Viability – SIMONICITY

Carry That Weight

“Boy, you’re gonna carry that weight

Carry that weight a long time

Boy, you’re gonna carry that weight

Carry that weight a long time”

(Lennon & McCartney, 1969)

Three interesting decision letters have been issued in the last ten days by the Planning Inspectorate in relation to large residential development projects in London:

Decision letter dated 14 May 2026, dismissing an appeal in relation to a proposed part 10 storey, part 28 storey building at 1 Battersea Bridge Road, including 110 new dwellings
Decision letter dated 18 May 2026, dismissing an appeal in relation to the proposed redevelopment of the Aylesham Centre Peckham, including 867 new dwellings
Decision letter dated 18 May 2026, allowing an appeal against a refusal to grant planning permission under section 73 for an amended version of an existing planning permission for the Camden Goods Yard development in Camden so as to be able to implement fire safety requirements, reducing the number of dwellings from 644 to 636 and reducing the affordable housing provision from 38% to 15%.

There has been much commentary, aimed at taking from those decisions pointers for other projects. But in my view the messaging from them is inevitably as mixed as the weather last week in Leeds.

Because, however much we all try to, and indeed often are paid to, forecast the outcome of particular applications and appeals, there are two particular aspects which make it in reality almost impossible (particularly in relation to larger, complex, projects):

What largely subjective assessment will the decision-maker reach on aspects such as the degree of harm caused to e.g. heritage and townscape and the significance of that harm?
What weight will the decision maker give to particular competing factors before arriving at an assessment of the overall planning balance?

Bear in mind those two questions as you read these extracts from the inspectors’ conclusions in these three appeals:

1 Battersea Bridge Road:

“187. Having regard to NPPF paragraph 215 and London Plan Policy D9, I must weigh the moderate, low and negligible levels of less than substantial harm to the significance of designated heritage assets, against the public benefits. All the aforementioned benefits should be regarded as public benefits. 188. The benefits of market and affordable housing delivery are substantial. These alone outweigh the harm to significance notwithstanding the considerable importance and weight I give to that harm. While NPPF paragraph 212 indicates that great weight should be afforded to the assets’ conservation, there is clear and convincing justification for the harm to these designated heritage assets as required by NPPF paragraph 213.

189. Accordingly, the proposal would have an acceptable effect on the setting and the significance of designated heritage assets. Despite the identified conflict with London Plan Policies D9 and HC1 and WLP Policies LP3 and LP4, the proposal would accord with NPPF paragraphs 212, 213 and 215.

190. Regarding the moderate indirect adverse effect on the significance of 10 – 14 and 24 – 52 Westbridge Road, 52 – 68 Battersea Bridge Road, and 11 – 35 and 61 – 71 Battersea Church Road as non-designated heritage assets and the conflict with London Plan Policies D9 and HC1 and WLP Policies LP3 and LP4, this would be significantly outweighed by the proposal’s benefits, having had regard to NPPF paragraph 216.

191. Although the heritage balance has been passed, the harms to the aforementioned heritage assets are included in the overall planning balance below.

192. While I have had regard to the appellant’s and the Council’s views on full or partial compliance with London Plan Policy D9 or with WLP Policy LP4, I do not pursue this debate further as the proposal clearly fails to comply with several of the elements of London Plan Policy D9 Part C [“visual, functional, environmental, and cumulative impacts… requires consideration of long, mid-range and immediate views; the local and wider context’s spatial hierarchy; wayfinding; architectural quality and materials; and protection and enhancement of the river’s open quality, public realm, and views”] and WLP Policy LP4 [“proposals for tall buildings will only be appropriate in tall building zones identified in WLP Appendix 2, where there would not be any resulting adverse visual, functional, environmental, or cumulative impacts”].

193. The proposal would provide the benefits of market and affordable housing, both of which individually carry substantial weight. There would be other benefits to which I have afforded significant and moderate weight and these are outlined above. However, I have afforded very substantial weight to the adverse effects on the character and appearance of the area. There are moderate, low and negligible levels of less than substantial harm to designated heritage assets which carries considerable weight and moderate indirect adverse effects on non-designated heritage assets which carry moderate weight.

194. Accordingly, the proposal would be contrary to the development plan taken as a whole, and there are no material considerations that indicate that planning permission should otherwise be granted.”

Aylesham Centre:

“98. Contrary to the appellant’s primary contentions, I have found that there is only partial compliance with the adopted development plan for the area, taken as a whole, bearing in mind all disputes made by LBSC and the Rule 6 party combined. Specifically, I find conflict with: SP Policy NSP74 in respect of CLT homes, design, heritage, tall buildings, and retention of retail; and LP Policies HC1, D1, D4 and D9, and SP Policies P13, P17, P20 and P21 and Area Vision AV.14 regarding harmful heritage and townscape impacts.

99. Although there would be some conflict with LP Policies NSP74, SD6 and E9, and SP Policies P32 and P35 I do not find that the appeal development would be deleterious to town centre vitality and viability, or to local business interests overall. Equally, the appellant’s underlying viability position is material. Accordingly, I find no harm from the reduced affordable housing provision as a result.

100. Consequently, linked to the appellant’s other contentions when applying paragraph 11 (d) of the Framework the policies which are most important for determining the application are not out-of-date. And in other respects, the site is already allocated for housing development.”

“103. Factoring significance evidence there would be less than substantial heritage asset harm to a range of relevant designated and non-designated heritage assets. I give great weight to the conservation of designated heritage assets. And substantial weight to the non-designated asset harm and overall townscape harm interlaced in the arguments made.

104. The collective public benefits on offer carry substantial overarching weight. They include: the delivery of the SP site allocation developed over a 10 year horizon with the aim of rejuvenating the area; more efficient use of previously developed land in a highly sustainable location; increased pedestrian permeability and connectivity; the facilitation of air quality improvements owing to greater reliance on sustainable modes of transport and with the promotion of cycling; increasing housing supply for Londoners as well as Peckham’s residents via 867 new homes, allowing for family provision as well as wheelchair accessibility needs; increasing much needed affordable housing provision (albeit at 12%); some urban greening betterment as well as ecological and notable BNG improvements; new external play space; plus the overall linked social and economic benefits from large scale town centre investment supporting its primary retail function and infrastructure which would provide and sustain employment in the process.

105. However, in this case such benefits do not outweigh the harm to the relevant designated heritage assets important to the area. Having regard to the Framework, there is no reason for me to conclude a design better responding to those heritage assets could not be achieved.”

“107. In undertaking the balancing exercise, I am cognisant there is a critical need to provide new homes of all tenures for Londoners urgently and at scale coordinated by SP allocation policies and the strategic policies of the LP. Moreover, there is acute affordable housing need in Peckham which some of the new home provision would alleviate. I accept that the totality of benefits would be considerable in this context.

108. Nonetheless, the direct benefits arising from the development comparative to harm to the RLPCA including designated and non-designated asset harm and to the townscape give me insufficient reasons to allow the appeal. From a Framework application perspective, the proposal would not be a sustainable form of development in light of such harms.

109. The circumstances of the case do not lead me to accept new housing and other associated betterments at all costs. Furthermore, SP Policy NSP74 entails a generational opportunity for Peckham which should be carefully managed to ensure a more optimally designed scheme for future generations.

110. For clarity, even with 35% affordable housing as initially proposed in the planning application process and accepting a worsening housing land supply position of less than 5 years purported by the appellant, I would still have found that the level of harm in this case would not be overridden.

111. Although the appeal scheme does have some positive design attributes and high order benefits, the elements of harm identified are not outweighed. There are no other material considerations for me to conclude otherwise.”

Camden Goods Yard:

[Also procedurally interesting given that it is another example of section 106 agreement renegotiation by the section 73 back door – see for more background my 1 March 2026 blog post And Another Thing….Another Misconception About Amending Section 106 Agreements]

“80. With regards the heritage balance, I have found a modest level of less than substantial harm to various heritage assets, to which I have afforded considerable importance and weight. The Framework requires any harm to designated heritage assets to be weighed against the public benefits of the proposal.

81. In this regard I have considered the economic, social and environmental benefits of the appeal scheme, the uppermost being the delivery of housing and affordable housing. While the quantum of housing and affordable housing is reduced from the earlier consented scheme, I am nonetheless satisfied that this public benefit in itself, which I afford great weight, does outweigh the harm to the heritage assets. As such the appeal scheme is not contrary to CLP Policy D2 and London Plan HC1 that seeks to protect designated heritage assets.

82. Turning to the overall planning balance, the appeal scheme would not provide the full quantum of affordable housing usually required by the Development Plan and would be at a lower level than that previously granted consent. 83. However, I am satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated, with regards the viability evidence submitted, that the appeal scheme makes appropriate provision for affordable housing and is therefore in accordance with the provisions of policy H4 of the Camden Local Plan and policy H5 of the London Plan and National Planning Guidance.

84. As such, in the context of an absence of a 5-year housing land supply and a continued high demand for affordable housing I afford the provision of housing and affordable housing, even at a reduced quantum, great weight.

85. Therefore, it is readily apparent that any adverse impacts of varying the conditions would not, by some considerable margin, significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework taken as a whole and other material considerations.

86. For the reasons given above I conclude that the appeal should succeed.”

Could any of you have accurately predicted ahead of these decisions what these outcomes would be? Is that uncertainty inevitable? Could national and/or local policy provide even more direction? Or indeed do parties sometimes need that lack of policy certainty given the inevitability that policies will never be wholly up to date and appropriate for all circumstances?

Whilst in my view it is encouraging that the draft revised NPPF will herald a simpler, more prescriptive, national policy approach (and encouraging indeed that ministers committed last week that the final version will be published by the summer – which I interpret to be by summer recess on 16 July), unless we are going to see some detailed calibration in policy as to, for instance, how specific levels of heritage harm are to be assessed against specific levels of housing undersupply (for which the present “tilted balance” has been, I would say, ultimately ineffective), those two aspects I referred to above are going to dampen down any hope of predictability.

