Category: Conditions

Section 73 Or Section 73B

Whether tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. Or to take arms against a sea of troubles by amending your permission to reflect current market or occupier requirements? Because, of course, in the equally timeless words of Gary Barlow, everything changes. 

The main part of this blog post is a detailed examination by my Town Legal colleague Susie Herbert of the potential opportunities arising from use of section 73B of the 1990 Act, introduced by way of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, and its potential limitations and ambiguities versus section 73. It’s an important part of DLUHC’s current consultation as to an accelerated planning system which I said I would come back to in my 9 March 2024 post that covered the rest of the proposals.

But first, an interesting appeal decision letter from last week. You may remember that for a temporary period (2013 to 2016) there was a specific statutory procedure, section 106BA, which allowed developers to apply to modify or discharge planning obligations in a section 106 agreement on the basis that they made the development unviable.

Since the repeal of section 106BA the question often arises as to how we might still achieve the same ends. After all, an application under section 106A to amend a section 106 agreement can only be made if the agreement is at least five years’ old. Otherwise, in proposing a deed of variation to the existing agreement, you are in the local planning authority’s hands with no right of appeal.

The alternative options would be to make an entirely fresh application for planning permission (an onerous process) or, conceivably, to make an application under section 73 for removal or variation of a condition attached to the previous planning permission and to use the application as a vehicle for proposing an amended form of planning obligation. The section 73 route was accepted by an inspector in a decision letter dated 25 March 2024 in relation to a proposed development in Thornton Heath, Croydon. There is an existing planning permission for 57 new dwellings , with a section 106 agreement requiring 35% of the homes to be delivered as affordable housing. A Section 73 application was made to amend condition 2 attached to the permission which set out a list of the approved drawings, proposing amended drawings increasing the proportion of three bedroom homes and external alterations to fenestration and elevations. A section 106 unilateral undertaking was put forward proposing no affordable housing, on the basis of a viability appraisal, which had been reviewed and accepted by the local planning authority. The application was not determined within the statutory period and the developer appealed. The authority resisted the appeal on the basis that a section 73 application was not the appropriate means to reduce the level of affordable housing previously secured.

 Having reviewed the relevant case law in relation to section 73, the inspector allowed the appeal:

“In this instance, a change in policy has not made it appropriate or essential to amend the obligation.  However, there has been a significant change in circumstances relating to the viability of the scheme.  It seems to me that it is a matter of planning judgment whether the change in circumstances makes it appropriate, essential or desirable to enter into a planning obligation in different terms to the original.  Given the case law outlined above, the terms of a new obligation may be connected to or intertwined with the amendments sought to the drawings, but there is nothing of substance to suggest they must.  Consequently, it would be going too far to suggest an amended obligation must be a consequence of, or directly related to, changes flowing from the proposed alterations detailed on the new drawings.

There is no dispute between the Council and appellant that since the original permission was approved, and the evidence underpinning it prepared, construction costs have rapidly risen whilst house prices have remained static. This has had a significant impact on the viability of the scheme.  As mentioned above, the situation is so altered that the Council and appellant agree the scheme can no longer provide affordable housing and remain viable.  Moreover, there is also common ground that the provision of affordable housing is not a benefit, alone or taken with other factors, which is required to outweigh any harmful impacts emulating from the scheme.  Indeed, the Council has only identified limited harm in respect of the housing mix, which is outweighed by other considerations in any event.  In these circumstances, altering the level of affordable housing would not be a fundamental change to the proposal.

Therefore, the current circumstances are such that there is a need for a planning obligation in different terms to the original to facilitate delivery.  The altered terms of the planning obligation would be consistent with the development plan taken as a whole.  The consequence being that the change would not have a bearing on whether the scheme would be acceptable.  Thus, the amended planning obligation is necessary, reasonable, supported by development plan policy and proportionate in the context of the prevailing circumstances.  Therefore, it is desirable, essential and appropriate to consider a planning obligation in different terms to the original, namely the provision of 0% affordable housing with a review mechanism as required by the LP.  In conclusion, the s73 application is an appropriate means in this instance to reduce the level of affordable housing relative to that previously secured.”

The case is another example of the potential flexibility of the existing section 73 procedure, notwithstanding the constraints imposed by the courts – particularly by way of Finney (the inability to use section 73 where the desired changes would be inconsistent with the description of development on the face of the existing permission (leading to a workaround in practice, with a willing authority, by way of use of section 96A in conjunction with section 73 – see my previous blog post here for more information).

Section 73B

So will the new section 73B procedure be the solution. Over to my colleague Susie Herbert for the detail…

On Budget Day, 6 March 2024, DLUHC launched a consultation on accelerating the planning system which closes on 1 May 2024.  As well as proposals relating to the application process, this includes a consultation on the implementation of section 73B to vary planning permissions and on the treatment of overlapping permissions.  This post concentrates on the proposals concerning variations to planning permissions via the new section 73B and the proposals for overlapping permissions.

Section 73B was introduced by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 (“LURA”).  The provision is headed “Applications for permission not substantially different from existing permission”.  It is not yet in force and secondary legislation is required to specify the application procedure including consultation arrangements, information requirements and the application fee as well as amendments to the CIL regulations.  The government proposes to implement section 73B following the consultation “as soon as parliamentary time allows”.

The consultation asks questions on:

  • The scope of the proposed Planning Practice Guidance relating to section 73B;
  • Procedural arrangements for a section 73B application;
  • Application fees for section 73B applications;
  • CIL and section 73B applications.

As background, the introduction to this section of the consultation notes “The ability to vary planning permissions in a proportionate, transparent and timely manner is an important feature of the development management system. It is common for developments, particularly if they are large, to require variations to the planning permission in response to further detailed design work, new regulatory requirements, and changing market circumstances. Without this flexibility, development risks being delayed or abandoned as the only option would be the submission of a brand new application for the development which would create uncertainty, delay and further costs.”

The consultation notes that the current legislative routes to varying planning permissions are section 73 and section 96A.  In 2009, guidance was introduced on “Greater Flexibility for Planning Permission”.  It was at this point that section 96A was introduced into the legislation to allow for “non-material” amendments to existing planning permissions.  The guidance envisaged that section 73 could be used for “minor-material” amendments by varying a condition that listed the approved plans by substituting new plans that showed the varied scheme.

However, in 2020, the Courts confirmed that section 73 cannot be used to amend the description of development (Finney).  Therefore, the scope to use section 73 to make “minor material amendments” by varying a condition which lists the approved plans is limited. 

Although not expressly explained in the consultation document, the reason that the inability to use section 73 to amend the description of development causes such difficulties in practice is because the case law has established that a permission granted under section 73 cannot introduce a condition which creates a conflict or is inconsistent with the description of development.  It has therefore become standard practice to minimise the level of detail provided in the description of development and thereby reduce the potential for future scheme amendments to conflict with the description.  In some cases an original description of development can be amended via s96A to remove detail from the description of development into a condition and thereafter amend this condition via section 73.

Section 73B is intended to deal with this issue by allowing both the description of development and the conditions to be varied in a single process.  The restriction on the use of section 73B is that the amended development cannot be “substantially different” from the existing development.

“Subtantially different”

A key point in the consultation is that the Government does not propose to provide prescriptive guidance on is what is meant by “substantially different”.  The consultation notes that section 73B does not provide a definition of the test and that it will depend on the scale of the changes required in the context of the existing permission.  Factors that could be relevant are location and the scope of the existing permissions and the proposed changes. 

It is not clear where “substantially different” will sit on the scale of potential changes.  We note that this term was used in the 2009 guidance on flexible planning permissions in respect of what was meant by a “minor material amendment” which stated:

“We agree with the definition proposed by WYG: “A minor material amendment is one whose scale and nature results in a development which is not substantially different from the one which has been approved.” This is not a statutory definition.”

This suggests that the intention may have been that section 73B was intended to align with the minor material amendments that the guidance envisaged to be made under section 73 with the additional ability to amend the description of development (to make “non-substantial” changes). 

However, since this drafting was introduced into the Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill, the Armstrong and Fiske cases have confirmed that section 73 is not restricted to minor material amendments.  It is helpful that at footnote 4, the document expressly states that “the department acknowledges that section 73 is not limited in scope to minor material amendments” following the recent cases of Armstrong and Fiske.  The judge in Fiske held that there is a restriction on the scope of section 73 which is whether the alteration is fundamental (while in Armstrong the judge had considered that even this restriction did not apply and the only restriction is consistency with the description of development).

Therefore, if the scope of changes allowed by section 73B is intended to be similar to “minor material amendments”, there is the possibility that section 73 would actually allow more flexibility as it extends to “not fundamental” amendments (provided always that it is possible to remain within the description of development). 

While it is understandable that the Government does not propose to provide prescriptive guidance on the meaning of “substantially different” because it will be a matter of judgement dependent on the context (as for section 96A), it is clear that the application and interpretation of this provision by each LPA is going to be a key to how useful this provision is in practice. 

The consultation states that the government’s proposed objective is for the section 73B route to replace the use of section 73 to deal with proposals for general material variations while the use section 73 would return to focus on the variation of specific conditions and that it proposes to introduce guidance to this effect.

It would therefore be helpful if the scope of changes allowed under section 73B was not less that the scope of changes that could be made via a section 73/ section 96A approach: otherwise the end result of the changes would be more complexity but less flexibility.  It does not seem that it would be overly prescriptive for the Government to provide guidance to this effect. It would also be consistent with the general proposed approach of treating a section 73B application in a similar way to a section 73 application in terms of procedure (as detailed below).

Features of section 73B

The consultation summarises the key legal features of section 73B as follows:

  • a section 73B application must identify the existing permission (which cannot be a section 73, section 73A or other section 73B permission, or permission granted by development order), and can propose conditions for the new permission;
  • as an application for planning permission to a local planning authority, the determination of a section 73B application is subject to section 70 and other decision making duties. But the local planning authority cannot grant permission for a section 73B application if the effect of the section 73B permission would be substantially different from the existing permission, and when determining the application, they must limit their consideration to the variation between the application and the existing permission; and
  • like a section 73 permission, a section 73B permission is a separate permission to the existing permission (and any other section 73 or 73B permissions related to the existing permission) so the granting of a section 73B permission does not affect the validity of the existing permission (or other section 73 or 73B permissions).

The provision also applies to applications for permission in principle.

Proposed general approach

As noted above, the Government’s proposed objective is for the section 73B route to replace the use of section 73 to deal with proposals for general material variations while the use section 73 would return to focus on the variation of specific conditions.  The consultation notes that because section 73 cannot be used to amend the description of development, it has become common practice to submit generic descriptions of development which do not specify key feature such as the number of dwellings with those details set out in conditions to allow them to be varied via section 73.  The consultation identifies that a benefit of using section 73B would be to allow a return to clear and more specific descriptions which would help improve the transparency of development proposals for local communities. 

The Government therefore proposes to use Planning Practice Guidance to encourage the use of clearer, more transparent descriptors of development and the use of section 73B to deal with general material changes to development granted planning permission.  The consultation asks “do you agree that guidance should encourage clearer descriptors of development for planning permissions and section 73B to become the route to make general variations to planning permissions (rather than section 73)? (Question 26)” and “also for any further comments on the scope of the guidance (Question 27)”.  This includes the question of whether the guidance should discourage the use of the, now standard, condition which lists approved plans which was introduced to facilitate minor-material amendments via section 73.  The consultation states that they are not minded to discourage the use of this condition and that it is beneficial to help support effective planning enforcement, particularly in relation to design.

Procedural arrangements

The aim is for the procedural requirements set out in regulations for a section 73B application to be “proportionate reflecting the position that the development proposed in the application is a material variation to an existing permission while still ensuring there is transparency about the proposed variation” and that “Local communities should be aware of proposed variations so they can make representations: the section 73B route is not a mechanism to undermine scrutiny.”

The proposal is:

  • information requirements will be generally the same as other applications for planning permission but certain requirements (such as a design and access statement) will not be required.
  • publicity requirements will be the same as other applications for the type of development (i.e. if it is a variation to major development, the major development publicity requirements would apply).
  • Consultation with statutory consultees would follow the approach of section 73 applications where there is a duty on the local planning authority to consult a statutory consultee if they consider appropriate (reflecting the position that a proposed variation may only engage specific issues which of an interest to only some statutory consultees and so it would be disproportionate to require those statutory consultees without an interest to respond) although the footnote states that applications would automatically be in scope of the consultation duty between counties and district LPAs, the consultation arrangements for parishes and neighbourhood forums and the arrangements for applications of potential strategic importance under section 2A TCPA 1990 for the Mayor of London and those combined authorities which have section 2A powers.

EIA and HRA requirements would apply as for section 73 permissions and a similar approach would be taken to Biodiversity Net Gain.

The consultation asks whether consultees agree with this proposed approach to procedural requirements.

