GPDO & UCO Amendments: Guidance, Scrutiny

On 18 September 2020 MHCLG amended its guidance to take into account the amendments to the General Permitted Development Order and Use Classes Order that I have covered in recent posts.

So now we have:

⁃ Updated Planning Practice Guidance on when planning permission is needed

⁃ Updated Planning Practice Guidance on town centres and retail

⁃ Updated Planning Practice Guidance on planning application fees to reflect the new permitted development rights to build upwards

⁃ “Key fact sheets” on recent permitted development rights and changes to the Use Classes Order

The new guidance is simply explanatory and I haven’t spotted anything new as to, for instance, the circumstances in which local planning authorities should or should not restrict the operation of the Orders by way of condition.

In the meantime, there remains some Parliamentary focus on the nature of the changes.

The House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee published a critical report on 10 September 2020:

“These instruments make substantial and wide-ranging changes to planning legislation. According to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, the aim is to encourage and speed up the delivery of housing and to support the economic recovery after the pandemic, especially in relation to England’s high streets. The changes are de-regulatory and concerns have been raised that they could lead to the construction of low-quality housing, an increased concentration of fast food restaurants with an impact on the health of local residents, and reduce the ability of local authorities to shape the character of their high streets. These are issues which the House may wish to explore, including in the context of the Government’s plans for further, more fundamental reform of the local planning system which have been published for consultation. While the Committee notes the Government’s intention to support the economic recovery from the pandemic, the plans for further reform do raise the question whether it would have been more appropriate to take forward the significant and far-reaching changes made by these instruments in a future planning bill, enabling Parliament to scrutinise the changes more fully.”

My 5 September 2020 blog post Lights Camera Action: The Planning Changes – Parliamentary Scrutiny, That JR referred to the motions which Labour has tabled in response to the GPDO changes. A Commons debate is now scheduled for 30 September 2020.

Simon Ricketts, 19 September 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Lights Camera Action: The Planning Changes – Parliamentary Scrutiny, That JR

Most of the summer blockbusters were paused from release this summer, except for Tenet, which no-one seems to understand. Oh and the statutory instruments making those major amendments to the GPDO (eg building upwards, and resi development to replace existing commercial buildings) and the Use Classes Order (eg the new class E), which hit our screens just before Parliament rose for the summer recess. The Planning For The Future white paper was published (visually spectacular) after Parliament had risen.

This post looks briefly at the role of Parliament in debating these documents, and at the Rights : Community : Action judicial review of the GPDO and Use Classes Order changes.

The amendments to the General Permitted Development Order and Use Classes Order

We’re talking about the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2020/755, The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2020/756 and The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2020/757 all laid before Parliament on 21 July, ahead of the Commons going into recess the following day, and came into effect on 31 August and 1 September. Parliament returned on 1 September.

The statutory instruments (“SIs”) were made under the negative resolution procedure. This means that although the SIs came into effect on when stated, either House can vote to reject them within 40 sitting days, following a motion (“prayer”) laid by a member of the relevant House. If rejected, the relevant statutory instrument is annulled, i.e. no longer of any legal effect.

There has been no Parliamentary debate so far on any of the SIs, although MHCLG minister Lord Greenhalgh did respond to questions in the Lords on 28 July 2020 (ahead of the Lords going into recess the next day).

Labour has laid a motion against the GPDO SIs, but (1) given the Government’s substantial majority there is surely no realistic likelihood of that succeeding on a vote and (2) the narrative in relation to the changes to the GPDO and Use Classes Order seems to have got hopelessly confused with concerns as to the separate proposals in the white paper in the minds of politicians,the press and the public – see for instance Valerie Vaz, shadow leader of the House of Commons, on 3 September 2020:

“We have prayed against the town and country planning permitted development regulations—I think there are three sets of them. The shadow Minister for Housing and Planning, my hon. Friend Mike Amesbury, has written to the Secretary of State. I hope that the Leader of the House will find time for that debate.

During August Parliament was not sitting, but extremely important announcements were being made. I cannot understand why the Government, who say consistently that Parliament is sovereign, do not come to the House to explain changes in policy. Apparently, algorithms will now be used in planning decisions. That takes away the very nature of making planning decisions—whether relevant considerations are taken into account or whether irrelevant considerations are taken into account—and it undermines administrative law. When you make a decision, you must give reasons.

The Town and Country Planning Association says that 90% of planning applications are approved and there are 1 million unbuilt commissions [sic]. It is time for the shires to rise up and oppose these new policies. Will the Leader of the House ask the current Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government to come to the House to explain why he is using algorithms to stomp on our green and pleasant land?”

Quite aside from the probably theoretical possibility of any or all of the SIs being annulled, there is also the judicial review that has been brought by a new campaign group, Rights : Community : Action. It describes itself as “a coalition of campaigners, lawyers, planners, facilitators, writers and scientists, united by a shared commitment to tackle the Climate Emergency – with people and for people, and the environment.” There are four protagonists: Naomi Luhde-Thompson (currently on sabbatical from Friends of the Earth), Hugh Ellis (Town and Country Planning Association), Laura Gyte (Oxfam) and Alex Goodman (Landmark Chambers).

The group has put its Statement of Facts and Grounds on line. These are the grounds:

“(1) GROUND 1: In respect of each of the three SIs, the Secretary of State unlawfully failed to carry out an environmental assessment pursuant to EU Directive 2001/42/EC (“the SEA Directive”) and the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 2004 (“the SEA Regulations”).

(2) GROUND 2: In respect of each of the three SIs, the Secretary of State failed to have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (“the PSED”) in s.149 of the Equality Act 2010 (“the EA 2010”).

(3) GROUND 3: In respect of each of the three SIs, the Secretary of State failed to consider the weight of the evidence against these radical reforms, including prior consultation responses and the advice of his own experts. This composite ground is divided as follows:

Ground 3a: The Secretary of State failed to conscientiously consider the responses to the consultation on proposed planning reforms which ran from 29 October 2018 to 14 January 2019

Ground 3b: In respect of the two SIs that expand Permitted Development rights (SI 2020/755 and SI 2020/756), the Secretary of State failed to take into account the advice of the government’s own experts: in particular, the findings of the Building Better, Building Beautiful Commission’s “Living with Beauty” Report (“The BBBB Report”), and the findings of his own commissioned expert report “Research into the quality standard of homes delivered through change of use Permitted Development rights” (“The Clifford Report”).

Ground 3c: In respect of the two SIs that expand Permitted Development rights (SI 2020/755 and SI 2020/756), the Secretary of State adopted an approach which was unfair, inconsistent and/or irrational in the context of the approach taken to similar proposed Permitted Development reforms: namely those relating to the deployment of 5G wireless masts.

Ground 3d: In respect of SI 2020/756, the Secretary of State was required to re- consult before introducing Class ZA. There was a legitimate expectation of re- consultation on the proposal for a permitted development right allowing the demolition and rebuild of commercial properties, arising from an express promise to re-consult which was made in the original consultation document.”

Do read the Statement of Facts and Grounds itself for the detail. The Government has served summary grounds of defence but I do not think that they are on line.

The group is seeking an order “declaring that the decision to lay the SIs was unlawful. The Claimant also seeks an order quashing the SIs for unlawfulness.” It was also initially seeking an order “suspending the operation of the SIs until the disposal” of the claim, but it has now withdrawn that request.

On 2 September 2020 Holgate J made an order listing the claim to be heard in court “for 1.5 days in the period between 8th October 2020 to 15th October 2020”. It will be a “rolled up” hearing, i.e. there has been no decision yet as to whether any of the grounds are arguable. The Planning Court has pulled out all the stops to list the case quickly – after all, if any parts of the SIs were now to be quashed just think of the implications and complications! But there must be a good likelihood of the case going to the Court of Appeal or beyond, particularly if any of the grounds gain any traction. There could be uncertainty for some time.

