Double-digit inflation. Can’t take the train to the job, there’s a strike at the station.
Don’t push me cause I’m close to the edge.
I’m trying not to lose my head.
It’s like a jungle sometimes.
The House of Commons rose on Thursday 20 July 2023, and only then did we have a spate of DLUHC announcements from the following Monday onwards.
This blog post simply aims to keep track of it all. For the actual analysis, you will need to tune into two Clubhouse sessions (Clubhouse! It’s a bit like when people talk about “old-school hip hop” – nod appreciatively, high five, lockdown vibes, those were the days were they not?):
– 5 pm, 2 August – Gove’s “long-term plan” – RSVP here
I’ll be joined by my rock steady crew: Sam Stafford (HBF), the eponymous Catriona Riddell, Landmark’s summer signing Hashi Mohamed, Annie Gingell (Tetlow King), Claire Petricca-Riding and Nicola Gooch (Irwin Mitchell), my Town Legal partner Victoria McKeegan and also perhaps by you?
We’ll discuss:
Michael Gove’s “long-term plan for housing”speech and press statement (24 July 2023), preceded by the same day by Rishi Sunak’s “PM to build 1 million new homes over this Parliament” announcement
A consultation paper on (more) changes to permitted development rights (24 July 2023)
A consultation paper on the implementation of plan-making reforms proposed in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (25 July 2023)
I never thought I would live to see a chief executive of Marks and Spencer plc (Marks and Spencer plc!) issue a statement such as this:
““After a two-year process where our proposals were supported at every stage, our investment in 2,000 jobs, building one of the most sustainable buildings in London, improving the public realm and creating a flagship store, is now effectively in the deep freeze. Today the Secretary of State has ignored his appointed expert David Nicholson who recommended approval of our scheme.
When 42 of the 269 shops on what should be our nation’s premier shopping street sit vacant, disregarding the expert opinion and approval of the appointed planning inspector and playing to the gallery by kiboshing the only retail-led regeneration proposal is a short-sighted act of self-sabotage by the Secretary of State and its effects will be felt far beyond M&S and the West End. It is particularly galling given there are currently 17 approved and proceeding demolitions in Westminster and four on Oxford Street alone, making it unfathomable why M&S’s proposal to redevelop an aged and labyrinthian site that has been twice denied listed status has been singled out for refusal.
The suggestion the decision is on the grounds of sustainability is nonsensical. With retrofit not an option – despite us reviewing sixteen different options – our proposed building would have ranked in the top 1% of the entire city’s most sustainable buildings. It would have used less than a quarter of the energy of the existing structure, reduced water consumption by over half, and delivered a carbon payback within 11 years of construction. It is also completely at odds with the inquiry process where the analysis on sustainability, including from independent experts Arup, was accepted.
We cannot let Oxford Street be the victim of politics and a wilful disregard of the facts. At a time when vacancy rates on what should be the nation’s premier shopping street are 13% higher than the average UK high street and Westminster Council is pleading for help in managing the growing proliferation of sweet shop racketeers, the Secretary of State has inexplicably taken an anti-business approach, choking off growth and denying Oxford Street thousands of new quality jobs, a better public realm and what would be a modern, sustainable, flag-bearing M&S store.
There is no levelling up without a strong, growing Capital city, but the ripple effect extends well beyond Oxford Street. Towns and cities up and down the country will feel the full effects of this chilling decision, with decaying buildings and brownfield sites now destined to remain empty as developers retreat. The nation’s fragile economic recovery needs Government to give confidence to sustainable regeneration and investment as well as following due process; in London and across the UK. Today the Secretary of State has signalled he is more interested in cheap shot headlines than facts and if it weren’t so serious it would be laughable.
We have been clear from the outset that there is no other viable scheme – so, after almost a century at Marble Arch, M&S is now left with no choice but to review its future position on Oxford Street on the whim of one man. It is utterly pathetic.” (Stuart Machin, 20 July 2023)
Throughout this process there has been ferocious opposition to the scheme by some prominent groups and individuals – with detailed representations made; lobbying at each stage, and commentary in the media and social media.
I have often criticised the process whereby the Secretary of State can call-in an application, or recover an appeal, for his own decision-making.
What is the point of local democracy? What is the point of a hugely expensive, lengthy, quasi-judicial process, and a 109 page report by one of our most experienced planning inspectors, when you arrive at this sort of outcome?
If Secretary of State didn’t like the scheme when he called it in, and was going to refuse it in any event, why even the pretence of due process?