And if the truth is that the decision-maker always has the whip-hand due to that black box within which subjective assessments and conclusions as to weighting of competing considerations can be reached, and that accordingly when we say decision-making is quasi-judicial that word “quasi” is doing some heavy lifting, it’s odd that the precise nature of the decision-maker in our system and whether they have any form of democratic mandate is ultimately random:

Most applications for planning permission: officers taking the decisions under delegated powers – applying section 38(6), presumably trying to arrive at a “correct” assessment of policy compliance, harms, benefits and arriving at an overall planning balance, presumably without “political” influence.
Other applications: elected councillors in planning committee – the same legal duty, so is it right that there be the room for politically-influenced judgment, particularly where there is an up-to-date local development plan and/or a clear and up to date national planning policy framework? Why is their decision “better” than that of trained officers?
Most appeals: decisions taken by civil servants, i.e. a single inspector, again applying section 38(6), presumably trying to arrive at a “correct” assessment of policy compliance, harms, benefits and arriving at an overall planning balance, without “political” influence. Again, why is their decision “better” than either that of local councillors or trained officers?
Some recovered appeals, and applications which have been called-in: decisions taken by ministers in line with national “political” objectives, in practice with significant input from civil servants, at least on technical aspects and ensuring that the ministers’ decision, whatever it may be, is legally defensible. Again, why is the minster’s decision “better” than either that of the inspector who has made recommendations or indeed that of local councillors or trained officers?

If our development management system is intended to be predictable and indeed properly quasi-judicial, such that most applications can be determined by officers and such that call-ins and recovered appeals only happen in utterly exceptional cases, wouldn’t we need to move towards (1) even more calibration in policy and (2) a much stronger duty on councillors to have an up to date local development plan in place with well-evidenced policies?

Otherwise, on these sorts of decisions, on complex sites with often conflicting imperatives, isn’t the truth that we are unfairly leaving a huge amount of weight on the shoulders of officers and, even possibly even more unfairly, individual inspectors? I was interested to see from the list of inquiry documents that, after the close of the 1 Battersea Bridge Road inquiry, the appellant sought unsuccessfully to have the appeal recovered by the Secretary of State – presumably in the hope that he would reach a different conclusion as to the relative weight that various considerations carried than the direction in which the inspector may have been thought to be heading..

Simon Ricketts, 25 May 2026

Personal views, et cetera

“The Government And The Mayor Now Expect Boroughs, Developers And Delivery Partners To Make Full Use Of These Measures To Approve And Build The Homes That Londoners Urgently Need”

The government’s and Mayor of London’s final package of support for housebuilding in the capital (25 March 2026) (published alongside the London Mayor’s Support for Housebuilding London Plan Guidance and the government’s consultation outcome document) has been substantially enhanced since my 13 December 2025 blog post on the initial draft and my earlier 1 November 2025 blog post where I set out certain key asks.

The final package goes some way to addressing my three main asks:

The requirement for a late stage (as opposed to an early stage) review mechanism has been removed from the time-limited planning route – and the qualifying timescale has been extended:

“Certain elements of the proposed planning route have been adjusted. The route will now be open to applications submitted and validated by 31 March 2028 [the draft package proposed that schemes had to be consented by that date], by which time the new London Plan is expected to have been adopted. The Late Stage gain-share mechanism has also been replaced by an Early Stage Review – aligning directly with the GLA’s current Fast Track Route – with no further reviews required beyond this. The Early Stage Review will be triggered where an agreed build out milestone is not met within a stipulated time period – with a default position comprising of a build out milestone of a first-floor slab to be achieved within 30 months starting from the grant of planning permission. Flexibility will also be allowed for boroughs and housebuilders to agree differently defined build out milestones and time periods for achieving this milestone – appropriate to the circumstances of the site and reflecting the imperative to incentivise starting construction and housing delivery.”

“Any Early Stage Review should be carried out in accordance with Mayoral Guidance and where a surplus is identified, 100 per cent of this should be provided to the LPA. Where this surplus is sufficient to support on site social and affordable housing provision, the additional social and affordable homes should be provided within the development prior to the occupation of a specified proportion of market units. Where the surplus identified is insufficient to support on site provision, the surplus should be paid to the LPA as a financial contribution prior to the occupation of a specified proportion of the market units”.

The viability test within the CIL relief that is available has been simplified and the qualifying timescale has been extended:

“This emergency relief will now apply to eligible schemes commencing before 31 March 2030, with further simplified requirements and processes to access the relief and get schemes moving.” (The previously proposed deadline was 31 December 2028).

“We now propose to:

require viability evidence, but: (i) it will be sufficient for developments to demonstrate through a residual appraisal that they are unviable currently – rather than evidence that the CIL relief is demonstrably necessary to make the development viable; and (ii) clarify that the statutory declarations which must accompany viability evidence should confirm that any inputs and assumptions are fair and reasonable at the point of the application (recognising that these can change over time)
amend the commencement deadline to 31 March 2030 (reflecting the changes made to the time limited planning route timescales) and set a default expectation of 5 years from commencement to completion (with the ability to deviate from this on a case-by-case basis through agreement between boroughs and developers), with relief being clawed back where this is not met.
to restrict access to CIL relief to residential floorspace, but clarify that relief will not be limited to entirely residential developments (i.e. residential units within mixed use developments will be able to qualify, provided they also meet all other relevant criteria).
focus relief on developments which do not predominantly take place on “excluded land”, but clarify that, where developments straddle multiple types of land with a limited portion on “excluded land”, these will be in scope of relief.
limit relief to developments delivering a minimum of 20 per cent social and affordable housing (the first 10 per cent nil grant), with a higher level of relief available for schemes delivering up to 35 per cent social and affordable housing, but: (i) require a higher minimum of 35 per cent social and affordable housing on public sector and industrial land (where industrial floorspace capacity has not been re-provided) to align with the time limited route; (ii) clarify that at least 60 per cent social rent must be provided, but where social and affordable homes are provided above 35 per cent, their tenure is flexible (noting CIL relief is only available up to 35 per cent); and (iii) allow Build-to-Rent developments to meet a different test to the social rent requirement, aligning with the requirements of the time limited route to better reflect the nature of their delivery model.
limit relief to developments attracting a whole-scheme borough-level CIL liability of over £500,000 on eligible residential floorspace, and clarify that, for multi-phased developments where the CIL on later phases is not yet certain, an estimate of overall liability may be provided.” [my emboldening]

“We intend to liaise with London boroughs, developers and other stakeholders on the implementation of the emergency relief from CIL and we intend to consult on the draft CIL amending regulations as soon as possible in the spring.”

There is now more focus on stalled sites that already have planning permission:

“In some cases, there will be existing consents at higher levels of social and affordable housing than the 20 per cent minimum proposed via the Time Limited Route. Where such schemes are unviable and therefore stalled – in keeping with the stated objectives – immediate steps should be taken to get these schemes moving and accelerate the delivery of homes for Londoners.”

The first step should be to be to seek grant to maximise the level of social and affordable housing. Applicants should also factor in the availability of the time-limited emergency CIL relief. Importantly:

“Having explored the availability of grant and factored in the available CIL relief, it may remain necessary to amend the scheme due to remaining viability challenges. As the Mayor of London Support for Housebuilding LPG makes clear, applicants who seek to amend their schemes in line with the terms of the new time limited route are not required to submit a full viability assessment. In such instances, applicants would need to seek a deed of variation to the Section 106 agreement and submit a Section 73 application where amendments to conditions are required. Again, the Government and Mayor are clear that ensuring schemes progress and housebuilding is accelerated is the priority, and local planning authorities are strongly encouraged to support applications that meet these minimum levels and conform to the eligibility criteria under the time limited route.” (my emboldening).

It’s time to get to work. The final sentence could indeed be read in part as a veiled threat to those who don’t play ball – whether from the private or public sector:

“The Government and the Mayor now expect boroughs, developers and delivery partners to make full use of these measures to approve and build the homes that Londoners urgently need.”

Simon Ricketts, 25 March 2026

Personal views, et cetera

And Another Thing….Another Misconception About Amending Section 106 Agreements

I really am the person you don’t want to be left sitting next to at the end of an evening in the pub: “and another misconception about amending section 106 agreements…”

This weekend I belatedly set about unpicking that recent Kimblin J judgment in Lancaster City Council v Secretary of State (High Court, 18 February 2026). The case was a legal challenge by the council to an inspector’s decision letter. The inspector had allowed a section 73 appeal that sought to amend a condition attached to a planning permission for the development of 24 homes. The condition required that the housing mix across the site be implemented in accordance with an approved accommodation schedule which was specifically referenced. The proposal was to amend the condition, on grounds of viability, so as to refer to a revised accommodation schedule, which (unlike that which had been previously approved) referred to all of the dwellings for sale in the open market rather than a proportion being affordable. In so doing he had taken into account a deed of variation agreed between the parties which removed from the existing section 106 agreement an obligation that at least 30% of the dwellings be affordable, whilst still requiring the payment of an open space obligation and setting out a mechanism for the provision and ongoing maintenance of certain areas within the proposed development.

Despite having entered into the deed of variation in the course of the appeal, the council’s ground for challenging the inspector’s decision was that somehow in concluding as part of his decision whether it was appropriate for the parties to enter into the deed of variation he should have applied the test in section 106A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 which is higher than the test to be applied under section 73 as to whether a planning permission condition should be discharged or amended, namely as to whether the original section 106 agreement continued to serve a useful purpose and if so whether it would serve that purpose equally well subject to the modifications in the deed of variation.

The judge sensibly rejected that argument and upheld the permission.

The case possibly does illustrate what we know the government has become vexed about: section 73 applications and appeals being used as a “Trojan horse” to achieve variations to section 106 agreements (albeit there does not appear to me to be anything wrong in law with that approach – equivalent to what happened in the Cuba Street appeal I referred to in my 8 October 2025 blog post London Stalling).

But more directly, it also triggered a different peeve: those local planning authorities that insist that any proposal for a section 106 deed of variation be the subject of a formal application under section 106A, with application form to be completed, notices served etc. This is just yet another example of procedural gold-plating or maybe just a misconception as to how section 106A works.

