Aarhus Convention – SIMONICITY

Court Costs, Inquiry Costs

Jessie J is no judge and when it comes to litigation costs “forget about the price tag” is poor advice.

Aarhus cost caps

I last blogged about Aarhus Convention cost capping in my 22 June blog post No Time To Be 21: Where Are We With Aarhus Costs Protection? The detail is in that blog post but basically the regime allows a potential claimant in many planning and environmental cases to cap exposure to the other’s side’s costs (if the claim fails) to (subject to case by case variations) £5,000 for an individual and otherwise £10,000. As a quid pro quo, if the claimant succeeds, the claimant can only recover (subject to case by case variations) £35,000 from the other side towards its costs.

A big question, unanswered until this month, was whether these amounts are inclusive or exclusive of VAT. This only matters if the party seeking to recover the costs is not VAT-registered and cannot recover its VAT. But it matters a lot to most individuals and campaign groups.

The issue was decided following written submissions in R (Friends of the Earth) v Secretary of State for Transport (Court of Appeal, 13 January 2021). The background doesn’t matter much but is odd – Friends of the Earth were one of the parties in the Heathrow cases that won in the Court of Appeal against the Secretary of State for Transport, but the case only proceeded to the Supreme Court because interested party Heathrow Airport Limited appealed. Despite the Court of Appeal’s ruling being overturned, Secretary of State for Transport remained on the hook for Friends of the Earth’s costs from the Court of Appeal and, before then, the Divisional Court.

The relevant Aarhus Convention based costs order that had previously been made by the Court of Appeal in the main proceedings was:

“The Defendant is to pay the costs of the Claimant in the Divisional Court and in this Court, subject to detailed assessment and a cap of £35,000 in respect of the costs in the Divisional Court, and a cap of £35,000 in respect of the costs in this Court.”

Friends of the Earth submitted that this meant they were due a contribution of £70,000 towards their costs, as well as the VAT element, i.e. £84,000. (Incidentally this is the express statutory position in Northern Ireland – in England and Wales the Civil Procedure Rules are silent on the issue). The Secretary of State submitted that the cap was inclusive of any VAT element.

The Court of Appeal sided with the Secretary of State for four reasons:

“First, that is the natural meaning of the words used in those provisions. The figures are set out as absolute amounts, without qualification.

Secondly, this construction is supported by the history of the consultation exercise and the response to it by the Government in the process which led up to the enactment of CPR 45.43.

Thirdly, it does not seem to us that this would impede or frustrate the implementation in domestic law of the Aarhus Convention. That Convention simply requires that the costs of environmental litigation such as this should not be prohibitive. It does not require a contracting State to specify a particular ceiling, still less to state whether it is inclusive or exclusive of VAT.

Fourthly, the fact that the regulations applicable in Northern Ireland expressly provide for the ceilings to be exclusive of VAT does not assist FoE. Indeed, it suggests that, when the relevant legislative body wished to make the point clear, it was able to, and did so.”

So the bottom line is that the £70,000 entitlement had become an entitlement to £58,333.33 plus the VAT element on that amount.

There is an element of unequal treatment in this – if the party claiming costs were able to recover VAT the cap would in practice apply to its net costs figure, the VAT element only being an issue where the party can’t recover its VAT. Time to amend the CPR to accord with the Northern Ireland position?

Incidentally, I recommend a short YouTube summary on the case by Kings Chambers’ Martin Carter. As I write, the video has had 36 views and Jessie J’s Price Tag has had 731 million views. Come on planoraks!

Other court costs awards

Stepping aside from Aarhus costs capping, the general principle is that “if a party who has been given leave to bring a judicial review claim succeeds in establishing after fully contested proceedings that the defendant acted unlawfully, some good reason would have to be shown why he should not recover his reasonable costs” (Lord Toulson in R (on the application of Hunt) v North Somerset Council (Supreme Court, 22 July 2015) but the court of course always has a wide discretion.

That discretion may well result in no award or a reduced award. Two examples which may serve to manage expectations:

In Tomkins v City of London Corporation (Lang J, 8 December 2020) the claimant challenged the making of an experimental traffic order in relation to Beech Street, which runs under the Barbican Estate. He won on three of eight grounds but was not awarded costs:

“The Claimant’s application for the City to pay his costs is refused. Although he succeeded on three of the eight grounds, he did not succeed in quashing the [experimental traffic order]. The Council succeeded on five of the grounds, and the issues on which the Council succeeded occupied the majority of the hearing, and the post-hearing submissions. The City incurred significant costs in preparing and presenting those issues. Their costs far exceed the Claimant’s claim for costs in respect of the grounds on which he was successful. The City is not pressing for its costs, but has instead proposed that there should be no order for costs. In all the circumstances I consider that this is a just and appropriate order.”

(Town Legal’s Town Library summary is here).

In Flaxby Park Ltd v Harrogate Borough Council (Holgate J, 25 November 2020) the claimant had sought to challenge the adoption of part of the Harrogate local plan on three grounds and succeeded on part of one ground. To cut a long story short (literally), Holgate J did not allow the claimant to recover the costs of an original bundle which he considered to be disproportionately lengthy or of the preparation of a witness statement which he determined to be unnecessary, and awarded the claimant 15% of the balance of its costs:

“I do not accept HBC’s submissions that there should be no order as to costs. … It was necessary for FPL to bring proceedings, but they ought to have been on a much more limited scale. Taking into account also the unnecessary expenditure to which HBC has been put in order to resist the substantial parts of the claim where FPL was unsuccessful, FPL should be awarded only 15% of its costs…”

Appeal inquiry costs awards

In Swale Borough Council v Secretary of State (Sir Ross Cranston, 17 December 2020), Swale Council sought unsuccessfully to challenge a costs order made against it by a section 78 appeal inspector

The judgment includes a helpful review of the case law in relation to challenges to inspectors’ awards of costs, leading to the following conclusion by the judge:

“the authorities establish the following propositions:

(i) the Secretary of State is entitled to adopt a policy about costs and having done so his inspectors must apply it;

(ii) the policy is that costs may be awarded against a party for unreasonable behaviour resulting in unnecessary or wasted expense;

(iii) “unreasonable” means unreasonable in the ordinary sense of the word, not unreasonable in a Wednesbury sense;

(iv) a Council’s behaviour may be unreasonable if its refusal of planning permission could not be supported by substantial evidence, but that is not the only test and there may be other relevant factors;

(v) one example is if a developer signs a section 106 agreement; it is accepting that it is reasonable even though the inspector may not be persuaded that it is necessary.”

The Council had sought to argue that it was wrong for it to be penalised for late withdrawal of its requirement for an affordable housing contribution and for the consequence of a late indication of particular highways concerns but the judge declined to interfere with the judgment of the inspector. For instance, on the second complaint:

“In my view this is one of those cases where a different inspector may have reached a different conclusion. However, I cannot conceive that Mr Upton has surmounted the high hurdle necessary to establish that this inspector’s decision was flawed. The case which Mr Village QC put to the inspector was that the Council had not raised what became condition 19, or the further contribution to traffic calming in Darlington Drive/Parsonage Chase, until immediately before the exchange of evidence on 6 January 2020, too late to avoid the preparation of Attwood’s highways evidence. When these were raised as a way forward, Attwood agreed and it was an example of the Council’s failure to review the case promptly following the lodging of the appeal, one of the examples the PPG gives as indicating unreasonable behaviour (at para. 049, referred to earlier).”

(Town Legal’s Town Library summary of the case is here).

Simon Ricketts, 16 January 2021

Personal views, et cetera

Learn An Instrument They Said. So I Picked Up The GPDO

At last – the Secretary of State announced on 30 September 2020 that dwellings created by way of permitted development rights will need to comply with the nationally described space standard.

There is no timescale given for when the change will be effected, which will need to be by way of a further statutory instrument amending the 2015 General Permitted Development Order. We have already had four such SIs already this year and further changes are in the queue, such as giving effect to the 14 July 2020 announcement that planning permission will be required for the demolition of theatres, concert halls and live music venues and giving effect to the proposed relaxation of permitted development rights for 5G infrastructure (of which more below). Good luck keeping up! (It’s odd how the Government can keep updating the Planning Practice Guidance but Parliament still does not make available up to date consolidated versions of secondary legislation, whether in our planning law field or for instance in relation to coronavirus measures.)

I dealt with the nationally described space standard in my 23 March 2019 blog post We Have Standards. Since being introduced in 2015, it has been up to each local planning authority to decide whether to adopt the standard as policy in its local plan. Once it is made a legal requirement for permitted development schemes we will have the curious position that in some areas, where authorities have not adopted it as local policy, it will be required for permitted development schemes but not for projects which are pursued by way of a traditional planning application.

It is disappointing that the additional requirement was not introduced in the June and July 2020 statutory instruments, which for instance introduced the additional prior approval requirement of “adequate natural light” (NB “adequate” undefined – wait for the arguments).

Public pressure and a continuing trail of adverse media stories in relation to office to residential schemes presumably have played their part (most recently Rowan Moore’s 27 September Observer piece ‘It’s like an open prison’: the catastrophe of converting office blocks to homes). As for the 30 September timing of the announcement? That’s obvious – later that day a Commons debate took place, as scheduled, in relation to Labour’s motion that the three statutory instruments amending the General Permitted Development Order be revoked. The announcement neutralised one of the most obvious lines of attack. Predictably the motion was defeated, entirely along party lines, 327 votes to 206 votes.

This month will of course see the hearing into the GPDO changes judicial review that I covered in my 5 September 2020 blog post Lights Camera Action: The Planning Changes – Parliamentary Scrutiny, That JR.

And now there is yet another judicial review underway, into the Government’s 22 July 2020 announcement that it proposes to extend “permitted development rights to support the deployment of 5G and extend mobile coverage”. There is a piece about the challenge here: Government faces legal challenge over 5G phone masts ‘safety fears’ (Evening Standard, 1 October 2020). As with the Rights: Community: Action judicial review it is crowd funded. The Rights: Community: Action challenge appears to have raised £12,245 “of £25,000 stretch target from 271 pledges”. The 5G challenge appears to have raised £66,615 pledged “of £150,000 stretch target from 2,004 pledges”.