No doubt the claim will touch various raw nerves amongst some – an attack on the Government’s “fast changes” agenda, part reliance on EU-derived environmental legislation, Aarhus Convention costs capping, crowdfunded litigation, “activist lawyers” – it ticks all the boxes! But let’s see what the court makes of it.

The Planning For The Future white paper

The white paper is of course out for consultation, along with the associated shorter term measures document, so it might be said that they don’t amount to significant policy announcements – but that would surely be simplistic: there is a clear direction of travel. With this in mind, being no expert on Parliamentary conventions and procedure, I have two questions:

1. Surely the announcements should first have been in Parliament if I read this House of Commons Library note on Government policy announcements (18 January 2013) correctly?

2. What is the precise status of Planning For The Future? It is expressed on the face of the document to be a “white paper” but would it not usually therefore be expected to have been tabled in Parliament as a numbered command paper and to include the wording: “Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government by Command of Her Majesty“? On one level, does it matter? But surely it does?

I also note that some of the shorter term measures (covered in last week’s blog post) could take effect soon after the consultation deadline of 1 October (particularly the introduction of the revised standard method – the “algorithm” if you will) so if there is to be any proper, informed, debate in Parliament I would suggest that there is little time to be lost.

Simon Ricketts, 5 September 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Of Use? (& That Old C2 Number Again)

Where is this Planning Policy Paper then? Now presumably to be published by MHCLG next week, isn’t it odd to be making any such announcement when Parliament is no longer sitting, unless, anti-climatically, it is going be a factual update as to progress rather than the “big bang” moment many anticipated?

This post was just going to be a shameless plug for two webinars on the new Class E of the Use Classes Order that we at Town are running next week jointly with Landmark Chambers, at 5pm on 4 and 6 August, on the legal implications and the planning implications respectively. Details are below. We have had a great take-up (over 1,500 acceptances in total for the two sessions) but there is still capacity. What would we do without Zoom??

New Class E: The Legal Implications

5 pm Tuesday 4 August 2020

Practical answers to the questions arising from the amended Use Classes Order.

• How precisely will it work

• What about existing conditions and other restrictions?

• How to assess new applications and scope/risk of restrictive conditions

• Scheme definition in the new world

• External works

• The GPDO transitional arrangements

• Are local plan policies now out of date?

• How does CIL apply?

Panelists:

• Zack Simons (barrister, Landmark Chambers)

• Duncan Field (partner, Town Legal LLP)

• Heather Sargent (barrister, Landmark Chambers)

• Simon Ricketts (partner, Town Legal LLP)

Chair: Meeta Kaur (partner, Town Legal LLP)

Register via this link: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_ow1AXngeRyyRrBE_moQPew

New Class E: The Planning Implications

5 pm Thursday 6 August 2020

The changes to the Use Classes Order have potentially fundamental consequences for land owners, developers, local authorities and communities:

• What can we expect to be the main opportunities?

• What are the concerns and how can they be mitigated?

• How will local authorities respond?

• What now for place making and sustainability?

• Retail, employment and leisure policies in the new world

Panelists:

• Alice Lester MBE (operational director, regeneration, London Borough of Brent)

• Michael Meadows (head of planning, British Land)

• Steve Quartermain CBE (consultant, Town Legal LLP)

• Sarah Cary (executive director, place, London Borough of Enfield)

• Zack Simons (barrister, Landmark Chambers)

Chair: Meeta Kaur (partner, Town Legal LLP)

Register via this link: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_GnWGpSBQRWiqAeeTONsSjw

I was going to leave it at that, but then an interesting case was handed down earlier today: Rectory Homes Limited v Secretary of State (Holgate J, 31 July 2020). It doesn’t concern the recent Use Classes Order questions but rather the longstanding question as to how extra care housing should be categorised in use terms.

Usually the issue is C2 versus C3 (eg see my 16 September 2017 blog post Class Distinctions: Housing For Older People) but here it was a different question: was a proposed ‘Housing with Care’ development (Use Class C2)” development to be categorised as “dwellings” for the purposes of South Oxfordshire District Council’s local plan, which requires schemes for 3 or more dwellings to provide affordable housing? An inspector had dismissed Rectory’s planning appeal. Both parties at the appeal had agreed that the proposal fell within class C2. The difference was over whether the accommodation could be categorised as “dwellings”. “The Claimant’s stance was that because it was agreed that the residential accommodation did not fall within Class C3, none of those units could constitute a dwelling. SODC’s case was that the “housing with care” units were dwellings in both “form and function”, and as such could fall within the C2 Use Class provided that they are not in C3 use.”

The inspector found that the accommodation fell within C2 but that it comprised “dwellings” for the purposes of the policy. His reasoning was rather odd: “the Inspector appears to have taken the view that if each of the dwellings proposed would be ancillary to the C2 use of the site, the exclusion of dwellings falling within the C3 Use Class, upon which the Claimant had relied, could not apply.”

The inspector went on to find as follows:

Taken as a whole the proposal would be contrary to the development plan in that it would materially exceed the maximum number of dwellings set out in the site specific policy in the [Thame Neighbourhood Plan]. It would cause harm to the setting of The Elms and to the [Thame Conservation Area], which are both designated heritage assets, contrary to the relevant policies in the SOLP, the SOCS and TNP; special attention and great weight should be given to these harms. It would also fail to provide affordable housing, in particular on-site, to deliver a mixed community, in line with the policies of the SOCS, the TNP and the Framework. While there would be compliance with other policies, I consider that these are the most important policies for the determination of this appeal. These policies are all up-to-date.

As explored above, the proposal would result in less than substantial harm to, and thus the significance of, both the setting of The Elms and to the TCA. These should be balanced in line with paragraph 196 of the Framework with the public benefits of the proposed development. In this regard I consider that the public benefits identified above would balance those heritage harms. This is in line with Policy HA4 of the TNP which allows for a balance to be undertaken as to the overall planning conclusion, but this would not mean that there was compliance with that policy overall due to the number of dwellings being proposed.


By failing to provide affordable housing on the appeal site, the proposal would result in very substantial harm. The need for owner occupied elderly persons extra care accommodation in the area does not outweigh this harm.”

Rectory challenged the decision. I only refer below to those issues arising which touch on use classes.

Holgate J makes a preliminary point, which is topical, given much discussion at the moment as to the advantages or disadvantages of defining proposals by way of the new class E, once the Use Classes Order changes take effect from 1 September:

“I deal first with a preliminary point. The Inspector suggested in his Pre-Inquiry Note that because the purpose of the Use Classes Order is to remove certain changes of use from development control, a planning permission ought not to be expressed in terms of a Use Class, particularly as that consent would be issued before the development is constructed and begins to be used. The principal parties at the inquiry did not see this as posing any legal difficulty and ultimately it did not appear in the Inspector’s reasoning in his decision letter. I agree with them on this point. For example, the provisions on certification of lawful development require that the lawfulness of an existing use (which may be based upon a planning permission), or the lawfulness of a proposed use, should be described by reference to any Use Class applicable (ss.191(5)(d) and 192(3)(b)). I therefore cannot see why the grant of a planning permission may not also be defined in terms of a Use Class.”

So, there is no reason not to define what is granted planning permission by way of a use class rather by way of a specific proposed use. (Obviously what is applied for will need to be justified by reference to the relevant development plan and other considerations. Absent clear government guidance, that is going to be a big issue in relation to the new Class E – how much weight should pre Class E development plan policies still have?).

The judge goes on to conclude that extra care accommodation can comprise dwellings:

“It has become well-established that the terms “dwelling” or “dwelling house” in planning legislation refer to a unit of residential accommodation which provides the facilities needed for day-to-day private domestic existence (Gravesham p. 146; Moore v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998) 77 P & CR 114, 119; R (Innovia Cellophane Limited) v Infrastructure Planning Commission [2012] PTSR 1132 at [27]-[28]). This concept is consistent with the Core Strategy’s interchangeable use of the words “dwelling”, “house”, “home” and “unit”. It can include an extra care dwelling, in the sense of a private home with the facilities needed for “independent living” but where care is provided to someone in need of care.”

