Money Money Money: Accounting For CIL

This tweet from MHCLG has been nagging away at me for a few days:

The announcement of course was in relation to the 1 September 2019 commencement date in the Community Infrastructure Levy (Amendment) (England) (No. 2) Regulations 2019 and the Government’s updated planning practice guidance in relation to CIL , planning obligations and viability.

I covered the background to the changes in my 8 June 2019 blog post The Bottom Line: Updates On CIL And Viability.

There was quite a splash on 1 September, with a MHCLG press statement Communities to see how housing developers cash benefits them thanks to new planning rules (1 September 2019) and media briefings by planning minister Esther McVey, duly reported in the professional press eg Councils forced to spell out details of CIL deals (Housing Today, 2 September 2019):

McVey said builders “spent a whopping £6bn towards local infrastructure in 2016/17” but councils had not been required to report on the total amount of funding they had received or how it was spent, “leaving residents in the dark”.

She went on: “The new rules … will allow residents to know how developers are contributing to the local community when they build new homes, whether that’s contributing to building a brand new school, roads, or a doctor’s surgery that the area needs.”

What has been nagging away at me in the tweet was the gif image: “Developers paid £6bn in contributions in 2016/2017…Community Infrastructure Levy”.

Huge if true.

But it’s not.

I have tracked the £6bn figure back to a research report The Incidence, Value and Delivery of Planning Obligations and Community Infrastructure Levy in England in 2016-17 by Dr Alex Lord, Dr Richard Dunning and Dr Bertie Dockerill (University of Liverpool), Dr Gemma Burgess (University of Cambridge), Dr Adrian Carro (University of Oxford) Professor Tony Crook and Professor Craig Watkins (University of Sheffield) and Professor Christine Whitehead (London School of Economics) published by MHCLG in March 2018.

From the executive summary:

There has been an increase in the aggregate value of planning obligations agreed and CIL levied since 2011/12, up 61% from £3.7bn to £6.0bn in 2016/17 (50% after adjusting for inflation).

So the £6bn is the total of the value of section 106 planning obligations agreed (not paid) and “CIL levied”. This is the table in the research document:

⁃ “The estimated value of planning obligations agreed and CIL levied in 2016/17 was £6.0 billion. This central valuation is premised upon the assumptions identified in the appendix, corresponding to survey validity, respondent representation and the distribution of values.

⁃ When adjusted to reflect inflation the total value of developer obligations in real terms is almost identical to the peak recorded in 2007/08 (£6.0 billion), but significantly higher than in 2011/12 (£3.9 billion). These changes coincide with changes in the number of dwellings granted planning permission over time.

⁃ 68% of the value of agreed developer obligations was for the provision of affordable housing, at £4.0 billion. 50,000 affordable housing dwellings were agreed in planning obligations in 2016/17.

⁃ The value of CIL levied by LPAs was £771 million in 2016/17, with a further £174 million levied by the Mayor of London.

⁃ The geographic distribution of planning obligations and CIL is weighted heavily towards the south of England. The South East and London regions account for 58% of the total value.

⁃ Direct payment contributions continue to provide a large proportion of the total contribution value for non-affordable housing obligations

But I am pretty sure there is a confusion over “CIL levied” too. The table shows that of the £6bn, £771m was LPA CIL and £174m was Mayoral CIL. As with the money attributed to planning obligations, I suspect that these CIL figures represent the amount of CIL that is calculated to be payable if development eventually proceeds pursuant to permissions issued in 2016/2017. After all we can cross-check the £174m against the MCIL monies actually collected by the Mayor from the boroughs in 2016/2017 which this GLA table shows to be only £137m.

There is something else important. Over two thirds of the “whopping £6bn towards local infrastructure” that developers allegedly spent in 2016/2017 was not even towards “local infrastructure” as defined by the Government – it was towards affordable housing!

So it’s not that developers are not committing huge sums towards local infrastructure, and even greater sums towards affordable housing.

And it’s not that CIL will not over time secure increasing contributions towards the provision of local infrastructure.

It’s the inaccuracies and exaggeration. £6bn was not received by local authorities in 2016/2017 to be spent on local infrastructure. Local authorities did not even accrue the right to that amount in the future. The reality is that planning permissions were issued which, could, in due course , deliver (subject to the application of CIL exemptions and reliefs in the case of the £945m CIL component) up to around £2bn.

The minister accuses authorities of “leaving residents in the dark” as to funding received and spent. Greater transparency from MHCLG on the numbers it uses would be equally helpful.

Simon Ricketts, 7 September 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Another Green World: The South Coast Nitrate Crisis

Local authorities in south Hampshire have been advised by a Government body not to grant permission for most forms of residential development until further notice. Perhaps absurdly, but in desperation, authorities have even been exploring amongst themselves whether they could at least grant planning permission subject to a condition restricting the homes from being occupied, or simply risk the consequences of ignoring the advice – the position is that bad.

I’m not sure that anyone can blame the EU, or lawyers, or local authorities, or developers, but no doubt they will. Rather, the problem arises from the apparent lack of adequate measures to ensure that, by virtue of its nitrate content, sewage generated as a result of new development does not harm the integrity of coastal waters protected as special areas of conservation and special protection areas under the Habitats and Birds Directives. Nitrate enrichment causes green algae, harmful to protected habitats and birds, through a process known as eutrophication. The chickens (not those in my 1 June 2019 blog post, although the same by product) are coming home to roost following a lack of priority for too long on the need by the Government and water companies to ensure that we have adequately funded and operated waste water treatment processes (see for instance the 25 June 2019 Guardian story Southern Water faces prosecution after record £126m penalty).

