So Who Did Win The SPG JR?

Isn’t it heartwarming when the opposing parties in litigation all claim to have won? He said wryly.

Ouseley J’s judgment in McCarthy & Stone Retirement Lifestyles Limited, Churchill Retirement Living Limited, Pegasus Life Limited and Renaissance Retirement Limited v Mayor of London was handed down at 10.30 am on 23 May.

The Mayor rapidly issued a press release that morning, Judge rules in favour of Mayor’s threshold approach to housing.

However, the subsequent press releases by McCarthy & Stone Judge rules in favour of retirement consortium’s judicial review of the Mayor of London’s SPG and by Renaissance Retirement later that day seemed to tell a different story.

So that they can be checked for factual, typographical or grammatical errors or ambiguities, Planning Court judgments are usually issued in draft to the parties at least 24 hours ahead of being handed down, under conditions of strict confidentiality. Disclosure beyond the lawyers and parties themselves is a contempt of court and can bring criminal sanctions. However, what that advance sight does mean is that, by the time that the judgment is formally handed down (often with the parties not needing to be present and with submissions about remedies, costs orders and so on dealt with separately by email), the parties have got to grips with the often complex analysis within it and are ready to influence the way in which the narrative appears in traditional and social media, particularly the breaking online news items in the specialist press.

Planning law can be difficult in its abstractions and it can take time and strong coffee to arrive at a full understanding of the implications of a judgment (particularly without a familiarity with the evidence presented and submissions made to the court). This blog always includes links to the judgment transcripts because, however detailed the summary, there is no substitute for reading the document itself, but even then it can be hard. All credit to Holgate J in Parkhurst for appending parts of the inspector’s report to provide readers with the necessary context, but that was still a complex judgment (there have been some glib summaries!) and always of course watch for the political spin (Cheshire East Council’s “Cheshire East wins landmark legal judgement for residents in fear of housing sprawl” press release, following its loss in the Supreme Court in Suffolk Coastal , with ultimately an award of costs against it, being a classic of the genre!).

Back to the case in hand. So who really did win?

The claimants are all developers of specialist housing for the elderly. Their main concern with the Mayor’s 2017 affordable housing and viability SPG was that their schemes, usually on small sites, are caught by its requirement for a late stage viability review but were not caught under the adopted London Plan, which refers to the mechanism in the context of schemes which “in whole or in part…are likely to take many years to implement“.

[I summarised the SPG in my 20 August 2017 blog post 20 Changes In The Final Version Of The London Mayor’s Affordable Housing & Viability SPG. (Warning: the Mayor of London’s SPGs are not subject to the same legal regime that applies to local planning authorities in preparing SPDs, summarised in the first part of my 1 December 2017 blog post What’s For The Plan, What’s Supplementary?)]

The claimants’ evidence was that they developed smaller sites – “usually brownfield, higher build costs, significant communal facilities and spaces which were not for sale – making them more costly per square metre than most market housing, and particularly so in London. These schemes were constructed in a single phase, and could not meet affordable specialist housing accommodation requirements on-site, as had been accepted for years; they always provided viability appraisals to justify off-site contributions to affordable housing, and always had to be completed as a whole before any elderly occupiers moved in; they had a markedly slower selling rate. This made the Claimants less able to compete with general house builders in site acquisition.”

Their evidence was that “the acute pressures, on the viability of specialist housing schemes, made it essential that the risk of the development’s returns falling significantly below expectations was reduced to a minimum. They relied on various forms of borrowing to fund site purchases. The standard but notional 20 percent development return used in such appraisals was the bare minimum “on the basis that the risk associated with the affordable housing cost is known…If there is a risk that [that] cost might rise significantly, the risk profile becomes unacceptable….” Mr Warren emphasised that it is the risk which matters when deciding on what price to pay for a site. And it is that extra risk which Mr Burgess said affected them more than those in the general market. The effect of the late stage review was felt by the Claimants at the stage of bidding for the sites in the first place; the uncertainty about the amount of money which might have to be paid over at the late stage review affected the calculation of risk for borrowing, in such a way as to make the funding impossible.”

The judge made no ruling as to whether these concerns were justified and they were not accepted by the Mayor but this was the claimants’ explanation as to why the issues mattered to them.

[I note at this point that the proceedings were brought in the knowledge that the emerging new London Plan would in any event be proposing an equivalent late stage review mechanism. The parameters of that mechanism will no doubt be considered as part of the examination into the draft Plan (rumoured as likely to take place from November 2018 to February 2019)].

So the claimants’ objective plainly was to challenge that requirement for a late stage review of viability in relation to schemes like theirs which could not be said to be “likely to take many years to implement” (although the claimants sought to argue that it was single phase schemes that should not be caught).

In order to demolish that requirement, they contended that the SPG was unlawful and in so doing relied on three grounds:

(1) it constitutes policy which should only be in the London Plan, which is currently being revised; the SPG was also inconsistent with that Plan;

(2) the SPG is a “plan or programme” which required a Strategic Environmental Assessment, SEA, under the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations, SI 2004 No.1633 but which had not been undertaken; and

(3) it was produced without due regard being had to the constituent parts of the public sector equality duty, PSED, in s149 Equality Act 2010.”

Ouseley J rejected grounds 2 and 3 as unarguable and I’ll say no more about them.

In relation to ground 1, Rupert Warren QC for the claimants first argued that the SPG contained policies which could only be within the London Plan itself, namely “the 35 percent threshold, the fast-track, and the viability tested route, with three viability appraisals, (initial, early stage and late stage), the deliberately slow-track.”, all of which are indeed now proposed as policy in the draft London Plan.

The judge largely sidestepped this issue: “I do not want this judgment to be misread as holding that the SPG, and at this level of detail, must as a matter of law be in the London Plan or alternatively that the SPG cannot lawfully be included in the Plan as policy“. He did not interfere with the Mayor’s decision to treat the matters as appropriate for an SPG.

He commented that whether the emerging policies that reflect those SPG requirements are appropriately strategic for the Plan will be a matter for the inspector to determine following his or her examination of it: “They may contain a level of detail for the control of negotiations in quite small forms of development, and larger non-PSI developments, which excludes them from s334, though I do not doubt that the levels of affordable housing developed on new housing sites, can be seen as a strategic matter. In particular, when the draft London Plan goes for public examination, the question of whether draft policy H6, which takes the SPG into the draft Plan, is “strategic” and “general” may be one on which the inspector after the examination in public expresses a view. I would not want what I say to resolve the content of the draft London Plan, in advance of any inspector’s consideration and report.”

Rupert Warren QC’s second argument under ground 1 was that the SPG was inconsistent with the adopted London Plan. The judge stated:

I am not prepared to hold that conflict with development plan policy of itself makes a non-statutory document unlawful. If it states that it is in conflict with the development plan because that plan is now out of date, for example because of changes in Government policy as might be found in the NPPF, or because the review of the Plan was delayed for proper reasons, I see no basis for it to be unlawful. The weight to be given to it is quite another in the light of s38(6), but the NPPF contains advice which conflicts with development plans up and down the country, and is not on that account unlawful. If an authority seeks to put forward some policy to cover the period when it is out of date, which could happen very quickly with new government policy, I see no reason to hold its actions unlawful. The plan-led system is supported by the proper application of s38(6), which can readily accommodate expressions of policy in conflict with the development plan. It does so often when a new draft plan is issued.”