I think I need to set out relevant parts of the section:

“106A Modification and discharge of planning obligations.

(1 ) A planning obligation may not be modified or discharged except—

by agreement between the authority by whom the obligation is enforceable […] and the person or persons against whom the obligation is enforceable; or

in accordance with

(i) this section and section 106B […]

(2) An agreement falling within subsection (1)(a) shall not be entered into except by an instrument executed as a deed.

(3) A person against whom a planning obligation is enforceable may, at any time after the expiry of the relevant period, apply to the local planning authority by whom the obligation is enforceable […] for the obligation—

to have effect subject to such modifications as may be specified in the application; or

to be discharged.

(4) In subsection (3) “ the relevant period ” means—

such period as may be prescribed; or

if no period is prescribed, the period of five years beginning with the date on which the obligation is entered into.

(5) […]

(6) Where an application is made to an authority under subsection (3), the authority may determine—

a. that the planning obligation shall continue to have effect without modification

b. if the obligation no longer serves a useful purpose, that it shall be discharged; or

c. if the obligation continues to serve a useful purpose, but would serve that purpose equally well if it had effect subject to the modifications specified in the application, that it shall have effect subject to those modifications.”

It will be seen that the general position is that a planning obligation (i.e. section 106 agreement or unilateral undertaking) may be modified or discharged (i.e. in practice the subject of a deed of variation) simply by agreement between the local planning authority and those bound by the existing document, with no prior procedural requirements and no specific test for the local planning authority to address before so agreeing.

What section 106A(3) on the other hand enables is a formal application to be made by a party against whom the obligation is enforceable, if the planning obligation is at least five years old (the government could prescribe a different period for the purposes of sub-section (3) but so far hasn’t) . If it does that, there is the specific test in subsection (6) for the authority to apply before determining whether to grant the application. If the authority refuses the application or doesn’t determine it within the statutory period the applicant can appeal to the Secretary of State pursuant to section 106B (for a recent example of a decision in relation to such an appeal see here).

Not only does this explain for the purposes of the Lancaster case why the subsection (6) test was entirely inappropriate but it also identifies why authorities should not insist upon a formal application process where the person requesting the variation is not proceeding by way of subsection (3).

Of course, this does mean that, unless there is a specific publicity commitment set out in the relevant authority’s constitution or statement of community involvement, the local community may not have sight of any proposed deed of variation before it is completed. However in my view this is neither required directly by Article 40(3)(b) of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015 or as a result of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R (Greenfield (IOW) Limited v Isle of Wight Council (Court of Appeal, 16 April 2025) – a case which in my view has led to further unnecessary delays in the completion of agreements and the issue of planning permission but…

… I see that last orders have been called and I think you quietly moved away to another table some time ago now.

Simon Ricketts, 1 March 2026

Personal views et cetera

The A In Section 106A

A is for…

There was an interesting planning appeal decision letter last week concerning a section 106B appeal against refusal of an application made under section 106A to amend a section 106 agreement on the basis that it no longer served a “useful purpose” (the statutory test in section 106A).

This post will look briefly at that decision but first I thought some legislative archaeology might assist.

Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is of course the statutory successor of section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971. Under section 52, the commitments had no specific description but were treated effectively as covenants analogous to restrictive covenants given by a landowner to a neighbouring landowner but (unlike usual property law covenants) able to contain positive requirements enforceable against successors in title rather than just restrictions – and, as is the case under section 106, enforceable by the local planning authority.

The only statutory method for amending or removing commitments given within a section 52 agreement was to make an application to what was then the Lands Tribunal (now the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber)) under section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925. In order for such an application to succeed, the Tribunal has to be satisfied (in summary – there are other tests which are less relevant for the purposes of this post) “that by reason of changes in the character of the property or the neighbourhood or other circumstances of the case which the Upper Tribunal may deem material, the restriction ought to be deemed obsolete”.

The section 84 process is slow, uncertain, outside the usual planning system and so on. When section 106 of the 1990 Act came into force on 24 August 1990 the only statutory process remained section 84 of the 1925 Act.

Then in the first of so many waves of amendments to the 1990 Act, along came the Planning and Compensation Act 1991, which came into force on 25 September 1991. The 1991 Act replaced section 106 with, basically, what we have now. Those commitments given by landowners on behalf of themselves and successors were the first time called “planning obligations”.

In those changes, the scope of what could be secured was expanded. Compare the original formulation of what could be secured via section 106 with what it became:

Original:

“(1) )A local planning authority may enter into an agreement with any person interested in land in their area for the purpose of restricting or regulating the development or use of the land, either permanently or during such period as may be prescribed by the agreement.

(2) Any such agreement may contain such incidental and consequential provisions (including financial ones) as appear to the local planning authority to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the agreement.”

What it became:

“(1) Any person interested in land in the area of a local planning authority may, by agreement or otherwise, enter into an obligation (referred to … as “ a planning obligation ”), enforceable to the extent mentioned in subsection (3)—

restricting the development or use of the land in any specified way;

requiring specified operations or activities to be carried out in, on, under or over the land;

requiring the land to be used in any specified way; or

requiring a sum or sums to be paid to the authority (or, in a case where section 2E applies, to the Greater London Authority) on a specified date or dates or periodically.”

[When we think about how the use of section 106 planning obligations to secure financial contributions has exploded over the last 30 or so years, it is worth comparing what is now section 106 (1) (d) above with what it replaced: section 106 (2) above. Was this intended at the time? An open question…]

Note also the reference to “by agreement or otherwise” in the first line of the changed version of section 106 (1). This opened up the possibility of the landowner entering into planning obligations by unilateral undertaking rather than just by agreement.

Alongside the reformulation of section 106 was the introduction of section 106A and B (from 10 December 1992), providing a procedure to applying to “modify or discharge” planning obligations in place of using the Law of Property Act 1925 procedure. As I know you know, section 106A allows an application to be made once at least five years have passed since the obligation was entered into – with an available appeal route (although it is worth noting that the Secretary of State can prescribe – very easily in legislative terms, simply a ministerial direction would surely suffice – a period shorter or longer than five years). An application may be made before five years have passed, but in those circumstances there is no right of appeal. If an application is made, the local planning authority has to determine either:

that the planning obligation shall continue to have effect without modification;

if the obligation no longer serves a useful purpose, that it shall be discharged; or

if the obligation continues to serve a useful purpose, but would serve that purpose equally well if it had effect subject to the modifications specified in the application, that it shall have effect subject to those modifications.

Section 106B provides for appeals to be made to the Secretary of State. (Interestingly, sub-section 106 (5) requires that before determining the appeal “the Secretary of State shall, if either the applicant or the authority so wish, give each of them an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by a person appointed by the Secretary of State for the purpose”. I interpret that as the parties having a right for any appeal to be determined bother than by written representations, i.e. by a hearing or inquiry).

What is meant by “no longer serves a useful purpose”? What did Parliament intend to connote by the use of those words? Was this just intended as a modernisation and abbreviation of the test in section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925? Should this be treated as a “useful planning purpose” or will any useful purpose do? Those words “No longer”: What if the obligation never served a useful purpose? And why five years? Of course, given the lack of any other statutory route to amend section 106 agreements and unilateral undertakings, all of this has come under increasing scrutiny both by inspectors on appeals and by the courts.

I have been looking back today at Hansard reports of debates in parliament that led to the Planning and Compensation Act 1990 to see whether legislators gave any of this specific thought. It would have been good if they had done but I can’t see that they did.

All this is particularly topical at the moment, at a time where many schemes are stalled through lack of viability and where development may be able to progress if planning obligations previously entered into are modified or discharged to the extent necessary to achieve viability. The government of course (a) missed any opportunity during the course of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 to reintroduce the section 106BA and BC procedure that we had between April 2013 and April 2016 to allow developers to apply to modify or discharge affordable housing obligations in Section 106 agreements where those obligations made a development economically unviable and (b) is still not exactly welcoming section 73 applications with open arms that serve as a vehicle to achieve that outcome (see Matthew Pennycook’s 18 December 2025 letter to the Planning Inspectorate) so, if the local planning authority is not willing to engage in such a renegotiation of its own volition, section 106A and B are the only game in town.

Which now takes me to that recent appeal decision I mentioned. This is a decision letter dated 20 January 2026 dismissing appeals by Hodson Developments and Chilmington Green Developments against the non-determination by Ashford Borough Council and Kent County Council of applications made under section 106A to make a total of 122 modifications to a section 106 agreement dated 27 February 2017 in connection with planning permission which had been granted for a large development including 5,750 homes together with commercial and other uses. Central to the inspector’s decision was the question as to whether the viability or otherwise of the scheme and the effect of an obligation and other obligations on viability, is relevant to whether an obligation serves a useful purpose.

The appeals have a long history, which I suspect is far from concluded. The position is not wholly clear but it seems that an initial application to modify or discharge various obligations was submitted in 2022 before the expiry of five years when the local planning authority at that time would have had a broad discretion as to whether to agree to the application (given that an appeal would not lie under section 106B in relation to such an application). After an initial judicial review that was settled, the applicant commenced a second set of judicial review proceedings, alleging that Ashford Borough Council and Kent County Council were wrong to conclude that viability of the development was not a relevant consideration under section 106A and that in any event in their consideration of the issue they erred in law. Following a renewal hearing in March 2022, the claim was held by Lieven J to be unarguable. On the specific point as to whether viability is a material consideration, she “remain[ed] unconvinced that it is not a material consideration”. However she considered that the councils had properly taken it into account. “I am not going to consider whether or not viability was legally a material consideration because that is a somewhat complicated point of law and would involve considering a number of previous cases. It is sufficient for the purposes of ground 1 that the local authorities in this case did consider viability with some care and detail…”

There was then a further application, presumably by which time the five years had expired, which was the subject of the appeals considered by the inspector (two appeal references – one for obligations in the agreement enforceable by Ashford Borough Council, the other for obligations enforceable by Kent County Council). Some of the requests for modifications were withdrawn but there was still a long list.

