The Court of Appeal handed down somewhat of a Christmas present today for those of us frustrated with questions raised from time to time by local planning authorities as to whether “Hillside” issues may arise in relation to particular application strategies adopted by our clients. In his judgment today in R (Fiske) v Test Valley Borough Council (Court of Appeal, 15 December 2023) Lindblom LJ makes it clear that this is simply a question for the developer to deal with – it is “not the authority’s job”.
The conclusion is clear although the underlying facts of the judgment take some unpicking. The first elephant trap to avoid is that whilst the case is part of the same saga arising from a local resident’s efforts to thwart development for a proposed solar farm in Hampshire, this is not an appeal from the High Court’s ruling in R (Fiske) v Test Valley Borough Council (Morris J, 6 September 2023) – the case that endorsed the now well understood legal position in relation to the scope of section 73 permissions, that the development approved must not depart from the description of development on the face of the parent planning permission and must not constitute a fundamental alteration to the development approved by the parent planning permission. The court held in that case that removal of a substation from the approved development (a revised form of substation having been approved within the site by way of a separate planning permission) could not be achieved by way of section 73 given both that this conflicted with the operative wording of the parent permission that referred to a substation and given that the planning committee was not made aware of the removal of the substation from the proposals. (Here is Town Legal’s Town Library summary of that ruling).
In today’s Court of Appeal ruling, the question before the court was as to whether that separate planning permission had been granted unlawfully, given that at the time it was granted the subsequently quashed section 73 permission (to amend the rest of the scheme to be consistent with that permission) had not yet been granted (Sincere congratulations if you are still following this). As encapsulated by Lindlom LJ at the beginning of his judgment:
“Did a local planning authority err in law when granting planning permission for a distribution network operator (“DNO”) substation to connect a proposed solar park to the national grid? In particular, did it fail to have regard to an “obviously material” consideration by not taking into account the incompatibility of that planning permission with the permission it had previously granted for the solar park itself? These questions arise in this case. They involve principles of law that are already well established.”
Lindblom LJ then sets out the relevant legal principles in relation to the nature of material considerations and as to the incompatibility of planning permissions (our old friends Pilkington, Pioneer Aggregates and Hillside).
He goes on to agree with the conclusions of HHJ Jarman KC at first instance: the incompatibility of planning permissions or the prospect of some future breach of planning control was not a material consideration to which the council was required to have regard under any provision of the statutory planning code.
“The fact that the differences between the two proposals were obvious when the challenged decision was taken does not mean that their incompatibility was an “obviously material” and thus mandatory material consideration in the council’s decision. That would be a misconception. The planning system does not preclude the possibility of a number of applications for planning permission being made and granted for different developments on the same site. It accepts the granting and co-existence of mutually incompatible permissions, one or more of which may prove incapable of lawful implementation, whether in whole or in part, unless the incompatibility can be defeated by a further grant of permission under section 70 of the 1990 Act, or section 73. This was a point strongly emphasised in Pilkington.
There is nothing in the judgment of Lord Sales and Lord Leggatt in Hillside Parks, nor in Lord Widgery’s in Pilkington, or elsewhere in the cases to which counsel referred, to support the proposition that the incompatibility between a previously granted planning permission and an application seeking permission for a different scheme is a mandatory material consideration in the decision being taken, either as a general rule or in the “special cases” to which Lord Widgery referred.”
“In the light of the relevant reasoning in Pilkington, recently confirmed in Hillside Parks, and the cases on mandatory material considerations, I do not accept that the fact of the 2017 permission being expressly “associated” with the application for the 2021 permission made the incompatibility between the two permissions an “obviously material” consideration. Such incompatibility did not nullify or prevent the implementation of either the 2017 permission or the 2021 permission. It did not negate the principle of a solar park development on the site, which the 2017 permission had established. Nor did it go to the intrinsic planning merits of the substation proposal that the committee was now considering.”
“I see no force in the submission that the possibility of Woodington Solar acting in breach of planning control was itself an “obviously material” consideration. If the incompatibility of the two planning permissions was not an “obviously material” consideration, the future actions of a developer with the benefit of those two permissions cannot be seen as a matter on which the council needed to speculate. This was a question for Woodington Solar as developer. It did not bear on the planning merits of the proposal in hand.”
“For a large development such as this to require changes to be made to it in the course of design and construction is not unusual. It often happens. When it does, the developer may be expected to make such changes through the normal planning process. If he has the benefit of two or more planning permissions incompatible with each other, or potentially so, there may be lawful steps he can take to overcome that incompatibility and proceed with the development he wants to build. Sometimes this will not be so. In that case the incompatibility will remain, and the lawful implementation of one permission or the other, or both of them, will not be possible. But the local planning authority is not legally compelled to anticipate how the developer might later choose to deal with such inconsistency, or to assume that he will resort to unlawful means of doing so. That is not the authority’s job.”
Hear, hear.
Just waiting now from my NPPF present from DLUHC, although I suspect it may be very similar to what we all received this time last year…
Simon Ricketts, 15 December 2023
Personal views, et cetera
Photo courtesy of Neenu Vimalkumar via Unsplash