Fees

The proposal is to align the fee for a section 73B application with the fee for a section 73 application.  The alternative approach of setting a higher fee for a section 73B application was considered on the basis that the section 73B route could be the default route for general material variations while section 73 focuses on the variation of a specific condition.  However, the higher fee could encourage applicants to continue to use section 73, undermining the purpose of the reform.

However, it is proposed to change the current flat fee approach for a section 73 application (£293) so that there would be three separate fee bands for householder, non-major development and major development. 

The householder fee would be reduced to £86 (double the fee for discharge of condition and removing the anomaly that an original householder application fee is lower than the section 73 fee).  The non-major development fee would remain at £293. 

For major development, there would be a higher fee which would be less than the fee for the original application and proportionate to the work necessary to consider the proposed variation (without exceeding full cost recovery). The consultation asks for views about where this fee should be set, including evidence from local planning authorities for the typical work which is involved dealing with an average section 73 application for a major development.

CIL

It is proposed that CIL would apply to section 73B in the same way that it applies to section 73 permissions.  This would mean that “if the section 73B permission does not change the CIL liability, the chargeable amount is that shown in the most recent liability notice issued in relation to the previous permission. But if the section 73B permission does change the CIL liability, the most recently commenced or re-commenced scheme is liable for the levy.”

Overlapping permissions and section 73B

The consultation refers to the recent Hillside and Dennis cases on overlapping permissions [see previous simonicity blog posts respectively here and here] and how these judgments have questioned the ability to use ‘drop in’ permissions where a subsequent permission is granted for an alternative development on a section of a larger development previously granted permission and still being implemented.

It summarises Hillside as confirming existing caselaw that “full planning permissions are not usually severable. That is to say, parts of the permission cannot be selectively implemented and that, if a new permission which overlaps with an existing permission in a material way commences, should the carrying out of the new permission make it physically impossible to carry out the rest of the existing permission, it would be unlawful to continue further development under the existing permission.  The Court then went on to say, if someone wanted to change part of the development, they should seek to amend the entire existing permission.” And notes that Dennis considered the implications for outline planning permissions and the question of severability further.

It notes that “drop in permissions have often been used during the implementation of outline planning permissions for large scale phased residential and commercial developments where a new development is proposed through a separate application for a phase outside the scope of the outline planning permission while the rest of the phases continue to be implemented under the outline permission. This approach has provided a flexible way of enabling changes to a specific phase to be managed through planning without having to seek a new planning permission for the entire development, particularly when the scale of change is outside the scope of a section 73 application.”

In terms of section 73B, “The government believes that the new section 73B route provides a new way of dealing with such changes to a specific phase of a large scale development granted through outline planning permission in many cases. While the use of section 73B is constrained by the substantively different test, these changes often continue to fit within the existing masterplan which underpins the outline permission and do not necessarily fundamentally change this permission – for instance, changing a phase of commercial development (use class E) to a cinema (use class – sui genesis) where the outline permission only allows class E uses. In this case, the section 73B application would provide details of the proposed variation to the outline planning permission and the consideration by the local planning authority would focus on the merits of this variation.”

However it is recognised that “there could be circumstances where the section 73B route may not be appropriate – for instance, if the change could be considered to be substantially different or there are wider financial and legal relationships between the master developer, land owners and investors which makes the preparation of a section 73B application difficult.”

The consultation asks for views about the extent to which the section 73B route could be used to grant permission for changes for outline planning permission in practice and what the constraints are.

It is clearly helpful that the consultation acknowledges that a new use could be introduced via section 73B which gives more potential flexibility and simplicity than a section 73 approach.  However, as noted, changes may well be considered “substantially different” even if they allow the remainder of a masterplan to be developed without amendment. There are also undoubtably complications in obtaining a new planning permission (even a section 73B) for an entire site where development has started and different plots are being developed by different developers, particularly if a section 106 agreement is required to be varied.

The final section of the consultation is a proposal to create a framework through a new general development order to deal with circumstances that cannot be addressed via section 73B. This general development order would deal with overlapping permissions in certain prescribed circumstances.  It notes that the Secretary of State has broad powers under section 59 of the Town and Country Planning Act to provide for the granting of planning permission through an order, including classes of development. This may be for a specific development or for a class of development.

The consultation asks for views on whether the focus of such an approach should be on outline permissions for largescale phased development or whether there are any other categories of development which could benefit from an alternative approach.

The consultation questions are:

Question 33. Can you provide evidence about the use of the ‘drop in’ permissions and the extent the Hillside judgment has affected development?

Question 34. To what extent could the use of section 73B provide an alternative to the use of drop in permissions?

Question 35. If section 73B cannot address all circumstances, do you have views about the use of a general development order to deal with overlapping permissions related to large scale development granted through outline planning permission?

It is not clear what the general development order proposal would entail but it is clear that an alternative approach for circumstances where section 73B cannot be used would be valuable and it is encouraging that the government is exploring further options to address the Hillside issue.

Thanks Susie for the above. Given ongoing concerns that I suspect many of us have both as to the need for a proportionate procedure for amending permissions but also more specifically to find a solution to the unnecessary complexities we all face by way of Hillside and Dennis, this is going to be an important consultation process.

The uncertainties as to whether “minor material” “substantially different” and “fundamental alteration” also bring to mind the consideration given recently by the Planning Court to whether, in the NPPF, “substantial” has a different meaning to “significant“, in Ward v Secretary of State (Lang J, 25 March 2024) (answer, after lengthy and unnecessary confusion which could have been prevented by accurate language used at the outset: nope).

Simon Ricketts, 1 April 2024

Personal views, et cetera

Edwin Booth as William Shakespeare’s Hamlet, circa 1870, courtesy Wikipedia

The Storrington Appeal Decision: A Small Neutrality Breakthrough?

A Side: Bridge Over Troubled Water

Thank you, Heather Sargent, for sharing this appeal win on LinkedIn. This is what I turn to LinkedIn for, rather than for posts about legal directory rankings!

This decision letter dated 6 October 2023 is a must-read for anyone grappling with Conservation of Habitats Regulations issues in relation to nutrient/water neutrality or recreational impact issues.

In summary, the Inspector, Michael Hayden was faced with two identical appeals against the refusal of planning permission relating to proposed residential development  (up to 78 homes). The site straddles the South Downs National Park Authority and Horsham District Council areas.

There were various issues to be determined by the inspector but I just want to focus on one:

“the effect of the proposed development on the integrity of the Arun Valley Special Area of Conservation, Special Protection Area and Ramsar sites, with particular reference to water abstraction, taking account of the proposed water neutrality measures.”

I first covered the north Sussex water neutrality issue in my 19 October 2021 blog post Development Embargos: Nitrate, Phosphate & Now Water. This is equivalent to the nutrients issue which of course has recently been so much in the news – and where we await a fresh Bill to re-present the legislative fix rejected by the House of Lords in its report stage debate on the Levelling up and Regeneration Bill (see eg my 16 September 2023 blog post NN No).

One of the frustrations surrounding the neutrality veto has been with the approach of Natural England and local planning authorities, which have been disinclined to accept that, given that any adverse effect on the integrity of the relevant SAC or SPA only occurs when the homes are occupied, in appropriate circumstances planning permission can still lawfully be granted, and reserved matters applications and pre-commencement condition discharge applications approved, with a Grampian condition preventing occupation until a satisfactory solution is in place to ensure no adverse effect. Whilst it is said that this just kicks the can down the road – who will build if there is no certainty as to occupation? – in some circumstances it can assist, where for instance there will in any event be a long development lead time and the developer is prepared to take the risk that in due course a strategic solution will have been arrived at and implemented – and is prepared to contribute to the costs of that solution and generally seek to ensure that it is achieved.

So what is so interesting about the Storrington decision letter is that the appellant took this issue head-on. And the inspector accepted its approach. See paragraphs 67 to 109 of the decision letter. If your work involves neutrality issues, it’s worth reading them in their entirety.

The appellant’s position was that its scheme incorporated various measures to reduce the increased demand for mains water from the proposed development:

“76. In order to achieve water neutrality, the appellant proposes to mitigate the increased demand for mains water from the proposed development through a combination of on-site water reduction measures and an off-site offsetting scheme. In terms of on-site measures, it is proposed to install water efficient fixings, and greywater recycling and rainwater harvesting systems into each dwelling. It is common ground that these measures would reduce potable water consumption from the residential development to 8,129.07 litres per day, subject to suitable management and maintenance to ensure they are effective.

77. The signed and executed UU contains obligations requiring an On-Site Water Neutrality Scheme to be submitted to, and approved by, the LPAs and implemented prior to first occupation, which would include a regime for the management and maintenance of greywater recycling and rainwater harvesting systems by a management company. I am satisfied this would provide a legally binding mechanism for the LPAs to ensure the long term effectiveness of the measures to reduce potable water use to the required level within the proposed residential development. This position was confirmed by the Council’s witness in oral evidence at the Inquiry.”

Over and above these measures:

“79. The appellant seeks to rely on one of two alternative means of offsetting the residual water demand of the proposed development:

• payment of a fee or tariff into an LPA-led offsetting scheme for the Sussex North WRZ as a financial contribution towards an equivalent reduction in mains water demand elsewhere in the WRZ (the strategic offsetting scheme); or

• installation of a rainwater harvesting scheme at a garden centre in Horsham that would deliver an equivalent reduction in mains water use (the site specific offsetting scheme).

80. The strategic offsetting scheme is not yet in place, but how it would operate is explained in the Mitigation Strategy prepared for the Sussex North WRZ45. The first element of the Strategy is a programme being implemented by Southern Water to reduce water demand across the network by reducing leakages and household water consumption. This is expected to mitigate a large part of the increase in demand from committed and planned housing growth in the WRZ in the period 2021-2039.

81. The balance of the increased water demand is proposed to be mitigated through an LPA-led offsetting scheme, comprising a series of measures to reduce water demand in social housing and property under LPA control, which would be funded by a tariff on all new development per litre of mains water required to be offset. The most significant measure would be a programme for retrofitting flow regulators into existing social housing stock within the WRZ managed by local authorities or registered social landlords (RSLs), the effectiveness of which has already been demonstrated in trials.”

“83. On the question of prioritisation, the Mitigation Strategy recommends that priority should be given to sites allocated in local plans or identified in the associated housing trajectories, such as through the allowance for windfall, albeit not strategic-scale windfall49. In this case, around two-thirds of the proposed residential part of the appeal site is allocated for housing in the SSWNP. The housing proposed on the part of the site allocated for allotments would count as windfall provision, not at a strategic scale, for which an allowance is included in the housing trajectory for Horsham district from 2024/25 onwards50. If allowed therefore, the appeal site should be a candidate for priority of access to water neutrality via a payment to the offsetting scheme, given that it forms part of the planned and projected housing growth in Horsham district.

84. I recognise that the governing body for the strategic offsetting scheme is likely to have choices to make in terms of an order of priority for permissions to access the scheme, particularly early on in its operation. However, if the appeal proposals were allowed, the appellant confirmed that they would not need to rely on the strategic offsetting scheme for a period of 18 months from the grant of planning permission, whilst reserve matters were dealt with, the allotments relocated and site infrastructure laid. By that time (early 2025), the LPA-led offsetting scheme would have been operating for around 12 months and offsetting capacity from the SW programme is likely to be available to contribute to water neutrality in planned housing schemes. Furthermore, under the suggested standard time limit condition, the appellant would have up to 5 years from the grant of planning permission for the outline residential component of the proposed development to be implemented. By then (mid-2028), the strategic scheme would have been operating for over 4 years, with further offsetting capacity added to the scheme by both the LPA-led and Southern Water programmes.

85. Therefore, there is firm evidence that the proposed development would be able to access offsetting capacity within the strategic scheme to mitigate its residual water demand. However, case law establishes that in order for a competent authority to reach a conclusion under Regulation 63 of the Habitats Regulations that a project will not adversely affect the integrity of the European site, there must be no reasonable scientific doubt. In order to provide the necessary degree of certainty, the appellant has proposed a ‘Grampian’ condition and an obligation in the S106 UU, the effect of which would be to prevent implementation of the proposed development until a payment is made to HDC under the strategic offsetting scheme and water neutrality secured.”

The inspector noted that the threshold for imposition of a Grampian condition is simply that it would not be the case that there are “no prospects at all” of the action in question being performed within the time-limit imposed by the condition. “The Council’s evidence is that there is a very slim, 5%53 prospect of the appeal proposal being able to offset its water demand through the strategic scheme during the lifetime of any permission. A slim prospect does not amount to no prospect at all. Therefore, the condition would be reasonable in terms of the likelihood of access to the strategic offsetting scheme.”

The council was worried about the precedent effect but the inspector considered that each application needs to be determined on its own merits.  “In this case, I have established above that a large part of the residential component of the appeal site is included in the planned housing growth in Horsham District, and the remainder would contribute to the windfall allowance in the housing trajectory, both of which the Mitigation Strategy recommends should be priorities for the strategic offsetting scheme. Accordingly, the condition would not be unreasonable on this count either.”