As with most crowdfunded litigation there is no analysis for potential donors on the crowdjustice website of its prospects of success, or what the judicial review process entails, but there is a link to the prospective claimants’ pre-action letter dated 21 August 2020 which alleges that the consultation process leading to the 22 July 2020 announcement was unlawful and was in breach of the public sector equality duty – and Aarhus Convention costs protection is sought. Without prejudging at all whether there is any basis for the complaints, this all is of course familiar territory in relation to these sorts of claims.

Finally, some plugs:

5.30 pm 7 October 2020

How will the Combined Infrastructure Levy work, how should it work?

(Town Legal with special guest MHCLG’s director of planning, Simon Gallagher)

Event details and registration: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_HeND28vJQ6STT-FdLz1u_Q

5.30 pm 14 October 2020

PC in 2020 – Has the Planning Court proved a success? What should be its future, and that of judicial review and statutory challenges in the planning system, in the light of the Faulks review?

(Town Legal with Landmark Chambers)

Event details and registration: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_2gsWU81vT7erSoeWqqQ7MQ

And lastly, watch out for a new series by Cratus and Town, Steve Quartermain in Discussion. The first episode is an hour long conversation with Secretary of State Robert Jenrick. More news will appear on the Cratus website.

Simon Ricketts, 3 October 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Linda Manzer’s pikasso guitar

Faulks Review Of Administrative Law: Call For Evidence

In my 15 August 2020 blog post, Introducing The Planning Court Case Explorer, I referred to the independent review of administrative law chaired by Lord Faulks, that the Government has commissioned. The review has now published, quietly it must be said, a call for evidence on 7 September 2020, with a deadline for responses of noon on 19 October 2020 (to be emailed to IRAL@justice.gov.uk).

The examination question that the review has been given by the Government is this:

“Does judicial review strike the right balance between enabling citizens to challenge the lawfulness of government action and allowing the executive and local authorities to carry on the business of government?”

The review is politically charged. The Conservative party’s 2019 manifesto said this:

“After Brexit we also need to look at the broader aspects of our constitution: the relationship between the Government, Parliament and the courts; the functioning of the Royal Prerogative; the role of the House of Lords; and access to justice for ordinary people. The ability of our security services to defend us against terrorism and organised crime is critical. We will update the Human Rights Act and administrative law to ensure that there is a proper balance between the rights of individuals, our vital national security and effective government. We will ensure that judicial review is available to protect the rights of the individuals against an overbearing state, while ensuring that it is not abused to conduct politics by another means or to create needless delays. In our first year we will set up a Constitution, Democracy & Rights Commission that will examine these issues in depth, and come up with proposals to restore trust in our institutions and in how our democracy operates.”

Lord Faulks’ standpoint is well-documented.

I suspect their focus will be on the, inevitably politicised, constitutional law litigation that we saw last year. That is an issue which is above this blog’s pay grade, but as a planning lawyer I’m concerned that any reform to administrative law may be to the detriment of the role of the Planning Court in relation to disputes arising under our planning system. And as we begin to move to a new system, the Planning Court will have a crucial role in joining the dots given the inevitable uncertainties that will arise. We need that process to be fast, efficient and, above all, trusted. The oversight of the process by the courts is a vital element in ensuring that our system continues to comply with, for example, the requirements of the Aarhus Convention and of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (and if anyone suggests that these things don’t matter, just wait till their property is compulsorily acquired without justification, or a dodgy planning permission is issued without any proper remedy in the courts).

I just read again the House of Lords rulings in the Alconbury cases (9 May 2001), which concerned the question as to whether various aspects of the planning system as it was at that time met the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, at that point having recently been incorporated into UK law by way of the Human Rights Act 1998. The House of Lords concluded that the system complied with the Convention, but on the basis that an essential element of that system was the supervisory role of the courts in reviewing the lawfulness and rationality of administrative decisions taken in the process.

My nervousness as to where we may eventually end up is accentuated by the current furore over clause 45 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, due to receive its second reading in the House of Commons on 15 September.

Imagine if the next Town and Country Planning Act rendered non-justiciable any regulations made under that Act? How convenient for a Government keen to proceed fast by way of secondary legislation and no doubt unhappy with the inevitable challenges it faces along the way (of which the Rights Community Action judicial review covered in last week’s blog post is a classic example).

Or if procedural failures in relation to decisions led to a rap over the knuckles for the authority rather than an undoing of what was done outside its powers?

Or if judicial review were codified in statute in such a way as to close out challenges to rationality or challenges on grounds such as bias, or legitimate expectation?

Of course, I hope that all of this is unlikely. I have some residual faith that there remains a basic understanding of the importance of the rule of law. I was pleased to see on Friday that the British Property Federation is canvassing its members in reaction to the call for evidence and I hope that other industry bodies do the same. After all, business needs predictability and to know that it is to be treated fairly – this is not just the domain of campaigners and communities!

If you have specific experiences of the role of judicial review in relation to the planning system, please do consider responding to that call for evidence.

As with any examination questions, do read the initial rubric first:

“The Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL) panel invites the submission of evidence on how well or effectively judicial review balances the legitimate interest in citizens being able to challenge the lawfulness of executive action with the role of the executive in carrying on the business of government, both locally and centrally. The panel is particularly interested in any notable trends in judicial review over the last thirty to forty years. Specifically, the panel is interested in understanding whether the balance struck is the same now as it was before, and whether it should be struck differently going forward.

The panel would like to hear from people who have direct experience in judicial review cases, including those who provide services to claimants and defendants involved in such cases, from professionals who practice in this area of law; as well as from observers of, and commentators on, the process. The panel are particularly interested in receiving evidence around any observed trends in judicial review, how judicial review works in practice and the impact and effectiveness of judicial rulings in resolving the issues raised by judicial review.”

So, what matters is direct experiences, evidence and data rather than rhetoric.

These are the specific areas which the review will be considering:

“• Whether the amenability of public law decisions to judicial review by the courts and the grounds of public law illegality should be codified in statute.

• Whether the legal principle of non-justiciability requires clarification and, if so, the identity of subjects/areas where the issue of the justiciability/non-justiciability of the exercise of a public law power and/or function could be considered by the Government.

• Whether, where the exercise of a public law power should be justiciable: (i) on which grounds the courts should be able to find a decision to be unlawful; (ii) whether those grounds should depend on the nature and subject matter of the power and (iii) the remedies available in respect of the various grounds on which a decision may be declared unlawful.

• Whether procedural reforms to judicial review are necessary, in general to “streamline the process”, and, in particular: (a) on the burden and effect of disclosure in particular in relation to “policy decisions” in Government; (b) in relation to the duty of candour, particularly as it affects Government; (c) on possible amendments to the law of standing; (d) on time limits for bringing claims, (e) on the principles on which relief is granted in claims for judicial review, (f) on rights of appeal, including on the issue of permission to bring JR proceedings and; (g) on costs and interveners.”

The call for evidence starts with a questionnaire for “Government Departments” (but which I would suggest is equally relevant for local authorities):

“1. In your experience, and making full allowance for the importance of maintaining the rule of law, do any of the following aspects of judicial review seriously impede the proper or effective discharge of central or local governmental functions? If so, could you explain why, providing as much evidence as you can in support?

a. judicial review for mistake of law

b. judicial review for mistake of fact

c. judicial review for some kind of procedural impropriety (such as bias, a

failure to consult, or failure to give someone a hearing)

d. judicial review for disappointing someone’s legitimate expectations

e. judicial review for Wednesbury unreasonableness

f. judicial review on the ground that irrelevant considerations have been taken into account or that relevant considerations have not been taken into account

g. any other ground of judicial review

h. the remedies that are available when an application for judicial review is successful

i. rules on who may make an application for judicial review

j. rules on the time limits within which an application for judicial review must be made

k. the time it takes to mount defences to applications for judicial review

2. In relation to your decision making, does the prospect of being judicially reviewed improve your ability to make decisions? If it does not, does it result in compromises which reduce the effectiveness of decisions? How do the costs (actual or potential) of judicial review impact decisions?

3. Are there any other concerns about the impact of the law on judicial review on the functioning of government (both local and central) that are not covered in your answer to the previous question, and that you would like to bring to the Panel’s attention?”

No doubt the responses to these questions, from those inevitably on the receiving end of judicial review, will point to the delays and uncertainty caused by legal challenges, but of course that is only one side of the story, which is why it is so important that there are responses from a wide section of business and society to the main questions which I set out below:

“1. Are there any comments you would like to make, in response to the questions asked in the above questionnaire for government departments and other public bodies?

2. In light of the IRAL’s terms of reference, are there any improvements to the law on judicial review that you can suggest making that are not covered in your response to question (1)?

Section 2 – Codification and Clarity

3. Is there a case for statutory intervention in the judicial review process? If so, would statute add certainty and clarity to judicial reviews? To what other ends could statute be used?

4. Is it clear what decisions/powers are subject to Judicial Review and which are not? Should certain decision not be subject to judicial review? If so, which?

5. Is the process of i) making a Judicial Review claim, ii) responding to a Judicial Review claim and/or iii) appealing a Judicial Review decision to the Court of Appeal/ Supreme Court clear?

Section 3 – Process and Procedure

6. Do you think the current Judicial Review procedure strikes the right balance between enabling time for a claimant to lodge a claim, and ensuring effective government and good administration without too many delays?

7. Are the rules regarding costs in judicial reviews too lenient on unsuccessful parties or applied too leniently in the Courts?

8. Are the costs of Judicial Review claims proportionate? If not, how would proportionality best be achieved? Should standing be a consideration for the panel? How are unmeritorious claims currently treated? Should they be treated differently?

9. Are remedies granted as a result of a successful judicial review too inflexible? If so, does this inflexibility have additional undesirable consequences? Would alternative remedies be beneficial?