Just because the proposed development is not within C3 does not mean that it cannot comprise dwellings for the purposes of policy. The inspector’s categorisation of the units of accommodation as ancillary to the main C2 use were seen by the judge as “wholly immaterial” to his decision.

Perhaps a reminder that, once we have all finished chewing over the uncertainties of new class E, the C classes are perhaps also in need of some updating…

(Zack: I reckon we could get a couple more webinars out of that exercise in due course…!)

Simon Ricketts, 31 July 2020

Personal views, et cetera

This blog post’s ear worm

E Is For Economy

It’s the economy, stupid.”

More E words: the English planning and property community was immediately, depending who you spoke to, exercised/excited by the changes to the Use Classes Order and General Permitted Development Order this week. Surprisingly so perhaps, given how heavily the changes had previously been trailed (although, it must be said, in terms of the Use Classes Order changes, not consulted upon). Inevitably and by contrast, the wider public appears to be oblivious as to what lies ahead, despite the potentially far-reaching implications of the creation of the new “commercial, business and serviceclass E within the Use Classes Order in particular.

There are many good summaries already of the changes. My Town colleagues Nikita Sellers, George Morton Jack and Meeta Kaur have prepared a detailed summary.

I am not going to consider the rights and wrongs of the changes in any detail. I have referred previously to my disappointment that the Government has not required for example its nationally described minimum space standards to be applied in relation to the creation of new dwellings by way of permitted development rights (despite having published, with curious timing, a report Research into the quality standard of homes delivered through change of use permitted development rights, on the same day as publishing legislation which does not take into account the recommendations of that work, with no explanation for the discrepancy). The Use Classes Order changes do provide some overdue flexibility given the structural changes underway in our town centres in the light of changed shopping patterns (not just Covid-related but of course now accentuated), but they are extremely wide ranging and I query whether the various permutations of potential consequences have been adequately considered. But that is all for another day.

Instead, I wanted to pull us back to some planning law fundamentals – in what circumstances may owners find that they cannot rely on the expanded use rights after all?

First, in order to move within a use class, the initial use first has to have been instituted, so if for instance you have an as yet unimplemented planning permission for a shop, or if the development has been built but not yet been occupied, the development will first need to have been used as a shop before there can be a change to another use within the new class E (e.g. offices).

Secondly, there must not be a condition on the planning permission authorising the current use that has the effect of preventing use changes that would otherwise have been enabled by way of the Use Classes Order and/or General Permitted Development Order. This is familiar but not straightforward territory. There is much case law as to whether particular phrases in conditions actually achieved what the local planning authority intended and indeed whether the benefit of the condition was lost through the grant of subsequent permissions which did not expressly impose it.

The general answer is that it depends on a careful analysis of the existing planning permission (and of course any provisions within any section 106 agreement).

The Supreme Court considered a situation like this in London Borough of Lambeth v Secretary of State (Supreme Court, 3 July 2019), which I summarised in my 4 July 2019 blog post What Really Is The Meaning Of Lambeth?

The original permission read:

The retail unit hereby permitted shall be used for the retailing of goods for DIY home and garden improvements and car maintenance, building materials and builders’ merchants goods and for no other purpose (including any other purpose in Class I of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1972 or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order).”

It was then amended to read:

The retail use hereby permitted shall be used for the retailing of DIY home and garden improvements and car maintenance, building materials and builders merchants goods, carpets and floor coverings, furniture, furnishings, electrical goods, automobile products, camping equipment, cycles, pet and pet products, office supplies and for no other purpose (including the retail sale of food and drink or any other purpose in Class A1 of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (as amended) or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order).”

The council then approved by way of section 73 a further change so that it was to read:

The retail unit hereby permitted shall be used for the sale and display of non-food goods only and, notwithstanding the provisions of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 (or any Order revoking and re-enacting that Order with or without modification), for no other goods.

However, the council neglected to include that wording in a condition. It was simply part of the description of the development.

The Supreme Court held that the permission was to be interpreted as constraining the use of the retail unit so that it was for the sale of non-food goods only. But for our purposes, this is an example that the courts (1) routinely treat conditions as able validly to restrict the operation of the Use Classes Order and/or General Permitted Development Order and (2) are perhaps currently more benevolent towards the local planning authority’s position than has previously been the case where there has been procedural imprecision, as long as what was intended was clear.

My 14 October 2017 blog post Flawed Drafting: Interpreting Planning Permissions referred to another recent example, Dunnett Investments Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 29 March 2017) which concerned this condition:

This use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained“.

The court held that “express planning consent” did not include prior approval pursuant to the “office to residential” permitted development right. The restriction applied.

So care is needed! Where there are restrictive conditions which would restrict the flexibility that the new class E would otherwise give, of course consideration can be given to applying to remove those conditions by way of section 73 application.

Thirdly, when applications for planning permission are now to be determined, careful consideration will need to be given to the proposed description of development and no doubt there will be issues arising as to whether decision makers are justified in imposing conditions which restrict the operation of the new Use Classes Order and General Permitted Development Order flexibilities. It will be the B1(a), (b) and (c) arguments all over again, but writ large.

I hope that we will have updated Planning Practice Guidance. In the meantime, the current Planning Practice Guidance has passages such as these:

“It is important to ensure that conditions are tailored to tackle specific problems, rather than standardised or used to impose broad unnecessary controls.

1. necessary;

2. relevant to planning;

3. relevant to the development to be permitted;

4. enforceable;

5. precise; and

6. reasonable in all other respects.”

“Is it appropriate to use conditions to restrict the future use of permitted development rights or changes of use?

Conditions restricting the future use of permitted development rights or changes of use may not pass the test of reasonableness or necessity. The scope of such conditions needs to be precisely defined, by reference to the relevant provisions in the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, so that it is clear exactly which rights have been limited or withdrawn.Area-wide or blanket removal of freedoms to carry out small scale domestic and non-domestic alterations that would otherwise not require an application for planning permission are unlikely to meet the tests of reasonableness and necessity. The local planning authority also has powers under article 4 of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 to enable them to withdraw permitted development rights across a defined area, where justified.

Will that guidance be sufficient to avoid disputes? I doubt it.

Am I entitled to apply for planning permission simply for Class E use? Given that Parliament now deems changes within class E not be material, why not? How will such applications be determined as against development plan policies which are likely to be at odds with such an approach, and how will CIL be calculated, given that many CIL charging schedules distinguish as between, for instance, retail and office use?

Fourthly, planning permission will still be required for operational works that materially affect the external appearance of the building. To what extent will local planning authorities seek to exert control by that route, as we have sometimes seen with office to residential conversions? How to guard against plainly substandard conversions of shops to offices and of, for instance, units on out of town business parks to shops?

Fifthly, there is going to be much focus on how precisely the General Permitted Development Order operates in relation to the new class. For an initial period, until 31 July 2021, the GPDO will operate as against how the relevant use was categorised before the changes to the Use Classes Order became effective. Are we to expect further changes to the GPDO in the coming period?

Sixthly, quite apart from these planning law constraints, private law constraints imposed by way of, for instance, restrictive covenants and user covenants in leases will still apply.

But, there’s no way round it, class E has huge implications for much of the world around us, from central business district to market town, to out of town retail or business park. It also brings with it, and this is its very point, huge opportunities to allow for adaptation and for entrepreneurship. How is all this going to work out in practice? Will people start using the new freedoms and then find that inevitably in due course the rules tighten again, by which time the horse has bolted, or, that for land owners, they may have unwittingly lost the right to the use which was most valuable in investment terms? E is also for experiment.

Simon Ricketts, 24 July 2020 (expanded version 25 July 2020)

PS and for Emily! Happy birthday daughter.

Personal views, et cetera

Permitted Development: Painting By Numbers Versus Painting The Sistine Chapel?