The issue was raised in a House of Commons debate on 17 June 2019 by Suella Braverman, Conservative MP for Fareham, but worryingly more from the perspective of seeking to suspend affected authorities’ housing targets rather than resolving the underlying issue:

“Planning applications that could deliver hundreds of new homes in Fareham are in limbo following advice from Natural England, which has instructed that planning permission should be refused unless developments are nitrate-neutral, after two rulings from the European Court of Justice. Will the Government work with me to look at suspending house building targets while affected councils work to find a solution to avoid being unfairly treated at potential appeals?

I’m not sure how reassured she we are by the response from the relevant Under-Secretary, Jake Berry: “We will happily work with my hon. Friend as she sets out. I believe that the housing Minister is already looking into this issue, and I am sure he will be in touch with her in due course.”

In south Hampshire the problem arises from a legal opinion obtained by Natural England and shared with relevant authorities on a confidential basis. If there is a copy in public circulation then do let me know and I will add it to this post. The opinion draws upon recent case law, particularly the ruling of Court of Justice of the European Union in Coöperatie Mobilisation for the Environment UA, Vereniging Leefmilieu V College van gedeputeerde staten van Limburg and Stichting Werkgroep Behoud de Peel v College van gedeputeerde staten van Noord-Brabant (CJEU, 7 November 2018).

Thankfully it’s known as the “nitrogen deposition” or the “Dutch” case. Whilst the case concerned nitrogen deposition effects arising from agricultural activities, there are two particular (unsurprising) parts of the ruling which are relevant for our purposes:

1. The Habitats Directive does not preclude “national programmatic legislation which allows the competent authorities to authorise projects on the basis of an ‘appropriate assessment’ within the meaning of that provision, carried out in advance and in which a specific overall amount of nitrogen deposition has been deemed compatible with that legislation’s objectives of protection. That is so, however, only in so far as a thorough and in-depth examination of the scientific soundness of that assessment makes it possible to ensure that there is no reasonable scientific doubt as to the absence of adverse effects of each plan or project on the integrity of the site concerned, which it is for the national court to ascertain.”

2. An appropriate assessment under the Habitats Directive “may not take into account the existence of ‘conservation measures’ within the meaning of paragraph 1 of that article, ‘preventive measures’ within the meaning of paragraph 2 of that article, measures specifically adopted for a programme such as that at issue in the main proceedings or ‘autonomous’ measures, in so far as those measures are not part of that programme, if the expected benefits of those measures are not certain at the time of that assessment.

The most detailed account that I could find of the legal advice and underlying issues is in Portsmouth City Council report to cabinet 11 June 2019. It explains that the Integrated Water Management Strategy published last year by the Partnership for Urban South Hampshire (PUSH) authorities, Natural England and the Environment Agency recognised that there were “significant uncertainties beyond the year 2020 relating to water quality, quantity, the capacity for accommodating future growth and the impacts on European nature conservation designations.

Following the CJEU ruling, Natural England (NE), the government’s adviser for the natural environment, advises that, under the requirements of the Habitat Regulations, the existing uncertainty about the deterioration of the water environment must be appropriately addressed in order for the assessment of a proposal to be legally compliant. They recommend that this is addressed by securing suitable mitigation measures to ensure that proposals achieve ‘nitrate neutrality’. It is recognised that it would be difficult for small developments or sites on brownfield land (which form the majority of applications in Portsmouth) to be nitrate neutral.

NE has therefore advised [Havant Borough Council that ‘planning permission[s] should not be granted at this stage’ whilst the uncertainty around this issue means that a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of a proposal cannot be satisfactorily carried out and while an interim strategic solution is being developed for the sub-region’. Natural England’s advice is that proposals for new employment or leisure uses which do not entail an overnight stay are generally not subject to these concerns.

Officers sought advice from Queen’s Counsel on the matter, which confirmed the validity of Natural England’s position (as of 05.05.19). As per the legal advice received, and in the absence of any pre-existing mitigation strategy, the City Council has temporarily ceased granting planning consent for additional dwellings (or an intensification of dwellings), tourism related development and development likely to generate an overnight stay at this time. Such applications can still be considered on an individual basis if they are able to demonstrate that the development would be ‘nitrate neutral’. It is understood that other Local Authorities within the Solent catchment have also temporarily stopped granting planning consent for development affected by this matter whilst mitigation strategies are being developed.”

In a subsequent specific agenda item on the issue in its report to planning committee on 19 June 2019 members were updated:

“3.11  Immediate actions being progressed are as follows:

a)  Portsmouth and the PUSH authorities to lobby central government on the approach to the matter. There appears to be disconnect between government agencies on their advice to Local Authorities, including a clear conflict between the approach to the water quality issue and the pressure to meet the government’s housing delivery targets. We will be urging Government to examine the sources of the nitrates problem, including its own environmental permitting regimes and insufficient wastewater treatment practices by statutory undertakers, rather than solely focusing on the planning system/ development industry to present solutions.

b)  PUSH authorities have agreed to explore a strategic solution to the nitrates problem that can be used as mitigation by all authorities.

c)  Officers are identifying and exploring with Natural England and other relevant parties short term measures which could enable planning consents to resume in the short term while a more comprehensive and strategic solution is determined.

d)  Officers are arranging to meet with Southern Water to explore any existing capacity for improvements in the operation of the existing waste water treatment infrastructure and the scope, timescales and mechanisms to improve the existing treatment”

The Partnership for Urban South Hampshire (“PUSH”) comprises Hampshire County Council, Portsmouth, Southampton, Eastleigh, East Hampshire, Fareham, Gosport, Havant, New Forest, Test Valley and Winchester.