After an eight day inquiry the inspector (solicitor Grahame Kean) disagreed that the effect of an obligation and other obligations on viability, may be relevant to whether an obligation serves a useful purpose (see paragraph 33). He goes on:

“34. An obligation must itself be soundly based on established criteria, ie it must be necessary to make a development acceptable in planning terms, directly related to the development, and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the development. If, say an obligation fails these criteria but requires some act unconnected to or at odds with the development, the obligation would be liable to be struck down as invalid. However, in a s106A application the question is different from the legitimacy of the obligation itself. As counsel for the Appellant accepted, the obligation must have been entered into for a planning purpose in the first place.10 It would be rare for the useful purpose not to be a planning one but as noted, the question under s106A is whether the obligation serves any useful purpose, not just a useful planning purpose.

35. The Appellant’s counsel claims that “in the present case, frustrating the development goes to the planning purpose”. Counsel might not have intended to refer to a deliberate attempt to frustrate a development as much as an objectively assessed outcome due to acts or omissions of local planning authorities. At any rate there is no evidence of any deliberate attempt to frustrate the development and if there were, s106A would not be the appropriate way to deal that scenario.

36. Furthermore, if a planning obligation is duly completed, although it may have the effect of “frustrating” the development in the sense that it prevents progress in the eyes of a developer unless and until certain acts are performed, and although ultimately circumstances may obtain such that it is no longer regarded (by some at least) as a viable project, that seems to me a consequence, and not part of the original purpose or reason for exacting the obligation in the first place.

37. The existence of an obligation, in the context of a development scheme, is to make development acceptable in planning terms. That is its quintessential purpose. The statutory criteria are simple and do not refer to the viability of the development. The obligations have a contractual nature, albeit statutorily based, which it is in the interests of the parties to be able to enforce, the one against the other, and subject only to limited exceptions set out in s106 that allow discharge or modification. Since they are limited exceptions that derogate from the principle of contractual enforceability, it also seems arguable that exceptions should be strictly applied.

38. An obligation can have a useful purpose of preventing development or further development until performed. This may make it inherently impossible, for financially viability reasons, to carry out or complete a development, but that does not necessarily deny the usefulness of the purpose in preventing a development that would otherwise be unacceptable in planning terms. Circumstances may throw light on whether the purpose continues to be “useful” but viability issues would not transcend the basic question of whether the obligation continues to meet any useful purpose.”

Faced with such a spread of requested modifications (including, in relation to affordable housing, requested modifications as to tenure requirements and delivery triggers), the inspector considered that the “evidence is not so clear and unambiguous as to persuade me that unless the obligations in the s106 Agreement were discharged or modified all as requested, the scheme would in fact be rendered financially unviable and unable to proceed.”

This may all be justified on the particular facts, I don’t know. However, standing back, if the inspector’s approach is that an obligation relating to, say, the provision of a particular percentage of affordable housing, still serves a useful purpose if the evidence were to show that unless that percentage is reduced (or for instance the tenure mix altered or the trigger delayed) the development will not proceed, and that with the modification there is every prospect of the development proceeding, resulting in actual provision of affordable housing (albeit a lower percentage than was initially promised), is this approach correct? And if so, where is there any common sense in it – where really is the “useful purpose”? – and what can be done? In a situation like this, rather than defer progress on development indefinitely, is the developer really to go back to the very beginning, to prepare and submit a fresh application for planning permission, delaying any delivery for many years and at frankly massive cost? The lack of any proportionate mechanism to reflect current economic circumstances, with any necessary protections, would be surely a scandal?

Simon Ricketts, 25 January 2026

Personal views, et cetera

The Proposed London Housing Emergency Measures Package Is Underwhelming

That is the message I have been receiving in many discussions with developers and advisors since consultation started on MHCLG’s Proposed London Emergency Housing Package and The Mayor of London’s draft Support for Housebuilding London Plan Guidance, both documents published on 27 November 2025 for consultation until 22 January 2026.

I’m picking up that the conclusion is reluctant. Clearly, it is helpful that the drought of new housing activity in London has been recognised. Clearly, it is appreciated that MHCLG and the London Mayor have worked hard at a co-ordinated package as between them which moves significantly, and no doubt with much internal organisational pain, from the previous policy position in terms of affordable housing expectations, in terms of the usual approach to CIL and in terms of some aspects of housing standards. There is also a dilemma on the part of the industry: this is an emergency; measures are needed now; if this set of proposals has to be ditched and replaced with a more effective package, we are just losing more time, unless the industry can point with some unanimity towards practical, easily implemented, improvements to what is on offer.

But the reality is that the current package (1) will not be enough and (2) is too caveated and conditional to provide the crucial reassurance that is needed to those who hold the strings in terms of funding or financing. From what I hear I’m not at all sure that the Mayor’s new time-limited route is even likely to be used, as opposed to continued reliance on viability testing.

Following the initial joint announcement on 23 October 2025 I wrote a blog post on 1 November 2025 setting out 4 Key Asks For The London Housebuilding Support Package Consultation. None were taken on board in the consultation drafts. Let’s hope that there still is time before the package is finalised.

To follow the structure of my previous post:

Should there be more focus on stalled sites that already have planning permission?

Of course!

Why ignore the lowest hanging fruit? The opportunity has now passed for primary legislation to reintroduce section 106BA (which could have been a late bolt-on to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill). But why not by ministerial direction reduce the minimum period of five years for the purpose of being able to make applications under section 106A, which are capable of appeal, to say two years – and introduce guidance as to MHCLG’s interpretation of “useful purpose” (of course the courts’ legal interpretation ultimately will be what counts but guidance will still be useful!)? And in any event introduce firm guidance to local planning authorities that they should approach requests for deeds of variation on viability grounds positively where the case has been made (and set out in the guidance what will be sufficient to make that case)?

Is late stage (as opposed to early stage) review necessary in relation to the proposed “time-limited planning route”?

No!

The uncertainties caused to funders by the mere existence of any review mechanism the application of which is outside their control has a deadening effect on developers’ ability to fund schemes, utterly disproportionate to the likelihood that any review mechanism will ever deliver any material amount of additional affordable housing, schemes are so underwater. And unnecessary uncertainty has been created because the time-limited route envisages a different set of mechanisms to those which currently exist.

The simple change would be for the Mayor’s LPG to specify that for a time-limited period the fast-track thresholds will be reduced from 35% and 50% to 20% and 35% with the structure remaining exactly the same as to when review mechanisms will be required and how they will operate. A bucketload of uncertainty would be immediately removed.

Are there unnecessary difficulties with introducing a viability test into the proposed CIL relief?

Yes!

In fact, this whole new intended structure for 50 to 80% relief from borough CIL is going to be disproportionately complex given that it will rarely make the difference between a project going ahead or not (and with the prospect of later clawback, funders will always assume the worst in any event so it just won’t help bring them over the line). What I’m being told is that where CIL is a killer is on cash flow. On viability – the overall go/stop on development – it is of only marginal influence.

If there is going to be any tweaking of the Regulations:

Why not allow for payment at a later stage (you recall that when the infrastructure levy was touted by the previous government as replacement for CIL it was to be payable at upon completion of the development so would there be such a problem with it being paid, say, on occupation)? Boroughs don’t spend the monies upon receipt – timing isn’t critical to them! And Mayoral CIL is simply paying down long-term debt in relation to Crossrail.
Require all boroughs to switch on the potential for exceptional circumstances relief and see what can be done to simplify the process.

Ahead of any Regulations, just lean on the boroughs to switch on exceptional circumstances relief (if they refuse that is a warning sign in itself) and introduce advice as to the evidence that should normally be sufficient. Even that would help.

And incidentally this would actually also would help SMEs, currently shut out of the relief proposed in the consultation document by a combination of the £500,000 liability threshold and the proposed £25,000 application fee. And while we’re at it, extend this beyond residential C3 development.

Are the proposed additional powers to be given to the Mayor enough?

Probably, but…

It really would be useful if the Mayor could call in schemes of 50 units or more even before the borough is minded to refuse them, as long as the statutory determination period has passed – thereby reflecting the current arrangements in the Mayor of London Order 2008 for schemes of 150 units or more.

Final thoughts

Of course the proposed additional grant funding for affordable housing is welcome. But inevitably it isn’t enough.

Surely, we all agree that the thrust of all these measures is not good to the extent that, consistent with the operation of the existing system, it assumes that affordable housing, including social housing (for which there is such a desperate need in the capital) is what has to give in order to enable development to proceed. How can we move to a system where the delivery of social housing is not reliant on, effectively, an affordable housing tax imposed on residential development, given that the current model is not working?

To end on a positive note, I was really cheered to hear about Homes For People We Need campaign and to read their report Making Social Rent Homes Viable. Whilst it identifies that £18.83 billion is required to develop 90,000 social rent homes per year, there is a strong investment case for substantial government subsidy, given that temporary accommodation costs of £2.8 billion annually could in theory service index-linked bonds worth circa £160 billion. “In theory an investment by HM Treasury to build c.130,000 Social Rent homes for those families currently in temporary accommodation, assuming £209,000 subsidy per home and thus a total subsidy of £27.2bn, could reduce the current bill for Temporary Accommodation to zero”.

There are a number of strategic recommendations and suggested policy reforms in the report:

“• Social Housing Tax Credits represent a promising approach, enabling private capital deployment now in exchange for future tax relief.

• Section 106 Agreements should fix affordable housing values at the planning stage to improve market efficiency.

• Right to Buy should be further reformed to preserve the affordable housing stock.

• ‘Flex Rent’ approaches linking rents to household income should be considered to optimise revenue generation whilst maintaining affordability.

• The Housing Association sector desperately needs recapitalisation in addition to the recent 10-year rent settlement.”

Santa hat-tip to Thursday’s Planning After Dark Podcast episode Santa Hats, Social Rent and Squeaky Leather Trousers for the chat with Grainger’s Michael Keaveney which introduced me to this.

In summary I hope that what is arrived at is fast, simple, measures to help meet the current housing and affordable housing emergency. But then I hope that there is a proper longer-term solution along the lines promoted by this report to help meet the underlying and remaining (national not just London) housing and affordable housing crisis. The current section 106 model is not working!