He considered that the measures set out in the section 106 unilateral undertaking would be workable in practice and met the requirements of Regulation 122 and of section 106 itself.

But what about Natural England’s objection?

“93. NE’s position with regard to the strategic offsetting scheme remains that whilst the mitigation strategy is evolving, decisions on planning applications should await its completion or demonstrate water neutrality by other means. Whilst the advice of NE as the expert national agency on this matter carries significant weight, case law establishes that, as the competent authority, I may lawfully depart from this advice, provided I have cogent reasons for doing so.”

After analysis he considered that he did.

The appeal was allowed. The relevant planning condition reads as follows:

“16. No development shall commence that results in an increased use of potable water when compared with the existing baseline water usage at the site until either:

(1) Water neutrality mitigation has been secured via the Council’s adopted Offsetting Scheme (in line with the recommendations of the Sussex North Water Neutrality Study: Part C – Mitigation Strategy, Final Report, December 2022) as set out in the Planning Obligation that accompanies this planning permission and this has been confirmed in writing by the Local Planning Authority; or

(2) The site specific Water Neutrality Mitigation Scheme set out in the Planning Obligation that accompanies this planning permission has been implemented in accordance with the requirements set out in the Planning Obligation and the Local Planning Authority has given its written confirmation of the same.”

Horsham District Council had applied for costs, partly on the basis that “the Appellant did not submit their full case on water neutrality with the appeals, delayed the provision of key information on their revised water neutrality strategy until 31 January 2023, and presented information on rainwater yield coefficients in an inaccurate and misleading way, leading Natural England and the Council to misinterpret the case, and the Council to incur unnecessary and wasted expense in terms of counsel’s advice and officer time redrafting its evidence.”

That costs application was refused.

This is a decision which will cause ripples but in my view is wholly in line with the regime set out in the Conservation of Habitats Regulations and potentially applicable to issues relating to, for instance, nutrient neutrality or recreational impact (eg Chiltern Beechwoods SAC).

B Side: Keep The Customer Satisfied

Phew, no politics in this blog post. After my midweek Drive Time post I was politely asked by a reader to keep politics out of my comments on planning. I think it was felt that simonicity had become simon15minicity. All reaction is good, and thank you for it, but the request is difficult, given that the whole of the planning system is a political construct and given that every legislative stub that we have to navigate around is the result of an often short-term political decision in the past. We arrive at a better planning system by seeking to ensure that those political decisions are as considered as they need to be. I also had push-back from a couple of people at my characterisation of the prime minister’s comments on 15 minute cities as “bizarre”. I would simply refer readers to the numerous fact-check pieces out there (see eg Full Fact). Whether wilful or in ignorance, I don’t think there really is an excuse for mixing up the 15 minute city concept (previously supported by the Government – see eg this 31 March 2023 statement) with traffic management measures in cities such as Oxford to ration use of road space and prioritise active travel. At the recent Oxford Joint Planning Law Conference, that hotbed of woke radicalism, Jonathan Porritt spoke of the dangers of each of us being a WeWeBe: a well-informed, well-intentioned, bystander. Let’s not be that. We can avoid that whilst maintaining party political neutrality. If people who know about something don’t say something, who will?

The neutrality concept needn’t mean that nothing at all can be done – or said.

Simon Ricketts, 7 October 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Simonandgarfunkelicity

All Tomorrow’s (Section 106) Parties

This post was prompted by the recent High Court judgment in Link Park Heathrow LLP v Secretary of State (Waksman J, 10 May 2023).

If I had a penny for every time I’ve been asked whether all those with a legal interest in the development site need to be a party to a section 106 agreement or unilateral undertaking…

In fact, my usual going rate is more than a penny. But have this for free:

Let’s start with the statutory power. Section 106 (1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides as follows:

“Any person interested in land in the area of a local planning authority may, by agreement or otherwise, enter into an obligation (referred to in this section and section 106A as “a planning obligation”), enforceable to the extent mentioned in subsection (3)—

(a) restricting the development or use of the land in any specified way;

(b) requiring specified operations or activities to be carried out in, on, under or over the land;

(c) requiring the land to be used in any specified way; or

(d) requiring a sum or sums to be paid to the authority (or, in a case where section 2E applies, to the Greater London Authority) on a specified date or dates or periodically.”

A planning obligation, which may be documented by way of agreement or unilateral undertaking, is given a particular legal effect (super power, really) by sub-section 106 (3): it isn’t just enforceable against the person entering into the obligation but also against any person deriving title from that person. And sub-section (4) makes it clear that the agreement or undertaking may provide that a person shall not be bound by the obligation in respect of any period during which he no longer has an interest in the land.

The purpose of a planning obligation is to secure any legally binding commitments that can’t be secured by way of planning condition and which are necessary to make the proposed development acceptable in planning terms.

It makes sense that the local planning authority’s solicitor needs to make sure that the planning obligation binds, as parties, all those with interests in the land which it is necessary to have on the hook, such that there can be no risk that anyone else with an interest in the land can carry out the development, or any part of it, free from any planning obligations which would need to be complied with in order for the development, or that part of it at least, to be acceptable in planning terms.

There is no blanket rule that all those with an interest in the land need to be a party to the planning obligation. Of course that is tidiest. But often it will be the case that a meaningful part of the development can’t be carried out by an individual landowner of part of the site in a way that would be problematic even if that owner were not a party to the agreement or undertaking and if it will not be straight-forward to have that landowner agree to be a party, some thinking needs to be done.. What can be built pursuant to the approved plans on the relevant parcel? Is there any other reason why there is in fact no risk of the mitigation not being provided pursuant to the section 106 agreement or undertaking as intended?

There’s a useful case, R (McLaren) v Woking Borough Council [2021] EWHC 698, which strangely isn’t online but, having checked the rules as to hierarchy of case citation, I feel comfortable relying on Killian Garvey’s LinkedIn feed as the most authoritative report of it (you’re right up there with the All England Reports in my world Killian):

“In McLaren a landowner brought a legal challenge against the grant of planning permission, essentially on the basis that they owned 50% of the site that permission had been granted for and they had not signed the section 106 agreement. The High Court held that there was no error of law in this.

The critical part of the judgment is as follows:

21. In my view, this ground does not raise an arguable legal or public law error. The s.106 agreement follows the requirements of s.106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 . It is in the form of a deed. It identifies, by the definitions referred to, the land in which the person entering the obligation, i.e. New Central, is interested, and the interest which the person entering into the obligation has. It will be recalled that recital 2 of the agreement stated that New Central was the owner of the land with title absolute at HM Land Registry under the number I have referred to and shown hatched blue on the plan. Despite infelicities in the drafting of cl.2, which I have quoted, interpreted in context it expresses the intention of the owner, New Central, to bind its freehold interest in the land, in other words, approximately one-half of the area of the site, the part which it owns.

22. Further, I cannot see any legal requirement that a s.106 obligation ought to bind all material interests in a planning application site. Those with no interest in land can apply for planning permission in respect of it, as Mr Mohamed conceded, and a local planning authority can grant planning permission on taking material considerations into account. On my reading it was not a pre-condition of the Planning Committee’s decision in 2017 for the claimants to be a party to the s.106 agreement. That is not what the report says in its conclusion, and the passage immediately following, under the heading “Planning Obligation”, which I quoted earlier. The fact is that the obligation binds a sufficient part of the site, namely, that belonging to New Central, to preclude development unless its purposes are met. I would add that the claimants have not been excluded from the agreement; they may unilaterally bind themselves at any time to its obligations if they choose to do so.”

Often, if it would be problematic in planning terms to allow development to proceed without a particular owner being bound by the planning obligations, the authority can impose what is known as an Arsenal-type condition to cover off the position. The mechanism is so named because it was used in relation to the Emirates Stadium development (not because it is in any way second best). Basically, the condition prevents development being carried out unless the remaining landowners first enter into a deed adhering to the obligations in the agreement or undertaking. The Government’s Planning Practice Guidance advises as follows:

“Is it possible to use a condition to require an applicant to enter into a planning obligation or an agreement under other powers?

A positively worded condition which requires the applicant to enter into a planning obligation under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 or an agreement under other powers, is unlikely to pass the test of enforceability.

A negatively worded condition limiting the development that can take place until a planning obligation or other agreement has been entered into is unlikely to be appropriate in the majority of cases. Ensuring that any planning obligation or other agreement is entered into prior to granting planning permission is the best way to deliver sufficient certainty for all parties about what is being agreed. It encourages the parties to finalise the planning obligation or other agreement in a timely manner and is important in the interests of maintaining transparency.

However, in exceptional circumstances a negatively worded condition requiring a planning obligation or other agreement to be entered into before certain development can commence may be appropriate, where there is clear evidence that the delivery of the development would otherwise be at serious risk (this may apply in the case of particularly complex development schemes). In such cases the 6 tests should also be met.

[…]

Paragraph: 010 Reference ID: 21a-010-20190723”

This makes sense. Otherwise how would planning permission ever be possible in advance, for instance, of compulsory purchase that may be needed to unlock the development, or of vacant possession being secured?

I don’t know what other people’s experience is, but I am finding inspectors frequently to be taking a hard line and you may not find this out until it is too late – when the decision letter is issued.

Perhaps the word “normally” is being overlooked in the Planning Inspectorate’s Planning Obligations: Good Practice Advice, which states:

“Normally all persons with an interest in land affected by a planning obligation – including freeholders, leaseholders, holders of any estate contracts and any mortgagees – must sign the obligation.”

Which brings us to Link Park Heathrow LLP v Secretary of State (Waksman J, 10 May 2023) (Town Legal acting for the claimant, instructing Rupert Warren KC)). This related to a proposal for a large data centre. There were a number of occupational tenants on the site which were not made party to the necessary section 106 unilateral undertakings.

In my view there was a perfectly respectable case for saying that the tenants did not need to be made party to the planning obligations in any event: the freeholder was bound and in any event none of the tenants could in practice carry out any meaningful element of the proposed data centre development on the area of the site demised to them. But that’s by the bye because the appellant and the two relevant local planning authorities had agreed a proposed Arsenal-type condition which was in this form:

“No work shall be carried out under this planning permission in the area shown hatched purple on the plan…

a) until either all parties with any interest in the area shown hatched purple have entered into a s.106 unilateral undertaking on the same terms on which this permission is granted or

b) such interests have come to an end and evidence of it having come to an end has been provided to the Council.

Reason: The planning permission has been granted subject to a s.106 unilateral undertaking and at the time of this permission being issued the applicant is not able to bind all relevant parties and interests in the site to the terms of the planning obligations that it contains.”

The appeal was by way of a hearing, which of course has its own limitations in terms of the opportunity for detailed debate on these matters. The Inspector dismissed the appeal and his decision letter contained the following conclusions as to whether it was sufficiently certain that the mitigation provided for in the unilateral undertakings would be delivered:

“51. The evidence before me was indicative that the area under jurisdiction of Buckinghamshire experiences residents migrating to other areas to undertake their employment. To mitigate this, the Council seeks the provision of employment and training opportunities on new developments in their area.

52. A planning obligation should run with the affected land. This means that should the land be transferred to a different owner the obligations within the agreement would be enforceable against the future owners. Therefore, a legal agreement should be signed by all parties with an interest in the land. The undertakings that have been submitted as part of the appeal proceedings have been signed by the landowner and the mortgagee, however, they have not been signed by leaseholders that occupy parts of the site. This means that not all of those who have an interest in the land are parties to the undertakings.

53. Therefore, in the event of these unilateral undertakings being breached, the Council cannot take enforcement action against the leaseholders. In consequence, I do not believe that the submitted unilateral undertakings provide me with sufficient certainty that the required mitigation would be provided.

54. I note that the unilateral undertakings have clauses that require that any leaseholds be surrendered prior to development commencing and that a planning condition could be imposed that would ensure that prior to development commencing the leasehold land was bound a legal agreement consistent with the submitted unilateral undertakings.

55. However, layout of the Development has been reserved for future consideration, therefore, at this juncture there is a possibility the land that is covered by the current leases might be the first to be developed. In consequence, if there is not an agreement in place at this point the respective councils would not be able to take enforcement actions against such a breach. Therefore, I must conclude the Development would not provide the required mitigation.

56. The appellant suggested this approach had been taken previously on another site outside the jurisdiction of the Councils involved in this appeal. I do not have full information regarding the planning circumstances of this, which means I can only give this matter a limited amount of weight. Nonetheless, I do not believe the circumstances of the appeal scheme, particularly given my previous conclusions, warrant diverging from the approach of having all the interested parties signing the unilateral undertaking.”

Where in the above is any consideration as to whether the proposed Arsenal-type condition agreed between the parties provided an appropriate solution? This was one of three separate grounds on which the court quashed the decision:

“As [the claimant] contends, either the Inspector misunderstood the effect of this condition, which was an error of law, or if he did understand it he did not take it into account in reaching his conclusion, which was that he was not prepared to remedy the problem of the unenforceable Undertaking before him while it was a material consideration in that regard. Either way, this rendered his decision unlawful.”

