaxby

Flaxby Park Limited v Harrogate Borough Council (Holgate J, 25 November 2020) concerned the new settlements policy within the plan, which purported to identify a broad location for a new settlement within the borough, at Green Hammerton/Cattal. Flaxby Park Limited argued that that the council had not properly considered its alternative proposals.

The detailed chronology is set out at length in Holgate J’s judgment but in basic summary, the local plan inspector agreed with Flaxby that the council should carry out further sustainability appraisal to consider possible reasonable alternatives to the Green Hammerton/Cattal, including broad locations around Flaxby and other new settlement options.

The council carried out further work and consulted upon it, reported it and the consultation responses to the inspector who concluded that the plan was sound. The council then adopted the plan.

In summary, Flaxby’s complaints were partly as to the adequacy of the sustainability appraisal work and the extent to which it had been taken into account by the council, arguing that the council (1) had failed properly to consider the outcome of the assessment of alternative “broad locations” (and officers purported to carry out that consideration rather than the council itself) (2) had failed to compare the broad locations of Flaxby and Green Hammerton/Cattal on an equal basis because it did not include in the Additional sustainability appraisal work an additional 630 ha of land which had been identified by consultees and (3) had failed properly to examine viability and deliverability of the Green Hammerton/Cattal proposals.

The judge partly accepted the first complaint, in that, after an examination of the extent to which decisions in relation to the local plan process may lawfully be delegated, he found that “the full Council did not take into account the final SEA material and consultation responses, or a summary and analysis thereof, when they resolved to adopt the local plan”.

The judge has ordered that “the whole of Local Plan shall be remitted firstly, to the Defendant’s Cabinet to re-consider whether or not to accept the Inspector’s recommendations in so far as they related to the New Settlement Policies, and secondly, to the Defendant’s full Council to consider the Cabinet’s decision, whether or not to accept the Inspector’s recommendations in so far as they related to the New Settlement Policies, and whether or not to adopt the Local Plan with those policies.”

For completeness while we are talking about local plan challenges…

Earlier in the year, Holgate J rejected a challenge to the Wycombe local plan, in Keep Bourne End Green v Buckinghamshire Council (Holgate J, 23 July 2020).

This claim focused on the Local Plan’s Policy BE2 which, in operation with other parts of the plan, releases from the green belt a site of approximately 32 hectares of mainly agricultural land at Hollands Farm, south-east of High Wycombe, allocating the majority of the site for housing (some 467 dwellings).

The main grounds of challenge were first that Policy BE2 releasing the Site from the green belt was adopted on a basis of misunderstanding or misinterpretation of national policy (including the National Planning Policy Framework 2012 paragraphs 47 and 50) and guidance (including the 2014 Planning Practice Guidance) regarding published household projections, in part involving erroneous calculations of “objectively assessed housing need” (“OAHN”) for the local area. Second, that that Policy BE2 releasing the Site from the green belt was adopted on a basis of misapplication of national green belt policy requiring exceptional circumstances for release of land from green belt, in part as there were no exceptional circumstances.

Holgate J rejected all grounds of challenge. He stated that “it is important for the court to emphasise … that its role is not to consider the merits of the Council’s proposed policy or of the objections made to it. The court is only able to consider whether an error of law has been made in the decision or in the process leading up to it.”

On the first ground, Holgate J held that the local plan had been adopted following proper consideration of applicable published household projections, without errors of law, and with appropriate planning judgment being exercised by decision-makers. In doing so, he commented that “There have been many attempts in the last few years to entice the courts into making pronouncements on the methods used to assess OAHN. Repeatedly the response has been that this is a matter of planning judgment for the decision-maker and not for the courts.”

On the second ground, Holgate J held that, on the basis of there being no definition of the policy concept of “exceptional circumstances”, the expression “is deliberately broad and not susceptible to dictionary definition. The matter is left to the judgment of the decision-maker in all the circumstances of the case. Whether a factor is capable of being an exceptional circumstance may be a matter of law, as an issue of legal relevance. But whether it amounts to such a circumstance in any given case is a matter of planning judgment”. He held that the relevant decision-maker’s (an Inspector) reasons for finding “exceptional circumstances” do not “raise any substantial doubt as to whether a public law error was committed”; the “overall package of considerations upon which the Inspector relied was plainly capable of amounting to “exceptional circumstances” and could not be described as simply “commonplace”. It is impossible to say that the judgment which the Inspector reached was irrational. It did not fall outside the range of decisions which a reasonable Inspector could reach.”

The Court of Appeal this month refused the claimant permission to appeal.

Finally, there is my self-explanatory 6 December 2019 blog post Unsuccessful Attacks On Guildford & Waverley Local Plans.

Simon Ricketts, 28 November 2020

Personal views, et cetera

NB For parts of this post I drew upon my colleagues Town Library case summaries – free subscription to our weekly updating service here: https://www.townlegal.com/news-and-resources/#the-town-library .

Faulty LP

Lights Camera Action: The Planning Changes – Parliamentary Scrutiny, That JR

Most of the summer blockbusters were paused from release this summer, except for Tenet, which no-one seems to understand. Oh and the statutory instruments making those major amendments to the GPDO (eg building upwards, and resi development to replace existing commercial buildings) and the Use Classes Order (eg the new class E), which hit our screens just before Parliament rose for the summer recess. The Planning For The Future white paper was published (visually spectacular) after Parliament had risen.

This post looks briefly at the role of Parliament in debating these documents, and at the Rights : Community : Action judicial review of the GPDO and Use Classes Order changes.

The amendments to the General Permitted Development Order and Use Classes Order

We’re talking about the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2020/755, The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2020/756 and The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2020/757 all laid before Parliament on 21 July, ahead of the Commons going into recess the following day, and came into effect on 31 August and 1 September. Parliament returned on 1 September.

The statutory instruments (“SIs”) were made under the negative resolution procedure. This means that although the SIs came into effect on when stated, either House can vote to reject them within 40 sitting days, following a motion (“prayer”) laid by a member of the relevant House. If rejected, the relevant statutory instrument is annulled, i.e. no longer of any legal effect.

There has been no Parliamentary debate so far on any of the SIs, although MHCLG minister Lord Greenhalgh did respond to questions in the Lords on 28 July 2020 (ahead of the Lords going into recess the next day).

Labour has laid a motion against the GPDO SIs, but (1) given the Government’s substantial majority there is surely no realistic likelihood of that succeeding on a vote and (2) the narrative in relation to the changes to the GPDO and Use Classes Order seems to have got hopelessly confused with concerns as to the separate proposals in the white paper in the minds of politicians,the press and the public – see for instance Valerie Vaz, shadow leader of the House of Commons, on 3 September 2020:

“We have prayed against the town and country planning permitted development regulations—I think there are three sets of them. The shadow Minister for Housing and Planning, my hon. Friend Mike Amesbury, has written to the Secretary of State. I hope that the Leader of the House will find time for that debate.

During August Parliament was not sitting, but extremely important announcements were being made. I cannot understand why the Government, who say consistently that Parliament is sovereign, do not come to the House to explain changes in policy. Apparently, algorithms will now be used in planning decisions. That takes away the very nature of making planning decisions—whether relevant considerations are taken into account or whether irrelevant considerations are taken into account—and it undermines administrative law. When you make a decision, you must give reasons.

The Town and Country Planning Association says that 90% of planning applications are approved and there are 1 million unbuilt commissions [sic]. It is time for the shires to rise up and oppose these new policies. Will the Leader of the House ask the current Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government to come to the House to explain why he is using algorithms to stomp on our green and pleasant land?”

Quite aside from the probably theoretical possibility of any or all of the SIs being annulled, there is also the judicial review that has been brought by a new campaign group, Rights : Community : Action. It describes itself as “a coalition of campaigners, lawyers, planners, facilitators, writers and scientists, united by a shared commitment to tackle the Climate Emergency – with people and for people, and the environment.” There are four protagonists: Naomi Luhde-Thompson (currently on sabbatical from Friends of the Earth), Hugh Ellis (Town and Country Planning Association), Laura Gyte (Oxfam) and Alex Goodman (Landmark Chambers).

The group has put its Statement of Facts and Grounds on line. These are the grounds:

“(1) GROUND 1: In respect of each of the three SIs, the Secretary of State unlawfully failed to carry out an environmental assessment pursuant to EU Directive 2001/42/EC (“the SEA Directive”) and the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004 (“the SEA Regulations”).

(2) GROUND 2: In respect of each of the three SIs, the Secretary of State failed to have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (“the PSED”) in s.149 of the Equality Act 2010 (“the EA 2010”).