PUSH held a joint committee meeting on 4 June 2019. The minutes make interesting reading. The meeting was joined by Graham Horton from Natural England and Philip James from Southern Water. Philip James made it clear that any solution arrived at by Southern Water would need to be acceptable to its regulator, the Environment Agency. I suspect this issue is not going to be resolved quickly…

As discussion continued, Members sought views from Graham Horton whether there is a short-term solution which might mitigate risk but allow housing to be built. Members were advised that an option could be that Natural England prepares a form of words which, whilst it would not remove the risk of challenge, may give reassurance to legal advisers to support Local Planning Authorities deliver housing.

The suggestion was put to the meeting that a possibility could include Local Planning Authorities granting permission with conditions of no occupation until this matter is resolved and Graham Horton was asked whether if this approach was taken whether Natural England would challenge LPAs.

The Committee was advised that if Natural England agree and sign up to this then there would not be a challenge, but they will reserve judgment at this time until a joint position is developed and agreed which allows the issue to be resolved. This will not eliminate the risk but should give Local Planning Authorities some comfort and allow them to determine their planning consents.

At the conclusion of the discussion on this item, the Chairman summarised that it was a matter for individual Local Authorities whether they started to issue planning consents, that the best approach was to collectively work on a form of wording and it was agreed this would form joint working and the that the PUSH Planning Officers’ Group would take the lead on the preparation of this Assessment as a matter of priority. ”

It was further resolved that the Chairman should write “on behalf of PUSH to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to outline how we balance the need for housing and the need to protect the environment and to request consideration of respite from the Housing Delivery Test until this is resolved.”

I can foresee a practical veto for some time to come in relation to housing proposals in the area, bar those which are big enough so as to be able to incorporate their own measures to ensure nitrogen neutrality.

But is anyone focusing on this huge issue, an issue not just for the environment but for the breakdown in practice of the normal planning system in a number of authorities? There has been one piece in the mainstream media, a 14 June 2019 BBC report, Hampshire housing developments on hold over nitrate as well as a more detailed subsequent 19 June 2019 article in Planning magazine (which provided my way into much of this post, thank you Mark Wilding).

It’s not as if Parliament is blind to the issue. After all the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee published a detailed and pretty direct set of recommendations in its 6 November 2018 report UK Progress on Reducing Nitrate Pollution.

But what chance of any solutions to the immediate crisis on the south coast, please?

Simon Ricketts, 29 June 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Far Far Away: Slade Green SRFI

Two years after my 6 May 2017 blog post Slow Train Coming: Strategic Rail Freight Interchanges In The South East, progress remains slow.

I referred in my blog post to the ongoing saga of the Howbury Park (now known as Slade Green), strategic rail freight interchange scheme promoted initially by Prologis (who obtained a, now time expired, permission on appeal in 2007) and now by Roxhill.

The site straddles the boundaries of the London Borough of Bexley and Dartford Borough Council. (The effective boundary is the River Cray, with the elements of the scheme within Dartford’s administrative boundaries being an access road and bridge over the river). At the time of my blog post, Dartford had resolved to refused planning permission. Bexley had resolved to grant planning permission but the Mayor of London was considering whether to intervene.

The Mayor on 17 July 2017 directed Bexley to refuse the application, on this ground:

The proposal is inappropriate development in the Green Belt and very special circumstances have not been demonstrated which would clearly outweigh the harm to the Green Belt by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm. The development is therefore contrary to Policy 7.16 of the adopted London Plan 2016 and the National Planning Policy Framework 2012.”

Dartford’s reasons for refusal additionally related to the likely effects of additional traffic on air quality and congestion detrimental to the quality of life of the community in Deptford.

Roxhill appealed. The appeals were recovered for the Secretary of State’s own determination on 7 November 2017 for the reason that they related to proposals for significant development in the Green Belt. An inquiry was held over 18 days between June and September 2018.

The Secretary of State issued his decision letter on 7 May 2019. He dismissed the appeals. He found that the scheme was not in accordance with the relevant development plans. “He has gone on to consider whether there are material considerations which indicate that the proposal should be determined other than in accordance with the development plan.

25.In this case the Secretary of State considers that the harm to the Green Belt from inappropriate development carries substantial weight against the scheme and the effect on the character and appearance of the local area carries significant weight along with the adequacy of the proposed rail link and the effect on existing/future passenger rail services. Significant weight is also given to the effect on the convenience of highway users.

26.The Secretary of State considers that the provision of social economic benefits of the scheme has overall limited weight and the resulting net biodiversity gain has moderate weight.

27.The Secretary of State considers that the benefits of the scheme do not outweigh the harm to the Green Belt by reason of inappropriateness and any other harm, and so very special circumstances do not exist. He considers that the adverse impacts of the proposal significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits. Overall, he considers that there are no material considerations which indicate that the proposal should be determined other than in accordance with the development plan.