To dip into the decision. First point: of course it’s written with an eye to being watertight against legal challenge, by way of making sure that the conclusions revolve around the degree of weight to be attached to specific material considerations and around ultimately subjective assessments as to harm and significance (albeit assessments made without the benefit of hearing the evidence, of accompanied site visits or the ability to ask questions of witnesses). Time will tell if that objective has been secured.
Given that some may think (I couldn’t possibly comment) that this is how the Secretary of State reached his decision, I’m going to start with the overall conclusions (paragraph 51 onwards).
The first set of subjective conclusions (paragraph 51) are findings as to “overall conflict with development plan policies D3 and 38 which deal with design, and partial conflict with heritage policies HC1 and 39”.
That enables him to take the position that the scheme is in conflict with the development plan overall. With the onus shifted, the question for him is accordingly “whether there are material considerations which indicate that the proposal should be determined other than in line with the development plan.”
In favour of the proposal are (paragraph 52) “the advantages of concentrating development in such a highly accessible location, which attracts substantial weight; and the potential harm to the vitality and viability of the area which could follow from a refusal of permission, which attracts limited weight. The heritage benefits carry moderate weight, and the possibility of demolition attracts limited weight. The benefits to employment and regeneration through improved retail and office floorspace, and the benefits in terms of permeability and connectivity, safety and shopping experience and the public realm collectively carry significant weight.” As long as properly reasoned, the weight to be attached to each consideration is for the decision maker.
Against the proposal (paragraph 53) “is the Secretary of State’s finding that in terms of paragraph 152 of the Framework, the proposal would in part fail to support the transition to a low carbon future, and would overall fail to encourage the reuse of existing resources, including the conversion of existing buildings, which carries moderate weight. He has also found that harm arising from the embodied carbon carries moderate weight; and the future decarbonisation of the grid carries limited weight.”
In terms of assessing the heritage impacts of the proposal “the Secretary of State has taken into account the requirements of s.66 of the LBCA Act and the provisions of the Framework. He has found that in terms of paragraph 202 of the Framework, the harm to the settings, and so the significance, of the designated heritage assets would fall into the ‘less than substantial’ category. In respect of Selfridges and the Stratford Place CA, he has found the harm would be at the upper end of that category; in respect of the Mayfair CA it would be in the middle of that category; and in respect of the Portman Estate CA it would be at the lower end of the category. Overall he has found that the harm to the settings of, and significance of the designated heritage assets carries very great weight. He has further considered paragraph 202 of the Framework and has found that the public benefits of the proposal do not outweigh the harm to the significance of the designated heritage assets. The Secretary of State considers that harm from the loss of the nondesignated heritage asset of Orchard House attracts substantial weight and has considered paragraph 203 of the Framework in coming to this decision. In respect of paragraph 189 of the Framework, the Secretary of State considers that the proposal would overall fail to conserve the heritage assets in a manner appropriate to their significance, so that they can be enjoyed for their contribution to the quality of life of existing and future generations. He considers that the possibility of an Oxford Street CA attracts limited weight.”
So what did the scheme in was its design, its less than substantial harm to designated heritage assets which he gives “very great” weight, not outweighed by public benefits; harm from the loss of unlisted Orchard House which he gives substantial weight, and, in terms of climate change issues, the failure to support the transition to a low carbon future (moderate weight), failure to encourage the reuse of existing resources (moderate weight), harm arising from the embodied carbon (moderate weight) and future decarbonisation of the grid (limited weight).
Let’s look in more detail at how the Secretary of State reached some of those conclusions.
Design
His conclusion on non-compliance with policy D3 is said by him to follow from his conclusions on the impact on designated heritage assets (paragraph 43). Similarly policy 38 (paragraph 44). Aside from these conclusions, based on concerns as to heritage aspects, he reaches no conclusions on the design of the scheme.
Heritage
So let’s turn to heritage.
The Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector (paragraphs 12 to 15) as to the level of harm caused to designated heritage assets. However, he disagrees as to the weight to be given to any harm (paragraph 15): “Given the significance of Selfridges, and his conclusions in paragraphs 13-14 above, the Secretary of State considers that the harm to designated heritage assets in this case carries very great weight. He does not agree with the Inspector’s assessment that the harm to the setting and so to the significance of Selfridges, including with the additional harm to the settings of the CAs, carries only moderate weight (IR.13.11 and IR13.78).”
The Secretary of State agrees with Historic England rather than the inspector as to the significance of Orchard House as a non-designated heritage asset (paragraph 16) and considers that its loss attracts substantial weight. He recognises, some heritage benefits of the scheme, to which he ascribes moderate weight.
Carbon
This is the area where we need to pay particularly careful attention.