(3) GROUND 3: In respect of each of the three SIs, the Secretary of State failed to consider the weight of the evidence against these radical reforms, including prior consultation responses and the advice of his own experts. This composite ground is divided as follows:

Ground 3a: The Secretary of State failed to conscientiously consider the responses to the consultation on proposed planning reforms which ran from 29 October 2018 to 14 January 2019

Ground 3b: In respect of the two SIs that expand Permitted Development rights (SI 2020/755 and SI 2020/756), the Secretary of State failed to take into account the advice of the government’s own experts: in particular, the findings of the Building Better, Building Beautiful Commission’s “Living with Beauty” Report (“The BBBB Report”), and the findings of his own commissioned expert report “Research into the quality standard of homes delivered through change of use Permitted Development rights” (“The Clifford Report”).

Ground 3c: In respect of the two SIs that expand Permitted Development rights (SI 2020/755 and SI 2020/756), the Secretary of State adopted an approach which was unfair, inconsistent and/or irrational in the context of the approach taken to similar proposed Permitted Development reforms: namely those relating to the deployment of 5G wireless masts.

Ground 3d: In respect of SI 2020/756, the Secretary of State was required to re- consult before introducing Class ZA. There was a legitimate expectation of re- consultation on the proposal for a permitted development right allowing the demolition and rebuild of commercial properties, arising from an express promise to re-consult which was made in the original consultation document.”

Do read the Statement of Facts and Grounds itself for the detail. The Government has served summary grounds of defence but I do not think that they are on line.

The group is seeking an order “declaring that the decision to lay the SIs was unlawful. The Claimant also seeks an order quashing the SIs for unlawfulness.” It was also initially seeking an order “suspending the operation of the SIs until the disposal” of the claim, but it has now withdrawn that request.

On 2 September 2020 Holgate J made an order listing the claim to be heard in court “for 1.5 days in the period between 8th October 2020 to 15th October 2020”. It will be a “rolled up” hearing, i.e. there has been no decision yet as to whether any of the grounds are arguable. The Planning Court has pulled out all the stops to list the case quickly – after all, if any parts of the SIs were now to be quashed just think of the implications and complications! But there must be a good likelihood of the case going to the Court of Appeal or beyond, particularly if any of the grounds gain any traction. There could be uncertainty for some time.

No doubt the claim will touch various raw nerves amongst some – an attack on the Government’s “fast changes” agenda, part reliance on EU-derived environmental legislation, Aarhus Convention costs capping, crowdfunded litigation, “activist lawyers” – it ticks all the boxes! But let’s see what the court makes of it.

The Planning For The Future white paper

The white paper is of course out for consultation, along with the associated shorter term measures document, so it might be said that they don’t amount to significant policy announcements – but that would surely be simplistic: there is a clear direction of travel. With this in mind, being no expert on Parliamentary conventions and procedure, I have two questions:

1. Surely the announcements should first have been in Parliament if I read this House of Commons Library note on Government policy announcements (18 January 2013) correctly?

2. What is the precise status of Planning For The Future? It is expressed on the face of the document to be a “white paper” but would it not usually therefore be expected to have been tabled in Parliament as a numbered command paper and to include the wording: “Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government by Command of Her Majesty“? On one level, does it matter? But surely it does?

I also note that some of the shorter term measures (covered in last week’s blog post) could take effect soon after the consultation deadline of 1 October (particularly the introduction of the revised standard method – the “algorithm” if you will) so if there is to be any proper, informed, debate in Parliament I would suggest that there is little time to be lost.

Simon Ricketts, 5 September 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Introducing The Planning Court Case Explorer

We understand why many participants – not just local authorities, but statutory consultees and the Planning Inspectorate – are risk averse. Judicial review is expensive, and to lose a judicial review in the courts is bad for the reputation of either [sic]. And judicial reviews can be precedent setting, establishing a new interpretation of the law. We think the proposals set out in the document should remove the risk of judicial review substantially. Most judicial reviews are about imprecise and unclearly worded policies or law. Our plans for an overhaul of planning law to create simple and clear processes and for plans that set out clear requirements and standards will substantially remove the scope for ambiguity and therefore challenge.” (Planning For The Future white paper, paragraph 5.16)

You can’t really contemplate any reform on the planning system without considering the role of the courts in the way that the system works in practice. Plainly where a public body (whether the state or a local authority) acts outside its powers, someone thereby affected needs to have access to an effective remedy, usually an order that renders it to be of no legal effect. Quite apart from the rights and procedures deriving from domestic common law principles, UK has international obligations to maintain such processes under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, specifically in relation to access to environmental justice, under the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention. You can’t embark on a new system without a functioning mechanism to ensure that everyone plays by the rules.

Whilst essential as a backstop against abuse of power, the role of the courts in the operation of the planning system does of course need to be kept to a minimum. There are two areas in particular where there has always been scope to reduce the number of unnecessary claims:

1. As mentioned in that passage in the white paper, many (I’m not sure I would say “most”) “judicial reviews are about imprecise and unclearly worded policies or law.” As regards that first area, the aspiration in the white paper (“an overhaul of planning law to create simple and clear processes and for plans that set out clear requirements and standards will substantially remove the scope for ambiguity and therefore challenge”) is worthy but at present purely wishful thinking. We anticipate now a separate “Autumn” consultation into potential changes to EU-derived legislation, with a view to streamlining for instance SEA and EIA processes (no surprise – see e.g. my 4 July 2020 Have We Got Planning Newts For You: Back To Brexit blog post as well as Environment Secretary George Eustice’s 20 July 2020 speech). Of course, EU-derived environmental legislation (although, to be accurate, this is not about the EU – the relevant EU directives in turn implemented wider international treaty obligations) has been at the root of much planning caselaw, but the white paper’s proposals introduce a wide range of fresh tensions and uncertainties into the process – whether that be about the central imposition of housing requirements on local authorities, accelerated routes to development approvals or the proposed shift to a wholly new mechanism for the funding and delivery of affordable housing and infrastructure.

2. Claimants should be discouraged from using litigation simply as a tactic to secure delay or publicity, or in order to have a “low consequences” speculative last throw of the dice. Some steps have been taken to address this in recent years, most importantly the establishment of the Planning Court in March 2014 so that cases could be dealt with more quickly, by specialist judges, by the introduction of a permission stage in relation to section 288 challenges and by tightening the rules on costs protection (see my 22 June 2019 blog post No Time To Be 21: Where Are We With Aarhus Costs Protection?).

The lack of statistics as to the effectiveness of the Planning Court is frustrating. I went into this in my 8 July 2018 blog post The Planning Court and Richard Harwood QC has also recently expressed similar frustrations in the July 2020 39 Essex Chambers planning, environment and property newsletter, How common are High Court planning challenges?

At Town we recently decided to do something about it. Working alongside Landmark Chambers, on 13 August 2020 we unveiled what we call the Planning Court Case Explorer. The Case Explorer brings together, in one dataset, all judgments of the Planning Court after a full hearing, since its establishment in March 2014 to the end of June 2020 quarter by quarter (25 quarters), together with all subsequent appellate judgments. That amounts to 377 judgments by the Planning Court, 105 by the Court of Appeal and 11 by the Supreme Court. The data captured includes the length of time between the decision under challenge and the ruling, parties, judge and subject matter, with a link to the bailii transcript and usually our Town Library summary, and with a variety of search options so as to be able to interrogate the data, by way of clicking into the tables.

Only now, through this data, can it be seen that the average duration between a decision under challenge and the first instance ruling in relation to that decision is 293 days and can the extent of further delay be seen when a case goes to the Court of Appeal (an average of 726 days between the decision and the ruling) or there after to the Supreme Court (1,000 days!). In the context of a six weeks’ deadline for bring the claim in the first place and then the initial permission stage, that 293 days’ figure in my view is not unreasonable. The subsequent delays on appeal are in my view wholly unjustifiable.

Which judge in the High Court has handed down the most rulings? Lang J (69 judgments), followed a long way behind by Holgate J (28). Which Court of Appeal judge in relation to appeals from rulings by the Planning Court? Unsurprisingly Lindblom LJ (56). For each judge there is a list of his or her judgments.

Which are the most frequent parties? The Secretary of State is way ahead of the field, unsurprisingly, with 267 cases. Second, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (14 rulings). Third, Gladman Developments Limited (12).

There are limitations to the work – for instance we have not focused on win/lose statistics, given the variety of permutations of outcome, and we have not analysed the much larger number of claims which are sieved out at the permission stage. However, I hope that the analysis is a useful step towards greater transparency.

The work now has additional topicality. The Government is not just proposing to reform the planning system. On 31 July 2020 it launched an “independent panel to look at judicial review”.