So, inconsistency of itself does not lead to an SPG being unlawful. However, as identified by the judge:

Here the Mayor clearly did not intend to produce SPG in conflict with the London Plan, let alone to avoid the development plan process. The Executive Summary of the SPG at [4] states that it is “guidance to ensure that existing policy is as effective as possible…it does not and cannot introduce new policy.” Indeed, the consistency of the SPG with the London Plan was a theme of the Defendant’s response to Grounds 2 and 3, SEA and PSED. It is inherent in the concept of SPG that it purports to supplement and not to contradict development plan policy. In so far as he did produce SPG in conflict with the London Plan, he would have misdirected himself as to the meaning and effect of either the Plan or the SPG and so failed, in promulgating it, to have regard to a material consideration. ”

So, inconsistency may well lead to an SPG being unlawful, if the policy-maker did not intend there to be any inconsistency, as was the case with this SPG.

Mr Warren is reported as pointing to two inconsistencies: “(1) the most important, is the introduction by the SPG of a late stage review to single phase sites where the London Plan only envisaged those for phased developments; (2) the adoption of a 35 per cent affordable housing on-site threshold at which no viability information was required, whereas the London Plan required each site to provide the maximum reasonable amount of affordable housing, which could be greater than 35 percent.”

The judge did not find that the 35% threshold was inconsistent with the adopted Plan (hence the focus of the Mayor’s press release!) but he did find there was inconsistency in relation to the requirement for a late stage review:

By contrast, the language of the London Plan does not permit the imposition of a requirement for all sites over 10 homes, of a specific requirement to produce at least three viability appraisals, and more if the phases so turn out. Nor does it permit it exceptionally. It permits it only where, in general, the timescale or scale of development means that it is likely to take many years to complete a phase or the whole.”

So, he found for the claimants on the issue which had led them to bring the claim in the first place.

The judgment indicates that he will now “hear submissions on the appropriate remedy, if any, for the inconsistency I have found to exist“. But it seems to me that whether the relevant parts of the SPG are formally quashed or not is neither here nor there – the effect of the ruling is that the Mayor cannot lawfully rely on the SPG in requiring a late stage viability review in relation to the sorts of schemes that they promote.

Of course, that may be a Pyrrhic victory. As the judge goes on to comment:

The status of SPG matters little now that the draft London Plan has been published and consulted upon, containing H6. Draft plans often are inconsistent with their predecessors and are given increasing weight as they progress, as outlined in the NPPF. Once the Mayor has considered the consultation responses to the draft Plan, the period for delivering which has expired, and has amended the Plan as he sees fit, it will have no lesser weight than the SPG. Giving some weight to draft policy which is inconsistent with the development plan is not uncommon. The NPPF contains material which is not consistent with developmental plans. The issue about the status and consistency of the SPG is not one of continuing importance.”

That may be so, but presumably the claimants went into the litigation with their eyes open, given the emerging draft London Plan. This will indeed be a temporary win if they do not persuade the inspector that late stage reviews are not appropriate in relation to smaller, usually single phased, schemes. But that will be an issue to be debated without pre-existing support in the form of the SPG.

Who won? The claimants on the point that I suspect they cared most about. The Mayor on the point that I suspect he cared most about: avoiding collateral damage from the proceedings, in the form of any wider adverse ruling on other matters such as the 35% threshold or the validity of the document as a whole.

Simon Ricketts, 26 May 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Pointers From Parkhurst?

Parkhurst Road Limited v Secretary of State (Holgate J, 27 April 2018) is a complex analysis by the High Court of issues relating to viability appraisal. Indeed Holgate J concludes an unusual postscript (paragraph 142 onwards) to his judgment by expressing the hope that “the court is not asked in future to look at detailed valuation material as happened in these proceedings“.

The Parkhurst Road dispute has indeed been protracted, to say the least.

Parkhurst Road Limited had purchased the site in May 2013 for £13.25m from the Ministry of Defence, the site having been allocated by Islington Council as a “site for intensification for residential accommodation to help meet housing need in the Borough“.

An initial development proposal for 150 homes, reduced to 116 homes, was refused by Islington in October 2014 and an appeal was dismissed on design grounds in September 2015 following a six day inquiry. There had been dispute about viability issues at that inquiry but the inspector had been satisfied with the appellant’s benchmark land value position of £13.26m, which would have led to a 14% affordable housing commitment (16 homes). He considered that market comparables relied on by PRL showed that the price paid by PRL for the site “was not of a level significantly above a market norm“. Islington had not accepted the inspector’s approach to viability (pointing to a circularity inherent in relying on market evidence of comparable transactions to the extent it may not have been adjusted to reflect the requirements of relevant planning policies) but had not challenged it, given that the appeal had been dismissed in any event.

A revised scheme was then brought forward in January 2016, for 96 homes, with the design issues resolved, but with no affordable homes, on the basis that the viability of the scheme could no justify it. Again the application was refused, effectively solely on viability grounds, due to an asserted failure to maximise provision of affordable housing as against the council’s borough wide strategic target of 50%. PRL again appealed and by the time the inquiry closed in March 2017 after nine sitting days, the position was that PRL were arguing for a reduced benchmark land value of £11.9m and proposing that 10% of the homes should be affordable housing. Islington was arguing for a benchmark land value of £6.75m, leaving headroom for 34% affordable housing. The council’s case was based on an approach of relying on a low existing use value with a premium added (EUV+). PRL’s case was based on using market signals from other transactions, disregarding transactions “which are significantly above the market norm“.

Holgate J was told “that the two decision letters on the Parkhurst Road site have generated a good deal of interest amongst planning professionals, as if either decision could be taken as laying down guidance of more general application on the approach to be followed where development viability and affordable housing contributions are in issue.”

He throws cold water on that suggestion:

It is important to emphasise that that is not normally the function of a decision letter. The Inspector’s task is to resolve the issues which have been raised on the evidence produced in that appeal. The Inspector is not giving guidance on what course should generally be followed, even in cases raising the same type of issue. First, the application of policy often involves a good deal of judgment and second, the circumstances of an appeal (and the evidence produced) may differ quite considerably from one case to another (see eg. St Albans DC v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 655 (Admin)). There is a risk of attaching too much importance to the decisions of individual Inspectors, particularly where their conclusions were heavily dependent upon the circumstances of the cases before them and the nature of the evidence and submissions they received, with all their attendant strengths and weaknesses specific to that appeal. Reliance upon such decisions may take up a disproportionate amount of time and may distract parties from preparing suitable and sufficient information to deal with the circumstances and issues which arise in their own case.”

I summarised the inspector’s decision letter dismissing the appeal in my 24 June 2017 blog post Viability & Affordable Housing: Update.

The appellant challenged the decision on three grounds:

Ground 1 – the inspector erred in concluding that the council’s case was based on the EUV plus approach.

Ground 2 – the inspector did not address flaws which had been shown in the council’s valuer’s approach, applied the consultant’s method in a manner which was inconsistent with his understanding of it and failed to recognise substantial changes in the council’s case by the time the end of the inquiry was reached.