First, to note that he reaches no concluded view on whether the redevelopment would over the life of the building use less carbon than any replacement: “the Secretary of State has also taken into account the applicant’s argument that over the life of the building it would use less carbon than any refurbishment, which would have to rely on an inefficient building envelope (IR13.38). He agrees with the Inspector, for the reasons given in IR13.37 and IR13.39, that the understanding of WLC Assessments and the tools available for calculations are still developing, and therefore it is no surprise that there was disagreement over the lifetime carbon usage for the proposals and, more particularly, for a refurbishment.” (paragraph 21).
That might be seen as surprising given that surely it is the core issue.
It was said by some that redevelopment should be delayed until the grid is decarbonised, when “the extent of embodied energy, particularly from manufacturing materials, and from vehicle emissions would be much lower or eliminated. He agrees that the proposed development now would result in far more carbon emissions than after the UK has achieved a net-zero grid (IR13.99), because a fully renewably sourced electricity grid should allow most construction vehicles, and the manufacture of concrete, steel and other materials, to be undertaken using renewable energy rather than fossil fuels (IR13.40).” However, he recognised that would not be a practical general principle: “An assessment of the weight to give to the fact that development now will give rise to far more carbon emissions than in the future with a net-zero grid depends on the facts of the case and the planning policy context. Evidence has been put before the Secretary of State that the existing store is currently assessed as failing (IR13.71), and M&S has stated that it will not continue to occupy and trade from the store for very much longer if permission is refused (IR13.46). The Secretary of State has also concluded that the development is supported by some current and up to date development plan policies which aim to support the regeneration and economic development of the area (paragraph 26 below). Overall he considers that this matter carries limited weight against the proposal.” (paragraph 22)
Strangely, although possibly because of the lack of empirical evidence on the point at the inquiry, he gives no weight to any possible reduction in pressure for development elsewhere (paragraph 23).
Paragraph 24 is important:
“The Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector at IR13.43 that there should generally be a strong presumption in favour of repurposing and reusing buildings, as reflected in paragraph 152 of the Framework. In the circumstances of the present case, where the buildings in question are structurally sound and are in a location with the highest accessibility levels, he considers that a strong reason would be needed to justify demolition and rebuilding. However, he agrees that much must depend on the circumstances of the case, including how important it is that the use of the site should be optimised, and what alternatives are realistically available. Like the Inspector, the Secretary of State has gone on to consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of an alternative scheme going ahead.”
The Secretary of State’s position as to the prospect of an alternative scheme going ahead is vital to his overall decision:
“31. The Secretary of State considers that given the Inspector could not draw clear conclusions on this matter, and its importance in the determination of this application, a degree of caution ought to be exercised in drawing overall conclusions from the evidence, and considering the weight to be given to this issue. He finds the applicant’s evidence much less persuasive than the Inspector appears to have done in light of the gaps and limitations identified by the Inspector. He does not consider it appropriate to draw such firm and robust conclusions about this issue as the Inspector does (IR13.70- 13.75 and IR13.97). The Secretary of State is not persuaded that it is safe to draw the same conclusion reached by the Inspector, namely that ‘there is no viable and deliverable alternative’ (IR13.74), which leads to the Inspector’s overall conclusion that ‘there is unlikely to be a meaningful refurbishment of the buildings’ (IR13.97).
32. Overall, the Secretary of State concludes that the evidence before him is not sufficient to allow a conclusion as to whether there is or is not a viable and deliverable alternative, as there is not sufficient evidence to judge which is more likely. The Secretary of State also does not consider that there has been an appropriately thorough exploration of alternatives to demolition. He does not consider that the applicant has demonstrated that refurbishment would not be deliverable or viable and nor has the applicant satisfied the Secretary of State that options for retaining the buildings have been fully explored, or that there is compelling justification for demolition and rebuilding.
33. The Secretary of State notes that M&S has stated that it will not continue to occupy and trade from the store for very much longer if permission is refused (IR13.46). Whether or not M&S leave the store following the Secretary of State’s decision is a commercial decision for the company. However, taking into account the locational advantages of the site, the Secretary of State does not agree with the Inspector at IR13.75 that redevelopment is the only realistic option to avoid a vacant and/or underused site. He considers that there is potential for some harm to the vitality and viability of Oxford Street as suggested by the Inspector at IR13.46-47 and IR13.74. However, he does not agree with the Inspector that harm would be caused to the wider West End beyond Oxford Street (IR13.46) as he considers that this overstates the scale of the impact. He also does not agree with the Inspector’s conclusion that the harm would be substantial. The Secretary of State considers that potential harm to the vitality and viability of Oxford Street could arise from a refusal of permission but, unlike the Inspector, he considers that 8 the extent of any such harm would be limited. He attributes limited weight to this possibility.”