Time now to look at some of the proposals to extend permitted development rights and to amend the Use Classes Order that are set out in the Planning Reform: Supporting the high street and increasing the delivery of new homes consultation paper published alongside the Autumn budget on 29 October 2018, and strongly criticised in Nick Raynsford’s final review of planning in England (November 2018):

The government’s announcement of its intention to extend even further this permissive ‘shadow’ planning process appears to reflect its model for the future direction of the system; and this has real implications for people and for the nature of both planning and planners. This reflects the tension recorded in evidence presented to the Review as to whether planning is a form of land licensing, which implies one set of skills and outcomes, or the much more complex and creative practice of shaping places with people to achieve sustainable development. The former task is like painting by numbers; the latter is like painting the Sistine Chapel. The difference in outcomes for people is equally stark.”

I’m not sure that sort of language (describing traditional planning applications as equivalent to painting the Sistine Chapel, a spectacularly inapt comparison, or indeed TCPA interim chief executive Hugh Ellis’ language in the accompanying press release: “‘Permitted development is toxic and leads to a type of inequality not seen in the Britain for over a century.“) is helpful to the debate.

It seems to me that the two key issues which need to be addressed in relation to permitted development rights that enable additional residential development (whether by way of conversion or construction) are the need for some control at a national or local level over room sizes and the need to provide a proportion of affordable housing whether on site or by way of financial contribution. Aside from those obvious issues (not addressed in the latest consultation paper), what is wrong with the Government looking to streamline development management processes where appropriate? Surely the question is where is the appropriate dividing line. Surely deemed planning permission should be for types of development where, given the public benefit in seeking to encourage them, the local planning authority should not need to question the principle of what is proposed up to a defined scale at a particular location (with more general powers to restrict rights available by way of Article 4 Direction) and where wider issues do not arise that cannot be resolved within a 56 day period for prior approval of specified aspects which are, as far as possible, not open to differing subjective views? Don’t we need to define some sort of principle along these lines before then considering different common types of development?

Allow greater change of use to support high streets to adapt and diversify

The Government proposes that uses in classes A1 (shops), A2 (financial and professional services), and A5 (hot food takeaways) (as well as uses as betting shops, pay day loan shops and laundrettes) should be allowed to change to “office use (B1)” (do they mean “office use” or do they mean B1 which also encompasses light industrial and R&D?). Hot food takeaways will be allowed to change to residential use (C1) as is already the case with the other uses referred to. There would be the requirement for prior approval, as with existing change of use permitted development rights.

Alongside this, the current “pop up” temporary permitted development rights to change the use from shops (A1) financial and professional services (A2), restaurants and cafes (A3), hot food takeaways (A5), offices (B1), non-residential institutions (D1), assembly and leisure uses (D2), betting shops and pay day loan shops to change to shops (A1) financial and professional services (A2), restaurants and cafes (A3) or offices (B1) will be extended from two years to three years. The temporary permitted development rights are proposed now to extend to changes to certain community uses, namely as a public library, exhibition hall, museum, clinic or health centre.

All of these proposals are put forward in the context of “supporting the high street” but no geographical limitation to the proposed changes is indicated that would prevent their application to any building in the relevant use, wherever it is located – shades of the original proposal in relation to the office to residential permitted development right, which was couched in terms of underused and empty office premises, when of course the right turned out not to have any such limitation. There is no indication of any floorspace cap. Might a department store, or supermarket, turn into an office? Nor indeed any cap on the proportion of any shopping area that might be converted to offices.

The document goes on to explore whether changes could also be made to the Use Classes Order, namely to:

“simplify the A1 shops use class to remove the current named uses and allow for a broader definition of uses for the sale, display or service to visiting members of the public.”

⁃ consider whether there is “scope for a new use class that provides for a mix of uses within the A1, A2 and A3 uses beyond that which is considered to be ancillary, which would support the diversification of high street businesses. This would replace the existing A1, A2 and A3 and result in a single use class to cover shops, financial and professional services, restaurants and cafes. This would mean that movement between these uses was no longer development and not a matter for the planning system to consider. It would bring greater flexibility but reduce the ability of communities and local planning authorities to distinguish between shops and restaurant uses“.

I agree that these parts of the Use Classes Order potentially need reform (within boundaries – is it really workable for there to be no distinction at all between A1 and A3?) but can’t this be as part of broader reform of the Order? The B, C and D classes all give rise to equivalent issues in that the old distinctions between uses have become increasingly difficult to apply.

A new permitted development right to support housing delivery by extending buildings upwards to create additional homes

This idea has been around since February 2016 without civil servants arriving at draft legislation, which is surely going to be the practical test.

Looking back, I covered this proposal most recently on 13 October 2018 in my blog post The Up Right, before that in my 17 March 2017 blog post Permitted Development: À La Recherche Du Temps Perdu and before that in my 15 June 2016 blog post Permitted Development: What Next? However, this latest version of the proposals is certainly the most far-reaching.

The permitted development right would allow additional storeys to be built above buildings in a wide range of uses, including residential, retail and offices. The Government indicates:

We want to explore whether there may also be other buildings whose use is compatible with the introduction of new homes. Given they are usually located in residential areas or high streets, would premises such as health centres and buildings used for community and leisure purposes be suitable for inclusion in the permitted development right? Out of town retail parks with a mix of shopping and leisure uses may also be suitable for upward extensions to provide additional homes.”

The consultation paper asks for “examples of how this permitted development right might be used in practice, and particularly of how the use of local design codes could help to encourage take up of the proposed right and improve the design quality and acceptability of upward extensions.”

It’s sounding complicated already. Then add the question of how far upwards the permitted development right could allow development to go. The consultation paper offers two alternatives, both of which could lead to significant factual disputes:

⁃ “A permitted development right could apply to the airspace above premises in a terrace of two or more joined properties where there is at least one higher building in the terrace. The roof of the premises extending upward would be no higher than the main roofline of the highest building in the existing terrace.”

⁃ “An alternative approach would be to permit upward extensions more widely to a height no higher than the prevailing roof height in the locality. While this may extend the proposed right to a greater number of properties, it would not be possible to define prevailing roofline in regulations. Therefore it would be a matter to be considered by the local authority as part of the prior approval. In doing so, the local authority would be able to define what it considered to be the prevailing roofline taking account of the local building types and heights and the extent of the area over which it should be determined.”

To add to the complications:

Where premises are not on level ground the impact of adding additional storeys can be significantly greater on the amenity of neighbouring premises, for example from overlooking and overshadowing and on the character of the area. We would welcome views on how best to take account of the topography of specific areas.”

The consultation paper proposes that there should be a maximum limit of five storeys from ground level for a building once extended (so the extension could be up to four storeys!). But there would be an even broader permitted development right for purpose built, free standing blocks of flats of over five storeys. “The government would also like a permitted development right to apply to such buildings, and is interested in views, including whether there should be a limit on the number of additional storeys that could be added, for example 5

The permitted development right would allow for the physical works required to construct or install additional storeys on a building. It could also, for instance, allow for “works within the curtilage where it is necessary for access to the additional new homes“.

The prior approval requirements would include appearance, ie “considering whether the proposed development is of good design, adds to the overall quality of the area over its lifetime, is visually attractive as a result of good architecture, responds to the local character and history of the area and maintains a strong sense of place, as set out in paragraph 127 of the National Planning Policy Framework. We expect prior approval on design to be granted where the design is in keeping with the existing design of the building.

Prior approval would also consider the impact of the development on the amenity of neighbouring premises, for example, from obscuring existing windows, reducing access to light or resulting in unacceptable impact on neighbours’ privacy from overlooking. It would also consider measures to mitigate these impacts, and enable the neighbours, including owners and occupiers of premises impacted, to comment on the proposal.

This is asking a lot of the 56 day prior approval process – sounds like a job for a traditional planning application to me.