Ground 3 – criticisms of the way in which the inspector treated certain comparable transactions when arriving at his decision to accept the council’s benchmark land value figure.

Holgate J is not a judge to be cowed by disputes involving matters of valuation. He is after all President of the Lands Chamber in the Upper Tribunal and Planning Liaison Judge (ie basically the lead Planning Court judge).

He summarises Government policy on viability, quoting from paragraph 173 of the NPPF (with an interesting reference to compulsory purchase compensation principles when referring to the concept of a “willing seller”) and paragraphs 1, 19, 23 and 24 of the viability section of the Government’s planning practice guidance, asserts that the guidance places the onus on the developer to demonstrate non-viability, before summarising relevant local policies.

He addresses the RICS professional guidance, “Financial Viability In Planning“, in paragraphs 50 to 58, without criticism – noting for instance the fact that the guidance note discourages reliance upon EUV+ “as the sole basis for arriving at site value, because the uplift is an arbitrary number and the method does not reflect the workings of the market. Furthermore, the EUV Plus method is not based upon the value of the land if the redevelopment involves a different land use (eg. an office building redeveloped for a residential scheme)”.

The Secretary of State and Islington resisted the grounds but submitted that, in any event, PRL’s criticisms “do not vitiate the essential conclusion of the inspector that, contrary to local policy, the appeal proposal failed to provide “the maximum reasonable amount of affordable housing“”.

After a lengthy analysis of the decision letter as well as the arguments that had been put forward by the parties, the judge rejected grounds 1 and 3. He accepted in part PRL’s arguments in relation to ground 2, there had indeed been flaws in the council’s valuer’s approach which were not addressed properly by the inspector. However that error, in the judge’s view, did not vitiate the basis upon which the inspector rejected PRL’s case that a 10% affordable housing provision represented the maximum reasonable level and was not therefore a basis for quashing the decision.

The claim was accordingly dismissed.

Which takes us to that postscript in paragraphs 141 to 147. It is an intriguing read for what is says about, for instance the following:

⁃ The importance of overcoming uncertainty as to how viability assessment should properly be carried out, which is “making it difficult for practitioners and participants in the planning process to predict the likely outcome and to plan accordingly. It also leads to a proliferation of litigation“.

⁃ The tension that has arisen in the application of paragraph 23 of the viability passages in the PPG, which should mean reflecting and not bucking relevant planning policies when arriving at a benchmark land value, but on the other hand ensuring that the application of those policies should be informed by and not bucking an analysis of market evidence.

⁃ Data on comparables should be adjusted properly but on the other hand there are drawbacks in a simple requirement to conform to EUV+, by way of formulaic application, especially via local authority documents which have not been subjected to independent statutory examination prior to adoption.

Finally, in the context of the Government’s consultation proposals in relation to standardised inputs to viability assessments (see my 10 March 2018 blog post Developer Contributions, CIL, Viability: Are We Nearly There Yet the judge offers a suggestion:

It might be thought that an opportune moment has arrived for the RICS to consider revisiting the 2012 Guidance Note, perhaps in conjunction with MHCLG and the RTPI, in order to address any misunderstandings about market valuation concepts and techniques, the “circularity” issue and any other problems encountered in practice over the last 6 years, so as to help avoid protracted disputes of the kind we have seen in the present case and achieve more efficient decision-making.”

That would indeed be welcome.

Simon Ricketts, 28 April 2018

Personal views, et cetera

[Colleagues at Town acted for PRL but these are, as always, my personal views].

Permitted Development: À La Recherche Du Temps Perdu

Feeling a little Proustian après MIPIM? Where did that time go?
Some minor changes have been made this month to PD rights, more significant changes are possibly still to come and some existing PD rights remain controversial.
The minor changes
The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) Order 2018 was made on 8 March 2018 and comes into force on 6 April 2018. It makes various detailed amendments to the existing regime, the most significant ones being:

– Extending the existing temporary right to change use of a building from a storage or distribution centre to a dwellinghouse, which was shortly to expire. The prior approval date must be by 10 June 2019 and the change of use must be completed within three years of the prior approval date. 
– Expansion of the permitted development right to change the use of agricultural buildings to dwellinghouses such that the maximum amount of floorspace that may be converted is increased from 450 sq m to 465 sq m and up to five dwellinghouses may be created from that floorspace rather than three. 

– Enabling the Secretary of State to pause the 28 day period for prior approval where he is considering calling in an application for his own determination. 

The more significant possible further changes
In my 15 June 2016 blog post Permitted Development: What Next? I speculated as to whether two further permitted development rights would be created, which the Government had previously contemplated, namely:

– Office demolition and residential rebuild
– Upward extensions in London
21 months later, the position is still uncertain in relation to both proposals. If they are introduced their scope could well be wider than initially envisaged, but will they? More lost time if they are introduced and prove to be successful in increasing housing supply. 
We had heard nothing on office demolition and residential rebuild since Brandon Lewis’ October 2015 announcement, and it was assumed that the idea was dead, until the unexpected announcement in the Autumn 2017 budget policy paper that “the government will consult on introducing… a permitted development right to allow commercial buildings to be demolished and replaced with homes“. 
Was the reference to “commercial buildings” intentionally wider in scope than just offices? What would be the prior approval requirements? Would there be a floorspace cap? I had hoped for an update alongside the draft revised NPPF announcements in February or alongside the Spring budget statement this month but still we wait. 
Similarly, we had heard nothing about the proposed PD right for upward extensions in London since a joint Mayor of London/DCLG consultation paper in February 2016. The ministerial policy statement on 5 February 2018 appeared to make it clear that the initiative (now across England, not just London) would be dealt with by policy, within the NPPF. But then Sajid Javid’s speech launching the draft revised NPPF on 5 March 2018 had this passage:
And there are also other areas in which we’re ready to go further to take the delivery of housing up a gear.

Including a new permitted development right for building upwards to provide new homes.”
I’m left scratching my head in relation to both proposals, frankly. 

Office to residential and other existing PD rights
The office to residential permitted development right remains controversial. Undoubtedly it has delivered in terms of increasing housing stock, although with a free ride for developers in terms of affordable housing and other contributions and in some areas jeopardising the stock of office floorspace. Quality of the conversions has been variable. But, in a housing crisis, has the end justified the means?
The Local Government Association published some campaigning research One in 10 new homes was a former office against the right on 18 January 2018.  

The current areas exempted from the right will lose that exemption from 31 May 2019 and many authorities are taking steps to remove it in any event by way of Article 4 Direction, for instance recently Westminster City Council (see its 26 January 2018 report to cabinet). Indeed, policy SD5 F of the draft London Plan supports that approach:
The Mayor will work with boroughs and support them to introduce Article 4 Directions to remove office to residential permitted development rights across the whole of the CAZ and the Northern Isle of Dogs (and those parts of Tech City and Kensington & Chelsea lying outside the CAZ)
It will be interesting to see how this tension with national policy is addressed at the examination into the draft plan.
In the meantime, inevitably given the complexity now of the PD rights regime and its advantages for developers in many situations over the traditional planning applications procedure, we have seen an increase in litigation as to the nuts and bolts of the prior approval procedure. 