As set out in the press statement:

“Specifically, the review will consider:

• Whether the terms of Judicial Review should be written into law

• Whether certain executive decisions should be decided on by judges

• Which grounds and remedies should be available in claims brought against the government

• Any further procedural reforms to Judicial Review, such as timings and the appeal process”

The panel’s detailed terms of reference make for potentially worrying reading in terms of their breadth. Don’t just take that from me – here are two recent posts by Mark Elliott, professor of public law and chair of Cambridge University’s law faculty: Judicial Review Review 1: The Reform Agenda & Its Potential Scope and The Judicial Review Review II: Codifying Judicial Review – Clarification Or Evisceration? The review also needs to be read in the context of the Policy Exchange’s agitations via its Judicial Power Project and most recently its 31 July 2020 document Reforming The Supreme Court (now let’s think about what motivation they might have for that? hmm…). This is all really important stuff – at least as important and potentially far reaching as planning reform, that’s for sure.

The panel comprises:

• Lord Faulks QC – Panel Chair

• Professor Carol Harlow QC

• Vikram Sachdeva QC

• Professor Alan Page

• Celina Colquhoun

• Nick McBride

It is very good to see Celina Colquhoun, as a well-respected and leading planning barrister, on the panel, and I hope that the operation of the Planning Court can perhaps be held out as a useful precedent, with its proactive, relatively quick, case management and judges familiar with our subject area, meaning quicker hearings with, in my view, a greater degree of predictability of outcome. 493 planning cases going to a full hearing (including appeals) in just over six years? That’s not many at all in my view, given the inherent contentious nature of our work and the extent to which there is room for dispute and uncertainty. Despite all the usual gnashing of teeth, isn’t this one aspect of our planning system that is actually working (or at least would be once the Court of Appeal adopts the same approach to timescales as the Planning Court)? In fact, where would we be without regular clarification from the courts as to what the legislation actually means?!

That leads neatly onto a reminder about our free weekly Town Library Planning Court rulings subscription service. The registration page for this and other Town Library updates (e.g. planning appeal decision letters) is here: https://www.townlegal.com/news-and-resources/#the-town-library .

Simon Ricketts, 15 August 2020

Personal views, et cetera

The Planning Court Case Explorer

Have We Got Planning Newts For You: Back To Brexit

Whether dog whistle politics, a dead cat strategy or a jibe at the triturus cristatus, the prime minister’s reference to “newt-counting delays” in his 30 June 2020 speech was no accident:

“Why are we so slow at building homes by comparison with other European countries?

In 2018 we built 2.25 homes per 1000 people

Germany managed 3.6, the Netherlands 3.8, France 6.8

I tell you why – because time is money, and the newt-counting delays in our system are a massive drag on the productivity and the prosperity of this country

and so we will build better and build greener but we will also build faster

and that is why the Chancellor and I have set up Project Speed to scythe through red tape and get things done”

As a literal statement, it is nonsense to blame the operation of the protected species regime in relation to great crested newts for the failure of successive governments to ensure that enough new homes are built in this country. Licensing has in any event already been overhauled – see Innovative Scheme to conserve newts and promote sustainable development is rolled out across England (Natural England, 25 February 2020). See also this BBC piece, Boris Johnson’s newt-counting claim questioned (Roger Harrabin, 3 July 2020).

The underlying messaging that was intended by the statement is of course clear: that there are environmental rules, “red tape”, previously foisted on us by Brussels, unnecessary, holding back development.

To continue with the animal references, this is a topical canard. I had in any event intended this week to sidestep the recent announcements about radical planning reform and go back to the possibly related question as to what is actually likely to happen from 1 January 2021 following the end of the Brexit transition period. My Town colleague Ricky Gama and I gave an online talk on this issue last week as part of the Henry Stewart Conferences course The Planning System. We need to focus again on all this, now that we are less than six months away from….what?

The EU (Withdrawal) Act received Royal Assent on 23 January 2020, amending in various respects the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and giving Parliamentary approval for the withdrawal agreement between the UK and EU that was then completed on 1 February 2020. We left the EU on 31 March 2020 in the sense of no longer being part of its structures, including the European Parliament or European Commission. But we remain subject to EU law until 31 December 2020.

Until 31 December 2020, decisions of the UK government and UK public bodies can still be the subject of complaints to the European Commission and rulings by the European Court of Justice, and we are bound by changes in law and by any rulings of the ECJ by that date.

On 31 December 2020, EU law becomes “retained EU law” and existing rulings of European Court of Justice have binding effect.

However (not to scare the horses but…), from that date Parliament may review, amend or repeal all EU-derived domestic legislation without restriction. The Government can provide regulations as to how the UK courts should interpret retained EU law. The Supreme Court is not bound by any retained EU case law. Ministers can by regulations provide for any other relevant court or tribunal not to be bound (first consulting with the president of the Supreme Court president and other specified senior members of the judiciary). Indeed, the Government is already consulting as to how it might give freedom to lower courts to do this: it is no longer a hypothetical possibility – see Government consultation on lower courts departing from retained EU law (Philip Moser QC, 2 July 2020).

Of course we will go into 2021 with EU environmental law fully domesticated into our own systems. As far as planning law is concerned, the EIA, SEA, protected habitats and species regimes will remain, as already set out in our domestic legislation. But then what?

This Government has given no assurances.

There was previously a requirement in section 16 of the 2018 Act that the Government would maintain environmental principles and take steps to establish overseeing body, by publishing a draft Bill in relation to those matters by the end of 2018

Section 16 set out the relevant environmental principles ie

a) the precautionary principle so far as relating to the environment,

b) the principle of preventative action to avert environmental damage,

c) the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source,

d) the polluter pays principle,

e) the principle of sustainable development,

f) the principle that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of policies and activities,

g) public access to environmental information,

h) public participation in environmental decision-making, and

i) access to justice in relation to environmental matters.

A draft Bill was published by that deadline and its provisions, with some amendments (including a reduced version of that list), are now within the current Environment Bill.

The reduced list of environmental principles (in clause 16(5) of the Bill) is now as follows:

“(a) the principle that environmental protection should be integrated into the making of policies,

(b) the principle of preventative action to avert environmental damage,

(c) the precautionary principle, so far as relating to the environment,

(d) the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and

(e) the polluter pays principle.”

It no longer includes the principle of “sustainable development” or the last three principles set out in the 2018 Act, which derive from the Aarhus Convention rather than directly from EU law.

Progress on the Bill has been delayed until September 2020 due to Covid-19 (whilst the Government has not chosen, by the 30 June 2020 deadline in the withdrawal agreement, to agree an extension to the 31 December date, which would of course have been possible on exactly the same basis). But in any event Royal Assent would only be the start of a long process of arriving at policy statements so as to deliver on those principles and have up and running a functional Office for Environmental Protection (recruitment for roles within the proposed OEP has not yet commenced).

So any “radical” reform of the planning system is likely to slip in ahead of oversight, in any meaningful way, by this new body or application of the principles that were intended at the time of the 2018 Act to plug the gap post Brexit.

In fact, it’s worse than that. Section 16 of the 2018 Act was repealed by the 2020 Act. There is no longer any duty upon the Government to adopt any particular environmental principles or to establish any independent overseeing body. If the Environment Bill is withdrawn, kicked into the long grass or, by way of amendment, stripped of meaning, there’s nothing to be done, the horse has bolted.

The December 2019 Queen’s Speech said this:

“To protect and improve the environment for future generations, a bill will enshrine in law environmental principles and legally-binding targets, including for air quality. It will also ban the export of polluting plastic waste to countries outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and establish a new, world-leading independent regulator in statute.”

By way of political commitment, that’s all there currently is. (NB I think we need to give that “world-leading” epithet a rest – I am trying to think of a recent example where we wouldn’t have been content to swap “world-leading” or “world beating” for, say, “functioning”?).

So from 1 January 2021, what changes might we see to EU-derived environmental law?

It’s pure guess-work, because the Government will not presently be drawn on that subject (which makes the “newt” reference so triggering).

But do you think it was an accident that the last essay in the Policy Exchange publication Planning Anew, just before the tail-wagging endorsement at the end by the Secretary of State, was an essay entitled Environmental Impact Assessment fit for the 21st Century by a William Nicolle and Benedict McAleenan? A flavour:

“To make them fit for the 21st Century, EIAs should focus only on the environmental impacts of development, like natural ecosystems, biodiversity, water, and other components of natural capital. Greater weighting and priority could be given to the most pressing environmental impacts of today, such as biodiversity, given recent evidence of the scale of international and national wildlife decline.

There are several, more subjective facets of EIAs that need to be stripped out, as they dilute this focus and prioritisation of environmental impacts. Landscape aesthetics, for example, should not be included in EIAs, as they are not environmental impacts per se. Policy Exchange has led calls for beauty to be a central factor in the planning system. We applaud this, and have argued for the natural landscape to be the inspiration for architecture, but the EIA should be concerned with what the environmentalist Mark Cocker calls the “more than human”.”

Who are the authors? William Nicolle apparently joined Policy Exchange in 2019, having been a graduate analyst at a utility. Benedict McAleenan is managing partner at “political risk and reputation” firm Helmsley Partners.