Simon Ricketts, 13 December 2025

Personal views, et cetera

4 Key Asks For The London Housebuilding Support Package Consultation

Most chats this week have been about the 23 October 2025 homes for London policy note.

tl;dr summary: positive direction but concerns about potential complexities, uncertainties and as to whether it will all be in place speedily enough.

We’re all now waiting for the consultation to start “over six weeks from November” (fair play, at least no “by the end of Autumn” fudge).

There are plenty of detailed issues arising, and differing interests will want to re-prioritise the measures in different ways, but I thought I would set out four key asks that I have, which in my view should be specifically addressed in the consultation documents:

Should there be more focus on stalled sites that already have planning permission?

This is the lowest hanging fruit. And yet all we have (in paragraphs 33 and 34) is a reference to the potential for renegotiating previously agreed arrangements by way of deed of variation and discouragement as to the use of section 73.

This isn’t enough. I set out the current procedural constraints in my 18 October 2025 blog post London Stalling.

Procedurally, bar reintroducing section 106BA or, for a temporary period, amending section 106A to reduce the 5 years’ requirement, at the very least we need:

Specific encouragement for local planning authorities to accept developers’ requests to engage with the process of varying existing agreements where specific criteria (consistent with the direction of the policy note) are met, linked to some sort of oversight, monitoring and/or route for complaint where authorities refuse to engage (given that unless your section 106 agreement is at least five years’ old, or unless this is in the context of a section 73 application (of which more in a moment) there is no right of appeal on the part of the developer)

Not the current suggestion that the section 73 process “should no longer be used as an alternative means of reconsidering fundamental questions of scheme viability or planning obligations” but rather a proper recognition of the real challenge of keeping planning permissions, and associated planning obligations packages, up to date as against changing circumstances and the important role that section 73 plays in this. Attempts to make currently unviable schemes viable invariably involve an intertwined mix of scheme changes and changes to planning obligations. Section 73B, introduced by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, is less useful as only the implications of the proposed changes are to be taken into account rather than considering the amended proposal holistically against the current development plan and other material considerations. This all needs to be connected up with the continuing problem that Hillside creates for amendments to projects (I was pleased to see Baroness Taylor confirm this week, on behalf of the government, in response to Lord Banner’s tabled amendment to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, that the government will “explore with the sector” a “statutory role for drop-in permissions to deal with change to large-scale developments”. This is so important!).

Is late stage (as opposed to early stage) review necessary in relation to the proposed “time-limited planning route”?

In basic summary, this route is where a residential scheme can commit to at least 20% affordable housing with a 60/40 social rent/intermediate tenure split with planning permission issued by the end of March 2028. If the first floor of the scheme has not been built by 31 March 2030 (in the case of larger phased schemes, in the case of any phase where the first floor of buildings providing at least 200 dwellings has not been built by that date), “a late review will be undertaken once 75 per cent of homes within the scheme or the final phase are occupied to determine whether a higher contribution for affordable housing can be made”.

Why the late stage review mechanism in these circumstances, rather than the early stage review that is currently the case with fast track schemes that don’t achieve substantial implantation by the specified deadline under London Plan policy H5? Late stage reviews unnecessarily spook funders and lenders, leaving the eventual outcome too late in the process – and also having the public policy disbenefit of being too late to allow for any further affordable housing, that can be unlocked via the review, to be accommodated within the scheme. There is also inconsistency with paragraph 30 which suggests another approach for multi-phase schemes: “For multi-phase schemes, a review of the scheme will apply prior to the start of each phase for which the milestone in paragraph 27 has not been reached, to determine whether additional affordable housing can be provided in subsequent phases.”

Isn’t it better to keep things simple and follow, where possible, the existing mechanisms within policy H5, just with the thresholds temporarily reduced?

Are there unnecessary difficulties with introducing a viability test into the proposed CIL relief?

Permissions which are secured via the new time-limited planning route that commence after the relief is in place and but before December 2028 will qualify for at least 50% relief from borough CIL (NB is this 50% after reliefs and exemptions have been applied and what will be the calibration to work out the higher level of relief where the scheme is delivering more than 20% affordable housing?), but the relief would be “contingent upon meeting proportionate qualifying criteria to ensure relief is targeted at schemes which would otherwise remain stalled or fail to come forwards, with a lower relief applicable where the full available amount is shown not to be warranted.” This sounds complicated. With this hurdle in place, not only would the developer not know whether they will qualify for the relief until planning permission is granted and they receive their liability notice, but it means that the purported advantage with the time-limited planning route of not having to undertake viability assessment is illusory, because the work will be needed in any event to secure the CIL relief – and the requirement will surely be very hard to turn into workable legislative drafting – we know how difficult exceptional circumstances relief is to secure due to the various criteria and requirements built into that particular mechanism.

Are the proposed additional powers to be given to the Mayor enough?

Boroughs would be required to “refer planning schemes of 50 units or more where the borough is minded to refuse the application – this would be a more streamlined process operating alongside the existing referral threshold of 150 units which applies regardless of a borough’s intended decision, and would ensure that the Mayor was able to review whether the right decision had been reached in the context of the housing crisis.”

But there may well be cases where schemes are being held up at borough level, either pre-resolution or post resolution whilst for instance the section 106 agreement is being negotiated, and where securing planning permission by the end of March 2028 will be critical under this package of measures. Here, speedy intervention, or threatened intervention, by the Mayor could really help. So, for this time limited period at least, why not allow the Mayor to intervene at any time after the end of the statutory determination period in relation to any scheme comprising at least 50 dwellings? Otherwise, that absolute cut of the end of March 2028 for grant of planning permission will need to some flex built in to allow for the possibility of appeal etc.

I’ll confine myself to those four although I have others, and I know that you do too…

NB none of this is to be churlish as to the scale of the task that MHCLG and the GLA have before them. It is of course by no means easy to get this package right and to avoid unintended consequences.

Simon Ricketts, 1 November 2025

Personal views, et cetera

Commons Select Committee: Land Value Capture

Today’s Commons Housing Communities and Local Government Committee’s report Delivering 1.5 million new homes: Land Value Capture (28 October 2025) contains recommendations which are more wide-ranging than the report’s title would suggest: some practical and, one would hope, uncontroversial; others touching on some raw political nerves at MHCLG no doubt.

Starting with the latter, do turn to the “epilogue” which comments directly on what were at that stage just media reports as to the “package of support for housebuilding in the capital” announcement which the government and the Mayor of London issued on 23 October 2025. The Committee expresses itself to be “seriously concerned by media reports that London’s affordable housing target could be cut” and “the Secretary of State may be considering suspending local authorities’ powers to charge the Community Infrastructure Levy to address concerns about development viability. None of the evidence to our inquiry—including from representatives of developers—advocated abolishing CIL entirely as a means of addressing viability concerns. On the contrary, we heard that the Government should reform CIL to extend its coverage where it is viable.”

“The Ministry must continue its work with the Greater London Authority to deliver an acceleration package, so that London boroughs are delivering housing in line with their local housing need targets. In response to this Report, the Ministry must provide its assessment of how changes to London’s affordable housing target may deliver more affordable housing units, by increasing the number of new homes built overall. Any reduction to London’s affordable housing target must be accompanied by a clawback mechanism to ensure developers return a portion of their profits to the local authority, ringfenced for affordable housing delivery, if a development surpasses an agreed benchmark profit. If London’s affordable housing target is reduced and the number of affordable housing units delivered declines, the Ministry and the Greater London Authority must commit to reinstating the 35% target.”

Perhaps this epilogue is slightly premature, given the actual announcement proved only to be a prologue to a consultation process that will run “from November” (late November is my guess). Perhaps the Committee should hear further evidence on that back of the consultation material to be published – it is slightly odd to be responding just to a newspaper report, particularly given that the actual announcement has been made.

But that epilogue does point to the fundamental policy tension in the current economic environment: what matters most – affordable housing delivery by percentage, or by absolute numbers? See for instance its recommendation that the government’s “forthcoming reforms to its guidance on viability assessments must ensure developers reliably deliver on their agreed affordable housing commitments, with viability assessments only used to alter these commitments retrospectively in the most exceptional circumstances. To support this, we recommend that all local authorities in England must be encouraged to set a minimum percentage target for affordable housing in their local plan [NB what don’t?], with a ‘fast-track’ route planning route for developments which meet this local target.”

“Too often, site-specific viability assessments are used by developers to negotiate down affordable housing requirements in circumstances where this is completely unjustifiable. Affordable housing contributions are frequently the first provision to be cut following a viability assessment, even where a developer may be making other significant contributions through Section 106 agreements and CIL. In areas with high land values, viability assessments should only be used in this way in very exceptional circumstances. Currently, not all local authorities have their affordable housing requirements clearly set out in local policy. Greater clarity from local authorities would provide developers with the right incentives to avoid lengthy viability negotiations, and ensure more applications are meeting local affordable housing requirements from the outset.

As part of its ongoing review of the viability planning practice guidance, the Government must consider how different types of developer contribution could be re-negotiated following a viability assessment, to protect affordable housing contributions. The Government must also update national policy to encourage all local authorities to set a minimum percentage target for affordable housing in their Local Plan for all major developments that include housing. This figure should be based on a local need assessment for affordable housing in each local authority, with particular regard for the local need for Social Rent homes. Local authorities should be encouraged to offer a ‘fast-track route’ for developments which meet the local affordable housing target, by making those developments exempt from detailed viability assessments and re-assessments later in the development process. This would encourage developments with a high percentage of affordable housing and speed up the delivery of housing of all tenures.

The Government must continue to develop its proposal to publish indicative benchmark land values to inform viability assessments on Green Belt land across England. The Government must publish different benchmark land values for each region of England, to reflect variation in land values. The Government must also ensure that the viability planning practice guidance contains clear advice on the “local material considerations” that would warrant local adjustments. The Government should continually review the effectiveness of the policy and consider how it may be extended to development on land that is not in the Green Belt.”