Most recently, in R (Marshall) v East Dorset District Council (Lang J, 13 February 2018), prior approval for the erection of an agricultural building was quashed on the basis that the PD right excluded buildings for the accommodation of livestock, whereas the application for prior approval had indicated that one of the proposed uses of the building was to “winter house 45 ewes and their lambs through the winter period“!
Last year’s decision in Keenan v Woking Borough Council (Court of Appeal, 16 June 2017) is also interesting, on a similar theme, making clear that where the authority fails to respond to an application for prior approval within 28 days, such that there is a deemed prior approval, if the proposed development did not fall within the criteria of the relevant part of the General Permitted Development Order it does not as a result of the deemed approval become “permitted development”. 
Accordingly, whether or not you have prior approval, or deemed prior approval, your proposed development still needs to fit within all of the relevant restrictions and thresholds within the Order. 
To end with M Proust:
“...loopholes opened by disappointment. Dreams are not to be converted into reality, that we know; we would not form any, perhaps, were it not for desire, and it is useful to us to form them in order to see them fail and to be instructed by their failure.”
Simon Ricketts, 17 March 2018
Personal views, et cetera

Developer Contributions, CIL, Viability: Are We Nearly There Yet?

Bookends to this last week:
On Monday 5 March 2018 the draft revised NPPF , accompanying consultation proposals document and the Government’s response to the housing white paper consultation were all published, as well as the two documents I’ll focus on in this blog post:
Supporting housing delivery through developer contributions: Reforming developer contributions to affordable housing and infrastructure (which also addresses proposed reform to CIL); and 

Draft Planning Practice Guidance for Viability 
On Friday 9 March 2018 Draft Planning Practice Guidance: Draft updates to planning guidance which will form part of the Government’s online Planning Practice Guidance was published. 

The draft revised NPPF itself says very little on developer contributions, CIL and viability. 
On contributions, paragraph 34 of the draft (headed, in contrast to the “developer contributions” document, “development contributions” – consistency of terminology would be good!) states:
Plans should set out the contributions expected in association with particular sites and types of development. This should include setting out the levels and types of affordable housing provision required, along with other infrastructure (such as that needed for education, health, transport, green and digital infrastructure). Such policies should not make development unviable, and should be supported by evidence to demonstrate this. Plans should also set out any circumstances in which further viability assessment may be required in determining individual applications.”

On viability:

58. Where proposals for development accord with all the relevant policies in an up-to- date development plan, no viability assessment should be required to accompany the application. Where a viability assessment is needed, it should reflect the recommended approach in national planning guidance, including standardised inputs, and should be made publicly available.”
The Developer Contributions consultation document (responses sought by 10 May) addresses both contributions by way of section 106 planning obligations and by way of CIL. The document is accompanied by a research report commissioned from the University of Liverpool, The Incidence, Value and Delivery of Planning Obligations and Community Infrastructure Levy in England in 2016-17 which has some interesting statistics, underlining for me the scale of monies already being secured from development, over £6bn in 2016/2017:

It is clear from the consultation document that we are still on a journey to an unknown destination:
“The reforms set out in this document could provide a springboard for going further, and the Government will continue to explore options to create a clearer and more robust developer contribution system that really delivers for prospective homeowners and communities accommodating new development. 

One option could be for developer contributions [towards affordable housing as well as infrastructure] to be set nationally and made non negotiable. We recognise that we will need to engage and consult more widely on any new developer contribution system and provide appropriate transitions. This would allow developers to take account of reforms and reflect the contributions as they secure sites for development. 

The proposals in this consultation are an important first step in this conversation and towards ensuring that developers are clear about their commitments, local authorities are empowered to hold them to account and communities feel confident that their needs will be met.”
First step in a conversation??
Contributions via section 106 planning obligations
The document sets out perceived disadvantages of relying on section 106 planning obligations, including:
– delays (but there is no mention of how these could easily be reduced by prescriptive use of template drafts and more robust guidance and the Government’s previous proposal for an adjudication process to resolve logjams in negotiations has been dropped)
– the frequency of renegotiations, most frequently changing the type or amount of affordable housing (but with no analysis of why this is so – often in my experience for wholly necessary reasons, often linked to scheme changes or reflection of changed government affordable housing priorities or funding arrangements)

– a concern that they may “only have captured a small proportion of the increase in value” that has occurred over the time period covered by the University of Liverpool research report (but, aside from where the scale of contributions has been depressed from a policy compliant position due to lack of viability, why is this relevant? Planning obligations should be about necessary mitigation of the impacts from development, not about capture of uplifts in land value ). 

– lack of transparency. 

– lack of support for cross boundary planning. 

Despite these criticisms, the document does not propose significant changes to the section 106 process (or provide any timescale for the further review it alludes to) save for proposing to remove the pooling restriction (Regulation 123 of the CIL Regulations 2010) in areas:

* “that have adopted CIL; 


* where authorities fall under a threshold based on the tenth percentile of 
average new build house prices, meaning CIL cannot feasibly charged; 


* or where development is planned on several strategic sites

The Government is consulting on what approach should be taken to strategic sites for this purpose, the two options being stated as:
“a) remove the pooling restriction in a limited number of authorities, and across the whole authority area, when a set percentage of homes, set out in a plan, are being delivered through a limited number of large strategic sites. For example, where a plan is reliant on ten sites or fewer to deliver 50% or more of their homes; 

b) amend the restriction across England but only for large strategic sites (identified in plans) so that all planning obligations from a strategic site count as one planning obligation. It may be necessary to define large strategic sites in legislation.”
I would prefer to see the pooling restriction dropped across the board. If authorities choose not to adopt a CIL charging schedule but to rely on section 106 planning obligations to make contributions towards infrastructure then why not let them, subject to the usual Regulation 122 test? I thought we wanted a simpler system?
There are sensible proposals for summaries of section 106 agreements to be provided in standard form (although we do not yet have the template), so that information as to planning obligations can be more easily made available to the public, collated and monitored. 
Contributions via CIL
The Government’s thinking on CIL continues along the lines set out alongside the Autumn 2017 budget and summarised in my 24 November 2017 blog post CIL: Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For ie wandering dangerously away from the CIL review panel’s ideas of a simpler, more uniform but lower charge regime. The proposed ability for authorities to set different CIL rates based on the existing use of land is inevitably going to make an overly complex system even worse, introducing another uncertainty, namely how the existing use of the land is to be categorised. The Government recognises that risk:

Some complex sites for development may have multiple existing uses. This could create significant additional complexity in assessing how different CIL rates should be apportioned within a site, if a charging authority has chosen to set rates based on the existing use of land. 

In these circumstances, the Government proposes to simplify the charging of CIL on complex sites, by: 

* encouraging the use of specific rates for large strategic sites (i.e. with a single rate set for the entire site) 


* charging on the basis of the majority use where 80% of the site is in a single existing use, or where the site is particularly small; and 


* other complex sites could be charged at a generic rate, set without reference to the existing use of the land, or have charges apportioned between the different existing uses.”

One wonders how this would play out in practice. 