The prime minister’s 30 June 2020 “Build, Build, Build” press statement promised a “planning Policy Paper in July setting out our plan for comprehensive reform of England’s seven-decade old planning system, to introduce a new approach that works better for our modern economy and society.”

If changes are proposed to EU-derived environmental laws, please can that be made absolutely clear so that we can have an informed debate. Change and improvement is possible but only where led by the science, not by the think tanks.

After all, any move towards a more zoning-based approach, where the development consenting process is simplified by setting detailed parameters at a plan-making or rule-setting level, will face complications due to the need for strategic environment assessment of any plan or programme required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions that sets the framework for subsequent development consents and which is likely to have significant environmental effects – assessment which has become highly prescriptive, particularly in terms of the need to consider, in detail, reasonable alternatives to the selected policy option. Projects which are likely to give rise to significant effects on the environment require environmental impact assessment. It must be shown that plans or projects will not adversely affect defined species of animals or the integrity of defined habitats – with rigorous processes and criteria. Politicians will be bumping up against EU-derived environmental law, and those environmental principles (not yet finalised), at every turn.

Of course, the Government would not have a completely free hand in changing or removing these processes. We are subject to wider international duties, under, for instance the European Convention on Human Rights, the Aarhus Convention, the Paris Agreement (climate), the Espoo Convention (environmental assessment) and the Ramsar Convention (habitats). Trade deals in relation to the export of our goods or services, with the EU and/or other countries and trading blocs, may also require specific commitments.

But, if the Government is moving rapidly towards “comprehensive” reform of the planning system, it’s a fair question to ask: What changes are proposed by this Government to these EU-derived regimes from the end of this year?

Isn’t this the elephant in the room?

Yours faithfully, a newtral observer.

Simon Ricketts, 4 July 2020

Personal views, et cetera

PS Two webinars coming up, free registration, covering the sorts of issues I cover in this blog. Do register and tune in if of interest:

4pm 7 July (hosted jointly by Town Legal and Francis Taylor Building): NSHIPs? The case for residential-led DCOs. I am chairing a discussion between John Rhodes OBE (director, Quod), Bridget Rosewell CBE (Commissioner, National Infrastructure Commission), Gordon Adams (Battersea Power Station), Kathryn Ventham (partner, Barton Willmore) and Michael Humphries QC (Francis Taylor Building). Register here: https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_7SoJtOhqQwSJNt0jtmUFVA

5pm 14 July (hosted by Town Legal): Living, Working, Playing – What Does The Covid Period Teach Us? My Town partner Mary Cook is chairing a discussion between Steve Quartermain (Government’s former chief planner, consultant Town Legal), Karen Cook (founding partner, PLP Architecture), Jim Fennell (chief executive, Lichfields), Simon Webb (managing partner, i-transport) and myself. Register here: https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_pSbroYIoSRioMXvtDlGP3Q

The great crested newt (courtesy: wikipedia)

Lessons From The Heathrow Cases

In my 15 October 2016 blog post Airports & Courts I made the obvious prediction that publication by the Secretary of State for Transport of the Airports National Policy Statement (“ANPS”) would inevitably lead to litigation. The ANPS is important because under the Planning Act 2008 it sets the policy basis for a third runway at Heathrow to the north west of the current runways (the “NWR Scheme”).

It was always going to be important for the High Court to be able to rise to the (in a non-legal sense) administrative challenge of disposing of claims efficiently and fairly. The purpose of this blog post is to look at how that was achieved (no easy feat) and what we can learn more generally from the court’s approach to the litigation

The ANPS was designated on 26 June 2018 and five claims were brought seeking to challenge that decision:

⁃ A litigant in person, Neil Spurrier (a solicitor who is a member of the Teddington Action Group)

⁃ A group comprising the London Borough of Richmond-upon-Thames, the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, Greenpeace and the Mayor of London

⁃ Friends of the Earth

⁃ Plan B Earth

⁃ Heathrow Hub Limited and Runway Innovations Limited [unlike the other claimants above, these claimants argue for an extension of the current northern runway so that it can effectively operate as two separate runways. This scheme was known as the Extended Northern Runway Scheme (“the ENR Scheme”)]

Arora Holdings Limited joined as an interested party to each set of proceedings in pursuance of their case for a consolidated terminal facility to the west of the airport.

The Speaker for the House of Commons intervened in the Heathrow Hub Limited claim to object to various statements made to Parliament and Parliamentary Committees being admitted in evidence.

The first four claims raised 22 separate grounds of challenge. The fifth claim raised a further five grounds of challenge.

As Planning Liaison Judge, ie effectively lead judge within the Planning Court, Holgate J in my view has played an extremely effective role. Following a directions hearing, ahead of a subsequent pre-trial review three months later, he laid down a comprehensive set of directions on 4 October 2018 which provided for:

⁃ the first four claims to be heard at a single rolled up hearing, followed by the fifth claim

⁃ the cases to be heard by a Divisional Court (ie two or more judges, normally a High Court Judge and a Lord Justice of Appeal. In the event, the four claims were heard by a Divisional Court comprising Hickinbottom LJ and Holgate J. The fifth claim was heard immediately afterwards by a Divisional Court comprising Hickinbottom LJ, and Holgate and Marcus Smith JJ.)

⁃ video link to a second court room and (paid for jointly by the parties in agreed proportions) live searchable transcripts of each day’s proceedings

⁃ procedure to be followed in relation to expert evidence sought to be submitted in support of the first claim

⁃ statements of common ground

⁃ amended grounds of claim, with strict page limits and against the background of a request from the judge to “review the extent to which they consider that any legal grounds of challenge previously relied upon remain properly arguable in the light of the Acknowledgments of Service“, and with specific claimants leading on individual issues

⁃ bundles and skeleton arguments complying with strict page limits and other requirements

⁃ payment of security for costs by Heathrow Hub Limited in the sum of £250,000

⁃ cost capping in the other claims on Aarhus Convention principles

The main proceedings were heard over seven days in March, with the Heathrow Hub proceedings then taking a further three days (followed by written submissions). As directed by Holgate J, hearing transcripts were made publicly available.

Less than six weeks after close of the Heathrow Hub hearing, judgment was handed on 1 May 2019 in both case:

R (Spurrier & others) v Secretary of State (Divisional Court, 1 May 2019)

R (Heathrow Hub Limited & Runway Innovations Limited) v Secretary of State (Divisional Court, 1 May 2019)

The transcript of the first judgment runs to 184 pages and the transcript of the second judgment runs to 72 pages.

I am not going to summarise the judgments in this blog post but happily there is no need as the court at the same time issued a summary, which serves as a helpful précis of the claims and the court’s reasoning for rejecting each of them.

The Divisional Court found that all but six grounds were unarguable (the six being two Habitats Directive grounds from the first case, two SEA grounds from the first case and two from the second case (legitimate expectation and anti-competition). “All the other grounds were not considered not to have been arguable: the claimants may apply for permission to appeal against the Divisional Court’s decision concerning those grounds to the Court of Appeal within 7 days. The remaining six grounds were ultimately dismissed. The claimants may apply to the Divisional Court for permission to appeal within 7 days. If the Divisional Court refuses permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the claimants may re-apply directly to the Court of Appeal.”

The Secretary of State for Transport gave a written statement in the House of Commons on the same day, welcoming the judgments.

The two judgments will be essential reading in due course for all involved in similar challenges; the 29 grounds, and various additional preliminary points, cover a wide range of issues frequently raised in these sorts of cases and each is carefully dealt with, with some useful textbook style analysis.

In the Spurrier judgment:

– the scope for challenge of an NPS (paras 86 to 90)

⁃ relationship between the NPS and DCO process (paras 91 to 112)

⁃ extent of duty to give reasons for the policy set out in the NPS (paras 113 to 123)

⁃ consultation requirements in relation to preparation of an NPS (paras 124 to 140)

⁃ standard of review in relation to each of the grounds of challenge (paras 141 to 184)

⁃ the limited circumstances in which expert evidence is admissible in judicial review (paras 174 to 179)

⁃ whether updated information should have been taken into account (paras 201 to 209)

⁃ whether mode share targets were taken into account that were not realistically capable of being delivered (paras 210 to 219)

⁃ the relevance of the Air Quality Directive for the Secretary of State’s decision making (paras 220 to 285)

⁃ compliance with the Habitats Directive (paras 286 to 373)

⁃ compliance with the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (paras 374 to 502)

⁃ whether consultation was carried out with an open mind (paras 503 to 552)

⁃ whether the decision to designate the ANPS was tainted by bias (paras 553 to 557)

⁃ the relevance of the Government’s commitments to combat climate change (paras 558 to 660)

⁃ whether there was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (paras 661 to 665)

In the Heathrow Hub judgment:

⁃ legitimate expectation (paras 113 to 138)

⁃ use of Parliamentary material in the context of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights (paras 139 to 152)

⁃ competition law (paras 157 to 209).