Finally, yet another extension of the previous proposals: “We are seeking views on whether the proposed right to build upwards to create new homes should additionally allow householders to extend their own homes.”

This all sounds like it’s on a collision course with what the Government has set in train with the establishment of the ‘Building Better, Building Beautiful‘ Commission.

The permitted development right to install public call boxes and associated advertisement consent

I may come back in a later blog post to the Government’s proposal to remove permitted development rights for the installation of public call boxes. Since earlier blog posts on the subject, I’m now off-side from commenting in detail due to acting for an electronic communications code operator, but I would briefly note that the need for additional apparatus is about enabling electronic communications both present (3G, 4G and wifi) and future (5G) rather than just being about the old phone box concept and in that respect the terminology in Part 16 and the references in the Control of Advertisements Regulations probably do need updating without throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Supporting housing delivery by allowing for the demolition of commercial buildings and redevelopment as residential

Well this proposal dates back to October 2015! As with the upwards extensions proposal, is it simply too difficult to draft in legislative form? The wording in the consultation paper is certainly tentative:

⁃ “It may be that a right focused on smaller sites may be more practical...

⁃ Despite the Government having set its face against affordable housing requirements in relation to the office to residential permitted development right, with this right it is said that the Government “would be interested in views on how developer contributions expected towards affordable housing and other infrastructure could be secured.

⁃ “We would welcome views as to the design of a right which could operate effectively to bring sites forward for redevelopment. The responses to these questions will inform further thinking and a more detailed consultation would follow.”

To be provocative, if additional storeys of residential development are to have deemed permission, and if new residential developments are to have deemed permission if they replace commercial buildings, what is the logic for not granting deemed permission for residential development on brownfield land more generally – what is inherently more complex or controversial arising from that than from the development that could come forward under these new rights? Why the prior complications with brownfield land, but not with these other rights, of land having to be placed by a local planning authority on a register before there is permission in principle?

The deadline for consultation responses is 14 January 2019.

Simon Ricketts, 8 December 2018

Personal views, et cetera

The Extra Care Question: RU-C2 or C3-UCO?

A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away, Parliament made the Use Classes Order. 
I referred in my 16 September 2017 blog post Class Distinctions: Planning For Older People to the blurred distinction between C2 (basically use for the provision of residential accommodation and care to people in need of care) and C3 (basically use as a residential dwelling) when it comes to “extra care” facilities for the elderly. I set out some of the criteria applied by inspectors in appeal decisions.
There was a very useful appeal decision letter last month which surely throws additional doubt upon the soundness of the curious attempt in the draft London Plan in effect to amend the Use Classes Order by policy rather than legislation, in that it seeks to deem extra care facilities for the elderly in London as falling within use class C3 (and thereby becoming subject to affordable housing and other obligations and requirements) whereas the recognised planning law position is that they are more likely to fall within use class C2. 
Draft policy H15 C states:
Sheltered accommodation and extra care accommodation is considered as being in Use Class C3. Residential nursing care accommodation (including end of life/ hospice care and dementia care home accommodation) is considered as being in Use Class C2.”
Paragraph 4.15.3 of the supporting text simply states again that “sheltered accommodation and extra care accommodation should be considered as C3 housing“, defining extra care accommodation as follows:
extra care accommodation (also referred to as assisted living, close care, or continuing care housing) is self-contained residential accommodation and associated facilities, designed and managed to meet the needs and aspirations of older people, and which provides 24-hour access to emergency support. A range of facilities are normally available such as a residents’ lounge, laundry room, a restaurant or meal provision facilities, classes, and a base for health care workers. Domiciliary care will be available to varying levels, either as part of the accommodation package or as additional services which can be purchased if required.”
First, how can it be appropriate in principle for a policy document to deem a use to be treated in a particular way in the Use Classes Order? The nature of the use and the determination of which use class, if any, it falls into, is a legal question. For instance whether planning permission would be required for a change of use would ultimately be determination by an application for a certificate of lawfulness of proposed use or development under section 191 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. By all means, if justified, the Mayor can determine that particular policies should apply to extra care accommodation (matters which could then be tested through the plan examination process) but his view as to which use class it might fall into has no weight in the legal determination of that question and in my view has no place in a document which is only allowed to address “matters which are of strategic importance to Greater London.

Secondly, his view, not supported by any reasoning, as to the appropriate use class do not sit easily with the conclusions that planning inspectors have come to. The most recent decision letter (22 January 2018) was by inspector Michael Boniface, where he allowed an appeal in Sidmouth, East Devon, by Pegasus Life for an “assisted living community for older people comprising extra care units, staff accommodation and communal facilities, including a kitchen, restaurant/bar/café, a well-being suite comprising gym, treatment rooms and pool, a communal lounge and storage facilities; car parking for residents, visitors and staff of the assisted living community; comprehensive landscaping comprising communal and private spaces; and associated groundworks.”
The decision letter and inspector’s reasoning is well summarised in a blog post by Housing LIN – “Planning Inspector sets out the distinctive elements of Extra Care scheme resulting in C2 Use Class conclusion” (8 February 2018). 

The inspector was presented with the Mayor of London’s position but it did not alter his conclusions on the facts of the case. 
 Thirdly, in its recent report Housing For Older People (8 February 2018) the Commons CLG Select Committee specifically considered the treatment of specialist older people’s housing in the planning system and particularly in the Use Classes Order:

125. We also heard that the “inconsistent and cumbersome” application of the C2 and C3 planning classifications to extra care housing was problematic for developers. Some local authorities apply the C2 classification, applied to residential care homes and nursing homes, to extra care housing which reduces planning charges. Others classify this type of housing as C3, along with mainstream housing, which means full charges apply. Audley Retirement argued that extra care housing should fall within the C2 class:

“Extra care is set up to fulfil many of the functions that care homes can provide in terms of care delivery as and when the resident requires it, monitored by an onsite care team and there is access to communal facilities. There are controls over who can occupy them by age and a need for care that do not exist on C3 standard dwellings.”

Extra care housing developers had a range of suggestions for countering this issue: an “extension and additional clarity” on C2 so that it captures extra care housing; the creation of a sub-section of C2 which attracts lower planning charges; and the creation of a “dedicated use class” for extra care housing which would enable planning contributions to be streamlined.

126. When we asked about this, the then Housing Minister, Alok Sharma, told us that the guidance will look at the “precise terminology that is used to describe the different types of older people’s housing”. 
The Select Committee concludes:
We believe that the level of planning contributions on specialist housing, which are increased as a result of the non-saleable communal areas which are a feature of this type of housing, is impeding the delivery of homes. We recommend either the creation of a sub-category of the C2 planning classification (which currently applies to residential care and nursing homes) for specialist housing, which would reduce the contributions required from developers, or the creation of a new use class for specialist housing which would have the same effect.”
In the light of these considerations, how can draft London Plan policy H15 C possibly be justified?
Simon Ricketts, 17 February 2018
Personal views, et cetera 

Flawed Drafting: Interpreting Planning Permissions

“What are words worth? Words

Words of nuance, words of skill”

Some of the most difficult cases in every area of law arise from flawed drafting and drafting which does not adequately anticipate future eventualities. 
I will leave for another blog post the issues that arise in relation to the drafting and interpretation of section 106 agreements and undertakings, although the Secretary of State’s 12 September 2017 decision letter dismissing an appeal for planning permission for 705 dwellings at King George’s Gate, Surbiton was a salutary lesson, and essential reading, for every planning lawyer.
In the light of Lang J’s judgment this month in London Borough of Lambeth v Secretary of State, this blog post limits itself to the question as how literally should planning permissions be interpreted? Is the planning permission in fact wider in its scope than the local authority intended when granting it? Have restrictions that were initially imposed fallen away by virtue of not being reapplied to subsequent permissions for the permitted buildings or to a permission for amendments to that initial permission? 