Time will tell if he is right.
I find his conclusion on the carbon which would go into construction materials unfathomable given that he failed to reach a conclusion on whether the new building would use less carbon than refurbishment of the existing building (paragraph 21 quoted earlier above):
“45. In respect of paragraph 152 of the Framework, the Secretary of State agrees that a substantial amount of carbon would go into construction (IR13.32), and that this would impede the UK’s transition to a zero-carbon economy (IR13.87). He has found that there has not been an appropriately thorough exploration of alternatives to demolition (paragraph 32 above). He has also taken into account that the carbon impacts would be to an extent mitigated by the carbon offset payments secured via the s.106 Agreement, which would be used to deliver carbon reductions (albeit it has not been demonstrated that the carbon reductions would fully offset the embodied carbon arising from this proposal). He has also taken into account the sustainability credentials of the new building (paragraph 21 above). Overall he concludes that in terms of paragraph 152 of the Framework, the proposal would in part fail to support the transition to a low carbon future, and would overall fail to encourage the reuse of existing resources, including the conversion of existing buildings. The Secretary of State considers that this carries moderate weight against the scheme.
46. The Secretary of State has also considered the Inspector’s conclusion at IR13.99 that of the material considerations in this case, the extent of embodied energy weighs most heavily against the scheme. He has taken into account that a substantial amount of embodied carbon would go into construction. He has also taken into account at paragraph 21 above the sustainability credentials of the new building, and has further taken into account that the carbon offset payments secured via the s.106 Agreement would be used to deliver carbon reductions (albeit it has not been demonstrated that the carbon reductions would fully offset the embodied carbon arising from this proposal). Given his conclusions on these matters, he considers, unlike the Inspector at IR13.99, that in the particular circumstances of this case, the embodied carbon carries moderate weight.”
Finally, a warning against treating this decision as too much of a precedent:
“47. The Secretary of State has considered the Inspector’s comments at IR13.94 that there is a ‘growing principle that reducing climate change should generally trump other matters’; and his comments at IR13.99 that as climate change policy is still developing, the Secretary of State is entitled to use his judgement to give this consideration greater weight than the Inspector has attributed to it. Policy in this area will continue to develop and in due course further changes may well be made to statute, policy or guidance. This decision letter sets out the Secretary of State’s judgement on the weight which attaches to these matters in the circumstances of this particular case.
48. The Secretary of State has considered the Inspector’s comment at IR13.95 that fear of precedent could be a material consideration of sufficient weight to justify dismissing the application. However, he is confident that any future decision-maker would pay attention to the whole decision and the detailed reasoning and not just to the outcome of the decision. In any event, the decision turns on its own very specific facts, including the relevant development plan policy matrix, the Inspector’s report and the evidence which was before the inquiry, which are all unlikely to be replicated in other cases.”
Easy to say but of course there will be attempts to read across these findings to other projects.
My overall prediction? An important part of Oxford Street may well indeed become vacant or subjected to uses which will do nothing for this vulnerable commercial area – which is currently frankly a disgrace. A project has been first stalled, then killed, brought forward by one of the country’s most respected companies, for reasons which aren’t even based on any finding that demolition and rebuild will lead to greater release of carbon over the lifetime of the building than a hypothetical refurbishment of the existing building – and, in so far as they are heritage-based, on the one hand ascribe a surprising amount of weight to the moderate levels of harm arising and on the other ascribe little weight to the public benefits that would surely arise from a twenty first century flagship department store in Oxford Street.
Some of you will get very upset by this blog post I’m sure. But not as upset as Mr Machin is about Mr Gove.
The question as to “what is the project?” for the purposes of environmental impact assessment has been arising a lot since R (Ashchurch Rural Parish Council) v Tewkesbury Borough Council (Court of Appeal, 7 February 2023), which I summarised in my 11 February 2023 blog post The Bridge To Nowhere Case. The facts in that case were stark but people have been worrying about how far to extrapolate the principle.
Briefly, the Cardiff local development plan has allocated a large area north west of Cardiff for development, including at least 5,000 homes. Redrow Homes had been granted planning permission to build just under 6,000 homes on part of the allocation. To quote from the judgment:
“The application was accompanied by an environmental statement (ES) which stated that Dŵr Cymru had confirmed that the significant volume of foul sewage which would be generated by the proposal could be accommodated on its network, but a hydraulic modelling assessment (HMA) would be needed before the extent of infrastructure improvements and storm water removal from the network could be finalised. Outline permission was granted on the application in March 2017, condition 24 of which required a HMA to be approved.”