As we wait to see whether any of these claims go further, I note that Arora has commenced pre application consultation ahead of submitting a draft DCO for a “consolidated terminal facility to the west of the airport, which we are calling Heathrow West, related infrastructure and changes to the nearby road and river network.” Now that is going to be another interesting story in due course. I’m not sure we have previously seen duelling DCOs…

Simon Ricketts, 4 May 2019

Personal views, et cetera

NPPF & PPG In Court

Hanging over me all week was a deadline for preparing a legal update about the NPPF. Then, thank you judges, just like London buses but with more barristers on board, along came three interesting cases.

Is the NPPF subject to the requirements of SEA?

The question as to whether the latest version of the NPPF required strategic environmental assessment was the question before Dove J in Friends of the Earth v Secretary of State (Dove J, 6 March 2019).

 

You will recall that requirements of the SEA Directive apply to plans and programmes which are “required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions” and which “set the framework for future development consent of projects”.

 

The Government argued that neither applied in the case of the NPPF. It was always going to be a stretch to argue that the, er,  Framework does not set the framework for the future development consent of projects and the judge wasn’t going to accept that. But he did conclude that due to the Framework’s curious, non-statutory, legal basis it could not be said to be required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions and therefore SEA was not required: “there is in reality nothing by way of any formal provisions which might be said to govern or regulate the production of the Framework“.

Incidentally, I had always assumed that fear of being caught by SEA requirements was one reason why the NPPF has remained so determinedly non-spatial but, on Dove J’s reasoning, even an NPPF with spatial policies would not require SEA.

Was consultation on the draft NPPF legally inadequate in relation to fracking?

The hearing in relation to Stephenson v Secretary of State (Dove J, 6 March 2019), a claim brought on behalf the Talk Fracking campaign group, immediately followed the Friends of the Earth hearing and one of its grounds (ground 3) was covered by the previous case. The other grounds focused on the new NPPF’s pro-fracking paragraph 209(a):

Minerals planning authorities should:
a) recognise the benefits of on-shore oil and gas development, including unconventional hydrocarbons, for the security of energy supplies and supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy; and put in place policies to facilitate their exploration and extraction
.”

Ground 1 contended that “the Defendant unlawfully failed to take into account material considerations, namely scientific and technical evidence, which had been produced following the adoption of a Written Ministerial Statement by the Secretary of State for Business and Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Defendant on 16th September 2015 (“the 2015 WMS”)

Ground 2 contended that “the Defendant failed, in publishing the policy in paragraph 209(a) of the Framework, to give effect to the Government’s long-established policy in relation to the obligation to reduce green-house gas emissions under the Climate Change Act 2008“.

Ground 4 contended that “the Defendant failed to carry out a lawful consultation exercise in relation to the revisions to the Framework which were published on 24th July 2018.”

Dove J started with ground 4, because “at the heart of the dispute” was the questions as to “what the Defendant was doing when incorporating paragraph 209(a) into the Framework or, more particularly in relation to Ground 4, what a member of the public engaging in the consultation process and reading the publicly available material as a reasonable reader, would have concluded the Defendant was doing“. The issues “cannot be disposed of by simply considering the Defendant’s private intentions“. In the documentation there was no suggestion that the merits or substance of the policy represented by the 2015 WMS were outside the scope of the consultation.

By contrast with what the reasonable reader would have discerned from the publicly available material, the Defendant had a closed mind as to the content of the policy and was not undertaking the consultation at a formative stage. The Defendant had no intention of changing his mind about the substance of the revised policy. Further, the Defendant did not conscientiously consider the fruits of the consultation exercise in circumstances where he had no interest in examining observations or evidence pertaining to the merits of the policy. This had the effect of excluding from the material presented to the Minister any detail of the observations or evidence which bore upon the merits of the policy. Given my conclusion as to what the reasonable reader would have concluded from the publicly available documentation the consultation exercise which was undertaken was one which involved breaches of common law requirements in respect of consultation and which was therefore unfair and unlawful.

Ground 1 accordingly also succeeded: it was unlawful to fail to take the Talk Fracking material into account in decision making as to the final form of the NPPF, given that it was clearly relevant to the questions posed. “The fact that the Defendant believed that he was taking a far more narrow and restricted decision from that which he had advertised to the public does not provide a basis for avoiding that conclusion.

Ground 2 failed, but on the basis of reasoning which may be helpful to the anti-fracking community, in that the judge accepted the Secretary of State’s submission that “in individual decisions on plans or applications the in principle support for unconventional hydrocarbon extraction, provided by paragraph 209(a) of the Framework, will have to be considered alongside any objections and evidence produced relating to the impact of shale gas extraction on climate change. These are conflicting issues which the decision-maker will have to resolve.”

The judge has not yet determined the appropriate relief (ie what should be done) to give effect to his judgment. But surely we are now likely to see further consultation as to paragraph 209(a) and potentially another tweaked NPPF in due course. NPPFs are also now coming along like buses.

What is the legal status of Planning Practice Guidance?

This question was relevant in Solo Retail Limited v Torridge District Council (Lieven J, 4 March 2019) as it went to complaints about the approach taken by a local planning authority to retail impact assessment, in a challenge by one value retailer to a planning permission granted to a competitor. The complaint was that the guidance in the PPG has not properly been followed.

Of course if there is doubt as to the legislative, regulatory or administrative basis for the National Planning Policy Framework, that doubt is accentuated in the case of the Government’s subsidiary Planning Practice Guidance.

The judge found that the NPPF and the local development plan were not prescriptive as to the form of retail impact assessment required to be carried out. The claimant therefore had to fall back on the detailed steps for assessment set out in the PPG.

However:

In my view the NPPG has to be treated with considerable caution when the Court is asked to find that there has been a misinterpretation of planning policy set out therein, under para 18 of Tesco v Dundee. As is well known the NPPG is not consulted upon, unlike the NPPF and Development Plan policies. It is subject to no external scrutiny, again unlike the NPPF, let alone a Development Plan. It can, and sometimes does, change without any forewarning. The NPPG is not drafted for or by lawyers, and there is no public system for checking for inconsistencies or tensions between paragraphs. It is intended, as its name suggests, to be guidance not policy and it must therefore be considered by the Courts in that light. It will thus, in my view, rarely be amenable to the type of legal analysis by the Courts which the Supreme Court in Tesco v Dundee applied to the Development Policy there in issue.

These points are illustrated the paragraphs of the NPPG that are most relevant in this case. Paragraph 015 says that “the impact test should be undertaken in a proportionate and locally appropriate way…” However, paragraph 017 says “The following steps should be taken in applying the impact test…”. Taken at face value these words would seem to suggest that the following elements are mandatory where there is a policy requirement for any form of impact test. However, in my view that cannot be the case. There is a judgement for the LPA as to what level of scrutiny of possible impact is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the proposal, taking into account the need to be proportionate. Paragraph 017 therefore cannot and should not be interpreted and applied in an overly legalistic way as if it was setting out mandatory requirements.”

A reminder not to interpret the PPG legalistically. There may be internal inconsistencies within it. Guidance means guidance.

Simon Ricketts, 9 March 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Heffalump Traps: The Ashdown Forest Cases

The Ashdown Forest in East Sussex is unique. Lindblom LJ recently described it as follows:
“Ashdown Forest contains one of the largest continuous blocks of lowland heath in south-east England. The [Special Area of Conservation] which extends to about 2,700 hectares, comprises both Northern Atlantic wet heaths with Erica tetralix and European dry heaths. It is a “European site” under regulation 8 of the Habitats regulations. The [Special Protection Area] was designated mainly for the protection of two species of bird: the Nightjar and the Dartford Warbler, both included in Annex 1 of EU Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds, as amended. Ashdown Forest is also designated a Site of Special Scientific Interest (“SSSI”), for its heaths, birds, invertebrates, reptiles and amphibians, including the Great Crested Newt.”

The Ashdown Forest was of course also the inspiration for A.A. Milne’s Winnie the Pooh:

“Anyone who has read the stories knows the forest and doesn’t need me to describe it. Pooh’s Forest and Ashdown Forest are identical.” (Christopher Milne)


This honeypot is particularly vulnerable to the indirect effects arising from development in two respects:

– nitrogen deposition caused by motor vehicles

– impacts from recreational use of the forest
It can be particularly difficult to model the levels at which those effects are likely to arise. Any standardised thresholds are bound to be simplistic and to err either on the side of unnecessary restriction of development or on the side of risking significant harm to the forest. But we can’t embark on a huge multi-disciplinary research project every time any change is proposed – and, even then, will the results be accurate?

Whether we are in or out of the EU, I assume that we all accept that there are some particularly special places such as Ashdown Forest that require longterm protection due their nature conservation value and which can be harmed in a number of ways by the incremental effects (direct and indirect) of development? Equally, I’m sure we all recognise that a balance has to be struck in the level of survey work and assessment that local planning authorities and developers should do to determine whether development will acceptable?