28.The Secretary of State therefore concludes that the appeal is dismissed, and planning permission is refused.”

In terms of the availability of alternative sites:

“18.The Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that in the 2007 decision it was identified that there was no alternative development site, a finding which attracted considerable weight in favour of that scheme (IR4.2). However, since 2007 the London Gateway, a brownfield site not located in the Green Belt, has been developed. For the reasons given in IR15.8.18 to 15.8.24, the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector’s conclusions that the London Gateway site has the potential to provide an alternative development option for the provision of a SRFI to serve the same part of London and the South East as the appeals proposal (IR15.8.26)

The Inspector’s conclusions, set out in section 15 of his report, are also worth delving into.

His findings ahead of his overall conclusions relied upon by the Secretary of State included the following:

The proposal would have a substantial adverse effect on the openness of the Green Belt and the introduction of this massive development beyond the built limits of Slade Green would constitute urban sprawl.”

[G]iven the requirement of the NPSNN [National Policy Statement on National Networks] that ‘as a minimum, a SRFI should be capable of handling 4 trains per day’, it follows that in order for the proposed rail link to be considered ‘adequate’, it would be necessary for it to be capable of accommodating 4 trains/day as a minimum…Based on the evidence presented, in my judgement, the number of trains that could be pathed to/from the appeals site, having regard to the current timetable, would be likely to fall well short of 4 per day (each way)

Unlike the circumstances in 2007, there is no longer a formally identified requirement for 3 or 4 SRFIs around London [4.2, 7.2.6, 8.5.1, 11.2.12, 11.2.14.f.]. The Government approach set out in the NPSNN is to support the realisation of the forecast growth by encouraging the development of an expanded network of large SRFIs across the regions [11.2.9]. Furthermore, ‘…SRFI capacity needs to be provided at a wide range of locations…There is a particular challenge in expanding rail freight interchanges serving London and the South East’. ”

Overall, I am content that there is a need and market for SRFIs to serve London and the South East [11.2.2-3]. I turn then to consider the extent to which the appeals scheme would be likely to meet the requirements of SRFIs set out in the NPSNN. ”

However, “the appeals scheme would not be well qualified to meet the identified need for SRFIs to serve London and the South East”

[T]he appellant’s ‘very special circumstances case’ included the assertion thatno alternative development options exist for SRFIs to serve this part of London and the South East…this represents a material consideration of very considerable weight’ ”

London Gateway, a brownfield site, has the potential to provide an alternative development option for the provision of a SRFI to serve the same part of London and the South East as the appeals proposal. Under these circumstances, even if the appeals scheme was also well qualified to meet that need, in my view, the weight attributable to this would be limited.”

Finally, the inspector also had significant concerns in relation to the traffic modelling that had been relied upon by the local authorities, including Transport for London and concluded that “the residual cumulative impact of the development on the local road network would be severe, with particular reference to congestion.

How uncertain, expensive and slow this process is. And how valuable it would be have been to have kept the 2007 Howbury Park permission alive.

Simon Ricketts, 11 May 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Lessons From The Heathrow Cases

In my 15 October 2016 blog post Airports & Courts I made the obvious prediction that publication by the Secretary of State for Transport of the Airports National Policy Statement (“ANPS”) would inevitably lead to litigation. The ANPS is important because under the Planning Act 2008 it sets the policy basis for a third runway at Heathrow to the north west of the current runways (the “NWR Scheme”).

It was always going to be important for the High Court to be able to rise to the (in a non-legal sense) administrative challenge of disposing of claims efficiently and fairly. The purpose of this blog post is to look at how that was achieved (no easy feat) and what we can learn more generally from the court’s approach to the litigation

The ANPS was designated on 26 June 2018 and five claims were brought seeking to challenge that decision:

⁃ A litigant in person, Neil Spurrier (a solicitor who is a member of the Teddington Action Group)

⁃ A group comprising the London Borough of Richmond-upon-Thames, the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, Greenpeace and the Mayor of London

⁃ Friends of the Earth

⁃ Plan B Earth

⁃ Heathrow Hub Limited and Runway Innovations Limited [unlike the other claimants above, these claimants argue for an extension of the current northern runway so that it can effectively operate as two separate runways. This scheme was known as the Extended Northern Runway Scheme (“the ENR Scheme”)]

Arora Holdings Limited joined as an interested party to each set of proceedings in pursuance of their case for a consolidated terminal facility to the west of the airport.

The Speaker for the House of Commons intervened in the Heathrow Hub Limited claim to object to various statements made to Parliament and Parliamentary Committees being admitted in evidence.

The first four claims raised 22 separate grounds of challenge. The fifth claim raised a further five grounds of challenge.

As Planning Liaison Judge, ie effectively lead judge within the Planning Court, Holgate J in my view has played an extremely effective role. Following a directions hearing, ahead of a subsequent pre-trial review three months later, he laid down a comprehensive set of directions on 4 October 2018 which provided for:

⁃ the first four claims to be heard at a single rolled up hearing, followed by the fifth claim

⁃ the cases to be heard by a Divisional Court (ie two or more judges, normally a High Court Judge and a Lord Justice of Appeal. In the event, the four claims were heard by a Divisional Court comprising Hickinbottom LJ and Holgate J. The fifth claim was heard immediately afterwards by a Divisional Court comprising Hickinbottom LJ, and Holgate and Marcus Smith JJ.)