“Dŵr Cymru [the statutory undertaker with the responsibility of providing a sewerage system under the Water Industry Act 1991] in November 2021 submitted an application to build a pumping station to serve the developer’s proposal. This would comprise a pumping station at the north end of a large open space called Hailey Park to the east of, and on the banks of, the River Taff. The site of the pumping station is about 1Km away from the site of the developer’s proposed development. Also included in the application is a valve kiosk on the other side of the river. What is not included is a pipe under the river to connect the two, as Dŵr Cymru proposes to use permitted rights to construct it. The authority granted that application in September 2022.
At the same time, the authority granted an application made by the developer to discharge condition 24 after a HMA had been obtained. Two applications were made, because of re-design, and each was granted by the authority, the latest one in September 2022.
The claimant is an association of residents of Llandaff North, which adjoins Hailey Park to the east. With permission granted by Steyn J, it challenges both decisions of the authority to grant planning permission for the pumping station and to discharge condition 24.”
“The application was accompanied by a planning statement by Dŵr Cymru’s consultants, Arup, which stated that the need for the proposed development “derives from” the grant of planning permission for 6000 homes at Plasdŵr. Arup submitted a screening request in relation to the sewage scheme which was being provided for that development, recognising that it was “effectively part of” that development on the basis that it would provide that additional capacity needed “to serve the increase in the local population size.” Arup considered the proposed development to be listed as Schedule 2 development and identified several potential impacts, including to protected sites of international significance such as those located on the Severn Estuary, but did not consider the impacts to be significant.
The authority issued a negative screening opinion on the basis that the sewage scheme and the residential development are stand-alone projects, and gave several reasons. The two schemes would not be located on adjacent land. The former was being undertaken by Dŵr Cymru and the latter by the developer. The former was being undertaken not only to serve the latter but also other existing and potential developments in the area so that there was a functional relationship between the two but no functional interdependence. The former was considered to be the project for EIA purposes and did not exceed the thresholds set out in Schedule 2. Accordingly, the authority did not consider whether any potential impacts would be significant. A separate screening opinion was issued in respect of the pumping station, which mirrored that in respect of the sewage scheme.”
The claimant’s first two grounds of challenge were as follows:
“i) The authority failed to take into account that there is functional interdependence between the Plasdŵr development and Dŵr Cymru’s application and wrongly took into account that the pumping station will serve other developments in the area;
ii) The authority failed to consider an integral part of Dŵr Cymru’s proposal, namely a scheme to remove surface water from its network thus increasing its capacity for foul sewerage. So considered, the scheme as a whole would amount to Schedule 2 development under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Wales) Regulations 2017 (the EIA Regulations) requiring an environmental statement (ES)”.
So, we are back to the question of “what is the project?” Did the pumping station proposal require EIA because it was part of a larger project (the Redrow development) which had been the subject of EIA?
His Honour Judge Jarman summarised the caselaw:
“In R (Ashchurch Rural Parish Council) v Tewkesbury BC [2023] EWCA Civ 101, Andrews LJ, giving the lead judgment, said at [74] that the term “project” should be interpreted “broadly, and realistically”. At [80], she added that the identification of the project is based on a fact-specific inquiry.
What constitutes the project is a matter of judgment for the planning authority, subject to challenge on grounds of rationality or other public law error. Lang J in R (Wingfield) v Canterbury City Council [2019] EWHC 1975 (Admin) at [64] after a review of the authorities, identified four criteria against which that judgment may be made: (i) whether two sites are owned or promoted by the same person; (ii) simultaneous determination; (iii) functional interdependence; and (iv) stand-alone projects. These were cited with approval in Ashchurch at [81] as “a non-exhaustive list of potentially relevant criteria, which serves as a useful aide-memoir.”
“The weight to be given to them will depend upon the circumstances of each case and is a matter for the decision maker.