It would never be easy to construct a legal regime that provides a fair and efficient process for determining what survey work and assessment is required and where the dividing line is between what is acceptable and unacceptable. As both a Special Area of Conservation and Special Protection Area, the Ashdown Forest is protected under the EU’s Habitats and Birds Directive, transposed in England and Wales by the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010.
In basic summary, if it cannot be proven, beyond reasonable scientific doubt, that there will be no significant effect on the site either alone or in combination with other plans or projects, “appropriate assessment” is required, namely consideration of the impacts on the integrity of the European site, either alone on in combination with other plans and projects, with regard to the site’s structure and function and its conservation objectives. If the assessment determines that there will be adverse impacts which cannot be mitigated or avoided by alternative solutions, the plan or project can only proceed in extremely limited circumstances. Appropriate assessment can be a significant undertaking. Relevant for what follows, policy makers have come up with a pragmatic mechanism of requiring contributions by developers to Suitable Alternative Natural Greenspace (“SANGs”) to provide for areas to come forward that will take recreational pressure away from protected sites as a standardised form of mitigation, often thereby avoiding the need for individual, development by development, appropriate assessment. 
Additional levels of protection, not just relevant to European designated sites, are provided by the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (in relation to the formulation of plans or programmes whose policies may give rise to significant environmental effects) and by the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (in relation to certain categories of development projects which may give rise to significant environmental effects). Each has a screening stage, by which the need for detailed assessment work can be avoided if it can be shown that significant environmental effects are unlikely to arise. 
The Great Repeal Bill will operate post Brexit so as to continue to give legal effect in the UK to all of these regimes until such time as Parliament reviews each of them. The Government published on 30 March its White Paper, Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the United Kingdom. It contains this details-free passage on environmental protection:
“The Government is committed to ensuring that we become the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than we found it. 

The UK’s current legislative framework at national, EU and international level has delivered tangible environmental benefits, such as cleaner rivers and reductions in emissions of sulphur dioxide and ozone depleting substances emissions. Many existing environmental laws also enshrine standards that affect the trade in products and substances across different markets, within the EU as well as internationally. 

The Great Repeal Bill will ensure that the whole body of existing EU environmental
 law continues to have effect in UK law. This will provide businesses and stakeholders with maximum certainty as we leave the EU. We will then have the opportunity,
over time, to ensure our legislative framework is outcome driven and delivers on our overall commitment to improve the environment within a generation. The Government recognises the need to consult on future changes to the regulatory frameworks, including through parliamentary scrutiny. ”
That may sound benign, but let’s keep an eye on that reference to ensuring “our legislative framework is outcome driven”. “Too much red tape’ appears to be the knee jerk reaction of many politicians to EU environmental legislation, viz recent jabs at protected species such as the great crested newt and at SANGs.
So have we got the balance right in our current legislation? Ashdown Forest has in the last two years given us four court rulings (three at Court of Appeal level) which in different ways identify the difficulties and complexities that inevitably arise in practice. If the sensitivity of a site such as the Ashdown Forest is a given, how would any other system better regulate the competing interests at play and provide an effective regime for determining forensically what are often complex and difficult environmental and ecological scientific issues?
Chronologically (if we ignore famous proceedings that ran from 1876 to 1882 as to the extent of commoners’ rights over the forest versus the rights of a landowner, the 7th Earl De La Warr), the cases have been as follows:

Ashdown Forest Economic Development LLP v Wealden District Council and South Downs National Park Authority (Court of Appeal, 9 July 2015)

This was a challenge by local landowners, including in fact the 11th Earl De La Warr, to policies in the Wealden Local Plan, including a requirement for SANGs provision in relation to housing developments within 7 kilometres of the forest. The Court of Appeal quashed the requirement, holding “with a degree of reluctance” that the council and the national park authority had failed to consider reasonable alternatives to the 7 kilometres cordon, in breach of the requirements of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive, overturning Sales J’s first instance ruling.  
Sales J had also rejected the landowners’ challenge to a cap on housing numbers in the plan, which had been justified on the basis of seeking to ensure that traffic movements did not increase beyond 1,000 AADT (annual average daily traffic flows on any road in the forest, equivalent to a 1% increase), treated by the authorities and Natural England as a threshold beyond which appropriate assessment would be required under the Habitats Regulations. The landowners were not given permission to appeal that ground and so that housing numbers policy stands. 
Secretary of State v Wealdon District Council (Court of Appeal, 31 January 2017)
This was a challenge by Wealden District Council to an inspector’s decision to allow an appeal against the refusal of planning permission for the construction of 103 dwellings, 42 of them to be provided as affordable housing, and the provision of 10 hectares of SANGs and public open space, on land at Steel Cross, a small settlement to the north of Crowborough. The site is about 2.4 km from the edge of the forest. The inspector had found that there would have been a need for appropriate assessment despite the 1,000 AADT threshold not having been reached, but for proposed mitigation in the form of financial contributions towards heathland management. The challenge had succeeded at first instance before Lang J and the Court of Appeal had to address a number of submissions from the opposing parties based on SAC and SPA issues:
– did the inspector adopt too strict an approach in concluding that there was no need for an appropriate assessment? 
– was he wrong to assume that heathland management to mitigate the effects of nitrogen deposition would be carried out under a strategic access management and monitoring strategy (“SAMMS”)? 

– did he fail to take into account evidence given for the council on the efficacy of heathland management?

The Court of Appeal held that the inspector’s approach to the potential relevance of even relatively small additional traffic numbers had not been wrong but he had failed to justify why, in the face of contrary evidence from the council, he considered that heathland management would amount to adequate mitigation. Furthermore:
“As Mr Price Lewis submitted, the inspector did not explain how he thought the financial contributions in the section 106 obligation were in fact going to be translated into practical measures to prevent or overcome the possible effects of nitrogen deposition to which he had referred, as well as funding the SAMMS projects which would tackle the potential effects of recreational use. He did not say what he thought was actually going to be done, by whom, and when, in implementing the “habitat management” upon which his conclusion on the need for “appropriate assessment” was predicated. That conclusion depended on his judgment that, with mitigation, including heathland management to mitigate the effects of nitrogen deposition, the proposed development, together with other proposals, was not likely to have significant effects on the European site. Such mitigation, as he made clear, was essential to his “precautionary approach”. So if there was any real doubt about the requisite heathland management coming forward, his conclusion that an “appropriate assessment” was not required would, to that extent, be undermined. It was necessary for him to establish with reasonable certainty that the relevant mitigation, including heathland management, would actually be delivered. But he did not do that. He did not identify a solid proposal for heathland management, relevant to this proposed development, to which there was a firm commitment on the part of those who were going to carry it out. His conclusions in paragraphs 68 and 71 of his decision letter, and in paragraph 105, clearly depended on the concept that the “contributions to SAMMS” in the section 106 obligation “would” – as he put it – actually be used, in part, to fund “projects” of “habitat management”. These projects would involve measures, such as cutting and grazing to reduce, “offset” or “outweigh” the effects of nitrogen deposition attributable to this development in combination with other proposals, including “additional eutrophication”. But which “projects” he had in mind is obscure.”
The planning permission was quashed. 
R (DLA Delivery Ltd) v Lewes District Council (Court of Appeal, 10 February 2017)  
This case raises a number of issues in relation to neighbourhood planning (see my 19.2.17 blog post, Five Problems With Neighbourhood Plans ) but for the purposes of this blog post the relevant question before the Court of Appeal was whether the neighbourhood plan for Newick, approximately 7 km from the forest, contravened the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive in that the need for strategic environmental assessment had been screened out, relying on on the emerging sustainability appraisal work carried out by Lewes District Council and the national park authority. The claim had been brought by a promoter of a scheme which had not been allocated for development in the plan. If SEA had been found to be required, this would have given it the opportunity to promote its site as a reasonable alternative for those allocated, given that it was outside the magic 7 km radius of the forest. Whilst the court found errors in the council’s reasoning for arriving at a negative screening opinion, they were not such as to vitiate the decision and the plan was not quashed. 
Wealden District Council v Secretary of State, Lewes District Council and South Downs National Park Authority  (Jay J, 20 March 2017)
The forest lies within Wealden’s and the national park authority’s respective administrative areas. Lewes District Council’s boundary is around 5-6km from the forest. This was a challenge by Wealden District Council of a joint core strategy prepared by Lewes and the national park authority. Wealden claimed that Lewes and the national park authority had acted unlawfully in concluding, on advice from Natural England, that the joint core strategy would not be likely to have a significant effect on the SAC in combination with the Wealden core strategy. 
Natural England had advised that if the expected increase in AADT flows on any route within 200m of a protected site was less than 1,000 cars per day or 200 HGVs per day, equivalent to less than a 1% increase in traffic, then appropriate assessment was not necessary. The expected increase turned out to be 190 AADT, but the expected increase of 950 generated by proposals in the Wealden core strategy was ignored. The defendants tried to argue before the court that the 1,000 AADT threshold was “sufficiently robust and precautionary to cover any likely scenario of in-combination effects. The amounts of nitrogen dioxide in play are so small that they are effectively de minimis and of neutral effect”. 
The judge held that Natural England’s approach was “plainly erroneous”. There was “no sensible or logical basis” for excluding the Wealden core strategy from account” and a “clear breach” of the Habitats Directive. 
A couple of additional points to note:
– The challenge was to policies in the joint core strategy, but (unlike the national park authority) Lewes had adopted it more than six weeks before the challenge had been brought. Accordingly only the policies relating to the provision of new housing in the national park authority’s area were quashed. 
– In an extreme case of nominative determinism, Natural England’s expert advisor, as in a number of these cases, was one Marion Ashdown. 