It seems that the requirement for regulation 123 lists (of the infrastructure projects or types of infrastructure which the authority intends to fund via CIL – and which therefore cannot be secured via section 106) is to be removed, which is of concern since regulation 123 lists (the use of which should be tightened rather than loosened) serve at least some degree of protection for developers from being double-charged. 
 The Government is proposing to address one of the most draconian aspects of the CIL process – the current absolute requirement for a commencement notice to be served ahead of commencement of development, if exemptions and the right to make phased payments (where allowed by the authority) are not to be lost, is to be replaced by a two months’ grace period. However, this does not avoid all current problems as any exemptions would still need to be secured prior to commencement.

A specific problem as to the application of abatement provisions to pre-CIL phased planning permissions is to be fixed. These flaws in the legislation continue to emerge, a function of the complexity and artificiality of the whole edifice, which the panel’s proposals would significantly have reduced. In the meantime, we are some way away from actual improvements to the system we are all grappling with day by day, with no firm timescale for the next set of amending Regulations. 
Viability
The thrust of the draft planning practice guidance for viability is understood and reflects what had been heralded in the September 2017 Planning for the right homes in the right places consultation document – focus viability consideration at allocation stage, standardise, make more transparent – but there are some surprising/interesting passages:
– Is the Government contemplating review mechanisms that don’t just ratchet upwards? Good if so:
It is important that local authorities are sufficiently flexible to prevent planned development being stalled in the context of significant changes in costs and values that occur after a plan is adopted. Including policies in plans that set out when and how review mechanisms may be included in section 106 agreements will help to provide more certainty through economic cycles. 

For all development where review mechanisms are appropriate they can be used to amend developer contributions to help to account for significant changes in costs and values over the lifetime of a development. Review mechanisms can be used to re- apportion or change the timing of contributions towards different items of infrastructure and affordable housing. This can help to deliver sites that would otherwise stall as a result of significant changes in costs and values of the lifetime of a development.”
– Review mechanisms are appropriate for “large or multi phased development” in contrast to the ten homes threshold in draft London Plan policy H6 (which threshold is surely too low). 
– The document advises that in arriving at a benchmark land value, the EUV+ approach (ie existing use value plus premium) should be used. The London Mayor will have been pleased to see that but will then have choked on his cornflakes when the Government’s definition of EUV+ is set out. According to the Government, EUV is not only “the value of the land in its existing use” (reflecting the GLA approach) but also “the right to implement any development for which there are extant planning consents, including realistic deemed consents, but without regard to other possible uses that require planning consent, technical consent or unrealistic permitted development” (which is more like the GLA’s approach to Alternative Use Value!). 
Then when it comes to assessing the premium, market comparables are introduced:
When undertaking any viability assessment, an appropriate minimum premium to the landowner can be established by looking at data from comparable sites of the same site type that have recently been granted planning consent in accordance with relevant policies. The EUV of those comparable sites should then be established. 

The price paid for those comparable sites should then be established, having regard to outliers in market transactions, the quality of land, expectations of local landowners and different site scales. This evidence of the price paid on top of existing use value should then be used to inform a judgement on an appropriate minimum premium to the landowner.”

I am struggling to interpret the document as tightening the methodologies that are currently followed, or indeed introducing any material standardisation of approach. 

The EUV+ position is covered in more detail by George Venning in an excellent blog post.
– There is a gesture towards standardisation in the indication that for “the purpose of plan making an assumption of 20% of Gross Development Value (GDV) may be considered a suitable return to developers in order to establish viability of the plan policies. A lower figure of 6% of GDV may be more appropriate in consideration of delivery of affordable housing in circumstances where this guarantees an end sale at a known value and reduces the risk.” However, there is no certainty: “Alternative figures may be appropriate for different development types e.g. build to rent. Plan makers may choose to apply alternative figures where there is evidence to support this according to the type, scale and risk profile of planned development.
More fundamentally, I am sceptical that viability-testing allocations at plan-making stage is going to deliver. At that stage the work is inevitably broad-brush, based on typologies rather than site specific factors, often without the detailed input at that stage of a development team such that values and costs can be properly interrogated and without an understanding of any public sector funding that may be available. If the approach did actually deliver, significantly reducing policy requirements, so much the better, but that isn’t going to happen without viability arguments swamping the current, already swamped, local plan examination process.
Indeed, as was always going to be the case with the understandable drive towards greater transparency, the process is becoming increasingly theoretical (think retail impact assessment) and further away from developers opening their books to demonstrate what the commercial tipping point for them is in reality, given business models, funding arrangements, actual projected costs (save for land), and actual projected values. “Information used in viability assessment is not usually specific to that developer and thereby need not contain commercially sensitive data“. 
The document contains more wishful thinking:
A range of other sector led guidance on viability is widely available which practitioners may wish to refer to.”
Excellent. Such as?
Topically, this week, on 6 and 7 March, Holgate J heard Parkhurst Road Limited’s challenge to the Parkhurst Road decision letter that I referred to in my 24 June 2017 blog post Viability & Affordable Housing: Update. The challenge turns on the inspector’s conclusions on viability. Judgment is reserved. 

We also should watch out for Holgate J’s hearing on 1 and 2 May of McCarthy and Stone & others v Mayor of London, the judicial review you will recall that various retirement living companies have brought of the Mayor of London’s affordable housing and viability SPG. 
The great thing about about writing a planning law blog is that the well never runs dry, that’s for sure. (Nothing else is). 
Simon Ricketts, 10 March 2018
Personal views, et cetera

Through A Glass Darkly: To BRE Or Not To BRE

How to determine whether the impact from a proposed development on the daylight and sunlight enjoyed by neighbours, or to be enjoyed by future occupiers of the scheme, is appropriate? That is the question. 
The problems are multi-layered:
– There is no practical guidance in the NPPF or NPPG as the approach to be taken.
– Many local planning authorities default in their policies to requiring compliance with a guide to good practice published by the Building Research Establishment in 2011: “site layout planning for daylight and sunlight: a guide to good practice” (BR 209) by Paul Littlefair (a document incidentally not freely available but available for purchase from the BRE for £55). 

– The document has various numerical criteria and calculations to determine acceptability. Whilst the need for flexibility in application is acknowledged in the document itself (“Although it gives numerical guidelines, these should be interpreted flexibly because natural lighting is only one of many factors in site layout design“) in practice this is often overlooked. 

– The document has not been updated to reflect changes in our understanding of what makes great places or indeed nuanced to reflect the very different expectations of those living in urban environments, and London in particular. 
The Government signalled in its February 2017 housing white paper that a new approach may be needed: “the Government intends to amend national planning guidance to highlight planning approaches that can be used to help support higher densities, and to set out ways in which daylight considerations can be addressed in a pragmatic way that does not inhibit dense, high- quality development.”
I will be disappointed if we do not see this in the draft revised NPPF (likely to be published on 5 March). 
Disappointingly, the Mayor of London has omitted specific guidance from the draft London Plan (2 March representations deadline looming). The opportunity has been missed to stress the need for flexibility and appreciation of context. Given the loss of the previous density matrices, daylighting and sunlighting issues will continue to be relied upon by objectors seeking to resist higher density schemes, which are inevitable if the housing targets in the plan are to be achieved. 
Against this context it is fascinating to read the inspector’s decision letter dated 21 February 2018 allowing an appeal by Londonewcastle for their Whitechapel Estate development, which comprises “demolition of all existing buildings and redevelopment to provide 12 buildings ranging from ground plus 2-23 storeys (a maximum 94m AOD height), comprising 343 residential dwellings (Class C3), 168 specialist accommodation units (Class C2), office floorspace (Class B1), flexible office and non-residential institution floorspace (Class B1/D1), retail floorspace (Class A1-A3), car parking, cycle parking, hard and soft landscaping and other associated works.” The site falls within the City Fringe Opportunity Area Planning Framework.
The inspector summarised the main issues as:
* “The quality of design of the appeal proposal and its effect on the character and appearance of the area and on the wider townscape;