Interdependence would normally mean that each part of the development is dependent on the other, as, for example, in Burridge v Breckland District Council [2013] JPL 1308 at [32] and [42].“
At [70], Holgate J pointed out that an irrationality challenge presents a high threshold:
Although two sets of proposed works may have a cumulative effect on the environment, this does not make them a single project for these purposes. Two potential projects but with cumulative effects may need to be assessed, see R (Larkfleet Ltd) v South Kesteven DC [2015] EWCA Civ 887, Sales LJ (as he then was) at [36]…”
If I can pause there, the recent Sizewell case cited by HHJ Jarman was an interesting example of the courts’ regular attempts to avoid EIA becoming an impossible obstacle course. There the argument by the claimants was that the Sizewell C nuclear power project should be defined for the purposes of the Conservation of Habitats Regulations as encompassing proposals by Northumbrian Water Limited to provide the significant amounts of potable water required during the construction, commissioning and operational phases of Sizewell C
Holgate J had this to say:
“The claimant’s argument has much wider implications. The need for the supply of utilities such as water is common to many, if not all, forms of development. A utility company’s need to make additional provision so as to be able to supply existing and new customers in the future does not mean that that provision (or its method of delivery) is to be treated as forming part of each new development which will depend upon that supply. The consequence would be that where a new supply has yet to be identified by the relevant utility company, decisions on those development projects would have to be delayed until the company is able to define and decide upon a proposal. That approach would lead to sclerosis in the planning system which it is the objective of the legislation and case law to avoid (R (Forest of Dean (Friends of the Earth)) v Forest of Dean District Council [2015] PTSR 1460 at [18]).
By way of a side-bar on this whole EIA sclerosis question, we all of course also await the Supreme Court’s ruling in R (Finch) v Surrey County Council on the question of whether it was unlawful for a local planning authority not to require the environmental impact assessment for a project of crude oil extraction for commercial purposes to include an assessment of the impacts of downstream greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the eventual use of the refined products of the extracted oil. The hearing took place on 21 and 22 June and if you have a couple of days spare (maybe you are between projects), you can watch it all here. By way of reminder, this was the Court of Appeal’s ruling, dated 17 February 2022.
Back to the Cardiff case. What did HHJ Jarman conclude on the facts? He found that the council’s planning officer was entitled to deal with the issue in the way that they had. “The fact that the pumping station is needed for the Plasdŵr development does not mean that it will not also serve other existing and potential developments in the area, and the officer and the authority were entitled to have regard to those matters. The high threshold of irrationality in this approach has not been surmounted.”
This is a helpful reminder both of how extreme the facts need to be (as they were with the bridge to nowhere) in order for a decision maker not to be able to conclude that works are not an integral part of a larger project and of the reluctance of the courts to interfere with the planning judgment reached on such issues by the decision maker.
I hope that calms some nerves.
I’m not sure nerves will have been calmed at DLUHC by publication on 14 July 2023 by the House of Commons Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee of its Reforms to National Planning Policy report. Let’s just say that when it comes to the Government’s proposed reforms, the Committee has not been getting with the project…
More on the report’s findings from the rest of your social media I am sure.
Finally, I’ve reluctantly got with another project. Having decided not to use Twitter since last November, I have signed up with the Meta alternative, Threads. It’s not perfect but if it places real pressure on Twitter to retreat from the harmful changes made since Elon Musk acquired that company, so much the better. There are already plenty of familiar names on the Threads app and, if you can bear being subject to yet another mutant algorithm, it’s very easy to use (suspiciously similar to Twitter’s interface in fact). If you’re passing, I’m on it as @sricketts101.
I have been commuting into Euston station for over twenty years, experiencing increasing frustration: at the past we have lost; the future that we are losing, and at the tatty and graceless perma-temp arrangement we have today.
I’m not sure that this week’s Public Affairs Committee report, HS2 Euston (7 July 2023), has yet had the attention it deserves and I’ll come back to that. But first:
But then so was the 1968 modernist version of Euston when it opened:
This 1968 British Rail brochure gushed with excitement at the wonders of the grill room, party catering room, “high class toilets with showers and baths” and underground car park, showing no regret for the previous building that had been swept away.
Since then, the modernist lines of the new station have of course long been lost by way of multiple interventions. It’s frankly a mess. And for the last few years, as you pull into the station by rail, to the right is a swathe of HS2 construction activity. If you walk out of the station towards Euston Square, via that unsignposted corridor past the left luggage place, through the door into the between the bicycle racks area, across Melton Street you have hoardings either side as you walk past where businesses have been acquired and demolished at the eastern end of Drummond Street – this really is HS2World.
Screenshot courtesy Google
The future
HS2 was going to be the future. Just as those in the 60s were seduced by the clean lines, the white heat of technology, the chance to wipe away the inefficiencies of the past, we were seduced by the idea of high speed rail, with Euston as its southern terminus.
From the Department for Transport’s March 2010 High Speed Rail command paper (foreword by then prime minister Gordon Brown and then Secretary of State for Transport Andrew Adonis):
“… HS2 Ltd’s recommended route for a London-Birmingham high speed line (‘High Speed Two’), which would run from a rebuilt Euston station in London to a new Birmingham City Centre station at Curzon/Fazeley Street, is viable, subject to further work on reducing specific impacts on the local environment and communities.”