⁃ video link to a second court room and (paid for jointly by the parties in agreed proportions) live searchable transcripts of each day’s proceedings

⁃ procedure to be followed in relation to expert evidence sought to be submitted in support of the first claim

⁃ statements of common ground

⁃ amended grounds of claim, with strict page limits and against the background of a request from the judge to “review the extent to which they consider that any legal grounds of challenge previously relied upon remain properly arguable in the light of the Acknowledgments of Service“, and with specific claimants leading on individual issues

⁃ bundles and skeleton arguments complying with strict page limits and other requirements

⁃ payment of security for costs by Heathrow Hub Limited in the sum of £250,000

⁃ cost capping in the other claims on Aarhus Convention principles

The main proceedings were heard over seven days in March, with the Heathrow Hub proceedings then taking a further three days (followed by written submissions). As directed by Holgate J, hearing transcripts were made publicly available.

Less than six weeks after close of the Heathrow Hub hearing, judgment was handed on 1 May 2019 in both case:

R (Spurrier & others) v Secretary of State (Divisional Court, 1 May 2019)

R (Heathrow Hub Limited & Runway Innovations Limited) v Secretary of State (Divisional Court, 1 May 2019)

The transcript of the first judgment runs to 184 pages and the transcript of the second judgment runs to 72 pages.

I am not going to summarise the judgments in this blog post but happily there is no need as the court at the same time issued a summary, which serves as a helpful précis of the claims and the court’s reasoning for rejecting each of them.

The Divisional Court found that all but six grounds were unarguable (the six being two Habitats Directive grounds from the first case, two SEA grounds from the first case and two from the second case (legitimate expectation and anti-competition). “All the other grounds were not considered not to have been arguable: the claimants may apply for permission to appeal against the Divisional Court’s decision concerning those grounds to the Court of Appeal within 7 days. The remaining six grounds were ultimately dismissed. The claimants may apply to the Divisional Court for permission to appeal within 7 days. If the Divisional Court refuses permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the claimants may re-apply directly to the Court of Appeal.”

The Secretary of State for Transport gave a written statement in the House of Commons on the same day, welcoming the judgments.

The two judgments will be essential reading in due course for all involved in similar challenges; the 29 grounds, and various additional preliminary points, cover a wide range of issues frequently raised in these sorts of cases and each is carefully dealt with, with some useful textbook style analysis.

In the Spurrier judgment:

– the scope for challenge of an NPS (paras 86 to 90)

⁃ relationship between the NPS and DCO process (paras 91 to 112)

⁃ extent of duty to give reasons for the policy set out in the NPS (paras 113 to 123)

⁃ consultation requirements in relation to preparation of an NPS (paras 124 to 140)

⁃ standard of review in relation to each of the grounds of challenge (paras 141 to 184)

⁃ the limited circumstances in which expert evidence is admissible in judicial review (paras 174 to 179)

⁃ whether updated information should have been taken into account (paras 201 to 209)

⁃ whether mode share targets were taken into account that were not realistically capable of being delivered (paras 210 to 219)

⁃ the relevance of the Air Quality Directive for the Secretary of State’s decision making (paras 220 to 285)

⁃ compliance with the Habitats Directive (paras 286 to 373)

⁃ compliance with the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (paras 374 to 502)

⁃ whether consultation was carried out with an open mind (paras 503 to 552)

⁃ whether the decision to designate the ANPS was tainted by bias (paras 553 to 557)

⁃ the relevance of the Government’s commitments to combat climate change (paras 558 to 660)

⁃ whether there was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (paras 661 to 665)

In the Heathrow Hub judgment:

⁃ legitimate expectation (paras 113 to 138)

⁃ use of Parliamentary material in the context of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights (paras 139 to 152)

⁃ competition law (paras 157 to 209).

As we wait to see whether any of these claims go further, I note that Arora has commenced pre application consultation ahead of submitting a draft DCO for a “consolidated terminal facility to the west of the airport, which we are calling Heathrow West, related infrastructure and changes to the nearby road and river network.” Now that is going to be another interesting story in due course. I’m not sure we have previously seen duelling DCOs…

Simon Ricketts, 4 May 2019

Personal views, et cetera

All About That Base

Good planning relies on good baselines. Determining the correct baseline or fallback position is the vital starting point for determining the effects that a development proposal would have, but is not easy – often involving the need for judgment as to what can be done in any event without planning permission or what the position would be in any event in terms of, for instance air quality, highways movements or the effect on the level of daylight and sunlight that existing properties enjoy.

In Wiltshire Waste Alliance Limited v Secretary of State (Sir Ross Cranston, 10 May 2018), an inspector had granted permission on appeal for the extension of a waste recycling plant.

Before him the company’s case was that if the appeal was dismissed the appeal site would continue to operate pursuant to a series of admittedly complicated planning permissions which, in any event, would allow a significant number of uses. The appeal was advanced on the basis of these “no project” baselines being in existence. No other grounds were advanced for the grant of planning permission. Essentially the claimant’s case against the appeal was that these baseline activities were not in fact permitted under the permissions operating. Further, for practical reasons what was permitted was limited and in any event could not take place.