There have been many examples where the courts have determined that the legal effect of a permission was not what the authority may have intended, applying what might be regarded as a classically pure planning law approach:

– where a planning permission is clear, unambiguous and valid on its face, regard may only be had to the planning permission itself, including the conditions imposed upon it and the reasons given for the imposition of those conditions 
– an extreme reluctance to imply extra wording into conditions (Widgery LJ’s statement in Trustees of Walton Charities v. Walton & Weybridge DC (1970): “I have never heard of an implied condition in a planning permission and I believe no such creature exists. Planning permission… is not simply a matter of contract between the parties. There is no place…within the law relating to planning permission for an implied condition. Conditions should be expressed, they should be clear, they should be in the document containing the permission.”)

– applying the judge-made principle of a “new chapter in the planning history” of a site, effectively wiping the slate clean of previous planning condition restrictions where a significant change of use or other development has occurred.

This has led over the years to many outcomes which, whilst logical on a dispassionate reading of the relevant document by a lawyer, were certainly not anticipated by the unfortunate planning officer. For instance:
– in Carpet Décor (Guilford) Limited v Secretary of State (Sir Douglas Frank QC, 17 July 1981) a condition “that no variations from the deposited plans and particulars will be permitted unless previously authorised” by the local planning authority was held not to be sufficiently unequivocal as to exclude the operation of the Use Classes Order. 
– in Dunoon Developments Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 18 February 1992) a condition on a planning permission for a car showroom that stated that the use of the premises would be limited to the display, sale and storage of cars was not sufficient to exclude the operation of the General Permitted Development Order.
– in I’m Your Man Limited v Secretary of State (Robin Purchas QC, 4 September 1998) it was held that for a planning permission to be construed as limited to a temporary period, it was not sufficient for the restriction to be set out in the description of development rather than in a condition. 
– in Stevenage Borough Council v Secretary of State (HHJ Waksman QC, 3 June 2010) the owner of a retail park was held to be free of various restrictions on the types of goods which could be sold, by virtue of planning permissions having been granted for subdivision of units and other alterations, which did not reimpose restrictions from the original permission. As with a number of similar cases and CLOPUD appeal decision letters, the ruling partly relied on a liberal application of section 75(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which provides that where the proposed use of a building (or part of) a building is not specified in a permission for its erection (or alterations), “the permission shall be construed as including permission to use the building for the purpose for which it is designed“.
– in Prudential Assurance v Sunderland City Council (Wyn Williams J, 15 July 2010) the High Court held that, through the windfall of a local planning authority’s mistake faced with successive planning applications, Peel Holdings had become free of section 106 restrictions on the types of goods that could be sold from its retail park in Washington, Sunderland. 
The tide then started to turn with the Court of Appeal in Peel Land and Property Investments Plc v Hyndburn Borough Council (19 December 2013). Peel, no doubt hoping for an equivalent outcome as achieved in Sunderland, argued that the failure of the local authority, in drafting a permission for works of alteration to retail park units, to reimpose a condition restricting the goods that could be sold, meant that the restriction had been removed. However the court rejected the submissions. The works did not create a new chapter in the planning history of the units and on the facts (with no indication in the application documents that unrestricted retail use was intended) section 75(3) could not be relied upon in the way that was sought. 

The Supreme Court in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Limited v The Scottish Ministers (16 December 2015) then indicated a more nuanced approach to interpretation:

When the court is concerned with the interpretation of words in a condition in a public document such as a section 36 consent, it asks itself what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole. This is an objective exercise in which the court will have regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the relevant words, the overall purpose of the consent, any other conditions which cast light on the purpose of the relevant words, and common sense. Whether the court may also look at other documents that are connected with the application for the consent or are referred to in the consent will depend on the circumstances of the case, in particular the wording of the document that it is interpreting. Other documents may be relevant if they are incorporated into the consent by reference … or there is an ambiguity in the consent, which can be resolved, for example, by considering the application for consent.

Interpretation is not the same as the implication of terms. Interpretation of the words of a document is the precursor of implication. It forms the context in which the law may have to imply terms into a document, where the court concludes from its interpretation of the words used in the document that it must have been intended that the document would have a certain effect, although the words to give it that effect are absent” (Lord Hodge)

Against this background it is therefore interesting to see this month another case in which the owner of a retail investment, in this case a Homebase DIY store, has achieved an outcome which was not intended by the local planning authority, and which could have been avoided by competent drafting of the decision notice. In London Borough of Lambeth v Secretary of State (Lang J, 3 October 2017), a planning permission had been granted varying conditions attached to an earlier permission. The purported effect of the widened conditions was set out in the description of development on the face of the permission:

” For: Variation of condition 1 (Retail Use) of Planning Permission Ref: 10/01143/FUL (Variation of Condition 6 (Permitted retail goods) of planning permission Ref. 83/01916 (Erection of a DIY retail unit for Texas homecare and an industrial building for cow industrial polymers) granted on 17.09.85 to allow for the sale of a wider range of goods to include DIY home and garden improvements, car maintenance, building materials and builders merchants goods, carpets and floor coverings, furniture, furnishings, electrical goods, automobile products, camping equipment, cycles, pet and pet products, office supplies and for no other purpose in Class A1 of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (as amended) Granted on 30.06.2010.


Original Wording:
 The retail use hereby permitted shall be used for the retailing of DIY home and garden improvements and car maintenance, building materials and builders merchants goods, carpets and floor coverings, furniture, furnishings, electrical goods, automobile products, camping equipment, cycles, pet and pet products, office supplies and for no other purpose (including the retail sale of food and drink or any other purpose in Class A1 of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (as amended) or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order. 


Proposed Wording:
 The retail unit hereby permitted shall be used for the sale and display of non-food goods only and, notwithstanding the provisions of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 (or any Order revoking or re-enacting that Order with or without modification), for no other goods.”

However, for some reason, whoever drafted the permission did not bother to go on and include the proposed wording as a condition. Lang J applied I’m Your Man and held that the purported restriction was of no effect. Lambeth Council’s “intended purpose was not given legal effect by the wording of the 2014 permission, because of flawed drafting.
As set out in Landmark Chambers’ helpful summary , Lang J has granted permission for the case now to go to the Court of Appeal:
I do not accept the Claimant’s critique of my judgment, and the application of the current law to the facts of this case. However, I am left with some unease about the result.  The principle established in I’m Your Man Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment 77 P & CR 251, and its application, merits consideration in a higher court which is not bound by precedent in the same way as the High Court. The interpretation and application of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd & Anor. v The Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 74, [2016] 1 WLR 85 is still evolving, and merit consideration by the Court of Appeal in this case.”

It is worth noting two post-Trump cases where the Court of Appeal has rejected submissions that a narrow interpretation should be given to specific conditions.
First, R (XPL Limited) v Harlow Council (Court of Appeal, 13 April 2016), where a condition preventing “repairs or maintenance of vehicles or other industrial or commercial activities (other than the parking of coaches and other vehicles …” outside specified hours at a coach depot was held to extend to a prohibition on the running of engines. 

Secondly, Dunnett Investments Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 29 March 2017) where the court had to determine whether the following condition is to be interpreted as excluding the operation of the General Permitted Development Order so as to allow change of use from offices to residential by way of the prior approval process:

“This use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained“.

Did prior approval from the local planning authority pursuant to the GPDO amount to “express planning consent” for the purposes of the condition?
The Court of Appeal reviewed the case law on interpretation of conditions:
In relation to the interpretation of, specifically, a planning condition which is said to exclude the operation of the GPDO, other authorities are of some assistance. From them, the following themes can be discerned.


i) It is rightly common ground that a planning condition on a planning consent can exclude the application of the GPDO (see Dunoon Developments v Secretary of State for the Environment and Poole Borough Council (1993) 65 P&CR 101 (“Dunoon Developments”)).


ii) Exclusion may be express or implied. However, because a grant of planning permission for a stated use is a grant of permission for only that use, a grant for a particular use cannot in itself exclude the application of the GPDO. To do that, something more is required (see, e.g., Dunoon Developments at [107] per Sir Donald Nicholls VC). 


iii) In Carpet Décor (Guilford) Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 261 EG 56, Sir Douglas Frank QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge said that, because in the absence of such a condition the GPDO has effect by operation of law, the condition should be in “unequivocal terms”. Although “unequivocal” was used by Mr Katkowski in his written argument, during the course of debate he accepted that that term was now less appropriate, given the modern trend away from myopic focus upon the words without proper reference to their full context. However, he submitted (and I accept) that, to exclude the application of the GPDO, the words used in the relevant condition, taken in their full context, must clearly evince an intention on the part of the local planning authority to make such an exclusion.”