“…effective integration with London’s current and planned transport networks is crucial, and that this is best delivered through the combination of a Euston terminus and a Crossrail Interchange station sited between Paddington and Heathrow, which would also provide a link to the Great Western Main Line.”
“…the new British high speed rail network should be connected to the wider European high speed rail network via High Speed One and the Channel Tunnel, subject to cost and value for money. This could be achieved through either or both of a dedicated rapid transport system linking Euston and St Pancras and a direct rail link to High Speed One. HS2 Ltd will carry out further work to assess the viability and cost of each of these, including a full assessment of the business case, prior to any public consultation.”
“The HS2 Y network (so named due to its shape) will provide direct high capacity, high speed links between London, Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester, with intermediate stations in the East Midlands and South Yorkshire.”
“The network will also provide improved links from the Midlands and the North to Heathrow Airport and the Channel Tunnel (via the existing High Speed 1 line). HS2 passengers will be able to travel directly to Heathrow and the Channel Tunnel without having to change trains.”
“Having reviewed the options again the Government’s conclusion remains that Euston is the right site for a London terminus, best serving passenger requirements and offering greater access to alternative onward travel networks than either Old Oak Common or Stratford. Any terminus other than Euston would offer a worse overall balance of costs and benefits.”
These aspirations weren’t properly tested. The Supreme Court held in R (HS2 Action Alliance) v Secretary of State for Transport (22 January 2014) that the white paper was not subject to any requirement for strategic environmental assessment as it was not a plan that “set the framework” for subsequent decision making. This is still one of the most disappointing litigation outcomes of my career and indeed the court’s consideration of Parliamentary sovereignty versus the effect of EU Directives was a forerunner of much of the subsequent debate over Brexit. I’m not sure that Parliamentary sovereignty has helped us achieve a good outcome on HS2…
I re-read yesterday the House of Commons second reading debate (28 April 2014) in relation to what was at that point the High Speed Rail (London–West Midlands) Bill (short title: “A Bill to make provision for a railway between Euston in London and a junction with the West Coast Main Line at Handsacre in Staffordshire, with a spur from Old Oak Common in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham to a junction with the Channel Tunnel Rail Link at York Way in the London Borough of Islington and a spur from Water Orton in Warwickshire to Curzon Street in Birmingham; and for connected purposes.”) . Patrick McLoughlin (now Lord McLoughlin) was Secretary of State for Transport:
“…it is time to connect great cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds. It is time for better links between north and south and between east and west, and time to connect to world markets to make the most of their skills and talents. It is time for HS2; time for a new north-south railway line.”
With the benefit of hindsight, the two “on the money” contributions to the debate were from MPs from different sides of the political divide, now both sadly deceased, but both superb representatives of their constituents and true Parliamentarians:
Cheryl Gillan, then Conservative MP for Chesham and Amersham, focused on the implications of the choices as to route and extent of tunnelling for the Chilterns area of outstanding beauty, alternative horizontal and vertical alignments having been rejected for reasons which in my view would not have stood up to proper independent scrutiny (I’ve already mentioned the lack of strategic environment assessment at the white paper stage; the other issue was the Select Committee process for testing the detailed proposals in the Bill – see my 30 July 2016 blog post, HS2: The Very Select Committee)
Frank Dobson, then Labour MP for Holborn and St Pancras, focused on the implications for the area surrounding Euston station:
“I should point out the ridiculous situation whereby the hybrid Bill before the House proposes major works in my constituency, none of which the Government now intend to carry out. The Bill also provides for a link from HS2 to HS1. That ridiculous proposal has been abandoned altogether. The Bill provides for the option 8 design of the station at Euston. That ridiculous proposal, we are told, is shortly to be abandoned, but the design, cost and construction timetable for the alternative to it have not yet been worked out, so there’s nowt to vote on.
The neighbourhoods to the east and west of Euston station and its railway approaches are densely populated with a variety of uses. Most of the streets are overwhelmingly residential. They are home to large numbers of residents living in high densities in settled and varied communities, with a wide range of incomes, housing tenures, jobs, ethnic origins and religions. Most of those residents want to continue to live there. They rightly resent patronising references to their neighbourhood by the much lauded chair of HS2 Ltd and have asked me to remind him and everyone else that where they live is not like the Olympic site. It is not a brownfield site, ripe for redevelopment.