I don’t know if others have experienced equivalent reluctance on the part of inspectors to accept Arsenal-type conditions? This was also an issue at the planning appeal stage in Satnam Millennium Limited v Secretary of State (Sir Duncan Ouseley, 8 October 2019) (Town Legal acting for the claimant, instructing Christopher Lockhart-Mummery KC and Heather Sargent) but the decision was quashed on other grounds.

We were also recently acting on a case where the appellant was an overseas company but, before our involvement, had not volunteered to the inspector a foreign lawyer’s opinion to confirm that the relevant unilateral undertaking had been validly executed (the point hadn’t been raised by the local planning authority). This was the only ground on which the appeal was dismissed. The Government Legal Department consented to judgment and the appeal is now being re-determined.

Many banana skins out there, for applicants/appellants and decision-makers alike.

Simon Ricketts, 9 June 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Image courtesy of Andy Warhol via Billboard

Dead Cert?

This week I wasn’t sure whether to write about the Government’s 21 February 2023 response to its consultation on the proposed biodiversity gain regulations or about the Government’s 23 February 2023 action plan for reforms to the nationally significant infrastructure projects process.

But both of these documents, important as they are, are largely self-explanatory – and have been covered in various summaries which are out there. So I ditched those ideas.

Instead I will focus on another interesting recent case, involving one of my favourite buildings (a “megastructure” according to the judge): the Brunswick Centre, Camden.

Lazari Properties 2 Limited v Secretary of State (Lane J, 21 February 2023) is nothing to do with the architecture of the building, but rather the architecture of the planning system itself. Whilst only a preliminary ruling by Lane J as to whether there were arguable grounds of challenge, some interesting practical issues arise as to:

⁃ the need for precision in framing lawful development certificate applications

⁃ the proper interpretation of conditions restricting uses by reference to superseded Use Classes Order descriptions.

The centre “contains 2 linked blocks of 560 flats above a shopping centre with rows of shops at raised ground level. The shops (which include a supermarket) are situated over a basement, which contains car parking, a service area and a cinema. Ramps and steps provide access to the central boulevard from several surrounding streets.”

Uses in the building are controlled in part by condition 3 of a planning permission in 2003 for the centre’s refurbishment:

“”Up to a maximum of 40 percent of the retail floorspace, equating to 3386m2 (excluding the supermarket and eye-catcher), is permitted to be used within Use Classes A2 and A3 of the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order.”

Old use classes A2 and A3 are now of course subsumed within the new use class E. So, given that retail uses also fall within class E, does that mean that this condition no longer has any effect such that the whole of the retail floorspace can now be used for any purposes falling within class E?

The owner submitted an application to the local planning application for a certificate of lawfulness of existing use or development (“CLEUD”), with a red line around the whole of the centre and with the proposal described as follows:

“Application to certify that the existing use of the Brunswick Shopping Centre within Class E and without compliance with Condition 3 of Planning Permission: PSX0104561 is lawful”.

Uh oh. I wrote about the perils and constraints of CLEUDs and CLOPUDs (certificates of lawfulness of proposed use or development) in my 12 June 2021 blog post I’m Sorry I Haven’t A CLEUD.

Quite aside from the legal question arising as to whether the references to classes A2 and A3 in the condition should now be read as references to class E, was the description of the existing use sufficiently precise?

The London Borough of Camden didn’t determine the application within the statutory period and the owner appealed. The inspector dismissed the appeal in a decision letter dated 27 July 2022:

⁃ the reference to use class E was not a sufficiently precise description of the existing uses of the units within the centre. Whilst the owner’s objective was clearly to establish that class E use of any of the units would not be in breach of the condition, that was not the role of lawful development certificates: “It is a long established principle that LDCs enable owners and others to ascertain whether specific uses, operations or other activities are or would be lawful. They do not enable anyone to ask the general question, “what is or would be lawful?“

⁃ the reference simply to the whole of the centre, which encompassed various uses plainly not falling within class E, was not sufficiently precise, and was not remedied by a plan excluding defined areas.

⁃ In accordance with case law, condition 3 was to be interpreted having regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, viewed in their particular context (statutory or otherwise) and in the light of common sense. The inspector considered that the purpose of Condition 3 is “clear from its stated reason. It is to safeguard the retail function and character of the Brunswick Centre. It does this by stating a maximum amount of floorspace that is permitted to be used for A2 and A3 purposes.

“Condition 3 only makes sense if there is an implied exclusion of the Use Classes Order or else it has no purpose. The purpose of Condition 3 is clear and it remains enforceable since the uses that are restricted are known, those being the uses set out as falling within Class A2 and A3 when planning permission was granted.”

Both parties made costs applications against the other. The inspector rejected the owner’s costs application and made a partial award of costs in favour of the council.

So what did Lane J make of all this? Without giving any reasoning, he considered that it was arguable that condition 3 was not to be interpreted in the way arrived at by the inspector. However, he found that the inspector’s conclusions as to the inadequacy of simply describing the existing use by reference to class E, as to the inadequacy of the submitted plans and as to costs were all unarguably correct.

An interesting procedural question as to why it was still appropriate for the interpretation question (referred to as grounds 1 and 2) to go to a full hearing, given the fundamental flaws in the formulation of the CLEUD application and appeal:

“I must accordingly explain why I have concluded that, on the facts of the present case, permission should be granted for grounds 1 and 2 to be determined at a substantive hearing. I accept Mr Taylor’s submission that grounds 1 and 2 are, in effect, severable and that there is a real purpose in permitting the claimant to argue them substantively, so that the High Court can reach a decision on the correct interpretation of condition 3. Given that a fresh application by the claimant under section 191 is highly likely, if not inevitable, and that condition 3 is likely to be relevant to the determination of any such application, it plainly makes sense that the issue of interpretation is settled before such a fresh application is made.

I accept that, as matters stand, the claimant has not sought a declaration, which will be needed on the above basis, given that the inspector’s decision should not be quashed. The claimant will need to do so. I do not, however, consider that the claimant’s failure, so far, to seek a declaration should be destructive of its case in respect of grounds 1 and 2.”

Like the judge, I’m not sure that the inspector’s conclusions in respect of condition 3 were necessarily correct and it will be useful to have a final ruling in due course on the issue, which may potentially assist with other interpretation questions arising from the introduction of class E in situations where conditions contain restrictions based on previous use classes. But I’m surprised that the case has gone so far on the basis of such a loose approach to the CLEUD process. Might a simpler approach have been to show all the retail units on a plan and to make a CLOPUD application proposing retail use in respect of each of them? That would have indirectly led to a ruling as to whether condition 3 was legally effective. But as it turns out, maybe the eventual outcome of these proceedings will end up getting to the same position for the owner, albeit at additional expense for all concerned.

Incidentally, if you would like much better summaries than this of planning law cases on a weekly basis, do subscribe to our free Town Library service if you haven’t done so already. Each week my Town Legal colleagues prepare summarise of any rulings handed down the previous week by the Planning Court, together with subsequent appeal rulings. Subscribe here.

Simon Ricketts, 25 February 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Photo of Brunswick Centre courtesy of Wikipedia

It’s Planning Law Month In The Supreme Court!

The UK Supreme Court, that is. The US Supreme Court has gone back at least 50, maybe 55, years as we all know. 

I’m ignoring as too painful for this blog post:

  • those rulings, which had their gestation partly in the process by which the judiciary is appointed in the US and partly in that country’s Delphic and out of date written constitution
  • the current uncertainties at the heart of UK politics, which must be giving rise to the question as to whether this country should have a written constitution. 

I’m also not yet making any predictions about what the changes within DLUHC ministerial team mean for the planning system reforms that are currently underway. 

However let’s just say that Where Did Our LURB Go? is pretty likely to be a future blog post title.

Whilst all this has been swirling around, two cases are before the UK Supreme Court which raise fascinating planning law questions, both of them having their root in what is, in the context of our relatively youthful postwar planning system, ancient and well-known case law.

On 4 July 2022 the court (Lord Reed, Lord Briggs, Lord Sales, Lord Leggatt and Lady Rose) heard Hillside Parks Limited v Snowdonia National Park Authority. 

I was very pleased to be part of the Hillside Parks team, behind Charlie Banner QC, Robin Green & Matt Finn & lead solicitor David Harries (Aaron & Partners). Before being appointed, I wrote a 7 November 2020 blog post Multiple Planning Permissions, Antique Planning Permissions: Hillside which set out my concerns with the Court of Appeal’s ruling. 

There is a brief summary of the issues before the court and relevant facts on the Supreme Court website and that page also includes links to recordings of the day’s proceedings, featuring some lively questioning of Charlie and (appearing for the park authority) of Gwion Lewis QC by the Supreme Court justices. 

At the heart of the arguments was the question of the proper application of  Pilkington v Secretary of State for the Environment (1973), where the Court of Appeal had held that where there were two incompatible permissions, the developer could not implement the earlier development when the later had rendered it no longer capable of implementation in the permitted terms. What is the position where the later permissions are for changes to one part of a wider development approved in the original planning permission? Zack Simons has done a good #planoraks blog post on the subject (of course): When you can’t build both – clashing permissions  (8 January 2021). 

How long until judgment? Your guess is as good as mine. The Supreme Court website says this:

“As a very broad indication, judgments tend to follow between three to nine months after the conclusion of the appeal hearing, although in some cases it may be earlier than that.”

On 12 July 2022 a similarly constituted court (Lord Reed, Lord Hodge, Lord Kitchin, Lord Sales and Lady Rose) will hear DB Symmetry Limited v Swindon Borough Council. The summary on the Supreme Court website sets out the issue as follows:

“Whether the principle enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Hall & Co Ltd v Shoreham by Sea Urban DC [1964] 1 WLR 240, that a planning condition could not lawfully require the developer to dedicate land for public purposes without the payment of compensation, is correct in law. 


Proper interpreted in light of the answer to the first issue, what is the legal effect of the relevant planning condition.”

There is some background and commentary on the Court of Appeal’s judgment in my 17 October 2020 blog post Do Your Conditions Have Symmetry In Mind? 

It is going to be useful to have an up to date articulation by the Supreme Court of the proper approach to both of these sets of issues: overlapping permissions and also what can be secured by condition. Indeed the rulings will have implications for the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill: respectively (1) does clause 98 go far enough in providing a new procedure for amending permissions and (2) if the role of section 106 agreements is to be much diminished under the new infrastructure levy system, how much of the heavy lifting can lawfully done by way of imposition of planning conditions?

In the meantime, there is plenty to listen to at least:

  • My Town Legal colleagues Meeta Kaur, Victoria McKeegan and Nikita Sellers have embarked upon a new podcast, Planning Law (With Chickens), which is very very good. There is a bumper first episode, with special guest Stephanie Hall, available via eg Apple and Spotify.
  • Sam Stafford kindly invited me onto his 50 Shades of Planning podcast to talk about the LURB with Catriona Riddell, Jennie Baker and Tony Burton. The episode will be released shortly. 
  • As previously mentioned, our next Planning Law Unplanned discussion on Clubhouse will be at 6 pm on 19 July: “LURB: who will have the power?” Do join here. Indeed, if you would like to speak do let me know – we would like a diverse range of voices and views. 

Simon Ricketts, 9 July 2022

Personal views, et cetera

Choiceplace, Wrong Place

Choiceplace Properties Limited v Secretary of State (Dove J, 27 April 2021) amounts to a short and sharp lesson for applicants and their advisers: make sure your application plans are accurate, not just in relation to your development proposals but as to the relationship of the proposals to the existing streetscape or landscape, particularly if a condition of the permission requires that development is to be carried out in accordance with those (scaled) plans.

Planning permission had been granted for a small block of flats to be built in north London. Condition 1 required the development to be carried out in accordance with a set of approved plans. The set included drawing “P.04”, street elevations”.

This is an extract from the plan:

Courtesy of London Borough of Barnet planning portal

To quote from Dove J:

“Not long after the permission had been granted the claimant mobilised in order to implement the development. In December 2018, the claimant was advised by the architect that it had retained to prepare detailed construction drawings that the street scene drawing P.04 was inaccurate. In essence, the drawing, which was one of those listed in condition 1 along with the other drawings forming part of the pack accompanying the application, was in error in purporting to show that the proposed development would have a ridge height lower than the neighbouring building 159 Holden Road, when in fact the ridge height of the proposed building would be higher. Whereas the street scene in drawing P.04 showed the buildings stepping down in height from 159 via the proposal to 157, where the ridge height of 157 Holden Road was shown to be lower than the application site proposed building, in fact the proposed building was taller than both of them.”

I suspect that it is quite unusual that an error such as this is spotted pre-construction. The stakes are even higher for all concerned if the discrepancy is spotted at a later stage.

The local planning authority, London Borough of Barnet, took the position that the permitted development could not be lawfully implemented. The parties waved opposing counsel’s opinions at each other. The applicant, Choiceplace, made an application for a certificate of lawfulness of proposed use or development under section 192 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to seek to make good its position. The application was refused by Barnet and the subsequent appeal was dismissed by an inspector.