10. What more can be done by the decision maker or the claimant to minimise the need to proceed with judicial review?

11. Do you have any experience of settlement prior to trial? Do you have experience of settlement ‘at the door of court’? If so, how often does this occur? If this happens often, why do you think this is so?

12. Do you think that there should be more of a role for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Judicial Review proceedings? If so, what type of ADR would be best to be used?

13. Do you have experience of litigation where issues of standing have arisen? If so, do you think the rules of public interest standing are treated too leniently by the courts?”

We have arranged a joint Town Legal/Landmark Chambers webinar at 5.30 pm on 14 October 2020 to consider these questions in the specific context of the planning system, and the operation of the Planning Court. Event and registration details here: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_2gsWU81vT7erSoeWqqQ7MQ .

Whether you come from the standpoint of a developer, local authority or community representative, when you strip away the legalism (as we will try to do) all of this really does matter in practice – not just in relation to the small minority of matters that end up in the Planning Court, but in relation to the operation of the system as a whole: fair and predictable procedures are only possible if we know that there are rules, and that remedies are available if they are broken. And when challenges are brought, they need to be resolved with speed, fairness and efficiency.

Simon Ricketts, 12 September 2020

Personal views, et cetera

PS two other webinars for your diary:

5.30 pm 15 September 2020

Permission In Principle – In Practice

(Town Legal with Landmark Chambers)

Event details and registration: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_5S0GAe6ySN2zfvsdtjd0uQ

5.30 pm 7 October 2020

How will the Combined Infrastructure Levy work, how should it work?

(Town Legal with special guest MHCLG’s director of planning, Simon Gallagher)

Event details and registration: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_HeND28vJQ6STT-FdLz1u_Q

The Great Hall, Royal Courts of Justice (courtesy Wikipedia)

Lights Camera Action: The Planning Changes – Parliamentary Scrutiny, That JR

Most of the summer blockbusters were paused from release this summer, except for Tenet, which no-one seems to understand. Oh and the statutory instruments making those major amendments to the GPDO (eg building upwards, and resi development to replace existing commercial buildings) and the Use Classes Order (eg the new class E), which hit our screens just before Parliament rose for the summer recess. The Planning For The Future white paper was published (visually spectacular) after Parliament had risen.

This post looks briefly at the role of Parliament in debating these documents, and at the Rights : Community : Action judicial review of the GPDO and Use Classes Order changes.

The amendments to the General Permitted Development Order and Use Classes Order

We’re talking about the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2020/755, The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2020/756 and The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2020/757 all laid before Parliament on 21 July, ahead of the Commons going into recess the following day, and came into effect on 31 August and 1 September. Parliament returned on 1 September.

The statutory instruments (“SIs”) were made under the negative resolution procedure. This means that although the SIs came into effect on when stated, either House can vote to reject them within 40 sitting days, following a motion (“prayer”) laid by a member of the relevant House. If rejected, the relevant statutory instrument is annulled, i.e. no longer of any legal effect.

There has been no Parliamentary debate so far on any of the SIs, although MHCLG minister Lord Greenhalgh did respond to questions in the Lords on 28 July 2020 (ahead of the Lords going into recess the next day).

Labour has laid a motion against the GPDO SIs, but (1) given the Government’s substantial majority there is surely no realistic likelihood of that succeeding on a vote and (2) the narrative in relation to the changes to the GPDO and Use Classes Order seems to have got hopelessly confused with concerns as to the separate proposals in the white paper in the minds of politicians,the press and the public – see for instance Valerie Vaz, shadow leader of the House of Commons, on 3 September 2020:

“We have prayed against the town and country planning permitted development regulations—I think there are three sets of them. The shadow Minister for Housing and Planning, my hon. Friend Mike Amesbury, has written to the Secretary of State. I hope that the Leader of the House will find time for that debate.

During August Parliament was not sitting, but extremely important announcements were being made. I cannot understand why the Government, who say consistently that Parliament is sovereign, do not come to the House to explain changes in policy. Apparently, algorithms will now be used in planning decisions. That takes away the very nature of making planning decisions—whether relevant considerations are taken into account or whether irrelevant considerations are taken into account—and it undermines administrative law. When you make a decision, you must give reasons.

The Town and Country Planning Association says that 90% of planning applications are approved and there are 1 million unbuilt commissions [sic]. It is time for the shires to rise up and oppose these new policies. Will the Leader of the House ask the current Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government to come to the House to explain why he is using algorithms to stomp on our green and pleasant land?”

Quite aside from the probably theoretical possibility of any or all of the SIs being annulled, there is also the judicial review that has been brought by a new campaign group, Rights : Community : Action. It describes itself as “a coalition of campaigners, lawyers, planners, facilitators, writers and scientists, united by a shared commitment to tackle the Climate Emergency – with people and for people, and the environment.” There are four protagonists: Naomi Luhde-Thompson (currently on sabbatical from Friends of the Earth), Hugh Ellis (Town and Country Planning Association), Laura Gyte (Oxfam) and Alex Goodman (Landmark Chambers).

The group has put its Statement of Facts and Grounds on line. These are the grounds:

“(1) GROUND 1: In respect of each of the three SIs, the Secretary of State unlawfully failed to carry out an environmental assessment pursuant to EU Directive 2001/42/EC (“the SEA Directive”) and the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004 (“the SEA Regulations”).

(2) GROUND 2: In respect of each of the three SIs, the Secretary of State failed to have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (“the PSED”) in s.149 of the Equality Act 2010 (“the EA 2010”).

(3) GROUND 3: In respect of each of the three SIs, the Secretary of State failed to consider the weight of the evidence against these radical reforms, including prior consultation responses and the advice of his own experts. This composite ground is divided as follows:

Ground 3a: The Secretary of State failed to conscientiously consider the responses to the consultation on proposed planning reforms which ran from 29 October 2018 to 14 January 2019

Ground 3b: In respect of the two SIs that expand Permitted Development rights (SI 2020/755 and SI 2020/756), the Secretary of State failed to take into account the advice of the government’s own experts: in particular, the findings of the Building Better, Building Beautiful Commission’s “Living with Beauty” Report (“The BBBB Report”), and the findings of his own commissioned expert report “Research into the quality standard of homes delivered through change of use Permitted Development rights” (“The Clifford Report”).

Ground 3c: In respect of the two SIs that expand Permitted Development rights (SI 2020/755 and SI 2020/756), the Secretary of State adopted an approach which was unfair, inconsistent and/or irrational in the context of the approach taken to similar proposed Permitted Development reforms: namely those relating to the deployment of 5G wireless masts.

Ground 3d: In respect of SI 2020/756, the Secretary of State was required to re- consult before introducing Class ZA. There was a legitimate expectation of re- consultation on the proposal for a permitted development right allowing the demolition and rebuild of commercial properties, arising from an express promise to re-consult which was made in the original consultation document.”

Do read the Statement of Facts and Grounds itself for the detail. The Government has served summary grounds of defence but I do not think that they are on line.

The group is seeking an order “declaring that the decision to lay the SIs was unlawful. The Claimant also seeks an order quashing the SIs for unlawfulness.” It was also initially seeking an order “suspending the operation of the SIs until the disposal” of the claim, but it has now withdrawn that request.

On 2 September 2020 Holgate J made an order listing the claim to be heard in court “for 1.5 days in the period between 8th October 2020 to 15th October 2020”. It will be a “rolled up” hearing, i.e. there has been no decision yet as to whether any of the grounds are arguable. The Planning Court has pulled out all the stops to list the case quickly – after all, if any parts of the SIs were now to be quashed just think of the implications and complications! But there must be a good likelihood of the case going to the Court of Appeal or beyond, particularly if any of the grounds gain any traction. There could be uncertainty for some time.

No doubt the claim will touch various raw nerves amongst some – an attack on the Government’s “fast changes” agenda, part reliance on EU-derived environmental legislation, Aarhus Convention costs capping, crowdfunded litigation, “activist lawyers” – it ticks all the boxes! But let’s see what the court makes of it.

The Planning For The Future white paper

The white paper is of course out for consultation, along with the associated shorter term measures document, so it might be said that they don’t amount to significant policy announcements – but that would surely be simplistic: there is a clear direction of travel. With this in mind, being no expert on Parliamentary conventions and procedure, I have two questions:

1. Surely the announcements should first have been in Parliament if I read this House of Commons Library note on Government policy announcements (18 January 2013) correctly?

2. What is the precise status of Planning For The Future? It is expressed on the face of the document to be a “white paper” but would it not usually therefore be expected to have been tabled in Parliament as a numbered command paper and to include the wording: “Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government by Command of Her Majesty“? On one level, does it matter? But surely it does?

I also note that some of the shorter term measures (covered in last week’s blog post) could take effect soon after the consultation deadline of 1 October (particularly the introduction of the revised standard method – the “algorithm” if you will) so if there is to be any proper, informed, debate in Parliament I would suggest that there is little time to be lost.

Simon Ricketts, 5 September 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Introducing The Planning Court Case Explorer

“We understand why many participants – not just local authorities, but statutory consultees and the Planning Inspectorate – are risk averse. Judicial review is expensive, and to lose a judicial review in the courts is bad for the reputation of either [sic]. And judicial reviews can be precedent setting, establishing a new interpretation of the law. We think the proposals set out in the document should remove the risk of judicial review substantially. Most judicial reviews are about imprecise and unclearly worded policies or law. Our plans for an overhaul of planning law to create simple and clear processes and for plans that set out clear requirements and standards will substantially remove the scope for ambiguity and therefore challenge.” (Planning For The Future white paper, paragraph 5.16)

You can’t really contemplate any reform on the planning system without considering the role of the courts in the way that the system works in practice. Plainly where a public body (whether the state or a local authority) acts outside its powers, someone thereby affected needs to have access to an effective remedy, usually an order that renders it to be of no legal effect. Quite apart from the rights and procedures deriving from domestic common law principles, UK has international obligations to maintain such processes under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, specifically in relation to access to environmental justice, under the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention. You can’t embark on a new system without a functioning mechanism to ensure that everyone plays by the rules.