The court did not accept the claimant’s arguments:
The first part of the condition sets out the scope of the permission. I respectfully agree with Patterson J (at [60]), the second part (“…and for no other purpose whatsoever…”) is not, as Mr Katkowski would have it, merely emphatic of the scope of the planning permission, but is rather a clear and specific exclusion of GPDO rights. Whilst, as I have described, each case depends upon its own facts, it is noteworthy that, in Dunoon Developments (at pages 105-6), in finding that the words “limited to” a particular purpose did not exclude GPDO rights, Farquharson LJ compared that phrase with “… and for no other purpose…” as considered in the earlier case of The City of London Corporation v Secretary of State for the Environment (1971) 23 P&CR 169, which he considered was far more emphatic and (he suggested) possibly sufficient to exclude the operation of the GPDO. In this case, we have a more emphatic phrase still, namely “… and for no other purpose whatsoever…”. Further, although we are concerned with rights under the GPDO and not the UCO, the interpretation of that phrase to exclude the operation of the GPDO is at least consistent with R (Royal London Mutual Insurance Society) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2013] EWHC 3597 (Admin); [2014] JPL 458, in which Patterson J held that a condition which restricted use to “only” particular uses within Use Class A1 excluded the right to use the land for other Class A1 uses, because it effectively evinced an intention to identify acceptable uses within the class whilst prohibiting other unacceptable uses within that class unless and until the merits of such use had been tested by the planning authority upon an application for planning permission (see also The Rugby Football Union v The Secretary of state for Local Government, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 927; [2002] JPL 740, in which Ouseley J, at [56], found that the words “for no other use” had similar effect, on the basis that such words “have no other sensibly discernible purpose than to prevent some other use which might otherwise be permissible without planning permission”). The third part of the condition before this court makes it the more abundantly clear that automatic or direct GPDO rights are excluded, by requiring a planning application if such uses are to be pursued.”
Furthermore, “”express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority” cannot sensibly include planning permission granted by the Secretary of State through the GPDO. It means what it says, i.e. planning permission granted by the local planning authority.”
What are the odds on Lang J’s judgment in Lambeth surviving the Court of Appeal?
In the meantime, and possibly whatever the outcome of that case, there is unpredictability. This is particularly unhelpful given the pressures on local planning authorities to issue permissions without unnecessary delay, and without the resources for a lawyer to check what may often on their face appear to be approvals of minor revisions and alterations. Mistakes happen. The extreme reluctance of authorities to issue revocation or modification orders to put mistakes right, a reluctance born of the liability to pay compensation that thereby arises, is another story – and in my view a large part of the problem. 
Simon Ricketts, 14.10.17
Personal views, et cetera

Class Distinctions 2: Student Housing

Happy freshers’ week. 
I blogged recently about how the planning system struggles when it comes to housing for older people. But there are worse problems when it comes to student housing. Some recent press articles are at the end of this post, but first you need to get through some law I’m afraid (there may be an examination on it later). 
For a start, from a legal perspective there is a similarly poor fit with the Use Classes Order.
Shared student living in converted houses has since 2010 (in England, 2016 in Wales) been hived off from use class C3 (residential use) into use class C4, the HMO (“houses in multiple occupation”) use class: “small shared houses occupied by between three and six unrelated individuals, as their only or main residence, who share basic amenities such as a kitchen or bathroom”.
This definition excludes: 
– HMOs in blocks of flats (eg what seems to be the main model these days in relation to purpose built student accommodation blocks, with clusters of self-contained flats, each housing six students, sharing cooking and living accommodation) 

– Houses shared by more than six students.

The background to the creation of C4, which was not all about students, but in part a response to concerns about pressures being caused to communities by high concentrations of HMOs more generally, is well summarised in a House of Commons library briefing paper, Houses in multiple occupation & planning restrictions (14 July 2017). 
By virtue of Part L of the Town & Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, unless the relevant local planning authority has made an article 4 direction to contrary effect, planning permission isn’t needed to change from C4 to C3 (residential use), or vice versa. Many university towns and cities have made article 4 directions, requiring planning permission to change from C3 to C4 use, for example Sheffield, Leeds, Loughborough, Leicester, Nottingham, Southampton and Durham to name but a few. 
Against the background of almost universal university expansion, this constraint on supply of converted accommodation, denying much of the already (in most areas at least) expensive PRS market to students, has surely played its part both in further increasing student housing costs and in giving students fewer practical alternatives to living in purpose-built student accommodation, often now built and operated by large specialist student housing providers. 
As far as the planning system is concerned, purpose built student housing blocks are generally treated as “sui generis” (outside any use class) and therefore specific planning policies are required at an individual local planning authority level to control them (or to impose standards in terms of unit size, daylighting and sound insulation). In some ways they now often more closely resemble clusters (stacked high) of quasi C4 HMO style accommodation, with bedrooms in self-contained clusters of six, each with its own kitchen and communal area. 
Planning permission is required to make a material change from a sui generis use. Whether there is a material change in the character of the use is for the decision maker to judge. As long as conditions or section 106 agreement planning obligations aren’t breached, change to, say, co-living may not require planning permission. 
Ensuring that purpose built student accommodation is affordable is a big issue. In recent years we have seen student rent strikes, supported by the NUS. In London, we wait to see what further controls will be proposed in the draft London Plan, now expected on 29 November. In the meantime, there was nothing in the Mayor’s draft housing strategy published on 6 September 2017 (in 236 pages I could only find one passing reference to students). To what extent will the policies set out in the previous Mayor’s March 2016 housing SPG remain? The SPG takes the following approach in relation to purpose built student accommodation (PBSA):

– “providers of PBSA are encouraged to develop models for delivery of PBSA in london which minimise rental costs, via its layout and location, for the majority of the bedrooms in the development and bring these rates nearer to the rate of a affordable student accommodation described below
– requirement for affordable student accommodation where a proposed provider does not have an undertaking with a specified academic institution(s) that specifies that the accommodation will be occupied by students of that institution(s)

– affordability determined by reference to a formula that equates to 55% of average student income. For the academic year 2016/2017 this equated to £5,886 or less and for a 38 week contract a weekly rent of £155. 

– the extent of affordable housing to be secured “should be the maximum reasonable amount subject to viability” (our old friend!)

– to enable PBSA providers to maximise the delivery of affordable student accommodation by increasing the profitability of the development, boroughs should consider allowing the temporary use of accommodation during vacation periods for ancillary uses and should consider setting nil CIL rates for affordable student accommodation. 

– eligibility for affordable student accommodation should be based on assessment of need. 

Now that reading list:

Oliver Wainwright, A new urban eyesore: Britain’s shamefully shoddy student housing (The Guardian, 11 September 2017)

Rhiannon Bury, Student housing may be a property bubble in waiting (Telegraph, 18 September 2017)

Could it be the end of the Newcastle student flat boom? Council set to vote on greater controls (Evening Chronicle? 15 January 2017)

Letter: Students vs Residents – this situation in Bath around housing is not students’ fault (Bath Chronicle, 5 September 2017)

Students in Wales taking out loans to afford ‘luxury’ flats (BBC website, 22 September 2017)

It seems to me that there are various issues to be unpacked here:
– the need for authorities properly to plan for the consequences of increases in student numbers

– competing needs as between between student and general needs housing

– often unjustified “there goes the neighbourhood” concerns about the impacts of students on an area. 