Some extracts from the inspector’s decision letter:

“In my view the starting point is that when interpreting a condition it should be asked what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean. In this case it clear to me the development should be built in accordance with the plans. At its simplest this is impossible because to build it in accordance with P.03 and P.06 the building will not look like the building shown in P.04. In other words the plans are inconsistent. The condition doesn’t require the development to be in accord with some of the plans, or parts of the plans, but with the approved plans, and I think it reasonable to imply the word “all” there, again on the basis that is what an ordinary reading of the condition implies.

Starting from this point, it could be argued that the P.04 is merely illustrative, the buildings either side could change shape or size or even be demolished, but that seems to me to be rather missing the point. Firstly, P.04 is clearly not illustrative, it is not a simple sketch purporting to show a view, but is an allegedly scale drawing with the heights of the neighbour at No 159 drawn on to specifically compare to the proposal. Secondly, whether the neighbours can change is irrelevant. The drawing shows the proposed building in a relationship to the neighbours at the time the application was made regardless of any theoretical future changes. That relationship should have been replicable on site on the date the permission was granted and it was not.

If we delve further into the extrinsic evidence to see if there is anything else to suggest that reliance on P.04 would be excessive or in some way unreasonable then it becomes clear, for the reasons given in the Council’s opinion, that the streetscene drawing was important in the determination of the application, which was only allowed by the committee by a narrow margin. Furthermore it is only by detailed analysis of various spot heights across several of the drawings that the errors are revealed. The Council should be able to rely on accurately scaled drawings, especially when the drawing in question is important to determining the acceptability of the proposal.”

Dove J agreed with the inspector:

“In my judgment, there is no reason why the depicted heights of the existing buildings should be regarded as illustrative or somehow excluded from the requirements of condition 1 on the planning consent. As was pointed out during the course of argument, a relationship between a proposed development and the existing height of either adjacent structures or indeed adjacent ground levels is a matter to be accurately depicted on plans accompanying planning permission for good reason. It is at the very least to be assumed to be an accurate depiction, in the absence of any specific text on the drawing indicating that elements of it are not to scale. The Inspector was correct in pointing out that the drawing showed a relationship between the proposed development and surrounding buildings which should have been capable of replication on the site at the time permission was granted and it was not. In short, the development is not capable of being implemented in accordance with the approved drawings because it is not capable of being implemented in a manner which replicates the street elevations both longitudinally and axially which are purported to be shown to scale on drawing P.04. To reach that conclusion does not involve any suggestion that the planning application granted might be capable of controlling the scale or appearance of adjacent dwellings beyond the application on site; it is simply a reflection of the inaccuracy in the plans leading to an inability to construct a development which accords with that which is depicted upon them.”

A simple case but with some potentially far-reaching conclusions for applicants:

1. Of course, be careful that all drawings, plans and written descriptions of your development proposal are accurate, are internally consistent and describe accurately the surrounding environment – particularly where by condition you are required to build in accordance with what has been set out. If there need to be caveats as to accuracy, include them.

2. To what extent has someone, at some remove from the detail, audited whether this is in fact the case and confirmed it, such that you can rely on that confirmation if an issue subsequently arises? It’s not the local planning authority’s job.

3. Always check that you will be able to comply with plans and other details that are set out in planning conditions. The condition here was all encompassing: “The development hereby permitted shall be carried out in accordance with the following approved plans: Site Location Plan; Drawing no. P.01 Rev C; Drawing no. P.02 Rev C; Drawing no. P.03 Rev B; Drawing no. P.04; Drawing no. P.05; Drawing no. P.06 Rev A; Landscaping Scheme Drawing no. TH/A3/1497/LS; Arboricultural Impact Assessment & Method Statement by Trevor Heaps Arboricultural Consultancy Ltd Ref: TH 1497 dated 11th December 2017 including drawing no. TH/A3/1497/TPP; Sustainability Statement by Henry Planning; Planning statement by Henry Planning; Document titled “Holden Road, London, N12 8SP – Part M4(2) Category 2 Accessible and Adaptable Dwellings”. I am always wary of such an approach. For instance, why were documents listed that were not even “plans” and precisely which elements of those statements were to be incorporated into the condition?

Simon Ricketts, 7 May 2021

Personal views, et cetera

NB Next Tuesday’s Queen’s Speech should be interesting, in terms of whether we will see any detail released as to the contents of the proposed Planning Bill and the Government’s proposed way forward, and what else is on the Government’s agenda impacting upon our little world. No surprise that this will be our main clubhouse #PlanningLawUnplanned topic for 6pm that evening. I hope you can join us – if you have an iPhone, here is an invitation.

Multiple planning permissions, antique planning permissions: Hillside

There is so much that planning legislation does not address and where principles have had to evolve from case law. One of those is the extent to which development pursuant to one planning permission can be carried out without jeopardising the ability of a developer to carry out work pursuant to another planning permission which was granted over the same area of land.

The principle established in Pilkington v Secretary of State for the Environment [1973] 1 WLR 1527 has been essential to the modern planning system. In that case, Lord Widgery CJ set down the test as follows:


“One looks first of all to see the full scope of that which is being done or can be done pursuant to the permission which has been implemented. One then looks at the development which was permitted in the second permission, now sought to be implemented, and one asks oneself whether it is possible to carry out the development proposed in that second permission, having regard to that which was done or authorised to be done under the permission which has been implemented.”

The case turned on a simple situation of two planning permissions that were granted for the construction of a bungalow on the same plot of land, one positioning the bungalow at the centre of the site and the other in one corner.

The principle is now routinely applied to much more complex situations, for instance where outline planning permission has been granted for a large multi-phase development, a “drop-in” planning permission is often secured for a different form of development on part of the site and permission secured under section 73 for any necessary amendments to conditions attached to the main permission so as to ensure that if development is carried on part of the site under the drop-in permission rather than the main permission, there will be no breach of any conditions attached to the main permission. Any other procedural route, for instance requiring planning permission to be applied for afresh for the whole outline planning permission area would be unnecessarily unwieldy.

The same principle is also relevant when reliance is sought on what I might term “antique” planning permissions, planning permissions which may be hugely valuable if still determined to be live, because they were granted in a more liberal policy climate and when development was not so constrained in terms of planning conditions and obligations. Whilst Parliament legislated for a comprehensive review and modernising of old minerals permissions, it has not done this in relation to permissions for other forms of development.

Last week, in Hillside Parks Limited v Snowdonia National Park Authority (Court of Appeal, 3 November 2020), in a judgment by Singh LJ, the Court of Appeal considered the question of whether one such antique planning permission was still “live”, a 1967 permission for the development of 401 dwellings on 29 acres of land at Balkan Hill, Aberdyfi, granted by Merioneth County Council, as was. The development, governed by a master plan which has been repeatedly varied, has still only been partly built out. In 1987 there was litigation as to whether the permission could still be relied upon and Drake J held that it could. As summarised by the Court of Appeal in the latest proceedings, Drake J held as follows:

“First, the full planning permission of 10 January 1967 was lawfully granted. Secondly, the 1967 permission was a “full permission which could be implemented in its entirety without the need to obtain any further planning permission or planning approval of details”. Thirdly, “the development permitted by the January 1967 Permission has begun; and that it may lawfully be completed at any time in the future”. The fourth declaration concerned the satisfaction of the condition attached to the 1967 permission.”

Snowdonia National Park Authority became the local planning authority in 1996.

“Departures from the Master Plan were granted by the Authority on:


(1) 27 June 1996 for a single dwelling house as a variation to the 1967 Permission.


(2) 20 June 1997 for “two terraces forming: 1 attached dwelling, six apartment units and 8 garages with apartments over” as a variation to the 1967 permission.


(3) 18 September 2000 for a two-storey detached dwelling house and garage on Plot 5 of the Site.


(4) 24 August 2004 for 5 detached houses and 5 garages as a variation to the 1967 permission.


(5) 4 March 2005 for the erection of a 2-storey dwelling and detached garage on Plot 17 on the Site.


(6) 25 August 2005 for the erection of a detached dwelling at Plot 3 of “Phase 1” on the Site.


(7) 20 May 2009 for the erection of 3 pairs of dwellings.


(8) 5 January 2011 for 1 dwelling at Plot 3 on the Site.”

The facts are frustratingly unclear from the judgment, as to the precise nature of these permissions, and indeed the extent to which they were in fact variations of the masterplan approved by way of the 1967 permission.

“On 23 May 2017, the Authority contacted the Appellant, stating that, in its view, the 1967 permission could no longer be implemented because the developments carried out in accordance with the later planning permissions rendered it impossible to implement the original Master Plan. The Authority required that all works at the Site should be stopped until the planning situation had been regularised.”

Hillside sought a declaration from the High Court that the authority was bound by the ruling of Drake J back in 1987, that the permission could still be relied upon and that the “planning permission may be carried on to completion, save insofar as development has been or is carried out pursuant to subsequent planning permissions granted for alternative residential development”. The claim was rejected by HHJ Keyser QC at first instance. He held that the 1987 order was not wrongly made but that “the development which has occurred since 1987 now renders the development granted by the 1967 permission a physical impossibility and that future development pursuant to that permission would no longer be lawful.”

The Court of Appeal did not consider that there had been anything inappropriate about the way that the judge had dealt with Drake J’s ruling and did not consider that the authority should be prevented from raising the “Pilkington” issue even though its predecessor had not raised it before Drake J. In weighing up whether to allow that issue to be raised, the court recognised that “there are undoubtedly important private interests, including the commercial interests of the Appellant. However, there are also important public interests at stake, including the public interest in not permitting development which would be inappropriate in a National Park.”

Singh LJ’s next comments are of interest, and perhaps of some concern, if they are to be interpreted in any way as casting doubt on effectiveness of the modern “drop-in permission plus section 73 permission” process I referred to earlier:

“Furthermore, I would accept the submission made by Mr Lewis on behalf of the Respondent that there have been significant legal developments since the decision of Drake J in 1987. In particular, the decision of the House of Lords in Sage has placed greater emphasis on the need for a planning permission to be construed as a whole. It has now become clearer than it was before 2003 that a planning permission needs to be implemented in full. A “holistic approach” is required.

In Sage the main opinion was given by Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, although there was also a concurring opinion by Lord Hope of Craighead. Mr Green emphasised that, on the facts of that case, what Lord Hobhouse was considering in terms was a planning permission for “a single operation”: see e.g. para. 23. It was in that context, submits Mr Green, that the House of Lords held that a planning permission must be implemented “fully” and that a “holistic approach” must be taken. Mr Lewis observed that, at para. 6, Lord Hope used the word “totality of the operations” (plural rather than singular). In my view, the important point of principle which arises cannot be determined according to semantic differences between the different opinions in the House of Lords. I would accept Mr Lewis’s fundamental submission that the decision in Sage made it clearer than it had previously been that a planning permission should be construed “holistically.”

As a matter of principle, I would endorse the approach taken by Hickinbottom J in Singh v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another [2010] EWHC 1621 (Admin), in particular at paras. 19-20, where Sage was cited. Hickinbottom J was of the view that, reflecting the holistic structure of the planning regime, for a development to be lawful it must be carried out “fully in accordance with any final permission under which it is done” (emphasis in original). He continued:


“That means that if a development for which permission has been granted cannot be completed because of the impact of other operations under another permission, that subsequent development as a whole will be unlawful.”

At the hearing before us there was an interesting debate about a point which ultimately this Court does not need to resolve on this appeal. That issue is whether, in the circumstances envisaged by Hickinbottom J, all the development which has already taken place, apparently in accordance with the first grant of permission, is rendered unlawful simply by virtue of the fact that subsequent operations take place pursuant to another permission which is inconsistent with the first. The phrase used by Hickinbottom J (“subsequent development”) might suggest that it is only the later development which would fall to be regarded as unlawful. Mr Lewis contended that as a matter of principle it must be the whole of the development, including any development that has already taken place. That would have the consequence that there could be enforcement action, and potentially criminal liability, in relation to the development that has already taken place, even though it was at the time apparently in accordance with a valid planning permission. Mr Lewis submitted that in such circumstances it would be unlikely that enforcement action would be taken in practice. Even if that is right, that would mean that whether or not enforcement action is taken would be a matter of discretion rather than law. These are potentially important questions on which we did not receive full argument because they do not need to be decided on this appeal. I would therefore prefer to express no view on them.”

This concept of the planning permission having to be built out as a whole surely needs to be unpacked a little bit more. Sage v Secretary of State (House of Lords, 10 April 2003) was a case about the part-construction of a dwelling. Care needs to be taken in extending any concept that the development needs to be “implemented in full” and is to be regarded as authorising a “single operation” to modern multi-phase permissions. There is no specific requirement that such a development, once started, must be completed – if the local planning authority has a concern in that respect it can serve a completion notice (although of course that procedure is not without its difficulties).