In his decision letter the inspector had identified that it was crucial to the proper determination of the appeal that the effects of generated HGV traffic on the highway network and air quality were calculated “on a precautionary basis and compared with any planning fall-back position from which realistic baseline positions are drawn. It is established law that for a fall-back position to be taken into account it must be legally possible with respect to existing permitted land uses and also likely to occur on available evidence.”

The planning permission for the existing facility did not include any condition restricting the amount of waste that could be treated, but the application for it had indicated a figure of up to 25,000 tonnes per annum for one area, whereas the fallback position being relied upon by the operator at the appeal had assumed that this could be increased to 75,000 tonnes without the need for planning permission. It argued that the 25,000 figure was no limitation (applying the I’m Your Man case, recently approved of by the Court of Appeal in Lambeth LBC v Secretary of State). The claimant argued that the inspector had not considered whether such an increase in the quantity of material treated would have amounted to a material change of use by way of intensification. Retired High Court judge Sir Ross Cranston accepted the claimant’s argument, but also determined, as had been conceded by the Secretary of State, that the inspector had also wrongly noted that the application document referring to the 25,000 tonnes figure had not been incorporated by reference into the permission. Sir Ross Cranston’s summary of the arguments and reasoning is brief. (In the light of the Lambeth case I don’t see how incorporation by reference of the application document is relevant.)

As well as meaning that the inspector had made a legal error in the way that he had considered the fallback position, the judge accepted that the approach that had been taken “has the potential to infect the conclusions regarding the baseline scenarios” for the purposes of assessment of likely significant environmental effects in the environmental impact assessment.

It is a cautionary tale – ensure that you can justify any fallback or baseline position that you rely upon.

Whilst it didn’t matter for the purposes of the judgment, I assume that the proposal was assessed under the 2011 EIA Regulations. The 2017 Regulations are more prescriptive. EIA now needs to include a “description of the relevant aspects of the current state of the environment (baseline scenario) and an outline of the likely evolution thereof without implementation of the development as far as natural changes from the baseline scenario can be assessed with reasonable effort on the basis of the availability of environmental information and scientific knowledge“.

The more far-reaching and longer-term the effects of a project, the more complex the analysis ends up being, as can be seen from the Secretary of State’s decision dated 10 May 2018 to authorise the development consent order applied for by Transport for London in relation to the proposed Silvertown twin-bore road tunnel under the Thames (a scheme which also was promoted under the previous EIA legislation). The task of analysing what would be the position in terms of issues such as congestion and air quality is complex. There will be much focus on his conclusion on air quality effects in particular, namely that “greater weight needs to be placed on the impact of the Development on the zone [for the Greater Urban London area as a whole] rather than at individual receptors. The Secretary of States therefore places weight on the fact that whilst some receptors will experience a worsening in air quality as a result of the Development, overall the Development should have a beneficial impact on air quality and that the Development is not predicted to delay compliance with the [Air Quality Directive] in the timeframes that the Updated [Air Quality Plan], including the zone plan for the Greater Urban London area, sets out as being the quickest possible time.”

We have seen recently how assumptions as to air quality levels can be proved wrong in ways that are unexpected, such as the VW emissions scandal that threw into question the degree to which air quality levels would improve as newer vehicles replaced older ones on the road, or ways which are possibly less unexpected, such as the Government’s delayed compliance with the Air Quality Directive.

Accurate analysis is of course equally necessary with more routine non-EIA projects: that is, accurate analysis both in the relevant technical assessment, whatever it may be, and accurate analysis by the decision maker in taking it into account in reaching a decision. R (Rainbird) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (Deputy Judge John Howell QC, 28 March 2018) was a recent example of a planning permission being quashed (that the council had granted to itself for an affordable housing development) because of incorrect conclusions being drawn from a report on sunlight and daylight issues, that in itself was held to be significantly misleading in a number of respects, both in relation to the relevant baseline position and in its analysis of compliance with the relevant BRE guidelines that had been incorporated into the council’s local plan. However, every case inevitably turns on its own facts and, as the judge identified, the threshold for challenge is high:

⁃ Baroness Hale in Morge v Hampshire County Council (Supreme Court, 19 January 2011: “reports obviously have to be clear and full enough to enable [members] to understand the issues and make up their minds within the limits that the law allows them. But the courts should not impose too demanding a standard upon such reports, for otherwise their whole purpose will be defeated: the councillors either will not read them or will not have a clear enough grasp of the issues to make a decision for themselves

⁃ Lindblom LJ in Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council(Court of Appeal, 8 September 2017): “The question for the court will always be whether, on a fair reading of his report as a whole, the officer has significantly misled the members on a matter bearing upon their decision, and the error goes uncorrected before the decision is made. Minor mistakes may be excused. It is only if the advice is such as to misdirect the members in a serious way—for example, by failing to draw their attention to considerations material to their decision or bringing into account considerations that are immaterial, or misinforming them about relevant facts, or providing them with a false understanding of relevant planning policy—that the court will be able to conclude that their decision was rendered unlawful by the advice they were given.


Where the line is drawn between an officer’s advice that is significantly or seriously misleading—misleading in a material way—and advice that is misleading but not significantly so will always depend on the context and circumstances in which the advice was given, and on the possible consequences of it. There will be cases in which a planning officer has inadvertently led a committee astray by making some significant error of fact.., or has plainly misdirected the members as to the meaning of a relevant policy… There will be others where the officer has simply failed to deal with a matter on which the committee ought to receive explicit advice if the local planning authority is to be seen to have performed its decision-making duties in accordance with the law…. But unless there is some distinct and material defect in the officer’s advice, the court will not interfere
.”