* The effect on heritage assets and their settings; 


* The effect on living conditions of neighbouring residents, having regard in 
particular to daylight and sunlight, outlook and privacy; 


* The quality of living conditions for future residents of the development, having regard in particular to daylight and sunlight, overshadowing, outlook and privacy. ”

The inspector’s approach to daylight and sunlight is particularly interesting, given that it follows detailed evidence from, for the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, none other than Paul Littlefair, author of the BRE guide, and, for the appellant, leading consultant Gordon Ingram of GIA, proponent of a more nuanced, contextual, assessment approach. 

It is plain from the decision letter that the inspector preferred the GIA methodology:
107. It is agreed that the starting point in the assessment of the effect on residents’ living conditions arising from daylight and sunlight should be the Building Research Establishment 2011 publication Site layout planning for daylight and sunlight: A guide to good practice, (‘the BRE guide’) whose author gave evidence at the Inquiry on behalf of the Council. Use of this methodology is demanded by the supporting text to MDD Policy DM2539 and by the Mayor of London’s Housing SPG of March 2016. 

108. The BRE document offers guidance on generally acceptable standards of daylight and sunlight, but advises that numerical values are not to be rigidly applied and recognises the importance of the specific circumstances of each case. Inner city development is one of the examples where a different approach might be justified. This is specifically endorsed by the Housing SPG, which calls for guidelines to be applied sensitively to higher density developments, especially in (among others) opportunity areas and accessible locations, taking into account local circumstances, the need to optimise housing capacity, and the scope for the character and form of an area to change over time. This approach is clearly relevant to the appeal site. The area’s identification for transformation through high density housing development indicates high scope for its form and character to change over the short and longer term. I agree with the appellants that blanket application of the BRE guide optimum standards, which are best achieved in relatively low-rise well spaced layouts, is not appropriate in this instance.
112. The figures show that a proportion of residual Vertical Sky Component (‘VSC’) values in the mid-teens have been found acceptable in major developments across London. This echoes the Mayor’s endorsement in the pre- SPG decision at Monmouth House, Islington that VSC values in the mid-teens are acceptable in an inner urban environment. They also show a smaller proportion in the bands below 15%. Even if there were some discrepancy in the appellants’ figures for this lower band at Whitechapel Central, which is disputed, the VSC outcomes for the appeal proposal would in general be very similar to those of the other major schemes. The appeal proposal would therefore appear to be in compliance with the LP as amplified by the SPG and as it is being interpreted by the Mayor. The GLA responses to the planning application did not raise any concern about neighbours’ amenity. 

113. I acknowledge that a focus on overall residual levels could risk losing sight of individual problem areas. It is accepted that light is only one factor in assessing overall levels of amenity, but I consider that the trade-off with other factors, such as access to public transport or green space, is likely to be of more relevance to an occupier of new development than to an existing neighbour whose long-enjoyed living conditions would be adversely affected by new buildings. However, I also consider that Inner London is an area where there should generally be a high expectation of development taking place. This is particularly so in the case of the appeal site, where the WVM and the OAPF have flagged the desirability of high density development. Existing residents would in my view be prepared for change and would not necessarily expect existing standards of daylight and sunlight to persist after development.”
121. As in the matter of daylight, the guidance on loss of annual and winter sunlight is not to be rigidly applied. Emphasis on the level of retained sunlight rather than degree of change would be justified. On balance, I accept the appellants’ conclusion the proposal’s overall effect on sunlight would not be significantly adverse.”
As to the effect of the scheme on living conditions for neighbouring residents:
125. I conclude that the proposal would result in some significant individual reductions in daylight and sunlight levels, but that this is almost unavoidable in achieving the policy requirement for high density development in a confined urban setting. The new buildings would for the most part be comparable in height with the existing and would re-define traditional street frontages. Retained levels of daylight and sunlight would be adequate and comparable with existing and emerging urban conditions. The effects would appear very comparable with those recently allowed by the Council at Whitechapel Central. There would be minimal adverse losses of outlook and increases in overlooking. Taken as a whole, the proposal would not result in unacceptably harmful effects on living conditions and would comply with the development plan in this respect. ”
Whilst of course individual decisions of inspectors are not formal precedents, and every scheme is dependent on its individual circumstances and the relevant local policy background, this decision is undoubtedly important and surely fully in line with what the Government was flagging in the housing white paper. 
The BRE guidance in part draws upon British Standard BS 8206-2 (2008) Lighting for Buildings – Part 2: Code of Practice for Daylighting. I am wondering whether one reason that the 2011 guidance has not been updated is that the British Standards Institute has been working with other EU member states’ standards institutes on a new voluntary set of standards for natural daylight, via the European Committee for Standardisation. During this process, revisions of the relevant standard at a domestic level must be placed on hold. Following consultation, a new ECS standard was ratified on 8 February 2018 and will be formally available from 25 April 2018. More information as to the tighter criteria that the new standard will introduce is set out in a useful (subscription-only I am afraid) Planning Resource piece by Gregory Francis of GVA Schatunowski Brooks. 
So, on the one hand, are we at last seeing a move towards more flexible application of daylighting and sunlighting standards? On the other hand, are we are likely in due course to see a tightening of the standards themselves? I find it disappointing that the extent to which there is domestic oversight of the BRE (since 1997 not a governmental body but an independent charitable organisation) is opaque to say the least, before we even get to the complexities of the workings of the European Committee for Standardisation. The Government, and London Mayor, really do need shine a light on all of this.
Simon Ricketts, 24 February 2018
Personal views, et cetera

The Extra Care Question: RU-C2 or C3-UCO?

A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away, Parliament made the Use Classes Order. 
I referred in my 16 September 2017 blog post Class Distinctions: Planning For Older People to the blurred distinction between C2 (basically use for the provision of residential accommodation and care to people in need of care) and C3 (basically use as a residential dwelling) when it comes to “extra care” facilities for the elderly. I set out some of the criteria applied by inspectors in appeal decisions.
There was a very useful appeal decision letter last month which surely throws additional doubt upon the soundness of the curious attempt in the draft London Plan in effect to amend the Use Classes Order by policy rather than legislation, in that it seeks to deem extra care facilities for the elderly in London as falling within use class C3 (and thereby becoming subject to affordable housing and other obligations and requirements) whereas the recognised planning law position is that they are more likely to fall within use class C2. 
Draft policy H15 C states:
Sheltered accommodation and extra care accommodation is considered as being in Use Class C3. Residential nursing care accommodation (including end of life/ hospice care and dementia care home accommodation) is considered as being in Use Class C2.”
Paragraph 4.15.3 of the supporting text simply states again that “sheltered accommodation and extra care accommodation should be considered as C3 housing“, defining extra care accommodation as follows:
extra care accommodation (also referred to as assisted living, close care, or continuing care housing) is self-contained residential accommodation and associated facilities, designed and managed to meet the needs and aspirations of older people, and which provides 24-hour access to emergency support. A range of facilities are normally available such as a residents’ lounge, laundry room, a restaurant or meal provision facilities, classes, and a base for health care workers. Domiciliary care will be available to varying levels, either as part of the accommodation package or as additional services which can be purchased if required.”
First, how can it be appropriate in principle for a policy document to deem a use to be treated in a particular way in the Use Classes Order? The nature of the use and the determination of which use class, if any, it falls into, is a legal question. For instance whether planning permission would be required for a change of use would ultimately be determination by an application for a certificate of lawfulness of proposed use or development under section 191 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. By all means, if justified, the Mayor can determine that particular policies should apply to extra care accommodation (matters which could then be tested through the plan examination process) but his view as to which use class it might fall into has no weight in the legal determination of that question and in my view has no place in a document which is only allowed to address “matters which are of strategic importance to Greater London.