Singh LJ rejects Hillside’s reliance on another old case, F. Lucas & Sons Ltd v Dorking and Horley Rural District Council (1966) 17 P & CR 111, as part of its argument that development pursuant to the 1967 permission on parts of the site was not inconsistent with development on other parts of the site pursuant to other permissions, but was he right to? As summarised by Singh LJ:

“Lucas was decided by Winn J in 1964. In that case, in 1952, planning permission was granted to develop a plot of land by the erection of 28 houses in a cul-de-sac layout. Later the plaintiffs applied for permission to develop the same plot by building six detached houses, each on a plot fronting the main road. Permission for this later development was granted in 1957 and two houses were built in accordance with it. Later, however, the plaintiffs proposed to proceed in reliance on the earlier permission from 1952 by building the cul-de-sac and the 14 houses on the southern side of it. That land was still undeveloped at that time. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the earlier permission was still effective and entitled them to carry out the proposed development on that part of the site where it could still take place. Winn J concluded that the 1952 permission was not to be regarded in law as a permission to develop the plot as a whole but as a permission for any of the development comprised within it. Accordingly, it did authorise the “partial” development proposed by the plaintiffs.”

Surely this was exactly the effect of Hillside’s permission, and certainly how I would categorise modern planning permissions for multi-phase development. As long as conditions are not breached and there is adequate assessment of the cumulative effects, what is the problem?

Singh LJ says this about Lucas:

“…Lucas was a highly exceptional case. It has never been approved by an appellate court. It has never been followed or applied, so far as counsel have been able to show us, by any court since. Furthermore, it was described as being an exceptional case by Lord Widgery CJ (a judge with immense experience in the field of planning law) in Pilkington. Both this Court and the House of Lords have had the opportunity in the many decades since Lucas to consider whether it should be regarded as setting out a general principle or not.

In my view, it would not be appropriate for this Court now to overrule Lucas. In order to do so we would have to be satisfied that it was wrongly decided on its particular facts. It is not possible to be satisfied of that, not least because we do not have the advantage of seeing the precise terms of the planning permission which was granted in that case. It suffices to say that the case should be regarded as having been decided on its own facts.

As Hickinbottom J observed in the case of Singh, at para. 25, it is conceivable that, on its proper construction, a particular planning permission does indeed grant permission for the development to take place in a series of independent acts, each of which is separately permitted by it. I would merely add that, in my respectful view, that is unlikely to be the correct construction of a typical modern planning permission for the development of a large estate such as a housing estate. Typically there would be not only many different residential units to be constructed in accordance with that scheme, there may well be other requirements concerning highways, landscaping, possibly even employment or educational uses, which are all stipulated as being an integral part of the overall scheme which is being permitted. I doubt very much in those circumstances whether a developer could lawfully “pick and choose” different parts of the development to be implemented.”

Lawyers: what do you make of all this? Further thought is required but I am concerned that this judgment may have introduced further uncertainty into our system, which is complicated enough thank you!

Simon Ricketts, 7 November 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Flag of Merioneth/Meirionydd

Do Your Conditions Have Symmetry In Mind?

A judgment of the Court of the Appeal yesterday – DB Symmetry Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 16 October 2020) – has potentially wide implications.

The court ruled that a condition on a planning permission cannot as a matter of law require land to be dedicated as highway. Unless a realistic interpretation can be given to the condition which avoids that outcome, and if the condition is not considered to be severable from the permission as a whole, in some circumstances the validity of the planning permission may be at risk.

Such a requirement needs instead to be included in that endangered species, the section 106 agreement.

The case arose from the first planning permission to be granted for part of the Swindon New Eastern Villages urban extension (“NEV”), which will eventually comprise 8,000 homes, 40 hectares of employment land and associated retail, community, education and leisure uses. The planning permission in part authorised the construction of a section of spine road envisaged eventually to connect through the wider development.

The report to committee in relation to the planning application explained “that the application site was part of a wider development proposal. It was to “integrate physically and functionally” with adjoining development. The NEV was to come forward as “a series of new interconnected villages.” Each scheme had to demonstrate how it fitted into the wider NEV. The proposal “must provide connections to future development within the [NEV] in the interests of enabling the comprehensive and sustainable development of the NEV as a whole”.

A condition was attached to the planning permission, condition 39:

“Roads

The proposed access roads, including turning spaces and all other areas that serve a necessary highway purpose, shall be constructed in such a manner as to ensure that each unit is served by fully functional highway, the hard surfaces of which are constructed to at least basecourse level prior to occupation and bringing into use.

Reason: to ensure that the development is served by an adequate means of access to the public highway in the interests of highway safety.”

The developer took the position that this condition did not require the dedication of the roads as public highway. I do not know why: perhaps wishing to retain greater control over their maintenance as private roads, perhaps wishing to retain the ability to charge a premium to those who might in the future wish to connect into the roads, including other developers.

As explained by Lewison LJ in the judgment, “the developer applied to Swindon for a certificate under section 192 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 that the formation and use of private access roads as private access roads would be lawful. Swindon refused the certificate; and the developer appealed. On 6 November 2018 Ms Wendy McKay LLB, an experienced planning inspector, allowed the appeal. She certified that the use of the access roads for private use only would be lawful.”

The council challenged the decision and at first instance Andrews J quashed it.

The Court of Appeal disagreed in no uncertain terms, regarding itself as bound by a 1964 Court of Appeal judgment, Hall & Co Ltd v Shoreham by Sea Urban DC:

“In Hall & Co Ltd v Shoreham by Sea Urban DC [1964] 1 WLR 240 sand and gravel importers and the owners and occupiers of land in an area scheduled for industrial development, applied for planning permission to develop part of their land for industrial purposes. The land adjoined a busy main road which was already overloaded. The highway authority intended to widen it at a future date and to acquire for that purpose a strip forming part of the developer’s land. The planning authority granted planning permission subject to a condition requiring the developer to “construct an ancillary road over the entire frontage of the site at their own expense, as and when required by the local planning authority and shall give right of passage over it to and from such ancillary roads as may be constructed on the adjoining land.” It is to be noted that the condition did not require the transfer of the land itself.

This court held that the imposition of that condition was unlawful. At 247 Willmer LJ summarised the developer’s argument as follows:

“It is contended that the effect of these conditions is to require the plaintiffs not only to build the ancillary road on their own land, but to give right of passage over it to other persons to an extent that will virtually amount to dedicating it to the public, and all this without acquiring any right to recover any compensation whatsoever. This is said to amount to a violation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights of ownership which goes far beyond anything authorised by the statute.

…

“The defendants would thus obtain the benefit of having the road constructed for them at the plaintiffs’ expense, on the plaintiffs’ land, and without the necessity for paying any compensation in respect thereof. Bearing in mind that another and more regular course is open to the defendants, it seems to me that this result would be utterly unreasonable and such as Parliament cannot possibly have intended.”

“Harman LJ said at 256: “It is not in my judgment within the authority’s powers to oblige the planner to dedicate part of his land as a highway open to the public at large without compensation, and this is the other possible interpretation of the condition. As was pointed out to us in argument, the Highways Acts provide the local authority with the means of acquiring lands for the purpose of highways, but that involves compensation of the person whose land is taken, and also the consent of the Minister.”

In the light of Hall, Lewison LJ concluded:

“I consider that, at least at this level in the judicial hierarchy, a condition that requires a developer to dedicate land which he owns as a public highway without compensation would be an unlawful condition. Whether the unlawfulness is characterised as the condition being outside the scope of the power because it requires the grant of rights over land rather than merely regulating the use of land; or whether it is a misuse of a power to achieve an objective that the power was not designed to secure; whether it is irrational in the public law sense, or whether it is disproportionate does not seem to me to matter. In my judgment Hall establishes a recognised principle which is binding on this court.”

“If the judge interpreted [advice in a previous Government circular] as authorising the imposition of conditions which not only required a developer to provide an access road, but also to dedicate it to public use as a highway, I consider that she was wrong. Such an interpretation would be flatly contrary to consistent government policy for nearly 70 years. In my judgment Hall does impose an absolute ban on requiring dedication of land as a public highway without compensation as a condition of the grant of planning permission. I also consider, contrary to Mr Harwood’s submission, that there is no difference for this purpose between dedicating a road as a highway and transferring the land itself for highway use. As I have said, the condition in Hall did not require the land itself to be transferred, yet it was still held to be unlawful.”

The reference to “at least at this level in the judicial hierarchy” is interesting – has the council the appetite to apply for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court? Hall was decided in another time and is it right that the operation of conditions should continue to be constrained in this way? Whilst Hall and Symmetry were both cases about conditions that potentially required the dedication of land as highway, the same principle would apply to conditions requiring the dedication, disposal or transfer of land for other purposes, e.g. open space or affordable housing. Care is required! The distinction nowadays between the “imposition” of planning conditions and the “agreement” of section 106 planning obligations is surely somewhat artificial – on major schemes, conditions are negotiated by the parties to almost an equivalent extent as planning obligations may be – and if the applicant isn’t happy with a condition that has been imposed, section 96A and section 73 are always available. Furthermore, Willmer J’s 1964 reference to the relevant condition amounting to a “violation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights of ownership which goes far beyond anything authorised by the statute” looks quaint from a 2020 perspective, where the price of planning permission for any significant scheme entails multiple violations of those so-called “fundamental rights” – and, on proposals within areas allocated for comprehensive development, in my view “anti-ransom” arrangements are essential planning prerequisites – why shouldn’t a condition be enabled to achieve that objective?

Once the Court of Appeal had concluded that the condition could not lawfully have the effect of requiring roads to be dedicated as public highway, it needed to consider whether another interpretation could realistically be given to the condition.

“In her decision letter, the inspector expressed her conclusion at [20] as follows: “Whilst the term “highway” usually means a road over which the general public have the right to pass and repass, the phrase “fully functional highway” cannot be divorced from the beginning of the sub-clause which states “shall be constructed in such a manner as to ensure…”. In my view, Condition 39 simply imposes a requirement concerning the manner of construction of the access roads and requires them to be capable of functioning as a highway along which traffic could pass whether private or public. It does not require the constructed access roads to be made available for use by the general public. I believe that a reasonable reader would adopt the Appellant’s understanding of the term “highway” as used in the context of the condition with the clear reference to the construction of the roads as opposed to their use or legal status. The distinct inclusion of the term “public highway” in the reason for imposing Condition 39 reinforces my view on that point.”

Lewison LJ:

“I do not think that the judge really appreciated the consequences of her decision. In my judgment, if the judge was right in her interpretation of the condition, the condition (and probably the whole planning permission) is invalid. In those circumstances, the validation principle comes into play. The question, then, is whether the inspector’s interpretation of condition 39 was realistic (even if not the most obvious or natural one).”

“In my judgment, the interpretation adopted by the inspector is, to put it no higher, a realistic one even if it is not the most natural. The validation principle therefore applies; and condition 39 should be given the meaning that she ascribed to it.”

Surely if the court had not managed to get to this interpretation of the condition it would not have quashed the whole consent? For the council that would have certainly been a “You’re only supposed to blow the bloody doors off!” moment.

What if the condition had been negatively worded: not to occupy more than x dwellings until defined roads had been constructed and satisfactory arrangements had been made for their adoption as public highway? Any different outcome?

The obvious practical lesson is to document these sorts of dedication and land transfer requirements other than by condition but let’s see if there’s a further appeal.

Simon Ricketts, 17 October 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Adonis blue (image from Wikipedia)

E Is For Economy

“It’s the economy, stupid.”

More E words: the English planning and property community was immediately, depending who you spoke to, exercised/excited by the changes to the Use Classes Order and General Permitted Development Order this week. Surprisingly so perhaps, given how heavily the changes had previously been trailed (although, it must be said, in terms of the Use Classes Order changes, not consulted upon). Inevitably and by contrast, the wider public appears to be oblivious as to what lies ahead, despite the potentially far-reaching implications of the creation of the new “commercial, business and service“ class E within the Use Classes Order in particular.

There are many good summaries already of the changes. My Town colleagues Nikita Sellers, George Morton Jack and Meeta Kaur have prepared a detailed summary.

I am not going to consider the rights and wrongs of the changes in any detail. I have referred previously to my disappointment that the Government has not required for example its nationally described minimum space standards to be applied in relation to the creation of new dwellings by way of permitted development rights (despite having published, with curious timing, a report Research into the quality standard of homes delivered through change of use permitted development rights, on the same day as publishing legislation which does not take into account the recommendations of that work, with no explanation for the discrepancy). The Use Classes Order changes do provide some overdue flexibility given the structural changes underway in our town centres in the light of changed shopping patterns (not just Covid-related but of course now accentuated), but they are extremely wide ranging and I query whether the various permutations of potential consequences have been adequately considered. But that is all for another day.

Instead, I wanted to pull us back to some planning law fundamentals – in what circumstances may owners find that they cannot rely on the expanded use rights after all?