Whilst essential as a backstop against abuse of power, the role of the courts in the operation of the planning system does of course need to be kept to a minimum. There are two areas in particular where there has always been scope to reduce the number of unnecessary claims:

1. As mentioned in that passage in the white paper, many (I’m not sure I would say “most”) “judicial reviews are about imprecise and unclearly worded policies or law.” As regards that first area, the aspiration in the white paper (“an overhaul of planning law to create simple and clear processes and for plans that set out clear requirements and standards will substantially remove the scope for ambiguity and therefore challenge”) is worthy but at present purely wishful thinking. We anticipate now a separate “Autumn” consultation into potential changes to EU-derived legislation, with a view to streamlining for instance SEA and EIA processes (no surprise – see e.g. my 4 July 2020 Have We Got Planning Newts For You: Back To Brexit blog post as well as Environment Secretary George Eustice’s 20 July 2020 speech). Of course, EU-derived environmental legislation (although, to be accurate, this is not about the EU – the relevant EU directives in turn implemented wider international treaty obligations) has been at the root of much planning caselaw, but the white paper’s proposals introduce a wide range of fresh tensions and uncertainties into the process – whether that be about the central imposition of housing requirements on local authorities, accelerated routes to development approvals or the proposed shift to a wholly new mechanism for the funding and delivery of affordable housing and infrastructure.

2. Claimants should be discouraged from using litigation simply as a tactic to secure delay or publicity, or in order to have a “low consequences” speculative last throw of the dice. Some steps have been taken to address this in recent years, most importantly the establishment of the Planning Court in March 2014 so that cases could be dealt with more quickly, by specialist judges, by the introduction of a permission stage in relation to section 288 challenges and by tightening the rules on costs protection (see my 22 June 2019 blog post No Time To Be 21: Where Are We With Aarhus Costs Protection?).

The lack of statistics as to the effectiveness of the Planning Court is frustrating. I went into this in my 8 July 2018 blog post The Planning Court and Richard Harwood QC has also recently expressed similar frustrations in the July 2020 39 Essex Chambers planning, environment and property newsletter, How common are High Court planning challenges?

At Town we recently decided to do something about it. Working alongside Landmark Chambers, on 13 August 2020 we unveiled what we call the Planning Court Case Explorer. The Case Explorer brings together, in one dataset, all judgments of the Planning Court after a full hearing, since its establishment in March 2014 to the end of June 2020 quarter by quarter (25 quarters), together with all subsequent appellate judgments. That amounts to 377 judgments by the Planning Court, 105 by the Court of Appeal and 11 by the Supreme Court. The data captured includes the length of time between the decision under challenge and the ruling, parties, judge and subject matter, with a link to the bailii transcript and usually our Town Library summary, and with a variety of search options so as to be able to interrogate the data, by way of clicking into the tables.

Only now, through this data, can it be seen that the average duration between a decision under challenge and the first instance ruling in relation to that decision is 293 days and can the extent of further delay be seen when a case goes to the Court of Appeal (an average of 726 days between the decision and the ruling) or there after to the Supreme Court (1,000 days!). In the context of a six weeks’ deadline for bring the claim in the first place and then the initial permission stage, that 293 days’ figure in my view is not unreasonable. The subsequent delays on appeal are in my view wholly unjustifiable.

Which judge in the High Court has handed down the most rulings? Lang J (69 judgments), followed a long way behind by Holgate J (28). Which Court of Appeal judge in relation to appeals from rulings by the Planning Court? Unsurprisingly Lindblom LJ (56). For each judge there is a list of his or her judgments.

Which are the most frequent parties? The Secretary of State is way ahead of the field, unsurprisingly, with 267 cases. Second, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (14 rulings). Third, Gladman Developments Limited (12).

There are limitations to the work – for instance we have not focused on win/lose statistics, given the variety of permutations of outcome, and we have not analysed the much larger number of claims which are sieved out at the permission stage. However, I hope that the analysis is a useful step towards greater transparency.

The work now has additional topicality. The Government is not just proposing to reform the planning system. On 31 July 2020 it launched an “independent panel to look at judicial review”.

As set out in the press statement:

“Specifically, the review will consider:

• Whether the terms of Judicial Review should be written into law

• Whether certain executive decisions should be decided on by judges

• Which grounds and remedies should be available in claims brought against the government

• Any further procedural reforms to Judicial Review, such as timings and the appeal process”

The panel’s detailed terms of reference make for potentially worrying reading in terms of their breadth. Don’t just take that from me – here are two recent posts by Mark Elliott, professor of public law and chair of Cambridge University’s law faculty: Judicial Review Review 1: The Reform Agenda & Its Potential Scope and The Judicial Review Review II: Codifying Judicial Review – Clarification Or Evisceration? The review also needs to be read in the context of the Policy Exchange’s agitations via its Judicial Power Project and most recently its 31 July 2020 document Reforming The Supreme Court (now let’s think about what motivation they might have for that? hmm…). This is all really important stuff – at least as important and potentially far reaching as planning reform, that’s for sure.

The panel comprises:

• Lord Faulks QC – Panel Chair

• Professor Carol Harlow QC

• Vikram Sachdeva QC

• Professor Alan Page

• Celina Colquhoun

• Nick McBride

It is very good to see Celina Colquhoun, as a well-respected and leading planning barrister, on the panel, and I hope that the operation of the Planning Court can perhaps be held out as a useful precedent, with its proactive, relatively quick, case management and judges familiar with our subject area, meaning quicker hearings with, in my view, a greater degree of predictability of outcome. 493 planning cases going to a full hearing (including appeals) in just over six years? That’s not many at all in my view, given the inherent contentious nature of our work and the extent to which there is room for dispute and uncertainty. Despite all the usual gnashing of teeth, isn’t this one aspect of our planning system that is actually working (or at least would be once the Court of Appeal adopts the same approach to timescales as the Planning Court)? In fact, where would we be without regular clarification from the courts as to what the legislation actually means?!

That leads neatly onto a reminder about our free weekly Town Library Planning Court rulings subscription service. The registration page for this and other Town Library updates (e.g. planning appeal decision letters) is here: https://www.townlegal.com/news-and-resources/#the-town-library .

Simon Ricketts, 15 August 2020

Personal views, et cetera

There Is No E In Inquiry

As the motivational cliche goes, there is no I in team. That’s as maybe. But, where I = Inquiry, nor is there yet any I on Teams (or on Zoom, on Skype, on BlueJeans, or even on Google Hangouts).

The Planning Inspectorate’s 28 April 2020 update Planning Inspectorate casework continues as first pilot digital hearing to take place in May makes interesting reading:

“We are continuing to issue decisions where we can and 1,625 have been issued across all case types since lockdown restrictions started. Not being able to visit sites and hold public events has, however, clearly had an impact on our ability to process cases and the time it is taking to reach a decision.

As explained in our guidance, to limit the spread of the Coronavirus we have postponed site visits up to the middle of May, as well as most hearing and inquiry physical events where these would otherwise have taken place in May. Our case officers have notified parties of event postponement until further notice. We will be issuing updated information on arrangements for postponed events as soon as practicable in line with latest government advice.

We have been able to progress cases where:

• the physical event was concluded prior to lockdown restrictions;

• no physical event is required to make a decision; or

• a physical event is still further in the future and preparatory activity can continue (e.g. via telephone case conferences).

New cases continue to arrive at normal levels and are being registered and processed as far as possible. As at 23 April, there were 9,591 open cases. In the last three weeks we have seen the number of open cases rise by 337.”

(It is encouraging, in passing, to note that appeals are still being made at normal levels – that is our experience too).

The Planning Inspectorate is anxious to reassure that it is moving quickly to catch up:

• “The first fully ‘digital’ hearing is due to take place on 11 May.

• We are preparing for additional cases to be heard by digital hearings/inquiries in May/early June with a view to scaling up digital events further over June/July.

• We are assessing postponed cases to establish whether they can proceed by digital, traditional or a ‘hybrid’ approach, in order to re-arrange these in due course accordingly.

• A trial of ‘virtual site visits’ is underway involving thirteen Inspectors.

• Five local advisory visits have taken place remotely (critical for helping Local Planning Authorities to progress local plans and reduce the length of examinations).”

But is this fast enough? Can more be done? Could we see a leap forward in the way that planning hearings and inquiries are conducted?

After all, the planning inquiry process has been constantly adapting. Planning inquiries were first introduced in the Housing, Town Planning etc Act 1909 to consider objections to town planning schemes. The right to appeal against a planning decision was introduced in the 1932 Act, and the 1947 Act provided that all appeals were to be determined by public inquiry. Weirdly to us now, the procedures followed and the reasoning for decisions was kept secret until changes were made to implement some of the recommendations of the 1957 Franks Committee on Administrative Justice. We still refer to the three Franks Principles, of openness, fairness and impartiality.

This is what was said by the minister of the time in a 1957 Commons debate on the report:

“I must, however, return to a point I made in the opening of my remarks, that we must not complicate the procedures more than we can help. The great majority of objectors and appellants are small people. Quite a few present their own cases without professional assistance and for most people it is essential that the procedure should be simple, intelligible, quick, and cheap, as well as fair.”

Dear reader, of course we did then complicate those procedures, often through changes made with the best of intentions. When I started practice, there was no advance exchange of proofs of evidence. We all read the documents for the first time as they were being read out by the witness. No rebuttal proofs, no laboriously prepared cross-examinations or written closing submissions. Every procedural step that has been introduced, introducing frontloading of appeal preparation and evidence (good), minimising surprises (good), has by a sidewind elongated and complicated the processes (bad). There may now be a much more forensic and detailed examination of the issues, but where have we left those “small people”?

The Planning Bar is obviously at the sharp end of the current slowdown and has been trying to move things along.