On land value capture itself:

“There is scope to reform the current system of developer contributions in England to capture a greater proportion of land value uplifts from development to deliver affordable housing and public infrastructure. There is a compelling case for such reforms—especially in the context of a deepening housing crisis and with public finances currently under strain. However, a radical departure from the Section 106/Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) regime, which currently constitute the existing mechanisms of land value capture in England, would risk a detrimental impact on the supply of land in the short-term. We recognise that this would be disruptive to the Government’s housebuilding agenda.

Reforms to land value capture should be iterative, starting with improvements to existing mechanisms. Therefore, the Government must immediately pursue the reforms to Section 106 and CIL outlined in the chapters below. These reforms must optimise the system’s capacity to capture land value uplifts and deliver infrastructure and affordable housing—particularly homes for Social Rent—in line with the Government’s wider policy ambitions. The Government must also trial additional mechanisms of land value capture in areas where there are significant uplifts in land value which current mechanisms may not capture effectively. Specifically, the New Towns programme discussed in Chapter 5 presents a vital opportunity to test new ways of financing infrastructure delivery on large developments and learn lessons for future reforms.

Any reforms to land value capture should also be considerate of the wider tax system, to balance public needs and equitable charges on development. To support this work, the Government should publish updated land value estimates, which were last published in August 2020. If the Government does not intend to do so, it must explain why it no longer publishes this data.”

In essence, the Committee sees any radical change as likely to be disruptive to the government’s current agenda. Instead, it is recommending a number of changes which in my view are “no brainers”, for instance better resources for local planning authorities and looking to simplify the approach to section 106 agreements and to CIL:

Reforms to section 106 agreements

“There is a strong case for the introduction of template clauses for aspects of Section 106 agreements across England, as was recommended by the National Audit Office and others. Templates would allow local authorities to focus negotiations on site-specific factors rather than legal wordings. Template clauses would also allow for greater standardisation and clarity of requirements across all local authorities, and in turn reduce the workload of local authorities and Small and Medium-sized Enterprise developers.

As part of the site thresholds consultation that will take place later this year, the Ministry must seek views on how standardised Section 106 templates could most effectively streamline the negotiation process across sites of all sizes. Based on the consultation responses, the Ministry must work with the Planning Advisory Service to develop a suite of Section 106 template clauses and publish these within six months of the consultation closing. Alongside their publication, the Ministry must also update its guidance to local authorities on Planning Obligations to encourage local authorities to adopt these template clauses.”

I covered the same ground in my 14 June 2025 blog post Why Does Negotiating Section 106 Agreements Have To Be Such A Drag? Not only that, but my firm has also been working on an actual template draft for small and medium sized schemes and a specific set of proposals for ironing out the pinch points that currently exist at every step of the sway from arriving at heads of terms through to agreement completion. This was there to be grasped – it is a national embarrassment. We held a workshop on 30 September 2025, attended by a selection of thirty or so lawyers and planners from the public and private sectors, developers and representatives of industry bodies with MHCLG present in an observer capacity. If you weren’t invited I apologise but we were limited by the size of our meeting room! The draft output from the workshop will be released next month. If there is an organisation out there which is willing to make a larger space available in late November for a launch event please let me know.

Section 106 dispute resolution scheme

This may be why I write blog posts…. The Committee picked up on a reference I made in the blog post mentioned above to section 158 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 which has never been switched on, allowing for a dispute resolution procedure to be able to be invoked where necessary during the course of negotiations.

“Local planning authorities across England have expressed concern that protracted Section 106 negotiations are causing delays to housing delivery. Drawn out negotiations do not benefit public outcomes and cause undue delays to development, which may impede the Government’s housebuilding ambitions. Whilst we recognise the Minister for Housing and Planning’s concerns that introducing a dispute resolution scheme may add complexity to the system, we believe the potential benefits to affordable housing delivery and unlocking stalled development outweigh this risk.

The Government should introduce a statutory Section 106 dispute resolution scheme, under the provisions of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. If the Government does not intend to pursue this, it should set out a detailed explanation as to why the Ministry has chosen not to implement the provision legislated for by Parliament in the 2016 Act. This should include setting out any specific technical or legal barriers to implementation which the Ministry has identified.”

Community Infrastructure Levy

Again, nothing earth-shattering. Rather, calls for more transparency as to which authorities are charging CIL and at what rates; widening opportunities for authorities to pool receipts (and recognising the opportunity that the reintroduction of strategic planning will bring) and greater focus on infrastructure funding statements.

On new towns:

The Committee calls on the government to set out where the funding is to come from (“The Government’s New Towns programme is likely to require billions of pounds of public and private investment over several decades, including millions from HM Treasury to establish development corporations during this Parliament”); greater use should be enabled of tax increment funding to fund infrastructure in cities and new towns. Specifically on the role that land value capture might play:

“There is significant potential to use land value capture as part of funding the proposed New Towns, especially on green field sites. However, we are concerned that the Government has announced substantial detail of the 12 potential sites without a planning policy to protect land value, contrary to the recommendation of the New Towns Taskforce. It appears that the Government has not yet established any delivery body to purchase land or enter agreements with landowners, which risks allowing developers considerable time to acquire sites for speculative development and immediately push up land values. The Taskforce said that, in the worst-case scenario, this could “jeopardise New Town plans”.

The Government must immediately conduct an analysis of Existing Use Values (EUV) on each of the 12 sites to maximise the capture of future land value uplifts, and develop plans for using appropriate mechanisms for land value capture on each site. This must include the option of development corporations using Compulsory Purchase Orders to assemble land where ownership is fragmented or negotiations stall. The Government must ensure arrangements for the purchase of land on New Towns sites are in place before it announces its final decision on locations by spring 2026.”

“The Ministry is right to prioritise New Towns which have the greatest potential to boost housing supply in the short-term, but its plan to “get spades in the ground on at least three new towns in this Parliament” does not match the scale of the Government’s housebuilding ambition. The New Towns programme can and must make a contribution towards increasing housing supply during this Parliament.

The Government must immediately clarify how housing delivery in New Towns will interact with local authority housing need targets. In its final response in spring 2026, the Government must include a roadmap for the New Towns programme, to show when each development corporation will be established, when development will commence on each site, and the estimated development timeline for each New Town.”

So will the government meet its 1.5m homes target?

“The housing sector is eagerly awaiting the Government’s Long-Term Housing Strategy, which it first announced in July 2024. Originally, this was to be published alongside the Spending Review in spring 2025. The continuing lack of a cohesive plan to deliver 1.5 million new homes has left the sector in the dark. We are also deeply disappointed that the Government has been unwilling to engage with us on the development of the Strategy, or provide any updates on its delayed publication, other than to tell us that it will be published “later this year”.”

“The Government can only begin to make significant progress towards its 1.5 million target once the sum of local housing need targets in Local Plans add up to that figure. Whilst the Government’s reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework seek to plan for approximately 370,000 new homes per year, local authorities will take several years to transition to this national annual target, as the currently Local Plans take seven years to produce and adopt on average. The Government has stated its ambition to introduce a 30-month plan-making timeline, but the relevant provisions in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 to speed up plan-making have still not been implemented.

The Government must immediately bring forward its Long-Term Housing Strategy without further delay. It must set out an ambitious, comprehensive, and achievable set of policies that will deliver 1.5 million new homes by July 2029. The Strategy must prioritise implementing reforms to the plan-making system to move towards a 30-month timeline. The Strategy document must include an annex to provide the Ministry’s assessment of how many net additional dwellings each policy change will contribute towards annual housing supply, adding up to 1.5 million new homes over the five-year Parliament. If the Ministry is unable to supply this, the Government must make an oral statement to the House to confirm how many new homes it will deliver by the end this Parliament.”

There we have it. If nothing else, that will all spur us on with the work on the template section 106 agreements work and, related to that, I’m very keen to discuss how section 158 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 might provide an effective, light touch, procedure.

Simon Ricketts, 28 October 2025

Personal views, et cetera

London Stalling

This one is about the current position with London (non) development and some thoughts about what procedural steps may be open to you if you are a London (non) developer with a planning permission for a scheme that is no longer viable to build out.

On 14 October 2025, Molior published figures for Q3 2025 construction starts and sales in relation to schemes in London with 25+ homes for private sale or rent. Apologies for the extensive quoting but their summary is clearer than anything I can write:

“Between 2015 and 2020, there were 60-65,000 homes for private sale or rent under construction in London at any given time.

Today, that number has fallen to 40,000 … and 5,300 of those are halted part-built.

With a surge of completions expected in 2026, Molior forecasts that just 15-20,000 new homes will be actively under construction on 1st January 2027.”

“London had just 5,933 new home sales in Q1-Q3 2025.

Sales rates are weak across all local markets and at every price point.

At prices up to £600 psf – the level at which most London owner-occupiers can buy – sales to individuals are virtually non-existent.”

“Build-to-rent completions are about to plunge.

Interest rates rose during 2022, then the Liz Truss budget pushed them higher.

This stopped new money from funding London multifamily development.

Completions are set to disappear after 2027 because construction starts fell in 2023 / 2024.”

“There were 3,248 private starts in Q1-Q3 2025.

London is now on track for fewer than 5,000 private construction starts in 2025.”

“Starts have been falling for a decade because sales rates and profitability have been falling for a decade.

Building Safety Regulator delays have made things worse in 2025.”

“Development is unviable across half of London.

Development costs are high, so it is unviable to build profitably in half of London – areas under £650 psf.

This is even if the land is provided free and there are no planning obligations like CIL and affordable housing.”

“London has 281,000 unbuilt permissions.

These numbers are private + affordable C3 permissions.

The numbers include outline consents, detailed consents and unbuilt phases of schemes partly under way.

Also included are projects successful at committee but still waiting S106 sign-off.”

Set all that alongside the homelessness and rough sleeping crises in London. The BBC reported yesterday that more than 132,000 households were living in temporary accommodation on 30 June 2025, up 7.6% from the same time last year. Aside from the human cost, this is of course at a huge financial cost for London boroughs: £740m ‘black hole’: London’s temporary accommodation crisis draining local resources (London Councils, 13 October 2025). And at the sharpest end: Number of people “living on the streets” of London increases by 26% (Crisis, 31 July 2025).