⁃ Section 31 (2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides that the High Court “must refuse to grant relief on an application for judicial review…if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred” unless it is appropriate to disregard this “for reasons of exceptional public interest.”

Simon Ricketts, 12 May 2018

Personal views, et cetera

CIL: Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For

So now we know. We will all be continuing to scratch our heads over CIL. 
My 25 March 2017 blog post CIL: Kill Or Cure? summarised the main October 2016 (but only published February 2017) recommendations of the CIL review team: “the replacement of the current system with a more standardised approach of Local Infrastructure Tariffs (LITs) and, in combined authority areas, Strategic Infrastructure Tariffs (SITs). LITs would supposedly be set at a low level calculated by reference to a proportion of the market value per square metre of an average three bedroom property in the local authority area…For developments of ten dwellings or more, there would be a return to the flexibility of section 106 for provision of site-specific infrastructure (netting off LIT liability) and of course abolition of the pooling restriction.”

The team’s brief had been:
“Assess the extent to which CIL does or can provide an effective mechanism for funding infrastructure, and to recommend changes that would improve its operation in support of the Government’s wider housing and growth objectives.” 
In February, the Government promised to respond to the team’s recommendations alongside the Autumn 2017 budget.  Here we are, two years on from when the CIL review team’s work was commissioned in November 2015. The Autumn budget policy paper published on 22 November 2017 does indeed respond to the team’s recommendations, in the following terms:


Going through the proposals:

Removal of section 106 pooling restrictions, recommended by the CIL review team, is to be welcomed. Of course that should not be a green light for authorities in relation to a development proposal to revert to blanket tariff type section 106 requirements which would fail the regulation 123 test and wider principles recently set out by the Supreme Court in the Aberdeen case (see my 28 October 2017 blog post). 
Speeding up the process of setting and revising CIL, also recommended by the CIL review team, needs greater care in my view. It made sense as part of the review team’s concept of lower rates, arrived at in a more mechanistic manner than is currently the case. But there is no hint of lower rates in the Government’s proposal. Accordingly, close scrutiny is required. It is difficult enough as it is to have a meaningful influence on the process. The indication that higher zonal CILs could quickly be introduced to seek to capture land value uplifts around stations for instance is interesting but such interventions will need to be introduced with care if they are not in fact to discourage land owners from making their property available. 
Allowing authorities to set rates that better reflect the uplift in land values between a proposed and existing use was not a proposal that was considered by the CIL review team. It adds a further degree of complexity to the process. Charging schedules will have more categories. Precise floorspace calculations will be required not just of the proposed development but of the building that is to be replaced. Unintended consequences will inevitably arise and influence development strategies.  
A change of the indexation basis to house price inflation from build costs was not recommended by the CIL review team and will marginally complicate the process of calculating indexation, given that different areas will be experiencing differing inflation rates. And why is house price inflation relevant to non-residential floorspace?
Allowing combined authorities and planning joint committees with statutory plan-making functions the option to levy a Strategic Infrastructure Tariff was recommended by the CIL review team but that was against the backdrop of CIL being replaced with a lower “local infrastructure tariff”. Any additional net cost to owners and developers will directly affect viability, ie reduce the amount of affordable housing that schemes could otherwise afford. If the ability to rely on viability arguments is to be reduced, as the Government separately proposes, this is definitely going to impede delivery. Furthermore, why does affordable housing always lose out to infrastructure, particularly when charging authorities are proving very slow in spending the CIL monies that they have so far collected?
The proposals make no mention of the CIL Review team’s proposal, widely supported, of allowing infrastructure to be delivered via section 106 agreements in connection with larger developments, recovering the flexibility and opportunities for efficiency that the CIL system has removed. 
What next?
There will be detailed consultation on these and other changes, ahead of or possibly alongside the draft revised NPPF (rumoured now to have slipped to April 2018) before regulations are made which would probably now not come into force until early 2019. Earlier regulations are expected to deal with the specific ambiguity within regulation 128A affecting section 73 applications (highlighted in the VOA ruling mentioned in my CIL: Kill Or Cure blog post and since challenged by way of judicial review by the charging authority, Wandsworth) – but the transitional provisions within those regulations, and the extent to which the clarification should have retrospective effect, will need careful thought. 
For my part I find it incredibly disappointing that this whole process has been so slow and that the considered recommendations of the review team appear to have been cherry picked, destroying any internal coherence in what is proposed. Aside from correcting some obvious flaws, there appears to be nothing that will reduce CIL’s complexity, the problems arising from the multiplicity of exemptions, the straitjacket that it imposes in relation to more complex schemes and the high rates that are being set with little real scrutiny – indeed quite the reverse. The Government may have answers to these criticisms but simply relying on one paragraph in the budget policy paper really isn’t good enough.  
Simon Ricketts, 24 November 2017
Personal views, et cetera

Crossrail 2, Where Are You?

We’ve got some work to do now. 
George Osborne’s March 2016 budget indicated that the then Government would be “investing in the infrastructure that will deliver economic growth for the next generation” by a number of measures, including “securing London’s future infrastructure by giving the green light for Crossrail 2 to proceed. The government will provide £80 million to develop the project with the aim of bringing forward a Hybrid Bill this Parliament”. 