⁃ Various Landmark Chambers barristers published a really excellent paper on 21 March 2020, Fairness and public participation in video or telephone hearings for planning appeals during the COVID-19 crisis

⁃ On 1 April 2020 Kings Chambers put out this statement, Kings Chambers team up with Turley and Pegasus Group to record remote public inquiry test.

It is of course hugely frustrating that the massive improvements to the inquiry appeals system brought about by the Rosewell review (see eg my 25 May 2019 blog post Pace Making: Progress At PINS) have been undone by this pandemic. The Rosewell changes, unlike possibly every previous reform of any aspect of the planning system, did not add complications, but modernised and streamlined it in many ways, with telephone case management conferences and the like now the norm. I assume that everyone saw the interview with Bridget Rosewell on last week’s second episode of Have We Got Planning News For You? Her frustration with the Inspectorate’s present apparent slowness to get virtual hearings and inquiries underway was apparent, talking about the need to “move forward as soon as possible” and extolling the “fairer access” that can be achieved in a “virtual environment”.

We should listen to Bridget.

(Indeed, to go off on a tangent, if I were Secretary of State for the day, I would presently quietly shelve “Planning For The Future” and instead ask Bridget, very nicely, to carry out “Rosewell 2”, this time a review, with similar practical focus, in relation to the planning application process, so as to identify opportunities for simplification and reduction of unnecessary paperwork. Step by step there are surely simple opportunities for improvement. Off the top of my head:

– Recommended word limits for supporting documents such as Planning Statements, Design and Access Statements and Environmental Statements (or application fee linked to size of the documentation)

– Removal of need for multiple hard copies of documents

– Modernisation of publicity requirements

– Recommended word limits for officers’ reports to committee

– Standardisation of wording of planning conditions

– Updated model section 106 agreement template (the Law Society’s current so-called template draft agreement dates from 2010!)

– Updated advice as to the types of application which properly should be dealt with by way of officers’ delegated powers

Do it!)

But of course, moving to virtual appeals, even on a temporary basis, is not easy. The interests of all participants, and potential participants, in the appeals process need to be taken into account. Whilst justice delayed is justice denied, justice has to be both done and be seen to be done.

I was struck by an assertion in the Landmark Chambers paper:

“ It is safe to proceed on the basis of a presumption that every participant in a planning appeal will have reasonable access to a means of participating in a remote hearing session unless they provide evidence to the contrary. Virtually every household has a telephone, and the vast majority of people have access to a computer or mobile device on which video conferencing is possible.”

This isn’t still true for a few members of my own family (well they all have a land line – but certainly couldn’t be expected to follow proceedings on a telephone). And indeed whilst the chattering classes are currently going on about Zoom and the rest of it, I know that many are finding it very difficult to access or be at ease on these platforms, surrounded by us lawyers and others who inevitably spend much of every day now speaking with a variety of people on screen and unwittingly developing new social norms and cues.

Any procedural solution does needs to meet the three principles set out in the paper:

– The common law requirements of fairness;

⁃ Article 6(1) ECHR – the right to a fair trial in civil cases;

⁃ Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention (“public participation in decisions on specific activities”).

But decisions as to procedure also need to have regard to “protected characteristics” under the Equality Act 2010, which of course include age and disability. Bridget is right that virtual hearings and inquiries would allow many to engage with the process who currently cannot, which is great as long as there are protections to make sure that some are not excluded.

In my view this is perfectly achievable for the majority of hearings and inquiries. I accept that (1) the inquiry process is very different from the court process and we cannot simply “read across” and (2) even in relation to the court process, there were some words of warning this week from the Court of Appeal in a family law case, Re A (Children) (Court of Appeal, 30 April 2020) – see paragraphs 49 to 56. However, let’s analyse the real position:

The only parties entitled to appear at a hearing are the appellant, the local planning authority and defined statutory parties. Everyone else is at the discretion of the inspector. As long as the inspector is confident that there is no third party, from whom the inspector feels he or she should hear, and who cannot participate adequately by some remote means, why should not virtual hearings proceed, as long as the proceedings are able to be viewed remotely (perhaps also with a transcript of what is said – not difficult at all – where there is any doubt as to whether there may be interested parties without adequate screen access)?

At inquiries, the parties only entitled to appear are the appellant, local planning authority, defined statutory parties and those who have (at their own request) become rule 6 parties. Again, if all of those parties are in agreement (with possible adverse costs award consequences for those who unreasonably refuse) and as long as the same approach can be taken in relation to other parties, why cannot inquiries proceed?

Site visits are less of a problem, whether accompanied or unaccompanied, and whether in fact still always needed, in the light of visual material now available.

Furthermore, as long as there are indeed adequate protections for those who should be heard at the hearing and genuinely cannot reasonably be expected to participate remotely, the change to a virtual process has the benefit of opening up access to so many other people. And imagine the benefits in future of being able to offer a “virtual” evening session at the next inquiry at your local town hall? That surely would be participative democracy.

Which is a long way of saying: I agree with Bridget.

Simon Ricketts, 2 May 2020

Personal views, et cetera

No Time To Be 21: Where Are We With Aarhus Costs Protection?

As with blog posts, it is helpful for legislation to have a snappy title.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters is therefore better known as the Aarhus Convention, after the city in Denmark where it was signed on 25 June 1998.

It currently has 47 parties. The UK ratified it in February 2005, as did the EU.

The Convention has three pillars:

⁃ access to information

⁃ public participation in decision making

⁃ access to justice

You will know that the Aarhus Convention requires that access to justice in environmental matters should be “be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”, a challenging requirement in jurisdictions such as ours where access to justice in environmental matters frequently relies upon access to the High Court and appellate courts thereafter, and where processes are almost by definition prohibitively expensive – not just your own lawyers’ costs (cough) but, if the dice roll the wrong way, your liability for those of the defendant authority.

I last properly blogged on Parliament’s, and the English courts system’s, response to that challenge in my blog post dated 11 March 2017, Aarhus: Caps In The Air Again.

I agreed to speak on this subject at the Kingsland Conference event at King’s College London arranged for this Tuesday to mark the 21st anniversary of the signing of the Convention. If this post whets your appetite to hear that day from much more knowledgeable people than me on every aspect of the Convention’s three pillars, then do sign up.

In itself, the Convention has no direct effect in domestic law and its enforcement is indirect, at member state level via meetings of the parties to the Convention and non-binding communications by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee. I say “in itself” because it does have direct effect in domestic law via specific EU directives in relation to environmental protection, which was the basis for the European Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling in Edwards (CJEU, 11 April 2013).

At the time of my March 2017 blog post the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2017 had just come into force, which tightened up the regime in various ways.

The claimant’s default cap against exposure to the defendant’s legal costs in an Aarhus Convention claim) is still £5k where the claimant is an individual and otherwise £10k, with the default cap on how much the claimant can claim if successful still capped at £35k. The caps apply to each party where there are multiple claimants or multiple defendants.

An Aarhus Convention claim is basically defined as a claim brought by a member of the public, challenging the legality of a decision on grounds which concern environmental matters as defined in Articles 9 (1), (2) and (3) or the Convention, whether the claim is by judicial review, or under two specific forms of statutory review:

⁃ section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (challenges to decisions in relation to enforcement notice appeals)

⁃ section 65 of the Town and Country Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 ((challenges to decisions in relation to listed building enforcement notice appeals)

The 2017 changes introduced the requirement that, where a claimant brings a claim and is seeking Aarhus costs protection it must say so on the claim form and must file a schedule of financial resources. The court may remove or vary the cap in these circumstances if satisfied that “to do so would not make the costs of the proceedings prohibitively expensive for the claimant“.

Proceedings are to be considered prohibitively expensive if their likely costs (including any court fees which are payable by the claimant) either—

“(a) exceed the financial resources of the claimant, or

(b) are objectively unreasonable having regard to –

(i) the situation of the parties;

(ii) whether the claimant has a reasonable prospect of success;

(iii) the importance of what is at stake for the claimant;

(iv) the importance of what is at stake for the environment;

(v) the complexity of the relevant law and procedure; and

(vi) whether the claim is frivolous“.

Where the court considers the financial resources of the claimant, “it must have regard to any financial support which any person has provided or is likely to provide to the claimant”.

Three aspects of the 2017 rule amendments were challenged by the the RSPB, Friends of the Earth and ClientEarth in R (RSPB) v Secretary of State for Justice (Dove J, 15 September 2017):

1. The ability for the court to vary costs caps at any stage in the litigation would not meet the EU law requirement for “reasonable predictability”

2. No express provision for hearings to be in private when a claimant or a third party supporter’s financial details may be discussed and examined.

3. Uncertainty as to whether the claimant’s own costs of bringing the litigation should be included in any assessment of their financial resources.

Dove J’s judgment is essential reading for an understanding of the background to costs capping in environmental matters, including the domestic and CJEU authorities.

He found against the claimants on the first ground but the issue was addressed in any event by Parliament in the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2018 which tightened up the procedural rules to make it clear that, save where there is a significant change in circumstances, variation of the caps can only be considered by the court if either the applicant had so requested in his claim form or if the defendant had so requested in his acknowledgement of service.

He found for the claimants on the second ground and the rules have again been changed to specify that hearings in relation to examination of claimants’ financial details must be heard in private.

He found that it was unnecessary to make a formal declaration to deal with the third ground but considered that it was clear that the court may indeed take account of a claimant’s reasonable costs in determining whether proceedings are “prohibitively expensive“.

The 2017 rule amendments defined “environmental matters” by reference to matters falling within the scope of Article 9 (1) to (3) of the Convention. I had wrongly assumed in my previous blog that the effect might be to limit the scope of the procedure but that has not been the case, following the broad meaning given by the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State v Venn (Court of Appeal, 27 November 2014).

I had also wondered whether the reference to “members of the public” in the amended rules might exclude parish councils from seeking Aarhus costs protection, but that assumption may also have been misplaced. At the permission stage of Crondall Parish Council v Secretary of State (Dove J, 14 May 2019), deputy judge John Howell QC accepted that the parish council was indeed a “member of the public”.