The HS2 project as now proposed would wreak havoc on those neighbourhoods. It would expand Euston station by 75 metres to the west, demolish the homes of 500 people and subject 5,000 more to living for a decade next to the construction site or beside roads that will be made intolerable by the heavy goods vehicles servicing the main site and the 14 satellite construction compounds. No consideration has been given to the cumulative harm that all this would do to the quality of life of my constituents. The proposed working hours regime enables work to proceed at any hour of the day or night. Every little park and play space near the site is to be taken over. Small, locally owned and locally staffed businesses, especially cafes, shops and restaurants in Drummond street, face financial disaster. Between 40% and 70% of their business is passing trade from pedestrians going to and from Euston station, which, for the duration of the works—10 years—will be cut off by a solid, 3.6 metre-high security fence.
The people I represent believe that HS2 should not go ahead. Failing that, they believe that HS2 should terminate at Old Oak Common, at least temporarily, to test its capacity and permit the assessment of any capacity needed at Euston to be based on experience rather than the guesswork used so far.”
Of course the Bill was passed in due course. There have been successive plans unveiled for Euston Station and then effectively abandoned:
Updated plans were then unveiled in March 2022 of a revised concept design by a design consortium made up of Arup, WSP, Grimshaw Architects, Haptic, and LDA Design, alongside HS2’s Station Construction Partner, Mace Dragados JV.
Despite nearly all of the disruption feared by Frank Dobson already having been caused by the construction works around Euston that are now well underway, Mark Harper, current Secretary of State for Transport, released a press statement on 9 March 2023, pausing new construction work at Euston for two years:
“The Government is prioritising HS2’s initial services between Old Oak Common in London and Birmingham Curzon Street to provide delivery of passenger benefits as soon as possible. We remain committed to delivering HS2 services to Euston, and will address affordability pressures to ensure the overall spending profile is manageable. We will therefore take the time to ensure we have an affordable and deliverable station design, delivering Euston alongside high-speed infrastructure to Manchester.”
“We remain committed to delivering HS2 services to Euston. We have decided not to proceed with construction at Euston over the next 2 years both to reduce expenditure during that period and to address the affordability challenge set out in the recent National Audit Office report. We will use this time to develop a more affordable scheme design that delivers for passengers, the local community and taxpayers.
The government will not be proceeding to construction on Phase 2a (West Midlands to Crewe) in the next 2 years to reduce expenditure. We will use the time to develop mature designs and delivery approaches to ensure that this section is delivered in the most cost-effective way.”
“As reported in the recent National Audit Office report on Euston, the latest proposed target price from the construction partner (Mace Dragados joint venture) is £4.8 billion – around £2.2 billion over HS2 Ltd’s budget and a higher cost than the previous design.
I visited the Euston site on 5 April 2023 and saw for myself the challenges of constructing a complex station in a dense urban environment that will integrate with the existing conventional station and London Underground and local transport, as well as enabling oversite development.
Nonetheless, the station is not affordable at this cost, nor in any case, does the government have the financial headroom to proceed with the construction over the next 2 years. We will, therefore, use the time to look again at the Euston station design to ensure it delivers for passengers, the local community and taxpayers. This will include considering how we might partner with the private sector to capture benefits for customers. It will require careful prioritisation of requirements and a willingness from stakeholders to compromise.”
It’s way over budget and they don’t know how to build it. And what delay do we think “two years” will turn into? Bodes well doesn’t it?
Which takes us to yesterday’s excoriating Public Accounts Committee’s report, HS2 Euston (7 July 2023).
Its summary:
“Despite being eight years into planning the High Speed 2 station at Euston, the Department for Transport (the Department) still does not know what it is trying to achieve with the station and what sort of regeneration it will support. It is clear now that the £2.6 billion budget HS2 Ltd set for the project was completely unrealistic, even before the impacts of inflation are considered. The Department will now need to reset the project for a second time in order to find a design that is realistic, affordable and provides value for money.
The Department does not know what the additional costs and impacts will be from its decision to pause construction at the station for two years. Working alongside HS2 Ltd, it now has a big task to identify what these costs and impacts are, including the impact on the supply chain and on local residents. It is essential for the Department to collect this information both to help it and HS2 Ltd manage the additional costs effectively and also to better inform any decisions in the future on whether to pause major projects.
Disappointingly, HS2 Euston station is yet another example of the Department making the same mistakes and failing to learn lessons from its management of other major rail programmes. Parliament has also not had the full transparency it needed on the likelihood of cost increases at Euston, despite the improvements the Department and HS2 Ltd have made in reporting on progress.”
SIMONICITY 