Controversy relating to Ashdown Forest is likely to continue if a recent Daily Mirror piece  on the Mid-Sussex local plan inspector’s 20 February 2017 preliminary conclusions on housing requirements is anything to go by…
So what do we conclude from all of this?
Even once we agree that complex eco-systems such as Ashdown Forest need protection, the dividing line between an appropriate precautionary approach to house-building in the vicinity and inappropriate over-protection is really hard to draw, and it is equally difficult to apply triage so as to reduce the amount of detailed assessment work required. 
The necessary predictions draw upon scientific disciplines such as chemistry, statistics, ecology and psychology as much as they are about planning or law. 
Perhaps there is room for greater clarity. After all, it is concerning when even the Government’s statutory advisory body can be “plainly erroneous” in its approach. And it is concerning that so many complex cases are reaching the courts – and leading to the quashing of decisions and policies. This hardly gives a certain basis for house building. 
But don’t think that this is ever going to be easy or that the problems mainly lie with the nature of the EU directives from which the legal principles flow. We will reinvent the wheel at our peril. 

After all that, perhaps there is one thing on which we can all agree?

It is more fun to talk with someone who doesn’t use long, difficult words but rather short, easy words like “What about lunch?” (A.A. Milne)

Simon Ricketts 8.4.17
Personal views, et cetera

Five Problems With Neighbourhood Plans

The real effects of neighbourhood plan making on housing delivery and on the efficient, democratic operation of the planning system are hard to pin down and yet the Government continues to champion its role. Are we really heading in the right direction? After all, despite the positivity of government sponsored initiatives such as mycommunity.org.uk  it isn’t all sweetness and light. Here is my personal worry list:
1. Neighbourhood Plans are usurping the role of local plans, whilst being subject to a lighter-touch examination process
The Court of Appeal, in R (DLA Delivery Ltd) v Lewes District Council  (10 February 2017), has now confirmed that a neighbourhood plan may be made without there being an up to date local plan. Until such time as the local plan comes forward, as the only up to date development plan, the neighbourhood plan’s policies will benefit from the statutory presumption in section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 and from paragraph 198 of the NPPF: “[where] a planning application conflicts with a neighbourhood plan that has been brought into force, planning permission should not normally be granted”.
This gives neighbourhood plans a role which was surely not foreseen by Parliament. Neighbourhood plans are intended to be in general conformity with the local plan’s strategic policies. But instead any policy vacuum can be filled by the neighbourhood plan’s own strategic policies. Whilst the Planning Practice Guidance urges collaborative working between neighbourhoods and local planning authorities, this does not prevent problems from arising which are exacerbated by two further factors:
–  in order to survive the ‘relatively limited‘ (Court of Appeal in DLA Delivery, para 5) examination process, neighbourhood plans only have to satisfy the ‘basic conditions’ set out in the paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 4B to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as applied to neighbourhood plans by section 38A of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, rather than the wider and more rigorous soundness test applicable to local plans. 
–  the Neighbourhood Planning Bill proposes to accelerate the process, by deeming post-examination pre-referendum neighbourhood plans to be a material consideration in the determination of planning applications (clause 1) and by deeming post-referendum neighbourhood plans to be treated as part of the statutory development plan ahead of formally being made by the district or borough council (clause 2). It will be easier for the Secretary of State to dismiss appeals on the basis of inconsistency with emerging neighbourhood plans (a sensitive subject for DCLG given for example Holgate J’s quashing in Woodcock Holdings Limited v Secretary of State, 1 May 2015 and a series of examples of the Secretary of State having consented to judgment in similar circumstances). 
2. The Neighbourhood Plan process is “complex and burdensome”
Not my words but a description given by participants, according to recent research by the University of Reading: Neighbourhood Planning Users Research Revisited.  
Any community embarking on a neighbourhood plan has to be ready for the long haul. Because policies within the plan can have real consequences for communities and developers alike, it is no surprise that the process can be litigious. 
R (Crownhall Estates Limited) v Chichester District Council  (Holgate J, 21 January 2016) was the third (third!) judicial review in relation to the Loxwood Neighbourhood Plan, with the claimant developer seeking unsuccessfully to challenge the plan’s provision for only 60 homes against a background of a failure of the district council to meet its obejectively assessed housing needs. 

I do not believe that there is a transcript of Dove J’s rejection in Swan Quay LLP v Swale Borough Council on 31 January 2017 of a challenge to the Faversham Creek Neighbourhood Plan which contained a policy preventing redevelopment of the claimant’s property on the basis that it would lead to ‘gentrification’. The ruling is summarised by the Faversham Creek Trust in a press release.  
Challenges commonly focus on whether there has been compliance with the requirements of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive, another unsuccessful ground of challenge in DLA Delivery. R (Stonegate Homes Limited) v Horsham District Council (the late, missed, Patterson J, 13 October 2016) was an example of a successful challenge on this basis. The Haddenham Neighbourhood Plan is another, where Aylesbury Vale District Council consented to judgment.
3. Neighbourhood Plans dissipate the local planning authority’s resources

Parish councils such as Haddenham are unlikely to have the resources to resist a legal challenge, leaving the responsibility to the local planning authority which, under the legislation, formally “makes” the plan. How much say will they have over the way in which the defence case is brought and, as importantly, why should the local planning authority’s resources be stretched in this way?

We also have of course dissipation of CIL proceeds, with 15% of CIL proceeds available to be spent by parish councils, increased to 25% where a neighbourhood plan is in place – proceeds that would otherwise have applied towards infrastructure projects required to deliver development. 
4. Neighbourhood Plans are unnecessary and marginalise the role of the local planning authority

District and borough councils are designed to operate down to ward level. We elect ward councillors to represent our local interests – that is to say, the things we care about in relation to our home environment, our neighbourhood. Local plans can and do include policies at neighbourhood level. Additionally, there is scope for area action plans to provide more detailed site-specific policies where justified. 

We should all engage more with local plan making. Does the distraction of neighbourhood planning fuel the inaccurate sense that what happens at district or borough level is remote and not to do with us? What if the energy that one sometimes sees expended on neighbourhood planning were to be properly harnessed at local planning authority level, with proper access to officers and with consistency of plan making over a strategically sensible area?
5. Neighbourhood Plans are not fit for the further roles that Government continues to give them
Neighbourhood planning is of course voluntary. It is more prevalent in affluent areas and its heartland is in the south east (Turley research, 2014). In unparished areas it is the preserve of unelected groups. And yet the Government intends it to play a grown up role alongside local plans. Indeed, given that they have statutory force, unlike the NPPF, have neighbourhood plans in fact become more important than the Government’s own planning policies?
Gavin Barwell’s 12 December 2016 written ministerial statement (see my blog post That Ministerial Statement) set out that relevant policies for the supply of housing in a neighbourhood plan that is part of the development plan should not be deemed to be ‘out-of-date’ under paragraph 49 of the National Planning Policy Framework where the following circumstances arise at the time a planning decision is made: 
* the written ministerial statement making the policy change on 12 December 2016 is less than 2 years old, or the neighbourhood plan has been part of the development plan for 2 years or less;

* the neighbourhood plan allocates sites for housing; and

* the local planning authority can demonstrate a three-year supply of deliverable housing sites. 

The statement is of course the subject of a judicial review. In the meantime, the Government’s Housing White Paper has added the further qualification that neighbourhoods should be able to demonstrate that their site allocations and housing supply policies will meet their share of local housing need and that the local planning authority should be able to demonstrate through the White Paper’s housing delivery test that, from 2020, delivery has been over 65% (25% in 2018; 45% in 2019) for the wider authority area (to ensure that delivery rates across the area as a whole are at a satisfactory level). 
 The White Paper also proposes changes to the NPPF to “highlight the opportunities that neighbourhood plans present for identifying and allocating small sites that are suitable for housing, drawing on the knowledge of local communities”.