The 2017 rule amendments do not extend the automatic costs capping process to the Court of Appeal and beyond. It will be for the appellate court to consider whether the costs of the appeal proceedings will be prohibitively expensive for a party which was a claimant (with no guidance as to how the costs of previous stages in the litigation are to be taken into account).

The UK is still under some international pressure as to its approach to compliance. In its September 2017 decision VI/8k, the Economic Commission for Europe noted that “while the 2017 amendments to the cost protection system in England and Wales introduced some positive improvements, the 2017 amendments overall appear to have moved [the UK] further away from meeting the requirements of its 2014 decision V/9n, namely that the UK should:

“(a) Further review its system for allocating costs in all court procedures subject to article 9, and undertake practical and legislative measures to ensure that the allocation of costs in all such cases is fair and equitable and not prohibitively expensive;

(b) Further consider the establishment of appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce financial barriers to access to justice;

(d) Put in place the necessary legislative, regulatory and other measures to establish a clear, transparent and consistent framework to implement article 9, paragraph 4, of the Convention”.

Furthermore, “by failing to ensure that private nuisance proceedings within the scope of article 9, paragraph 3, of the Convention, and for which there is no fully adequate alternative procedure, are not prohibitively expensive, the Party concerned fails to comply with article 9, paragraph 4, of the Convention“.

There is also a complaint which is being investigated by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee. It is based on (1) the exclusion from current system of automatic costs capping for section 288 challenges of planning appeal decisions and (2) the risk of public disclosure of claimants’ financial means.

The complainant sets out the position as follows:

“In 2008 a property developer sought to obtain planning permission to build an estate of 18 houses in open countryside outside of Ashover, Derbyshire. Permission to carry out this development was refused. The developer then reapplied for planning permission to develop 26 houses in 2014 and again in 2015. These applications were both refused. An appeal was made against the most recent decision and an Inspector was appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government to hear the evidence and make a recommendation to the Secretary of State. After hearing all evidence over a four-day period and visiting the site the Inspector recommended that the appeal be dismissed and planning permission be refused. The Secretary of State disagreed with his Inspector’s recommendation, allowed the appeal, and granted planning permission.

Challenging the Decision

Objectors to the development sought a legal opinion on challenging the Secretary of State’s decision. It was the opinion of counsel that challenging the Secretary of State’s decision would be extremely costly and could fail. The costs protection regime for “Aarhus claims” would not be available for challenges to decisions of the Secretary of State even though the only difference rendering it inapplicable was the identity of the decision-maker. As a result of the uncertainty as to costs no member of the public had the appetite to challenge the decision.

We have been made aware that amendments were made to Part 45 Section VII of England and Wales’ Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) (“The 2017 Amendments”) on 28th February 2017. These mean that any claimant or a third party supporter of a claim now risks public disclosure of their financial means.”

DEFRA’s response dated 8 March 2019 is interesting:

1. Section 288 challenges will be brought within the scope of the rules later this year.

2. The new Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2019 change the criteria as to when a hearing will be held in private but one of the criteria is whether “it involves confidential information (including information relating to personal financial matters) and publicity would damage that confidentiality“.

There do remain various open questions, for instance:

1. Post-Brexit, how will we see the Government flesh out the principle outlined in the draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill of “access to justice in relation to environmental matters“?

2. Does the current process give claimants “reasonable predictability“?

2. What are the practical risks for a defendant, in terms of potentially thereby elongating proceedings, in seeking to vary or remove a costs cap?

3. What effects are the changes having in practice on potential claimants as well as third party funders?

4. Where there is no Aarhus costs protection, are we going to see more applications for security for costs by defendants: the £250,000 required of Heathrow Hub Limited for example in the recent Heathrow proceedings (to be heard in the Court of Appeal in November) or the £60,000 required of the claimant in We Love Hackney v London Borough of Hackney (Farbey J, 17 April 2019).

Happy birthday, Aarhus Convention. Let them eat cake?

Simon Ricketts, 22 June 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Lessons From The Heathrow Cases

In my 15 October 2016 blog post Airports & Courts I made the obvious prediction that publication by the Secretary of State for Transport of the Airports National Policy Statement (“ANPS”) would inevitably lead to litigation. The ANPS is important because under the Planning Act 2008 it sets the policy basis for a third runway at Heathrow to the north west of the current runways (the “NWR Scheme”).

It was always going to be important for the High Court to be able to rise to the (in a non-legal sense) administrative challenge of disposing of claims efficiently and fairly. The purpose of this blog post is to look at how that was achieved (no easy feat) and what we can learn more generally from the court’s approach to the litigation

The ANPS was designated on 26 June 2018 and five claims were brought seeking to challenge that decision:

⁃ A litigant in person, Neil Spurrier (a solicitor who is a member of the Teddington Action Group)

⁃ A group comprising the London Borough of Richmond-upon-Thames, the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, Greenpeace and the Mayor of London

⁃ Friends of the Earth

⁃ Plan B Earth

⁃ Heathrow Hub Limited and Runway Innovations Limited [unlike the other claimants above, these claimants argue for an extension of the current northern runway so that it can effectively operate as two separate runways. This scheme was known as the Extended Northern Runway Scheme (“the ENR Scheme”)]

Arora Holdings Limited joined as an interested party to each set of proceedings in pursuance of their case for a consolidated terminal facility to the west of the airport.

The Speaker for the House of Commons intervened in the Heathrow Hub Limited claim to object to various statements made to Parliament and Parliamentary Committees being admitted in evidence.

The first four claims raised 22 separate grounds of challenge. The fifth claim raised a further five grounds of challenge.

As Planning Liaison Judge, ie effectively lead judge within the Planning Court, Holgate J in my view has played an extremely effective role. Following a directions hearing, ahead of a subsequent pre-trial review three months later, he laid down a comprehensive set of directions on 4 October 2018 which provided for:

⁃ the first four claims to be heard at a single rolled up hearing, followed by the fifth claim

⁃ the cases to be heard by a Divisional Court (ie two or more judges, normally a High Court Judge and a Lord Justice of Appeal. In the event, the four claims were heard by a Divisional Court comprising Hickinbottom LJ and Holgate J. The fifth claim was heard immediately afterwards by a Divisional Court comprising Hickinbottom LJ, and Holgate and Marcus Smith JJ.)

⁃ video link to a second court room and (paid for jointly by the parties in agreed proportions) live searchable transcripts of each day’s proceedings

⁃ procedure to be followed in relation to expert evidence sought to be submitted in support of the first claim

⁃ statements of common ground

⁃ amended grounds of claim, with strict page limits and against the background of a request from the judge to “review the extent to which they consider that any legal grounds of challenge previously relied upon remain properly arguable in the light of the Acknowledgments of Service“, and with specific claimants leading on individual issues

⁃ bundles and skeleton arguments complying with strict page limits and other requirements

⁃ payment of security for costs by Heathrow Hub Limited in the sum of £250,000

⁃ cost capping in the other claims on Aarhus Convention principles

The main proceedings were heard over seven days in March, with the Heathrow Hub proceedings then taking a further three days (followed by written submissions). As directed by Holgate J, hearing transcripts were made publicly available.

Less than six weeks after close of the Heathrow Hub hearing, judgment was handed on 1 May 2019 in both case:

R (Spurrier & others) v Secretary of State (Divisional Court, 1 May 2019)

R (Heathrow Hub Limited & Runway Innovations Limited) v Secretary of State (Divisional Court, 1 May 2019)

The transcript of the first judgment runs to 184 pages and the transcript of the second judgment runs to 72 pages.

I am not going to summarise the judgments in this blog post but happily there is no need as the court at the same time issued a summary, which serves as a helpful précis of the claims and the court’s reasoning for rejecting each of them.

The Divisional Court found that all but six grounds were unarguable (the six being two Habitats Directive grounds from the first case, two SEA grounds from the first case and two from the second case (legitimate expectation and anti-competition). “All the other grounds were not considered not to have been arguable: the claimants may apply for permission to appeal against the Divisional Court’s decision concerning those grounds to the Court of Appeal within 7 days. The remaining six grounds were ultimately dismissed. The claimants may apply to the Divisional Court for permission to appeal within 7 days. If the Divisional Court refuses permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the claimants may re-apply directly to the Court of Appeal.”

The Secretary of State for Transport gave a written statement in the House of Commons on the same day, welcoming the judgments.

The two judgments will be essential reading in due course for all involved in similar challenges; the 29 grounds, and various additional preliminary points, cover a wide range of issues frequently raised in these sorts of cases and each is carefully dealt with, with some useful textbook style analysis.

In the Spurrier judgment:

– the scope for challenge of an NPS (paras 86 to 90)

⁃ relationship between the NPS and DCO process (paras 91 to 112)

⁃ extent of duty to give reasons for the policy set out in the NPS (paras 113 to 123)

⁃ consultation requirements in relation to preparation of an NPS (paras 124 to 140)

⁃ standard of review in relation to each of the grounds of challenge (paras 141 to 184)

⁃ the limited circumstances in which expert evidence is admissible in judicial review (paras 174 to 179)

⁃ whether updated information should have been taken into account (paras 201 to 209)

⁃ whether mode share targets were taken into account that were not realistically capable of being delivered (paras 210 to 219)

⁃ the relevance of the Air Quality Directive for the Secretary of State’s decision making (paras 220 to 285)

⁃ compliance with the Habitats Directive (paras 286 to 373)

⁃ compliance with the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (paras 374 to 502)

⁃ whether consultation was carried out with an open mind (paras 503 to 552)

⁃ whether the decision to designate the ANPS was tainted by bias (paras 553 to 557)

⁃ the relevance of the Government’s commitments to combat climate change (paras 558 to 660)

⁃ whether there was a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (paras 661 to 665)

In the Heathrow Hub judgment:

⁃ legitimate expectation (paras 113 to 138)

⁃ use of Parliamentary material in the context of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights (paras 139 to 152)

⁃ competition law (paras 157 to 209).