First, in order to move within a use class, the initial use first has to have been instituted, so if for instance you have an as yet unimplemented planning permission for a shop, or if the development has been built but not yet been occupied, the development will first need to have been used as a shop before there can be a change to another use within the new class E (e.g. offices).

Secondly, there must not be a condition on the planning permission authorising the current use that has the effect of preventing use changes that would otherwise have been enabled by way of the Use Classes Order and/or General Permitted Development Order. This is familiar but not straightforward territory. There is much case law as to whether particular phrases in conditions actually achieved what the local planning authority intended and indeed whether the benefit of the condition was lost through the grant of subsequent permissions which did not expressly impose it.

The general answer is that it depends on a careful analysis of the existing planning permission (and of course any provisions within any section 106 agreement).

The Supreme Court considered a situation like this in London Borough of Lambeth v Secretary of State (Supreme Court, 3 July 2019), which I summarised in my 4 July 2019 blog post What Really Is The Meaning Of Lambeth?

The original permission read:

“The retail unit hereby permitted shall be used for the retailing of goods for DIY home and garden improvements and car maintenance, building materials and builders’ merchants goods and for no other purpose (including any other purpose in Class I of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1972 or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order).”

It was then amended to read:

“The retail use hereby permitted shall be used for the retailing of DIY home and garden improvements and car maintenance, building materials and builders merchants goods, carpets and floor coverings, furniture, furnishings, electrical goods, automobile products, camping equipment, cycles, pet and pet products, office supplies and for no other purpose (including the retail sale of food and drink or any other purpose in Class A1 of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (as amended) or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order).”

The council then approved by way of section 73 a further change so that it was to read:

“The retail unit hereby permitted shall be used for the sale and display of non-food goods only and, notwithstanding the provisions of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 (or any Order revoking and re-enacting that Order with or without modification), for no other goods.”

However, the council neglected to include that wording in a condition. It was simply part of the description of the development.

The Supreme Court held that the permission was to be interpreted as constraining the use of the retail unit so that it was for the sale of non-food goods only. But for our purposes, this is an example that the courts (1) routinely treat conditions as able validly to restrict the operation of the Use Classes Order and/or General Permitted Development Order and (2) are perhaps currently more benevolent towards the local planning authority’s position than has previously been the case where there has been procedural imprecision, as long as what was intended was clear.

My 14 October 2017 blog post Flawed Drafting: Interpreting Planning Permissions referred to another recent example, Dunnett Investments Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 29 March 2017) which concerned this condition:

“This use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained“.

The court held that “express planning consent” did not include prior approval pursuant to the “office to residential” permitted development right. The restriction applied.

So care is needed! Where there are restrictive conditions which would restrict the flexibility that the new class E would otherwise give, of course consideration can be given to applying to remove those conditions by way of section 73 application.

Thirdly, when applications for planning permission are now to be determined, careful consideration will need to be given to the proposed description of development and no doubt there will be issues arising as to whether decision makers are justified in imposing conditions which restrict the operation of the new Use Classes Order and General Permitted Development Order flexibilities. It will be the B1(a), (b) and (c) arguments all over again, but writ large.

I hope that we will have updated Planning Practice Guidance. In the meantime, the current Planning Practice Guidance has passages such as these:

“It is important to ensure that conditions are tailored to tackle specific problems, rather than standardised or used to impose broad unnecessary controls.”

1. necessary;

2. relevant to planning;

3. relevant to the development to be permitted;

4. enforceable;

5. precise; and

6. reasonable in all other respects.”

“Is it appropriate to use conditions to restrict the future use of permitted development rights or changes of use?

Conditions restricting the future use of permitted development rights or changes of use may not pass the test of reasonableness or necessity. The scope of such conditions needs to be precisely defined, by reference to the relevant provisions in the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, so that it is clear exactly which rights have been limited or withdrawn.Area-wide or blanket removal of freedoms to carry out small scale domestic and non-domestic alterations that would otherwise not require an application for planning permission are unlikely to meet the tests of reasonableness and necessity. The local planning authority also has powers under article 4 of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 to enable them to withdraw permitted development rights across a defined area, where justified.

Will that guidance be sufficient to avoid disputes? I doubt it.

Am I entitled to apply for planning permission simply for Class E use? Given that Parliament now deems changes within class E not be material, why not? How will such applications be determined as against development plan policies which are likely to be at odds with such an approach, and how will CIL be calculated, given that many CIL charging schedules distinguish as between, for instance, retail and office use?

Fourthly, planning permission will still be required for operational works that materially affect the external appearance of the building. To what extent will local planning authorities seek to exert control by that route, as we have sometimes seen with office to residential conversions? How to guard against plainly substandard conversions of shops to offices and of, for instance, units on out of town business parks to shops?

Fifthly, there is going to be much focus on how precisely the General Permitted Development Order operates in relation to the new class. For an initial period, until 31 July 2021, the GPDO will operate as against how the relevant use was categorised before the changes to the Use Classes Order became effective. Are we to expect further changes to the GPDO in the coming period?

Sixthly, quite apart from these planning law constraints, private law constraints imposed by way of, for instance, restrictive covenants and user covenants in leases will still apply.

But, there’s no way round it, class E has huge implications for much of the world around us, from central business district to market town, to out of town retail or business park. It also brings with it, and this is its very point, huge opportunities to allow for adaptation and for entrepreneurship. How is all this going to work out in practice? Will people start using the new freedoms and then find that inevitably in due course the rules tighten again, by which time the horse has bolted, or, that for land owners, they may have unwittingly lost the right to the use which was most valuable in investment terms? E is also for experiment.

Simon Ricketts, 24 July 2020 (expanded version 25 July 2020)

PS and for Emily! Happy birthday daughter.

Personal views, et cetera

New Planning Legislation! A Detailed Guide

The Business and Planning Bill was introduced to the House of Commons on 25 June 2020 and the Town and Country Planning (Permitted Development and Miscellaneous Amendments) (England) (Coronavirus) Regulations 2020 were laid before Parliament on 24 June 2020, and have passed into law.

The following is a summary prepared by my Town colleagues Victoria McKeegan, George Morton Jack and Meeta Kaur. I will leave any commentary as to the implications for another week.

Summary

The Bill contains temporary provisions to facilitate the extension of the duration of certain planning permissions and listed building consents. This ensures that relevant permissions and consents will remain extant, enabling development to commence following delays caused by Covid-19. As well as extending the time limit for permissions and consents expiring between enactment of the new provisions and 31 December 2020, these measures also have retrospective effect, facilitating the revival of permissions which expired since 23 March 2020, subject to an ‘additional environmental approval’. The local planning authority may only grant such approval if it is satisfied that EIA and habitats assessments remain up to date. In all cases, the time limits for commencing development are extended until 1 April 2021.

The Bill introduces a fast-track planning application process for the temporary variation of both planning conditions limiting construction site working hours and documents approved pursuant to planning condition containing such limitations. The fast-track process is facilitated through a requirement for the local planning authority to respond to the application within 14 days from the day after submission, and deemed approval in the event of no response.

The Bill also introduces measures introducing flexibility for the Planning Inspectorate to use more than one of the procedures to determine planning appeals in-combination. Appeals could take a hybrid form, combining elements of written representations, hearings and planning inquiries.

The final planning measure affords the Mayor of London temporary flexibility to make the London Plan available for inspection by appropriate electronic means, rather than having to make copies available for inspection at the Greater London Authority’s offices and to distribute copies when requested.

The Regulations amend permitted development rights (“PDR”) – the rights under the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (the GPDO) that effectively grant planning permission for specific types of development with no need for a planning application, although subject to prior approvals from the local planning authority (LPA) – and certain advertising and other regulations.

The principal changes to PDR are:

o a new requirement for provision of adequate natural light where PDR are exercised for changes of use to housing. This provision relates specifically to all habitable rooms, and is intended to improve the quality of homes delivered under existing PDR for changes of use to housing;

o new PDR for temporary use of land, including temporary use of land by developers for any purpose subject to several restrictions (with this right in force from 25 June 2020 to 31 December 2020), and by local authorities for holding a market (with this right in force from 25 June 2020 to 23 March 2021);

o new PDR for construction of new homes on detached blocks of flats, where the permitted development consists of works for construction of up to two additional storeys of new dwellinghouses (meaning flats for this new PDR), immediately above purpose-built detached block of flats of three or more above-ground storeys. This new PDR permits various related works including reasonably necessary engineering works to construct the additional storeys and the new flats, and is subject to several restrictions.

The PDR amendments also include some minor, more technical or clarificatory updates to the GPDO.

The Regulations include some minor amendments to advertising and compensation regulations.

The Regulations come into force in two stages: first, on 25 June 2020 (including changes to PDR for temporary use of land); and second, on 1 August 2020 (including changes to PDR for residential development).

In detail

THE BILL

1.1 Part Three of the Bill relates to planning. This main section 1 provides a brief summary of those planning matters.

Automatic extension of planning permissions

1.2 The Bill introduces three new sections to the TCPA 1990 on a temporary basis up until 1 April 2021. New section 93A modifies any condition attached to a planning permission imposing a time limit for the commencement of development which is due to expire between the day on which the enabling provision of the Business and Planning Act (the “Act”) comes into force and 31 December 2020. The time limit for the commencement of development is automatically extended to 1 April 2021.

1.3 New section 93B has the same effect as section 93A (extending the time period for implementation until 1 April 2021) for any planning permission subject to a condition that the development must be commenced by a time falling between 23 March 2020 and the day on which the enabling provision of the Act comes into force, if an ‘additional environmental approval’ is granted or deemed to be granted in respect of that permission. As such, it is section 93B which creates retrospective effect, effectively reviving planning permissions which expired during the lockdown period (subject to ‘additional environmental approval’).

1.4 As regards the ‘additional environmental approval’, an application must be made to the local planning authority and contain sufficient information to enable it to determine whether approval should be granted . There is provision for deemed approval of the application within 28 days (or a longer agreed period) if the local planning authority does not issue its decision within this period. The local planning authority may only grant approval if the ‘EIA and habitats requirements’ are met. The EIA requirement is met if either the development is not EIA development or the development remains the subject of an up-to-date EIA assessment. The habitats requirement is met if the development would not presently require an appropriate assessment (if planning permission were being granted for the development now) or, if it would, the development was previously subject to assessment which ascertained that the development would not adversely affect the integrity of a European site / offshore marine site and the local planning authority is satisfied that the assessment remains up to date.

1.5 An ‘additional environmental approval’ is absolute and may not be granted subject to condition. Further, no ‘additional environmental approval’ may be granted following 31 December 2020, unless granted on an appeal lodged on or before that date. There is a right of appeal against a refusal of an ‘additional environmental approval’.

Automatic extension of outline planning permissions

1.6 The Bill introduces further new sections to the TCPA 1990 in relation to outline planning permissions, which have similar effect to those mentioned above in relation to full planning permissions. Again, the new sections are introduced on a temporary basis up until 1 April 2021.

1.7 New section 93D modifies any condition attached to an outline planning permission that imposes a time limit for the submission of an application for approval of any reserved matter which falls between 23 March 2020 and 31 December 2020. The time limit for submission of such applications is extended to 1 April 2021.

1.8 New sections 93E and 93F have the same effect as new sections 93A and 93B, but apply in relation to outline planning permissions. They extend the time period by which development must be begun to 1 April 2021 for those outline planning permissions due to expire between the date on which the enabling provision of the Act comes into force and 31 December 2020. Further, the extension of time for implementation and the ‘additional environmental approval’ process is the same as for full planning permissions in the case of outline planning permissions which expired between 23 March 2020 and the date that the relevant enabling provision of the Act comes into force.

Automatic extension of listed building consents

1.9 The Bill introduces a new section 18A to the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. This modifies any condition attached to a listed building consent which imposes a time limit for the commencement of works which expires between 23 March 2020 and 31 December 2020. The time limit for commencement in such cases will be extended to 1 April 2021. Again, the temporary modifications expire on 1 April 2021.

1.10 The Secretary of State may make regulations to extend the time periods set out in these new sections facilitating the automatic extension of planning permissions and listed building consents, along with their expiry date.

Further measures

Modification of conditions relating to construction working hours

1.11 The Bill introduces three new sections to the TCPA 1990 in order to facilitate a new fast-track application process for the temporary variation of planning conditions relating to construction site working hours. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill state that the new process is designed to enable the facilitation of safe construction working practices in line with social distancing guidance issued by the Government. The fast-track process expires on 1 April 2021.

1.12 New section 74B applies to planning permissions which impose a condition specifying the times during which construction activities may be carried out or where a similar restriction is contained in a separate document approved by a local planning authority pursuant to a planning condition. It allows an applicant to apply to modify the restrictions imposed either by way of condition of approved document so as to allow construction activities to be carried out for a longer period than permitted on a particular day or on a day which is currently not permitted.

1.13 The application must specify the date from which it is proposed that the modifications should take effect which can be no earlier than the end of the period of 14 days from the day after submission of the application. Such an extension may only be for a temporary period not extending beyond 1 April 2021.