Whilst I try not to wear out my two typing-fingers commenting on press speculation about forthcoming announcements, I think we can assume that the government and the Mayor of London will soon be announcing various measures to try to turn this around or at least provide some sort of jump-start (note to government press team, I suggest that we are in “jump-start” rather than “turbo-charge” territory). See for example the Guardian’s 17 October 2025 piece London developers to be allowed to reduce percentage of affordable homes.

The spectre in the press pieces of some temporary reduction in developers’ threshold for qualifying for the Mayor’s fast-track (i.e. basically avoiding the need for formal viability appraisal and a late stage viability review mechanism if they can commit to a level of affordable housing which is usually 35%, with a policy-compliant split of affordable housing tenure types within that – see policy H5 of the London Plan for more detail) down to perhaps 20% is being seen by some as amounting to an actual reduction in the amount of affordable (and particularly socially rented) housing that will be developed. But this analysis is unfortunately wrong: very few schemes are currently proceeding with 35% or more affordable housing. Viability appraisals either agreed or accepted after scrutiny on appeal (this is not developers cooking the books) are already coming out at way less than 20%, let alone 35% (which is why simply reducing the threshold alone wouldn’t be enough). See for instance the inspector’s decision in relation to the Stag Brewery appeal (summarised in my 4 May 2025 blog post (7.5% affordable housing) and the 29 May 2025 decision letter in relation to a proposed tower block in Cuba Street (16.6% affordable housing). Nor is this a purely London phenomenon, if you recall last month’s Brighton Gasworks decision (summarised in my 27 September 2025 blog post) (zero affordable housing).

20%, plus the other measures being whispered about such as increasing subsidies for socially rented housing and/or allowing councils not to charge CIL, may tip the balance so as to turn some non-developers back into being developers again and thereby deliver more affordable housing (including socially rented housing) in absolute numbers (which is what counts after all) than is currently the case.

But what about the many schemes consented on the basis of 35% or more, that simply aren’t proceeding, at least beyond basic operations to keep the permission alive (see my 7 September 2025 blog post The Stressful & Sadly Often Necessary Task Of Keeping Planning Permissions Alive)?

If we look to amend existing, unviable, section 106 agreements, no longer do we have the benefit of section 106BA, a provision introduced in April 2013 via the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013, to allow developers to apply to modify or discharge affordable housing obligations in Section 106 agreements where those obligations made a development economically unviable, and then repealed three years later in April 2016. That provision unlocked various stalled permissions at the time. Is it too late, or too unpalatable, for an amendment to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill simply to reintroduce it?

Instead, the main routes are:

If the section 106 planning obligation is at least five years’ old, a formal application to the local planning authority can be made under section 106 A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 on the basis that the relevant obligation, unless modified, “no longer serves a useful purpose”. The test is expressed very generally which is unhelpful but the case would be that if the obligation is causing development, otherwise beneficial, not to proceed, it cannot be serving a “useful purpose”. There is the right of appeal to the Planning Inspectorate.

Seeking variation of section 106 planning obligations in the slip-stream of an application made under section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (an application, of course, for planning permission for the development of land without complying with conditions subject to which a previous planning permission was granted – and which is to be assessed against the current development plan and other material considerations). This was the route taken in the Cuba Street appeal I mentioned above. Full planning permission had been granted in December 2022. A section 73 application was made to amend the approved floor plans set out in the schedule referenced in condition 2 of that permission, to “provide an increase in the residential units from 421 to 434, and a reduction in the affordable housing (AH) provision from 100 (71/29 affordable rented to intermediate split as a ratio) to 58 (66/44 affordable rented to intermediate split as a ratio). In percentage terms the change in AH would be from 30.15 % to 16.6%. A consequence of these changes would be amendments to conditions 24 and 29, with respect to wheelchair accessible homes and cycle storage, given that they relate to the quantum of development subject to the original permission.”

Negotiating a deed of variation to the section 106 planning obligation, outside these formal procedures, without any recourse to appeal if the authority is resistant.

A fresh application for planning permission – utterly the nuclear option in times of cost, time and risk.

If there is indeed some form of announcement from MHCLG and the Mayor of London, I will be interested to see:

What is said about existing stalled permissions and any advice that is to be given to boroughs as to the approach they should take when approached by way of any of these procedural routes.

More generally, how will any announced (presumably temporary) relaxations with regard to the London Plan policy H5 threshold approach or any other policy requirements sit as regards section 38 (6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (“If regard is to be had to the development plan for the purpose of any determination to be made under the planning Acts the determination must be made in accordance with the plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise”)? Where there’s a will there’s a way but this is all another reminder, as if we needed it, that the process for reviewing and updating the London is so slow as not to be fit for purpose.

Oh and we still await MHCLG’s updated planning practice guidance on viability.

“London calling, at the top of the dial.

And after all this, won’t you give me a smile?”

Simon Ricketts, 18 October 2025

Personal views, et cetera

Bank Holiday Weekend Special: Mayors, Oxford Street, Stag Brewery

The election for the first London Mayor took place 25 years today, 4 May 2000. I learned this via a piece by Nick Bowes in LCA’s latest LDN newsletter.

It is a topical weekend to think back as to the influence of the three very different political figures who have been London Mayor: Ken Livingstone, Boris Johnson and Sadiq Khan. Even without the extent of devolved powers available to their counterparts in other world cities, they have been able to exert significant influence over the shape and operation of our capital city, particularly in relation to transportation and in relation to strategic planning, including in relation to individual development projects of “potential significant importance”.

As Labour rolls out its vision for Mayoral strategic authorities across the country, what are going to be the political consequences over time and for the shaping of those areas? My 18 January 2025 blog post Viva La Devolution sought to summarise what lies ahead in terms of devolution and the introduction of strategic planning, modelled (in legislative form at least) on the spatial development strategy (aka London Plan) model, with equivalent intervention powers to the London Mayor in relation to applications of potential strategic importance (the power to direct refusal or to take over as decision maker).

For example, Greater Lincolnshire is now of course a combined county authority, covering the Lincolnshire County Council, North East Lincolnshire Council and North Lincolnshire Council’s areas. On 1 May 2025, Reform party politician Dame Andrea Jenkyns was elected Mayor and will lead the authority, the other members being:

Constituent members: Six members appointed by the constituent councils. Agreed at the first GLCCA meeting on 6 March, these are:

Councillor Martin Hill OBE – Leader of Lincolnshire County Council
Councillor Patricia Bradwell OBE – Lincolnshire County Council Councillor
Philip Jackson – Leader of North East Lincolnshire Council
Councillor Stan Shreeve – North East Lincolnshire Council
Councillor Rob Waltham MBE – Leader of North Lincolnshire Council
Councillor Richard Hannigan – North Lincolnshire Council

Non-constituent members: Four people nominated by the district councils within the area. Agreed at the first GLCCA meeting on 6 March, these are:

Councillor Richard Wright – Leader of North Kesteven District Council
Naomi Tweddle – Leader of City of Lincoln Council
Craig Leyland – Leader of East Lindsey District Council
Nick Worth – Leader of South Holland District Council

Additional non-constituent or associate members: Up to two further members, including one of the police and crime commissioners for the area and another from a business background. Agreed at the first GLCCA meeting on 6 March, these are:

Marc Jones – Police and Crime Commissioner for Lincolnshire
Neal Juster- Interim Associate Member

What will all this mean for planning?

I had a brief look at Reform UK’s policy documents:

Aside from a whole page on scrapping the government’s net zero policies, this is all there is on planning, on housing:

“Review the Planning System

Fast-track planning and tax incentives for development of brownfield sites. ‘Loose fit planning’ policy for large residential developments with pre-approved guidelines and developer requirements.

Reform Social Housing Law

Prioritise local people and those who have paid into the system . Foreign nationals must go to the back of the queue. Not the front”.

It will be interesting to see how the new authority engages with the process of preparing a spatial development strategy in due course and the extent to which the process will be used a wider political platform. Social media posts from Reform’s deputy leader and MP for Boston and Skegness (Lincolnshire of course) and from Dame Andrea Jenkyns perhaps give a flavour of what is in store:

Conflict with the government on national policy issues:

Influence in relation to wider political/cultural issues:

Of course it must be said that each of our London Mayors have used their role from time to time in equivalent ways!

Turning back to London, one long-running east-west scar across the centre of the capital has been Oxford Street. I wrote in my 21 September 2024 blog post Street Robbery about the Mayor’s 17 September 2024 announcement that he is to create a Mayoral Development Corporation to “transform Oxford Street, including turning the road into a traffic-free pedestrianised avenue” so that it can “once again become the leading retail destination in the world”. Since then a public consultation process was launched on 28 February 2025 which closed on 2 May 2025. For a detailed, authoritative account of the last hundred years of managing transport on Oxford Street, which puts the current proposals into context, I strongly recommend you read an On London blog post published today, 4 May 2025, by Paul Dimoldenberg, long serving Westminster City Council member. How much progress will be made towards at least partial pedestrianisation before the end in 2028 of Sadiq Khan’s current term? One to watch.

We are also watching and waiting for the Mayor’s high level Towards a London Plan consultation document, initially expected last month but now delayed to May. Adoption is not expected of the final document until 2027, a year from the next Mayoral election. These slow time periods are crazy.

We are also still waiting for the final versions, following consultation in May 2023 (see my 6 May 2023 blog post New Draft London Guidance On Affordable Housing/Viability) of non-statutory London Plan Guidance on affordable housing and on development viability. All we have had so far is a December 2024 “practice note” on accelerating housing delivery (see my 11 January 2025 blog post Is The London Mayor Doing Enough In Practice To Accelerate Housing Delivery?)