Finally, local planning authorities will now be “expected to provide neighbourhood planning groups with a housing requirement figure, where this is needed to allow progress with neighbourhood planning. As part of the consultation on a new standard methodology for assessing housing requirements, we will seek views on whether a standard methodology could be developed for calculating housing need in a neighbourhood plan area“.
Let us remember that these are voluntary plans, prepared by parish councils and community groups. Are we not seeing, yet again, a relentless move towards process and complexity, in an effort to make running repairs to a mechanism that was not designed for this function? 
Simon Ricketts 19.2.17
Personal views, et cetera

There Goes The Neighbourhood? Recent Challenges To NDPs

There is still significant legal debate as to what is the proper scope of neighbourhood development plans. This has resulted in a series of cases in which the parish council or neighbourhood forum that has promoted the relevant NDP sits on the sidelines (due to lack of resources) as the borough or district council which has been required to make it finds itself embroiled in significant legal proceedings. 
Can an NDP be made in advance of an up to date local plan?

This question is critical because, if so, there is significant freedom for the NDP to set the local policy agenda on issues (such as housing numbers in the neighbourhood) which might be thought to be more properly the domain of the local plan (whereas if there is an adopted local plan there is the statutory constraint that the NDP must be in “general conformity” with its “strategic policies”). 

To date High Court judges have taken the view that the answer is “yes” but this will come before the Court of Appeal for the first time this coming week, when the claimant’s appeal from the ruling of Foskett J in R (DLA Delivery) v Lewes District Council  (31 July 2015) is heard on 15 and 16 November 2016. Foskett J had taken an equivalent approach to that of Lewis J in R (Gladman Developments Limited) v Aylesbury Vale District Council  (18 December 2014) and Holgate J in Woodcock Holdings v Secretary of State  (1 May 2015). 
Can an NDP require new dwellings to be occupied as a “principal residence”?
This was the main issue before Hickinbottom J (promoted to the Court of Appeal since the hearing) in R (RLT Built Environment Limited) v Cornwall Council  (10 November 2016). This of course concerned the St Ives Neighbourhood Plan’s proposed ban on new dwellings being used as second homes. 
As is so often the case in NDP challenges (see below for more of this) the first line of attack was as to the adequacy of the strategic environmental assessment that had been carried out. The claimant, a local developer, claimed that increasing the amount of market housing for local people to buy was a “reasonable alternative” that should have been assessed. The judge disagreed – as an alternative it was an “obvious non-starter” as it did not achieve the objective of the policy which was to reduce the number of second homes in the area.  
The second line of attack was that the policy would amount to an unjustified interference with the right to a home in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The judge held that whilst the right might in theory be interfered with if a resident had to leave the area due to changes in personal circumstances, the interference was proportionate and therefore acceptable. The LPA would also be able to take personal circumstances into account in deciding whether or not to take planning enforcement action. 
Whilst much turned on the local circumstances of the second home honeypot that is St Ives, can one extrapolate to other areas under pressure from second homes, such as parts of London?
When will a plan be quashed on the basis of inadequate strategic environment assessment?
There have been many challenges, whether to decisions to screen out SEA (eg R (Larkfleet Homes Limited) v Rutland County Council  (Court of Appeal, 17 June 2015)) or to the adequacy of the SEA process (most recently in the Cornwall case but before that in for instance in BDW Trading Limited v Cheshire West and Chester Borough Council  (Supperstone J, 9 May 2014)). Until last month, I only knew of one example of an NDP being quashed on the basis of inadequate assessment: the Haddenham Neighbourhood Plan, where Aylesbury Vale District Council consented to judgment  in March 2016 (to the chagrin of the parish council that had promoted the plan). 
So R (Stonegate Homes Limited) v Horsham District Council  (Patterson J, 13 October 2016) is quite something: the Henfield Neighbourhood Plan was quashed by the High Court following a contested hearing on 4 October (Mark Lowe QC acted for the successful claimant, who incidentally also acted for the successful defendant in the Cornwall case two days later on 6 October). The plan favoured residential development to the east of the settlement and, relying on perceived problems with the local road system, no assessment was carried out of the possibility of development to the west, despite a planning appeal having been allowed to the west and a highways reason for refusal having been withdrawn by the LPA following agreement between the appellant and the county council. The plan was quashed on the basis of a flawed assessment of reasonable alternatives within the SEA process as well as on the basis that there was no evidential basis for the examiner of the plan ruling out locations to the west or for the LPA to conclude that the plan met EU law requirements.  
The case is an encouraging example of the SEA Directive fulfilling a necessary role in providing a safeguard against loose or lazy thinking, against the background of a process where examination can be light touch (to put it charitably) and where the legislation has as many holes as a Cornish trawler net when it comes to NDPs, minnows of our plan led system. 

Simon Ricketts 12.11.16
Personal views, et cetera

(EIA + SEA) – EU = ?

Deadlines, deadlines. 
The EU’s 2014 amending directive on environmental impact assessment  has to be transposed by member states into domestic law by 16 May 2017. 
Given that Theresa May has announced that Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty will be invoked by the UK government by the end of March 2017, which would see us out of the EU by the end of March 2019, does the 16 May 2017 deadline matter?
The Scottish Government is currently consulting  on transposition, with a consultation deadline of 31 October 2016. The Welsh Government is consulting  with a consultation deadline of 11 November 2016. 
I have seen no signs of any equivalent work underway for England or Northern Ireland, despite the lengthy lead-in period to the transposition process if it is to be done in accordance with the UK government’s own guidance .

This can only be deliberate but is going to lead to problems for developers and LPAs alike. 
What does the amending Directive change?
The changes are significant. For instance:
– More information is to be provided with requests for screening opinions, requiring more analysis and work at an earlier stage

– Mitigation measures considered at the screening stage need to be specified and retained in the final development proposals

– Reasoning for screening opinions and directions are expressly required

– If a scoping opinion is obtained, the ES must comply with it

– The Environmental Statement becomes an ‘EIA Report’

– It will need to be prepared by ‘accredited and technically competent experts’

– Decision makers in reaching decisions will need to decide whether the environmental information is up to date or whether further updated information is required

– The decision maker will need to decide whether to impose monitoring obligations to cover the implementation and management of the project

– The minimum public consultation period in relation to the EIA report will be 30 days (whereas the UK minimum period is of course 21 days).

It is not of course unknown for a member state to be late in transposing a Directive, but there are real consequences. The state can be fined for its failure to transpose. But, of more specific relevance to developers and LPAs, the failure to transpose the Directive by the deadline can in some circumstances lead to grounds of challenge for a claimant when, for instance, seeking to challenge a planning permission on the basis that the LPA has not complied with the requirements of the Directive. The Directive applies where projects have not been screened or scoped – or the subject of an ES submitted – by 16 May 2017. 
So, pre 16 May 2017, the 2011 Regulations will continue to apply (as long as you have screened, scoped or submitted) and post 16 May 2017 it would be prudent to comply with the substance of the amending Directive. 
But what will happen once we have left the EU? Well of course we have been promised the ‘Great Reform Bill’ which seems designed to retain UK legislation that transposes EU legislation in some holding pen, from which laws will be taken out individually over time to be amended or repealed. Accordingly, even after March 2019 (or whenever our exit from the EU turns out to be) the 2011 EIA Regulations (as amended from time to time) will continue to apply until further notice.
In my view it would be a mistake to envisage any substantial repeal of environmental impact assessment legislation, as opposed to attempts no doubt at streamlining. 
Accordingly, the stream of EIA case law will undoubtedly continue. Some 2016 highlights:
R (XY) v Maidstone Borough Council  (Deputy High Court Judge Rhodri Price-Lewis QC) – held that negative screening opinion was lawful – on the facts no requirement to treat proposal for gypsy site as inevitably part of a larger development proposal given other similar proposals in the area. 
R (Jedwell) v Denbighshire County Council  (Hickinbottom J, 16 March 2016) – reasons for negative screening opinion not given within a reasonable period of time but permission not quashed. 
R (Licensed Taxi Drivers Association) v Transport for London  (Patterson J, 10 February 2016) – challenge to London’s east-west cycle superhighway failed – determination of adverse environmental effects was for the LPA.
SEA
The SEA Directive  is fully transposed into law in England by the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004  – also destined for the Great Repeal Bill holding pen. 
In the meantime the cases continue. According to a Landmark Chambers update  we await the outcome of R (RTE Built Environment Limited) v Cornwall Council in relation to the St Ives Neighbourhood Plan, with its proposed second homes ban, following a hearing on 6 October 2016. 
More selfishly, a number of us who have contributed chapters to the forthcoming book by Greg Jones QC and Eloise Scotford, The Strategic Environmental Directive: A Plan For Success?  are hoping that it has a long and relevant shelf-life….

Simon Ricketts 8.10.16
Personal views, et cetera