As we wait to see whether any of these claims go further, I note that Arora has commenced pre application consultation ahead of submitting a draft DCO for a “consolidated terminal facility to the west of the airport, which we are calling Heathrow West, related infrastructure and changes to the nearby road and river network.” Now that is going to be another interesting story in due course. I’m not sure we have previously seen duelling DCOs…

Simon Ricketts, 4 May 2019

Personal views, et cetera

The Age Of Reasons

Two recent cases have considered the extent to which decision-makers in relation to planning matters are under a duty to give reasons for their decisions. This has never been an easy question and the answer has practical consequences because:
– for decision-makers, articulating reasons is time consuming and sometimes not to easy to get right

– for those benefiting from a decision, there is the risk that the decision is opened up for legal challenge if those reasons appear to be flawed

– for those objecting to a decision, without reasons being given to explain how it was reached, legal challenge, or even proper scrutiny, is made much more difficult.

There is also often a dilemma on the part of decision-makers because if reasons are volunteered, even if not required, they need to be rational and can render a decision susceptible to challenge, which would not have been if no reasons were given.
Dover
Lord Carnwath’s Supreme Court’s judgment in Dover District Council v CPRE Kent (6 December 2017) dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal ruling that I blogged on last September in Avoiding Dover-type reasons JRs where a planning permission for a major development proposal had been quashed that had been resolved by councillors to be approved against the recommendation of their officers, who wished substantially to reduce its scale due to perceived effects on an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty and an ancient monument. In granting permission to appeal, the Supreme Court had indicated that it “would wish to consider generally the sources, nature and extent of a local planning authority’s duty to give reasons for the grant of planning permission“.

In a nutshell, the main implication of the case is that even where there is no statutory requirement to give reasons for granting planning permission, it is now prudent to assume that reasons should always be given by a local planning authority, and particular care is needed where the decision is not fully in accordance with the reasoned recommendations made to the authority by its planning officers.
The judgment itself starts:
“1. When a local planning authority against the advice of its own professional advisers grants permission for a controversial development, what legal duty, if any, does it have to state the reasons for its decision, and in how much detail? Is such a duty to be found in statutory sources, European or domestic, or in the common law? And what are the legal consequences of a breach of the duty? “
The judgment does not confine itself to that question but ranges widely over various decision-making procedures:
“23. The statutory rules relating to the giving of reasons are all to be found in subordinate legislation. It is hard to detect a coherent approach in their development.

The main categories are:

i) Secretary of State decisions (including those delegated to inspectors) –

a) following an inquiry or hearing;  

b) on written representations.  

ii) Decisions by local planning authorities –

a) Refusing planning permission or imposing conditions;  

b) Granting permission;  

c) Officer decisions under delegated powers.

iii) Decisions (at any level) on applications for EIA development.”

Working through these one by one:

In relation to appeals determined by inquiry or hearing, there is a specific statutory duty upon the Secretary of State and his inspectors to give reasons for their decisions.
There is no corresponding rule in relation to written representations appeals, although it is the practice for a fully reasoned decision to be given, giving rise in practice to an enforceable duty.
When a local planning authority refuses planning permission there is a statutory requirement that the authority must in their decision notice state “clearly and precisely their full reasons”.
Aside from a blip between 2003 and 2013 (when there was legislation requiring authorities to include on their decision notice “a summary of their reasons for the grant of permission” and “a summary of the policies and proposals in the development plan which are relevant to the decision“), there is no statutory requirement for local planning authorities to give their reasons for granting planning permission, save that:
– since 2014, in the case of officers’ delegated decisions there has been a duty by virtue of the Openness of Government Bodies Regulations 2014

– in relation to EIA development, decision-makers must not grant planning permission “unless they have first taken the environmental information into consideration” and “they shall state in their decision that they have done so“.

As for the necessary standard of reasons, Lord Carnwath sets out the famous passage of Lord Brown in South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (2004):
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”
Lord Carnwath explains that even where there is no statutory duty to give reasons, in the interests of transparency (and with reference to, for instance, the requirements of the Aarhus Convention) a common law duty arises upon local planning authorities to give reasons (to that exacting standard) where the circumstances justify it. What circumstances? That is where the judgment is more problematic. The court approves the approach taken by the Court of Appeal earlier this year in Oakley v South Cambridgeshire District Council (15 February 2017) where it held that a duty did arise in the particular circumstances of that case: where the development would have a “significant and lasting impact on the local community”, and involved a substantial departure from Green Belt and development plan policies, and where the committee had disagreed with its officers’ recommendations.
I don’t find the following passage in Lord Carnwath’s judgment helpful in drawing any practical dividing line between situations where reasons will or will not need to be given for departing from officers’ recommendations, which leads me to the conclusion that the only safe assumption is that they will now always need to be given (to the South Bucks v Porter standard):
“As to the charge of uncertainty, it would be wrong to be over-prescriptive, in a judgment on a single case and a single set of policies. However it should not be difficult for councils and their officers to identify cases which call for a formulated statement of reasons, beyond the statutory requirements. Typically they will be cases where, as in Oakley and the present case, permission has been granted in the face of substantial public opposition and against the advice of officers, for projects which involve major departures from the development plan, or from other policies of recognised importance (such as the “specific policies” identified in the NPPF – para 22 above). Such decisions call for public explanation, not just because of their immediate impact; but also because, as Lord Bridge pointed out (para 45 above), they are likely to have lasting relevance for the application of policy in future cases.”
The judgment certainly reinforces the care that needs to be taken by an authority where a decision is taken to grant planning permission against officers’ recommendations, if judicial review is to be avoided. It also risks delaying the taking of such decisions, referring to the “important legal principle that a decision-maker must not only ask himself the right question, but “take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly” (Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014, 1065B). That obligation, which applies to a planning committee as much as to the Secretary of State, includes the need to allow the time reasonably necessary, not only to obtain the relevant information, but also to understand and take it properly into account.”

If members are now going to depart from officers in resolving to grant permission, or in their reasons for doing so, in most cases it may now be prudent for the application to return to a subsequent committee meeting for reasons to be properly formulated.
Save
The Dover judgment confines itself to decisions as to whether to approve or refuse planning applications but of course there are many other important decisions within the development management process. Lang J’s judgment in Save Britain’s Heritage v Secretary of State (29 November 2017) concerned a challenge by Save Britain’s Heritage to the decision by the Secretary of State not to call in for his own determination the Paddington Cube application, which had been resolved to be approved by Westminster City Council.
She sets out the statutory position as follows:
“19. There is no statutory duty to give reasons for not calling in an application. However, the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure)(England) Order 2015 envisages that reasons may be given when the minister decides to call in an application. By article 17, if an application is called in, the local planning authority is required to serve on the applicant a notice “setting out the terms of the direction and any reasons given by the Secretary of State for issuing it“.

Save relied on two grounds for their challenge:

“Ground 1. The Claimant submitted that the Defendant’s decision was unlawful because he failed to give reasons for not calling in the applications, in breach of the Claimant’s legitimate expectation that reasons would be given. The legitimate expectation arose from a change in practice, announced in a Green Paper and in Parliament in December 2001. Thereafter, ministers began to give reasons for not calling in planning applications, when previously they had not done so.”

“Ground 2. Alternatively, the Claimant submitted that the court should find that there was a general common law duty to give reasons under section 77(1) TCPA 1990”
Lang J reaches the conclusion that where there is no statutory duty, government practice can change: there was previously a government policy to give reasons but “…in February 2014, in the course of preparation for the High Court case of Westminster City Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWHC 708 (Admin), a departmental decision was made to cease the practice of giving reasons.” Accordingly she could not “accept Mr Harwood QC’s submission that the practice of giving reasons remains in force because it has not been formally and publicly revoked by a ministerial statement or published policy document. It is a fundamental principle of public law that public bodies cannot lawfully fetter the future exercise of their discretion under statutory powers, by adopting policies which cannot be changed.”
The 2014 case was of course the challenge to the decision not to call in the Elizabeth House redevelopment application that had been resolved to be approved by the London Borough of Lambeth. In setting out his reasons for not intervening (even though there was no statutory requirement to give reasons), the then Secretary of State made a number of errors and the challenge only narrowly failed on the strange basis that the reasoning was so bad that it should not be taken as a formal attempt to give reasons, for which there was no statutory requirement:
“Mr Cameron understandably expressed surprise that it was said that the letter was so obviously wrong that the defendant could not have meant what is set out in it. However, I am satisfied that regrettably that is the case. The letter cannot be regarded as one which was intended to give reasons. The defendant was relying on his right not to give reasons and the letter must be read accordingly. It is plain when the advice to him is seen that he could not have been unaware of nor could he have misunderstood his policy. It follows that the first three grounds relied on must fail since in addition there is no question of giving reasons. While it may be that it would be desirable if the defendant were required to give reasons why he decided not to call-in in a case which did meet the criteria for call-in but it is not open to me in the light of the existing authorities to impose such a duty.” (Collins J)
It is interesting to consider Collins J’s comment in that final sentence, and Lang J’s reasoning, in the light now of Lord Carnwath’s judgment. Lang J distinguished decisions in relations to planning applications from decisions not to call in applications in the following way:
“I accept the submissions of the Defendant and the Second Interested Party that Oakley is distinguishable since a call-in decision is a very different type of decision to a decision by a local planning authority to grant planning permission. A call-in decision is in essence a procedural decision by the Secretary of State on whether to intervene in the planning process; it does not result in the grant of any substantive rights.”
Wouldn’t it be clearer if we had a comprehensive statutory framework that dealt with these basic questions?

Simon Ricketts, 9 December 2017
Personal views, et cetera

Money & Justice: Tribunal Fees, Licensing Fees, Court Costs

Topical issue: what are the legal constraints on the Government and local authorities in setting the fee rates and cost recovery regimes for administrative and court processes?
Claimant and applicant fee rates in particular are seen by the Government as a lever to seek to
– ensure that users of procedures make a fair contribution to the costs of providing them

– reduce the burden on the public purse and

– winnow out those who are seen as misusing the system.