Secondly, his view, not supported by any reasoning, as to the appropriate use class do not sit easily with the conclusions that planning inspectors have come to. The most recent decision letter (22 January 2018) was by inspector Michael Boniface, where he allowed an appeal in Sidmouth, East Devon, by Pegasus Life for an “assisted living community for older people comprising extra care units, staff accommodation and communal facilities, including a kitchen, restaurant/bar/café, a well-being suite comprising gym, treatment rooms and pool, a communal lounge and storage facilities; car parking for residents, visitors and staff of the assisted living community; comprehensive landscaping comprising communal and private spaces; and associated groundworks.”
The decision letter and inspector’s reasoning is well summarised in a blog post by Housing LIN – “Planning Inspector sets out the distinctive elements of Extra Care scheme resulting in C2 Use Class conclusion” (8 February 2018). 

The inspector was presented with the Mayor of London’s position but it did not alter his conclusions on the facts of the case. 
 Thirdly, in its recent report Housing For Older People (8 February 2018) the Commons CLG Select Committee specifically considered the treatment of specialist older people’s housing in the planning system and particularly in the Use Classes Order:

125. We also heard that the “inconsistent and cumbersome” application of the C2 and C3 planning classifications to extra care housing was problematic for developers. Some local authorities apply the C2 classification, applied to residential care homes and nursing homes, to extra care housing which reduces planning charges. Others classify this type of housing as C3, along with mainstream housing, which means full charges apply. Audley Retirement argued that extra care housing should fall within the C2 class:

“Extra care is set up to fulfil many of the functions that care homes can provide in terms of care delivery as and when the resident requires it, monitored by an onsite care team and there is access to communal facilities. There are controls over who can occupy them by age and a need for care that do not exist on C3 standard dwellings.”

Extra care housing developers had a range of suggestions for countering this issue: an “extension and additional clarity” on C2 so that it captures extra care housing; the creation of a sub-section of C2 which attracts lower planning charges; and the creation of a “dedicated use class” for extra care housing which would enable planning contributions to be streamlined.

126. When we asked about this, the then Housing Minister, Alok Sharma, told us that the guidance will look at the “precise terminology that is used to describe the different types of older people’s housing”. 
The Select Committee concludes:
We believe that the level of planning contributions on specialist housing, which are increased as a result of the non-saleable communal areas which are a feature of this type of housing, is impeding the delivery of homes. We recommend either the creation of a sub-category of the C2 planning classification (which currently applies to residential care and nursing homes) for specialist housing, which would reduce the contributions required from developers, or the creation of a new use class for specialist housing which would have the same effect.”
In the light of these considerations, how can draft London Plan policy H15 C possibly be justified?
Simon Ricketts, 17 February 2018
Personal views, et cetera 

Nothing Was Delivered

“Nothing was delivered/And I tell this truth to you/Not out of spite or anger/But simply because it’s true” (Bob Dylan)

It was the first meeting on 5 February of the prime minister’s housing implementation taskforce. The subsequent press statement summarises the event as follows:
Today the Prime Minister chaired the first meeting of the Housing Implementation Taskforce at Downing Street.

She stressed the integral role all Government departments have in helping to fix the broken housing market and deliver 300,000 additional homes by the mid-2020s.

The taskforce discussed the steps Government has already taken, including further investment at the Budget, planning reform, releasing land faster, the Housing White Paper and building more affordable housing. They emphasised the key role of Homes England in driving forward change, and also focused on the supply of new housing, public sector land sales, land banking, house-building skills and building the infrastructure needed for new housing developments.

The Prime Minister reiterated that a step change was needed right across Government and that all departments needed to think creatively about how they can contribute to building the homes the country needs.
That “300,000 additional homes by the mid-2020s” reference is an interesting one, reflecting the Government’s previous 11 January 2018 announcement of the creation of Homes England:
Homes England will play a major role in fixing the housing market by helping to deliver an average of 300,000 homes a year by the mid-2020s.
This is surely a tactical step back from the Conservative party’s 2017 manifesto commitment, with no longer any pre-2022 election target:
We will meet our 2015 commitment to deliver a million homes by the end of 2020 and we will deliver half a million more by the end of 2022.”
A significant proportion of the country’s homes will need to come forward in London – the Mayor of London’s draft London Plan sets a target of around 65,000 homes a year, a significant increase from the previous plan figure of 42,000. 
These figures are only going to be achieved with a large degree of consensus between central government, the Mayor, boroughs and local communities. If I were prime minister (perish the thought) I would be worrying that in many areas, but particularly in London, there is increasing “spite or anger” (in the words of Mr Dylan). Inevitably, in any year with borough elections, planning becomes politicised but this year, with the repercussions of the Grenfell tragedy, the predictions of Conservative council losses and the internal battles within the Labour party, this is particularly so. EG has tracked the number of refusals in London up to the end of 2017. It makes for uncomfortable reading and the position will only be worsening. 


Against that background, is there a crisp appeals process? Not at all. The Planning Inspectorate’s performance statistics are still poor:


Anecdotally, many developers and authorities are keeping politically controversial decisions away from committees until the other side of the 3 May local government elections, even though the formal purdah rules, summarised in a useful Local Government Association guide, largely allow for statutory processes to carry on.
The politically charged atmosphere in many boroughs isn’t just leading to refusals of permission against officers’ recommendations – leading in turn to officers having to spend time defending appeals, with inevitable repercussions for capacity to cope with other applications in the system – but it’s impeding the work of boroughs that seek to achieve housing development, particularly in relation to estate regeneration schemes, without which those London numbers are not going to be met. 
Progress on the Haringey Development Vehicle initiative, brought forward by Haringey Council with private sector joint venture partner Lendlease, has now been halted by leader councillor Claire Kober, with no further decisions to be taken before purdah commences on 26 March until after the 3 May local election. Given that, following sustained pressure over the project, she announced on 30 January that she will not be standing for re-election, its long term future may be in doubt. This was a strategy to bring about widespread development on sites in the council’s ownership, including the proposed delivery of up to 6,400 homes. The HDV would in due course formulate development proposals for sites and make planning applications, applications which would be assessed as against planning policy, with the power for the Mayor to intervene in the usual way, but plainly in Haringey even the nature of the vehicle to be used to bring about development, presumably because of the role to be played in it by a private sector developer, was seen by objectors as unacceptable. 
There is room for debate in a democracy as to the form that regeneration should take and the extent and types of affordable housing to be provided but if the HDV is not to happen, what will? In current political and financial reality, my fear is that an opportunity to increase housing at scale, including affordable housing, will be lost. It is vital that affordable housing, with tenures to meet needs, is provided. Will the collapse of the HDV render this more or less likely? What’s the alternative? What’s the objectors’ plan? To continue this position until a 2022 general election? 
Whilst the politics played out, unpleasantly according to Councillor Kober’s account, Ouseley J was writing his judgment in Peters v London Borough of Haringey. This was a crowdfunded judicial review that had been brought on behalf of campaign group Stop HDV, seeking to establish that the council had acted outside its powers in proceeding with the project. The hearing had taken place over two days in October 2017 but Ouseley J’s judgment, over 50 pages long, was only handed down on 8 February 2018. 
The main ground of challenge was a legalistic one if ever one there was: that the council had acted outside its powers in establishing with Lendlease a limited liability partnership as the vehicle to take forward its strategic aims, on the basis that section 4(2) of the Localism Act 2011 provides that where “a local authority does things for a commercial purpose, the authority must do them through a company“. The judge rejected the argument:
To my mind, there is no doubt but that the Council’s purpose in entering into the arrangements setting up the HDV and governing its operation, including the relationship between the two partners, cannot be characterised as “a commercial purpose” within the scope of the Localism Act. Even more clearly is its dominant purpose not commercial. Any commercial component is merely incidental or ancillary, and not a separate purpose.”

“…the phrases to which Mr Wolfe took me do not show a separate commercial purpose, whether minor or not. It is important to examine why this is all being done. The purpose behind the Council’s entering into the HDV and associated arrangements is not that of a property investor, simply seeking to make a profit or to achieve a return on development or improved rentals. The purpose of the Council is to use and develop its own land to its best advantage so that it can achieve the housing, employment and growth or regeneration objectives that it has laid down. In order to achieve as much as it can, it has to achieve the best consideration on any disposal of its land; and it must be in other respects financially prudent, to produce returns in various ways which can be used to further its policy objectives. Achieving the return is neither the activity nor its purpose of itself.”

“The acquisition of other land in the context of regenerating a large estate is a commonplace, and, backed by compulsory purchase powers, it demonstrates not one whit that a separate activity of property development is being undertaken.”
In any event, the judge considered that the challenge in relation to this ground and others (lack of consultation, Equality Act) had been brought out of time. I understand that the claimant is likely to seek permission to appeal. 
In another part of London, progress is still slow on another regeneration project that has been to the High Court and back, the Aylesbury Estate. I covered in my blog post Regeneration X: Failed CPOs the decision of the Secretary of State to decline to confirm Southwark Council’s CPO based on his concern as to the effects of acquisition on leaseholders, a decision which was subsequently quashed by consent following a challenge brought by the council. A second inquiry that has been taking place into the order was adjourned on 31 January 2018 to resume for a further two weeks on 17 April. Judging from a ruling by the inspector prohibiting further filming at the inquiry it has been a lively event so far. 

According to the council’s statement of case:
The acquisition of the Order Land will enable demolition of the existing buildings in order to replace the 566 existing units of social and privately owned housing with a mixed tenure development comprising 830 homes. Of these, 304 will be social rent, 102 will be intermediate (affordable homes available as shared ownership or shared equity) and 424 will be private (of which 48 will be for open market rent and the remainder for sale). Included in the social rent homes are 50 extra care units and 7 units for people with learning difficulties.”
Inevitably, whatever the gains in housing numbers to be achieved (and indeed the affordable housing of all tenures to be provided), there will be legitimately held concerns on the part of residents directly affected. The Mayor announced on 2 February 2018 “mandatory ballots of residents for schemes where any demolition is planned as a strict condition of his funding“. 
Meanwhile, elsewhere in Southwark, Delancey has continued to face resistance in relation to its proposed redevelopment of the Elephant and Castle centre. At a committee meeting on 16 January, members overturned an officer’s recommendation to grant planning permission. A final decision has now been deferred, following a revised offer as to affordable housing and other commitments reportedly made by the developer. 
Delivery of the right schemes, in a way which maximises the potential for affordable housing and the wide range of other requirements set out in the draft London Plan will not be easy. How will land owners and developers respond? Will the Mayor continue to intervene to direct refusal where the affordable housing proportion offered is considered to be less than the maximum reasonably achievable? Will he use his call-in powers where boroughs unreasonably withhold permission for schemes which would deliver homes at scale? The Government had proposed back in 2015 reducing the threshold above which the Mayor could intervene on planning applications from 150 to 50 homes but unless the Mayor is seen as using his existing powers regularly and proactively to increase housing delivery, this may remain on the Government’s to-do list. 
The housing numbers that the Government is targeting will not be achieved without an active and engaged private sector. What if land owners choose not to release their land? There is a remarkable degree of consensus between the Conservative and Labour parties as to the desirability of using compulsory purchase powers. I covered the Conservative party’s manifesto thinking in my blog post Money For Nothing? CPO Compensation Reform, Land Value Capture (20 May 2017), in which I tried to set out some of the complexities arising from any proposal to change CPO compensation principles so as to strip out planning “hope” value (as opposed to just being smarter about using CPO powers in a way that hope values haven’t arisen in the first place). There was much publicity this month arising from an announcement from Labour shadow minister John Healey reported in the Guardian on 1 February that “Labour is considering forcing landowners to give up sites for a fraction of their current price in an effort to slash the cost of council house building“. 
Landowners currently sell at a price that factors in the dramatic increase in value when planning consent is granted. It means a hectare of agricultural land worth around £20,000 can sell for closer to £2m if it is zoned for housing.

Labour believes this is slowing down housebuilding by dramatically increasing costs. It is planning a new English Sovereign Land Trust with powers to buy sites at closer to the lower price. 

This would be enabled by a change in the 1961 Land Compensation Act so the state could compulsorily purchase land at a price that excluded the potential for future planning consent.”
I haven’t seen any more detailed analysis of the proposal or indeed any fleshing out of the idea of an English Sovereign Land Trust. Personally I would prefer to see Homes England grasp the nettle, with their existing wide compulsory purchase powers, to acquire sites at a scale which would be difficult to achieve without compulsory purchase, thereby minimising “no scheme world” values. Labour’s English Sovereign Land Trust concept sounds very rural in concept and not a substitute for facing up to difficult challenges about maximising use in cities of public sector land, about densifying suburbs and about effective approaches to estate renewal. 
And given the supposed cross-party support for increasing housing delivery, wouldn’t it be good to try to depoliticise the process where we can, rather than demonise the participants whether from public or private sector? I’ve previously blogged about the multiplicity of reviews being undertaken, to which list can now be added the CLG Commons Select Committee’s land value capture inquiry, for which the deadline for evidence is 2 March 2018). What scope can we find for consensus, about priorities, about the respective roles of the public and private sector, about funding of social housing and about the appropriate use of compulsory purchase?
Simon Ricketts, 10 February 2018
Personal views, et cetera