– affordability

– the extent to which universities should retain responsibility for housing their students, affordably and to appropriate quality standards.

Class, discuss. 
Simon Ricketts, 24.9.17
Personal views, et cetera

Class Distinctions: Planning For Older People

Housing is needed by people of all ages but there is a particular need for specialist housing for the elderly. A research report, Housing our Ageing Population: Learning from Councils meeting the Housing Need of our Ageing Population was published by the Local Government Association on 8 September 2017. From its executive summary:
“The number of people aged over 65 is forecast to rise over the next decade, from the current 11.7 million people, to 14.3 million by 2025, a 22 per cent rise. This means that one in five of the total population will be over 65 in 10 years’ time, which will become one in four by 2050. 

In the UK, the vast majority of over 65s currently live in the mainstream housing market. Only 0.6 per cent of over 65s live in housing with care, which is 10 times less than in more mature retirement housing markets such as the USA and Australia, where over 5 per cent of over 65s live in housing with care. The suitability of the housing stock is of critical importance to the health of individuals and also impacts on the demand for public spending, particularly social care and the NHS.
Making quality options available also helps with “right-sizing”, freeing up larger under-used homes back into the housing stock. 
Not only is there great need but changes to local government funding are afoot which are going to increase the pressure for supported housing for the elderly. From the LGA report:
Funding for Supported Housing: Consultation contains the key elements of the Government’s proposals for the future funding of supported housing from April 2019 including: 

“Councils will have responsibility for funding, commissioning and quality assuring all supported housing in their areas from April 2019.

“These proposals would in effect bring to an end the current housing benefit arrangements for all specialist older people’s housing at the end of March 2019“. 

We can expect policies on housing for the elderly in the forthcoming London Plan. The Mayor of London says as much in his draft Housing Strategy, published on 5 September 2017: One of his objectives is “increasing opportunities for older homeowners to move to accommodation more suitable for their needs, including benchmarks for older people’s housing requirements in the draft London Plan” (part of policy 5.2). 
I was also pleased to see a section on planning for older people in the DCLG consultation paper, Planning for the right homes in the right places (14 September 2017) even if it only amounted to two paragraphs:
“92. Section 8 of the Neighbourhood Planning Act 2017 requires the Secretary of State to provide guidance for local planning authorities as to how they should address the housing needs that result from old age or disability. Helping local planning authorities provide a simple yet robust evidence base for such groups will form part of the guidance, and will allow them to maintain the benefits of a more streamlined approach to calculating the overall housing need. 

93. When developing new planning guidance for older people, it is important that we have a shared understanding of who is included in this group. The definition of older people in Annex 2 of the National Planning Policy Framework reflects a range of people at different ages with different needs from retirement age to the very frail elderly. We are also aware of different types of housing that accommodate such a group – ranging from general market and affordable housing to specialised, purpose-built market and rental accommodation and care homes. Given the importance of planning for the need for older people as our population ages, we are reviewing whether we need to amend the definition of older people for planning purposes. We consider that the current definition is still fit-for-purpose but would welcome views.”
Not only is more housing required, there needs to be much more specificity and definition. Whilst there are more detailed supportive passages in the Planning Practice Guidance, paragraph 50 of the NPPF simply says: 
local planning authorities should: 

    * plan for a mix of housing based on current and future demographic trends, market trends and the needs of different groups in the community (such as, but not limited to, families with children, older people, people with disabilities, service families and people wishing to build their own homes)”

As the consultation paper seems to accept, the definition of “older people” in the glossary to the NPPF is extremely wide:
“People over retirement age, including the active, newly-retired through to the very frail elderly, whose housing needs can encompass accessible, adaptable general needs housing for those looking to downsize from family housing and the full range of retirement and specialised housing for those with support or care needs.”
I’m not sure on what basis the definition can be said to be fit for purpose. Housing for the elderly doesn’t fit neatly into traditional planning law, partly because it is a wide spectrum of operating models, some being a specialist version of use class C3, dwellinghouses, and some being institutional and care based in nature, falling within use class C2. 
Class C2: “Use for the provision of residential accommodation and care to people in need of. care (other than a use within a class C3 (dwelling house). Use as a hospital or nursing home.”
Class C3: “Use as a dwellinghouse (whether or not as a sole or main residence) — (a) by a single person or by people living together as a family, or. (b) by not more than 6 residents living together as a single household (including a household where care is provided for residents).”
 I wrote a blog post last year, Time To Review The “C” Use Classes?. As with other alternative or quasi residential uses, the use class distinction matters because local planning authorities have very different policy approaches in terms of whether the proposal is acceptable in that location and as to the requirements arising, for instance in relation to affordable housing. The distinction can be crucial in relation to the extent of CIL liability and indeed whether planning permission is required in the first place.

The problem is that in reality the distinctions between C2 and C3 are becoming increasingly blurred – there is a spectrum, with no clear dividing line between the two. 
At the C3 end of the spectrum, there is sheltered housing and retirement living operated by the likes of McCarthy and Stone and Churchill Retirement Living. Churchill have produced a useful guide for planning and design professionals, Retirement Living Explained (April 2017). In order to distinguish its retirement living model from general C3 use, Churchill advocates the use of model age restricted planning condition:
“Each of the apartments hereby permitted shall be occupied only by: 

* Persons aged 60 or over; or 


* A spouse/or partner (who is themselves over 55 years old) living as part of a single household with such a person 
or persons; or 


* Persons who were living in one of the apartments as part of a single household with a person or persons aged 60 
or over who has since died; or 


* Any other individual expressly agreed in writing by the Local Planning Authority. ”

Is it right that C3 retirement living should be required to deliver affordable housing when itself it meets a non-mainstream housing need? Pending any reconsideration of that policy, Churchill’s guide includes a template section 106 agreement, suggesting the making of an off-site affordable housing contribution (with early stage review if the development hasn’t started reached shell and core stage within 28 months), given that the affordable housing requirements attaching to general market housing C3 products would be inappropriate. 

At the C2 end of the spectrum, there is a variety of operating models, with a bewildering variety of descriptions, including care homes, continuing care retirement communities, assisted living, very sheltered housing and close care. 
Hardest to categorise is what the market refers to as “extra care”, which has been described as follows: 
“Extra care housing is housing with care primarily for older people where occupants have specific tenure rights to occupy self-contained dwellings and where they have agreements that cover the provision of care, support, domestic, social, community or other services. Unlike people living in residential care homes, extra care residents are not obliged as a rule to obtain their care services from a specific provider, though other services (such as some domestic services, costs for communal areas including a catering kitchen, and in some cases some meals) might be built into the charges residents pay.” (Extra Care Housing What Is It?, paper, 2015, published by Housing LIN). 

So what are the distinguishing factors between C2 and C3?
A September 2017 blog post, Update on recent Extra Care Housing Planning Appeals and CIL Success, by Tetlow King’s John Sneddon, identifies two recent appeal decisions where inspectors agreed that proposed extra care developments would fall within use class C2. (The piece is also useful on the opportunities for ensuring that C2 developments are exempted from CIL within local planning authorities’ CIL charging charging schedules.)

My Town partner Liz Christie has previously carried out an analysis of planning appeal decisions. The most important factors for determining whether the operation is properly to be regarded as C2 or C3 use are (i) the physical layout of the building; (ii) the level of care; and (iii) the nature of the operation of the proposed development. We can go into more detail on each of these aspects, with appeal references, for anyone with a specific interest in the issues but, in summary, the whole area unnecessarily complicated and uncertain. Some standardised definitions and policy expectations would be really helpful.  
I wrote this blog post as a by-product of preparing to speak at LD Events’ 26 September 2017 conference, Alternative Residential Property 2017. See some of you there. 
Simon Ricketts, 16 September 2017
Personal views, et cetera