This is however a dangerous game, if access to justice is to be maintained in accordance with domestic and international legal principles. How to get it right?
Dove J heard on 19 July the judicial review by RSPB, Friends of the Earth and ClientEarth of the Government’s changes to the cost capping regime regime that applies to JRs relating to environmental law matters. They take the position that the changes breach the Aarhus Convention’s requirement that access to environmental justice must be available, without prohibitive cost. I have previously blogged on the Government’s changes. ClientEarth issued this press release after the hearing but judgment has been reserved.

I would not be surprised if that set of proceedings did not end up in the Supreme Court. If so, it could be a worthy sequel to two interesting rulings from the Supreme Court in the last couple of weeks in relation to different subject areas but that same underlying theme.

R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor (Supreme Court, 26 July 2017) concerned a challenge by trade union Unison to the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013. The Supreme Court agreed with the claimant that the fee regime for claimants in employment tribunal proceedings and appellants in relation to appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal was unlawful because of its effects on access to justice. The full judgment handed down by Lord Reed and supplementary judgment by Lady Hale in relation to discrimination issues are well worth reading. Here are some quotes, which you may care to read with our planning system in mind:
There is a “constitutional right of access to justice: that is to say, access to the courts (and tribunals: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Saleem [2001] 1 WLR 443).” (paragraph 65)
“At the heart of the concept of the rule of law is the idea that society is governed by law. Parliament exists primarily in order to make laws for society in this country. Democratic procedures exist primarily in order to ensure that the Parliament which makes those laws includes Members of Parliament who are chosen by the people of this country and are accountable to them. Courts exist in order to ensure that the laws made by Parliament, and the common law created by the courts themselves, are applied and enforced. That role includes ensuring that the executive branch of government carries out its functions in accordance with the law. In order for the courts to perform that role, people must in principle have unimpeded access to them. Without such access, laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless charade. That is why the courts do not merely provide a public service like any other.” (paragraph 68)
“People and businesses need to know, on the one hand, that they will be able to enforce their rights if they have to do so, and, on the other hand, that if they fail to meet their obligations, there is likely to be a remedy against them. It is that knowledge which underpins everyday economic and social relations.” (paragraph 71)
“There is however no dispute that the purposes which underlay the making of the Fees Order are legitimate. Fees paid by litigants can, in principle, reasonably be considered to be a justifiable way of making resources available for the justice system and so securing access to justice. Measures that deter the bringing of frivolous and vexatious cases can also increase the efficiency of the justice system and overall access to justice.” (paragraph 86)
“The Lord Chancellor cannot, however, lawfully impose whatever fees he chooses in order to achieve those purposes. It follows from the authorities cited that the Fees Order will be ultra vires if there is a real risk that persons will effectively be prevented from having access to justice. That will be so because section 42 of the 2007 Act contains no words authorising the prevention of access to the relevant tribunals. That is indeed accepted by the Lord Chancellor. ” (paragraph 87)
“In order for the fees to be lawful, they have to be set at a level that everyone can afford, taking into account the availability of full or partial remission. The evidence now before the court, considered realistically and as a whole, leads to the conclusion that that requirement is not met. In the first place, as the Review Report concludes, “it is clear that there has been a sharp, substantial and sustained fall in the volume of case receipts as a result of the introduction of fees”. While the Review Report fairly states that there is no conclusive evidence that the fees have prevented people from bringing claims, the court does not require conclusive evidence: as the Hillingdon case indicates, it is sufficient in this context if a real risk is demonstrated. The fall in the number of claims has in any event been so sharp, so substantial, and so sustained as to warrant the conclusion that a significant number of people who would otherwise have brought claims have found the fees to be unaffordable.” (paragraph 91)
“The question whether fees effectively prevent access to justice must be decided according to the likely impact of the fees on behaviour in the real world. Fees must therefore be affordable not in a theoretical sense, but in the sense that they can reasonably be afforded. Where households on low to middle incomes can only afford fees by sacrificing the ordinary and reasonable expenditure required to maintain what would generally be regarded as an acceptable standard of living, the fees cannot be regarded as affordable.” (paragraph 93)
“Given the conclusion that the fees imposed by the Fees Order are in practice unaffordable by some people, and that they are so high as in practice to prevent even people who can afford them from pursuing claims for small amounts and non- monetary claims, it follows that the Fees Order imposes limitations on the exercise of EU rights which are disproportionate, and that it is therefore unlawful under EU law.” (paragraph 117)
The previous week the Supreme Court had returned to the difficult and long-running saga of challenges to Westminster City Council’s fees regime for the licensing of sex shops. The case has been an unholy mess for the Council. It had been setting licensing fees at a rate that included its costs of enforcing the licensing scheme against unlicensed third parties running sex shops. The fee was made up of two parts. One part was payable regarding the administration of the application and was non-refundable. Another part (which was considerably larger – £29,435 in 2011/12) was for the management of the licensing regime and was refundable if the application was refused. Licensed shops brought a challenge, arguing that the second element of the fee was in breach of the Provision of Services Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2999) (which had been made to give effect domestically to EU Directive 2006/123/EC) and that the only fees that the Council could levy related to the administrative costs of processing the relevant applications and monitoring compliance with the terms of the licence by licence holder, rather than fund enforcement against those who didn’t seek or obtain licences.
Regulation 18 of the 2009 Regulations provides that:
“(2) Authorisation procedures and formalities provided for by a competent authority under an authorisation scheme must not –

(a) be dissuasive, or

(b) unduly complicate or delay the provision of the service”

“(4) Any charges provided for by a competent authority which applicants may incur under an authorisation scheme must be reasonable and proportionate to the cost of the procedures and formalities under the scheme and must not exceed the cost of those procedures and formalities.”

The Court of Appeal had upheld the claim in 2013 and as a result made repayments totalling £1,189,466 to the licence holders, together with a further £227,779.15 which it paid, it turned out, by mistake.
However, the Supreme Court overturned that ruling in 2015, finding that the fees regime was basically lawful. There was one aspect which the court referred to the European Court of Justice, namely the way in which the part of the fee which covered wider enforcement costs was paid upfront when the application was made but only repaid if the application was unsuccessful. The European Court confirmed in November 2016 that this aspect of the regime was indeed unlawful.
The case came back to the Supreme Court with the Council arguing that it was entitled to be paid or repaid the sums it repaid to licence holders in 2013 and the licence holders in turn contending that they are entitled to retain the repayment made to them in full, because it was charged in a way which in part at least had been unlawful. In its judgment dated 19 July 2017 the court basically agreed with the Council that it is entitled to be reimbursed to the extent that it has raised fees lawfully, but it has remitted the case to the Administrative Court to resolve a whole host of complexities that arise from the whole mess, including a number of accounting issues, complications arising where licensees have ceased to exist and the recovery of the monies that the Council had paid by mistake.
Implications for planning
It may be thought that our planning system currently has the opposite problem: many applicants would be willing to pay higher application fees if the fees enabled authorities to staff up and offer a faster, better, service. The Government went less far than many would have wished when it announced in its February 2017 housing white paper that:
“We will increase nationally set planning fees. Local authorities will be able to increase fees by 20% from July 2017 if they commit to invest the additional fee income in their planning department. We are also minded to allow an increase of a further 20% for those authorities who are delivering the homes their communities need and we will consult further on the detail. Alongside we will keep the resourcing of local authority planning departments, and where fees can be charged, under review.” (para 2.15)
But even that relatively weak and overdue measure has not yet been brought into effect.
More controversially the white paper indicated that the Government would consult on introducing a fee for applicants submitting planning appeals: “We are interested in views on this approach and in particular whether it is possible to design a fee in such a way that it does not discourage developers, particularly SMEs, from bringing forward legitimate appeals. One option would be for the fee to be capped, for example at a maximum of £2000 for the most expensive route (full inquiry). All fees could be refunded in certain circumstances, such as when an appeal is successful, and there could be lower fees for less complex cases.”

The white paper consultation sought views on:
“a) how the fee could be designed in such a way that it did not discourage developers, particularly smaller and medium sized firms, from bringing forward legitimate appeals;

b) the level of the fee and whether it could be refunded in certain circumstances, such as when an appeal is successful; and

c) whether there could be lower fees for less complex cases.”

This is another area where we await an indication of whether the new ministerial team will take a different approach. Careful note will need to be taken of the Supreme Court’s rulings in Unison and in Heming.
Finally, court fees continue to increase, most recently, from 26 July 2016, by way of the Civil Proceedings, Family Proceedings and Upper Tribunal Fees (Amendment) Order 2016 . The Order’s explanatory memorandum puts it like this:
“The majority of fees affected by this instrument will be increased by a rate which is above the level of inflation. The Government has decided, in view of the financial circumstances and given the reductions to public spending, that such an increase is necessary in order to make sure that the courts and tribunals are adequately funded and access to justice is protected, in the long term.”
In relation to judicial review, the fee levels are still relatively modest compared to some other court procedures but are still significant sums for some claimants to find, particularly at short notice:
– application for permission to apply £154 (previously £140)

– request to reconsider at a renewal hearing £385 (previously £350)

– to proceed to a full hearing if permission is granted £770, or £385 if reconsideration fee already paid (previously £700 and £350)

There is that tired saying about justice in England being open to all, like the Ritz Hotel. It’s true, save that the Ritz doesn’t close its doors for months on end. The court term ends on Monday 31 July (with the next term starting on 1 October).
The end of this term marks the end of an era for the Supreme Court: Lords Neuberger and Clarke are retiring (there is an amusing Legalcheek account of their 28 July valedictory speeches) and Lady Hale will become president (only of the Supreme Court unfortunately rather than of the western world). If only we were to see more blogging from the retired judiciary such as that of Sir Henry Brooke. Do read his recent blog post on a truly surreal Tribunal case.
Simon Ricketts, 29 July 2017
Personal views, et cetera

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