1.14 New section 74C provides that the local planning authority can approve the application, refuse the application or determine, with the agreement of the applicant, different modifications or alternative dates during which they will have effect. There is provision for deemed approval of the application if the local planning authority does not respond within a period of 14 days from the day after submission of the application, hence this being termed a ‘fast-track’ process. There is a right of appeal against refusal of an application under the new procedure.

Procedure for certain planning proceedings

1.15 The Bill amends the power of the Secretary of State to determine which procedure (i.e. written representations, hearing or local inquiry) should be adopted in various appeal proceedings. The amendments effectively facilitate a combination of these proceedings and are permanent. They are described in the Explanatory Notes as providing flexibility for a Planning Inspector to use more than one procedure to determine planning appeals which is required to enable the Planning Inspectorate to deal with cases quickly and effectively during the coronavirus pandemic. However, they are also described as providing ‘ongoing efficiencies to the work of the Planning Inspectorate’. The amendments apply to section 319A(2) of the TCPA 1990, section 88D(2) of the LBC Act and section 21A(2) of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990.

Electronic inspection of spatial development strategy

1.16 The Bill temporarily modifies the effect of section 43 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 until 31 December 2020. Section 43 of the GLAA requires the Mayor of London to take steps to give adequate publicity to various strategies and to make the current versions available for public inspection at the GLA’s offices, as well as provide copies where requested. The amendments apply solely in relation to the Mayor’s spatial development strategy, namely the London Plan. In respect of the London Plan, the Bill removes the requirement to make the current version of the London Plan available for inspection and to provide copies if a copy of the current version of the strategy is available for inspection free of charge by appropriate electronic means.

Commencement

1.17 The Bill provides that the permission extension changes would come into force 28 days after the Act is passed, the construction site working hours proposal would come into force six days after the Act is passed, while the appeal procedure flexibility and GLAA amendments would come into force on the day on which the Act is passed.

What’s Next?

1.18 MPs will next consider all stages of the Bill in one day on Monday 29 June 2020. The Government is aiming for it to pass into law by 4 July 2020.

2. THE REGULATIONS

2.1 This main section 2 provides a brief summary of the Regulations’ amendments.

Definitions of “dwellinghouse” and “flat” (Regulation 3, in force on 1 August 2020)

2.2 Regulation 3 updates article 2 of the GPDO’s definitions of “dwellinghouse” and “flat” applying to the new “Class A” PDR (“New dwellinghouses on detached blocks of flats”) in Schedule 2, Part 20 of the GPDO (which is introduced by Regulation 22, for which see the comments below on Regulation 22).

Extension of determination period for prior approval applications (Regulation 4, in force on 1 August 2020)

2.3 Regulation 4 amends article 7 of the GPDO (“Prior approval applications: time periods for decision”). It allows an applicant and an LPA to agree a period longer either than 8 weeks for the authority to determine prior approval applications, or than a time period otherwise specified in the GPDO.

New prior approval fee (Regulation 5, in force on 1 August 2020)

2.4 For the existing PDR “Enlargement, improvement or other alteration of a dwellinghouse” (GPDO Schedule 2, Part 1, Class A), in relation to development of certain dwellinghouses where prior approval is required for a larger single storey rear extension, there is a new a prior approval fee (which is set out in the Town and Country Planning (Fees for Applications, Deemed Applications, Requests and Site Visits) (England) Regulations 2012).

Additions to roof of a dwellinghouse (Regulation 6, in force on 1 August 2020)

2.5 For the PDR “additions etc to the roof of a dwellinghouse” (GPDO Schedule 2, Part 1, Class B), in relation to alteration of a house’s roof, a rear or side extension now includes an original projection or a subsequent extension of the house that extends from the rear or side of the principal part of the original house.

Limit on new PDR for new dwellinghouses (Regulations 5 to 12, in force on 1 August 2020)

2.6 Regulations 5 to 12 amend PDR under Schedule 2, Part 1 of the GPDO.

2.7 They operate to limit the new “Class A” PDR (“New dwellinghouses on detached blocks of flats”) in Schedule 2, Part 20 of the GPDO (for which see our comments below on Regulation 22).

2.8 Regulations 5 to 12 ensure that a new home built under that new “Class A” PDR cannot use PDR under Schedule 2, Part 1 of the GPDO (“Development within the curtilage of a dwellinghouse”).

2.9 They do so in relation to the following classes in Schedule 2, Part 1:

(a) Class A – Enlargement, improvement or other alteration of a dwellinghouse;

(b) Class B – additions etc to the roof of a dwellinghouse;

(c) Class C – other alterations to the roof of a dwellinghouse;

(d) Class D – porches;

(e) Class E – buildings etc incidental to the enjoyment of a dwellinghouse;

(f) Class F – hard surfaces incidental to the enjoyment of a dwellinghouse;

(g) Class G – chimneys, flues etc on a dwellinghouse; and

(h) Class H – microwave antenna on a dwellinghouse.

Adequate natural light in homes (Regulations 13 to 19 and 27, in force on 1 August 2020)

2.10 To improve the quality of homes delivered under existing PDR for changes of use to housing, the Regulations introduce a new requirement for provision of adequate natural light in all habitable rooms (defined as “any rooms used or intended to be used for sleeping or living which are not solely used for cooking purposes, but does not include bath or toilet facilities, service rooms, corridors, laundry rooms, hallways or utility rooms”).

2.11 This requirement applies to development under the following change of use classes under Schedule 2, Part 3 of the GPDO:

(a) Class M – retail, takeaways and specified sui generis uses to dwellinghouses;

(b) Class N – specified sui generis uses to dwellinghouses;

(c) Class O – offices to dwellinghouses;

(d) Class PA – premises in light industrial use to dwellinghouses; and

(e) Class Q – agricultural buildings to dwellinghouses.

2.12 The new requirement for provision of natural light involves, as part of the prior approval application process, mandatory submission to the LPA of design details, in a floor plan indicating the dimensions and proposed use of each room, the position and dimensions of windows, doors and walls, and the elevations of the dwellinghouses. Further (under Regulation 18), “the local planning authority must refuse prior approval if adequate natural light is not provided in all the habitable rooms of the dwellinghouses”.

2.13 Regulation 27 has transitional provisions accounting for where developers, as of 1 August 2020, have already submitted a prior approval application in respect of Classes M, N, O, PA and Q as above. These transitional provisions ensure that any such applications submitted before 1 August 2020 will be determined in accordance with PDR in force before that date. Regulation 27 also covers certain circumstances where a developer may, after 1 August 2020, continue to rely on the PDR in force before that date.

2.14 The same requirement for provision of natural light in respect of Classes M, N, O, PA and Q as above applies to the new “Class A” PDR in Schedule 2, Part 20 of the GPDO, for which see our comments below on Regulation 22.

Additional temporary use of land (Regulation 20, in force on 25 June 2020)

2.15 Regulation 20 creates a new PDR for “additional temporary use of land” (as the new “Class BA” in Schedule 2, Part 4 of the GPDO). This new right permits temporary use of land for any purpose.

2.16 There are the following additional points to note in relation to use of land under the new right:

(a) the right is in addition to use under the existing Schedule 2, Part 4, Class B PDR for temporary use of land;

(iii) the right includes the right to place on the land any moveable structure (such as a stall or a marquee) for the purposes of the permitted use;

(b) any use of land for any purpose must be for not more than 28 days in total during the period 1 July 2020 to 31 December 2020; of those 28 days, no more than 14 days in total may be for the of (i) holding a market, (ii) motor car and motorcycle racing including trials of speed, and practising for these activities;

(c) development is not permitted if the land in question is a building or is within the curtilage of a listed building; if the use of the land is for a caravan site; if the land is, or is within, a site of special scientific interest and the use of the land is for: (i) motor car and motorcycle racing including trials of speed or other motor sports, and practising for these activities; (ii) clay pigeon shooting; or (iii) any war game, or if the use of the land is for the display of an advertisement;

(d) the right will cease to have effect from 1 January 2021.

PDR for local authority markets (Regulation 21, in force on 25 June 2020)

2.17 The Regulations introduce a new PDR “Class BA” to part 12 of Schedule 12 of the GPDO, for local authorities to use land for holding a market (including provision of any moveable structure related to the market use). This PDR lasts until 23 March 2021.

PDR for Construction of new homes on detached blocks of flats (Regulation 22, in force on 1 August 2020)

2.18 This PDR follows from the MHCLG consultation “Planning Reform: Supporting the high street and increasing the delivery of new homes” (October 2018).

2.19 The Regulations introduce a new PDR to Schedule 2 of the GPDO inserting a new Part 20 Class A. It allows development consisting of works for construction of up to two additional storeys of new dwellinghouses (which means flats for this new PDR), immediately above purpose-built detached block of flats of three or more above-ground storeys.

2.20 It also permits, in connection with this, the following works:

(a) reasonably necessary engineering works to construct the additional storeys and the new flats;

(b) replacement of existing or installation of additional rooftop plant reasonably necessary for the new flats;

(c) Construction of safe access and egress including additional external doors or staircases to escape fire;

(d) Construction of storage, waste or other ancillary facilities reasonably necessary for the new flats.

2.21 There are limitations on these connected works, as well as a significant number of other limitations which render the PDR unavailable, including those in the following list.  Hence, development is not permitted if:

(a) the permission to use any building as a dwellinghouse was granted by PDRs set out in any of classes M, N, O, P, PA or Q of the GPDO, which are those that permit changes of use from various uses to residential (and includes the contentious office to residential PDRs);

(b) the building was constructed before 1 July 1948 or after 5 March 2018 (the latter being the date on which the government first announced its intention to introduce the upward extension PDR);

(c) the extended building would be greater than 30m high;

(d) it does not comply with limitations on floor to ceiling heights of the additional storeys and the overall height of the roof of the extended building;

(e) the site on which the building is located is or forms part of a conservation area, National Park, AONBs, or SSSI, a listed building or a scheduled monument or land within their curtilage.

2.22 The PDR is also conditional on a number of matters which include the following:

(a) before beginning the development prior approval must be sought as to the following impacts: transport and highways, air traffic and defence assets, contamination and flooding risks, external appearance, provision of adequate natural light in all habitable rooms and amenity of existing and neighbouring buildings including overlooking, privacy and loss of light and impacts on protected views.

(b) the development must be completed within 3 years and the LPA must be notified of completion;

(c) a report must be submitted to the LPA setting out how the construction will be managed.

2.23 There is a specific procedure set out for applications for prior approval for this PDR which includes a list of information that must accompany the application and the bodies that must be consulted on for the purposes of the specified impacts (see (a) above).  The LPA must publicise the application by way of site notice and notice to owner/occupiers of the existing building and neighbours.

2.24 It is worth noting that applications must be accompanied by detailed plans that show (amongst other things) the position of the windows and doors and the LPA must refuse prior approval if adequate natural light is not provided in all the habitable rooms.

2.25 The LPA can require further information in order to determine the application which may include assessments of impacts or risks or how those may be mitigated having regard to the NPPF.  When determining the application the LPA must have regard to representations received in response to consultation and the NPPF so far as is relevant to the prior approval application, in the same way as if it were a planning application.

2.26 The LPA must determine a prior approval application within 8 weeks but unlike some other PDRs there is no deemed approval if the LPA fails to issue a decision within that period.  There is however a right of appeal for non-determination. The development must not begin before prior approval is received and must be carried out in accordance with the approved details.  Prior approval can be granted unconditionally or subject to conditions reasonably related to the subject matter of the approval.

2.27 The new flats may only be used for Class C3 residential purposes and do not benefit from any of the existing PDRs for dwellinghouses in Part 1 of the GPDO.

2.28 This new PDR can be withdrawn (by way of a direction under article 4 of the 2015 Order), and as a result the Regulations amend “The Town and Country Planning (Compensation) (England) Regulations 2015” so as to limit a LPA’s compensation liability in the event it issues an article 4 direction.

2.29 The Planning Practice Guidance may yet be updated to reference this new PDR but no update has been issued at the time of writing.  CIL will be payable on the new floorspace and, in accordance with the existing PPG, a LPA can require planning obligations, but the PPG currently requires that these should be limited to matters requiring prior approval and should not for example seek contributions for affordable housing.

Advertising (Regulations 23 and 24, in force on 1 August 2020)

2.30 Regulations 23 and 24 amend the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 in order to correct the Town and Country Planning Permitted Development, Advertisement and Compensation Amendments) (England) Regulations 2019. They do so by means of inserting definitions of “electronic communications apparatus”, “electronic communications service” and “telephone kiosk”.

Compensation (Regulations 25 and 26, in force on 1 August 2020)

2.31 See the comments above on the Town and Country Planning (Compensation) (England) Regulations 2015 in relation to Regulation 22.

What next?

2.32 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Regulations notes in relation to the new PDR for homes on detached blocks of flats (Regulation 22) that “Government also intends to introduce further permitted development rights for building upwards, including for new and bigger homes”.

 Simon Ricketts, 26 June 2020

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