As we wait for those documents, the inspector’s decision letter dated 2 May 2025 in relation to the Stag Brewery proposed development in Mortlake, Richmond-on-Thames, makes for interesting reading – and a reminder of how financially challenging it is to bring forward large-scale brownfield development. I need to declare an interest in that my Town Legal colleagues Elizabeth Christie and Aline Hyde acted for the successful appellant, Reselton Properties Limited. The proposals entail the redevelopment of the site for residential and mixed use purposes (including up to 1,075 new homes), together a new secondary school. The decision letter follows a lengthy saga, with a previous scheme on the site having been the subject of refusal by the Mayor in May 2021 following resolution to grant by the London Borough of Richmond-on-Thames in January 2020. The local planning authority had similarly resolved to approve this latest scheme; the main issue, again, was with the Mayor, primarily in relation to viability and the approach to affordable housing.

The appellant and local planning authority agreed that viability testing had demonstrated that the viable position would be zero affordable housing, and that, against this technical position, the offer of 7.5% affordable housing (split 80% social rented, 20% intermediate), with viability review mechanism to capture future uplifts in viability, was a benefit. The Mayor disagreed that this represented the maximum viable provision required by policy, questioning some of the viability inputs, namely on private residential sales values, developer return (appellant’s and council’s position: 17.2%, Mayor’s position 15%) and growth and review potential. However, the inspector accepted the appellant’s and council’s position, indeed rejecting an alternative offer by the appellant of 12% affordable housing if the inspector were to have found against the appellant and council on elements of the viability case. In the context of the council having marginally less than five years’ housing land supply; the additional presumption to be given to brownfield development, and other benefits including the opportunity for delivery of a new secondary school as required by the local plan allocation and wider economic benefits flowing from the development, planning permission was granted.

Simon Ricketts, 4 May 2025

Personal views, et cetera

Fires

Two sad stories, presented without further comment.

Fire 1

Everyone will remember the case of the Crooked House pub in Dudley.

For a summary of the relevant facts, I turn to Mould J, in the opening passages of his judgment in ATE Farms Limited v Secretary of State (Mould J, 5 February 2025):

“The Crooked House used to operate as a public house well known for its tilted appearance both within and outside. The causes of the differential settlement resulting in that appearance and evident in the building are possibly various, including the underlying natural geology and the impact of historic mining activity. The pub closed in July 2023 apparently following a burglary which had caused considerable and costly damage. The appellant purchased the land on 21 July 2023.

On 5 August 2023 the building was seriously damaged by fire, the cause of which, and in particular whether it was caused deliberately by criminal action, are currently the subject of a police investigation. On 7 August 2023 the fire-damaged building was demolished by contractors acting on the instruction of the appellant.”

South Staffordshire Council issued an enforcement notice on 27 February 2024, alleging that without planning permission the Crooked House, an unlisted building, was demolished and that this was unauthorised development constituting a breach of planning control. “The appellant’s case is that those demolition works were initially agreed to by the second respondent, but that they led to an urgent risk of collapse and justified the immediate demolition of the remaining structure.”

“The enforcement notice requires the Crooked House to be rebuilt effectively so as to reinstate it in facsimile.”

“On 27 September 2024 the [council] requested that the appeal inquiry be adjourned until after the police investigation into the fire had been concluded, because the cause of the fire and whether it had occurred through human agency could be a key issue for the inquiry to resolve. On 18 October 2024 the Crown Prosecution Service wrote to the inspector notifying him that their current expectation was that the criminal investigation and any decisions on prosecution would be completed by the end of 2024. That letter included the following:

“As the Appeal touches upon an issue a criminal court may be asked to determine, we request that consideration be given to adjourning the appeal to allow time for the CPS to conclude its review. While we appreciate a decision not to charge a person with any criminal offence will not assist either party to the Appeal, a decision to prosecute may have a bearing on the Appeal and could also impact the criminal proceedings should the appeal be held in tandem.”

“On 15 November 2024 the appellant requested that the inspector postpone the start date for the inquiry on the grounds of fairness and prejudice to the criminal proceedings and pending completion of any criminal process.”

Following further representations by both parties, the inspector issued a note:

“As I am sure you understand, the Inspectorate has a duty to determine appeals in a timely manner, in particular where there is considerable local interest, hence our reluctance to postpone the inquiry. Timescales for the outcome of investigations and any subsequent Court proceedings are uncertain. If there is a court case this could take several years before we even began to consider the planning merits of the demolition of the building. Such a delay also ignores the question, how relevant is the issue of responsibility to the determination of the various grounds of appeal? This is still a matter of dispute between the parties.

In this regard, before I consider who was responsible for the fire, should that become necessary, there are a number of more fundamental questions to answer:

1.Can a fire be an act of demolition for the purposes of the 1990 Act?

2. If it can, does it matter who was responsible for the fire in so far as this may be relevant to the grounds of appeal?

3. Is there a difference between a genuine accident (an act of God) and a deliberate act – regardless of who carried out the deliberate act in so far as it relates to the considerations under appeal?

The three questions above are essentially legal and interpretational issues (and I have already had your outline views on them) which should, I would suggest, be dealt with by way of submissions. Consequently, in order to continue with the current, agreed, timetable, I suggest the following process is followed. Both parties provide submissions on the above questions which will cover grounds (b) [whether the matters have occurred which are alleged to be in breach of planning control] and (c) [whether, if they did occur, they amounted to a breach of planning control] at the same time as proofs are submitted. Proofs of evidence should then be limited to grounds (a) and (g) which will be the only matters examined at the inquiry.

Without prejudice to my determination of the appeal, I consider, at this stage, that there are three likely outcomes of grounds (b) and (c). Firstly, that ground (b) succeeds so there has been no demolition in which case the notice will be quashed. Secondly that ground (b)/(c) succeeds to the extent that the allegation needs to be corrected so that demolition is restricted to the part of the building that remained after the fire; and, thirdly, the grounds fail and it is unnecessary to correct the notice. This last outcome is the main component of ground (a), should planning permission be granted for the demolition of the building?

For the inquiry ground (a) should be considered on the basis of either the second or third outcomes.

Should you consider any additional outcomes may arise from grounds (b) or (c), relevant to ground (a), these should also be addressed in your submissions and proofs of evidence. Having heard the evidence on grounds (a) and (g) [whether a longer period for compliance should be allowed] and discussed conditions I will then discuss how best to proceed.

At present I consider the best way forward would be to adjourn the inquiry to allow me to consider the written and oral evidence. If it turns out that further evidence is required concerning the identity of those responsible for the fire this can either be dealt with by way of further written representations or I can re-open the inquiry. It may be possible to reach a decision without further evidence in which case I could close the inquiry and issue the decision letter. I will ensure both main parties have an opportunity to address me on this before I adjourn the inquiry and before any final decision is issued.”

The appellant argued that the inquiry should be postponed pending the outcome of the criminal investigation but the inspector issued a final ruling, confirming that the inquiry would start on 11 March 2025.

The appellant challenged the inspector’s ruling by way of judicial review and Mould J agreed that it should be quashed and remitted to the inspector for reconsideration:

“Firstly, it is the appellant’s case that the question whether they were responsible for the fire which occurred on 5 August 2023 is central not only to the determination of the enforcement appeal generally, but in particular to the evaluation of, and the determination of, the issue raised under ground (a). Whether the fire was accidental or was caused by human agency, their case is that they are innocent of its occurrence. They therefore, understandably, contend that it would be grossly disproportionate to their rights protected under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights to require them to reinstate the building at very considerable cost, in the event that the answer to that first question was in their favour. The appellant says that would be a powerful material consideration in support of the grant of planning permission retrospectively for the demolition of the building.”

“There is simply no realistic possibility that consideration of the ground (a) appeal at the forthcoming inquiry, let alone its determination, will be able to proceed without the inspector grappling with those questions of fact and causation. In my view, the inspector clearly misdirected himself in proceeding on the basis that he may be able to determine the enforcement appeal on ground (a) or at all, independently of inquiring into and finding facts as to the cause of the fire, on a true understanding of the evidence.”

“I have considerable sympathy for the inspector in his desire to avoid unnecessary delay and postponement of the inquiry. Not only does that objective flow from the Procedure Rules, as I have indicated, but it was in any event an entirely reasonable and understandable objective for him to pursue. The question though is whether he has misdirected himself in seeking to achieve that.

It seems to me, for the reasons that I have given, that the approach that he has followed cannot, in truth, avoid delay in relation to the determination of the ground (a) appeal. In order to determine the ground (a) appeal, it is inevitable that the inspector will have to hear evidence and make findings of fact on the cause of the fire: in particular, as to whether the appellant was responsible for it. He must do so in order to establish the true factual matrix against which to determine whether retrospective planning permission is merited in vindication of the appellant’s Article 1 Protocol 1 rights. On a true analysis of the position, there is no proper basis upon which the inspector can avoid hearing such evidence in the context of the ground (a) appeal.”

And so the appeal remains in abeyance, pending the outcome of the criminal investigations.

Fire 2

Many of you will also have read about the more recent fire that destroyed a grade II* listed World War 1 aircraft hangar, hangar 3, at Old Sarum Airfield, Salisbury, on 17 April 2025. See for instance Protecting airfield is about ‘protecting heritage’ (BBC, 24 April 2025) and Council seeking legal advice after fire rips through Grade II-listed site with permission for hundreds of homes (Inside Housing, 23 April 2025).

The fire coincided with the final outcome of a planning appeal inquiry (appeal decision letter dated 9 April 2025 and costs decision letter dated 17 April 2025).

The appeal was for a mixed use scheme at Old Sarum Airfield including 315 dwellings and was allowed, albeit with the inspector rejecting the appellant’s case that the development could not viably support any affordable housing, instead concluding that the proposed development could viably deliver 25%. Condition 17 imposed a restriction on occupation of more than 160 dwellings until hangar 3 had been restored. There were no awards of costs.

For a more personal narrative (which I am in no position to verify), you may be interested to read Hashi Mohammed’s recent LinkedIn post, Hashi having appeared for Wiltshire Council at the inquiry.

Simon Ricketts, 27 April 2025

Personal views, et cetera

	George Vasdekys on Carry That Weight
	simonicity on What’s The Use?
	simonicity on What’s The Use?
	Ian Knight on What’s The Use?
	practicallydreamerdf… on What’s The Use?