There have been rumours that the Treasury or Department for Transport subsequently have not yet been convinced of the business case but, whatever the reason (the twin challenges of Brexit and the need to devote resources to Northern Ireland to prop up a new born minority government? Politics = events, dear boy, events), the project’s absence from the Conservatives’ 2017 manifesto and subsequently from the Queen’s Speech on 21 June has been hugely disappointing. 
Perhaps given Mr Osborne’s new job it is no surprise that on the day of the Commons debate on the Queen’s Speech, 29 June, the London Evening Standard set out its concern in a strongly written editorial, but the points are surely well made. 
Delay to the project would have a series of harmful consequences:
– Postponement of the commuting benefits and congestion relief that it will bring. Given the need to provide additional capacity at Euston ready for the opening of HS2 in 2033, it is time critical (see City am’s 28 June 2017 piece).
– Loss of the opportunities that it will open up for additional housing and employment development around stations on the route, including opportunities for Transport for London to explore the possibilities for land value capture mechanisms. The Crossrail 2 Growth Commission confirmed in its 2016 report that the project could unlock 200,000 additional homes and 200,000 additional jobs. Without Crossrail 2, how will further housing come forward at the scale that is needed? In this uncertain period, are key sites going to lie fallow or developed at less than the scale that could be achieved with better rail connectivity?

– The unnecessary cost of delay, estimated by Crossrail 2 managing director Michele Dix at £2bn a year.

– Extended blight that will be caused along its current route, safeguarded in 2015 and shown on this interactive map.

– The uncertainty that has now been created for the impending replacement London Plan, the first draft of which we will see in November. The implications of Crossrail 2 are so significant that might the Mayor have to publish “with and without Crossrail 2” draft policies? How can the likely effects of the plan be properly assessed with such a question mark over Crossrail 2? 

The Mayor commenced consultation on 26 June 2017 in relation to his Mayor of London Community Infrastructure Levy 2 Preliminary Draft Charging Schedule (MCIL2 PDCS). MCIL1, which was adopted on 1 April 2012, was directed towards funding Crossrail 1. MCIL2 is directed towards funding Crossrail 2 and the Mayor intends for it to be adopted in April 2019. 

The proposed per sq m rates are £80 for band 1, £60 for band 2 and £25 for band 3, save that in central London and the Isle of Dogs, the rates for office, retail and hotel uses will be £185 for offices, £165 for retail and £140 for hotel uses.
 
Central London. 


Isle of Dogs

The Mayor’s supporting information says this about the current funding position for Crossrail:
Since the 2016 Budget, Transport for London, the Greater London Authority and the Government have been working to develop a funding package for the project as part of the development of a strategic outline business case. The London contribution to the costs of Crossrail consists of four funding sources: 

    * Crossrail 2 net operating surplus – i.e. the net impact of Crossrail 2 on TfL’s rail revenues 


    * over station development – proceeds from development of land and property initially required for construction (development related with Crossrail 2 will pay Mayoral CIL 2 on the same basis other developments) 


    * a Business Rate Supplement (BRS) (once the current BRS repays Crossrail 1 related debt) 


    * a Mayoral Community Infrastructure Levy (MCIL2).”


MCIL2 is intended to meet approximately 15% of the project’s costs. What if Crossrail 2 does not go ahead? The document states:

“Negotiations on the Crossrail 2 scheme are still underway and there is no agreed funding package at present. However, MCIL2 does need to be brought forward now to avoid a charging gap at the end of Crossrail 1 construction and to allow for early funding of the Crossrail 2 scheme. Should no funding deal be achievable, the Mayor will be able to apply the MCIL2 proceeds to fund other strategic transport projects for which there is a significant funding gap.
Crossrail 2 is also a key strand of the Mayor’s draft transport strategy published on 21 June 2017: “It
 will enable London’s highly productive economy to continue to grow by helping 270,000 more people get into the centre in the morning peak. It will thereby support 200,000 new jobs, as well as unlocking 200,000 additional new homes – more than 30 per cent of them outside London”

So what is happening behind the scenes? Will Crossrail 2 emerge in a leaner form? A City am story on 26 June asserts (denied by Crossrail 2) that a revised business case provided to the Government in March had dropped the proposed station at Kings Road Chelsea (the subject of a vociferous celebrity-backed campaign) and that possible stations at Turnpike Lane and Balham have been replaced by Wood Green and Tooting Broadway options respectively. The continued speculation without any real information, isn’t helping anybody.

What political weight, if any, does the National Infrastructure Commission still have? George Osborne (him again) established the NIC in October 2015 to “determine Britain’s infrastructure priorities and hold governments to account for their delivery” and appointed Lord Andrew Adonis as its chairman. NIC’s support of Crossrail 2 was hugely influential in the lead up to that March 2016 announcement. It set out on 26 June 2017 its top 12 infrastructure priorities, with Crossrail 2 featuring strongly: “The Government should by the end of 2017 publish a plan, agreed with the Mayor of London, for the funding and phased construction of Crossrail 2, and for securing the necessary parliamentary consent, taking account of the recommendations in the NIC’s Transport for a World City report.”
If this stasis goes on much longer I may even start to get nostalgic about all of those photos of George Osborne in high vis and hard hat…
Simon Ricketts, 1 July 2017

Personal views, et cetera