Housing Needs, Housing Shortfalls

We’ve got five years, my brain hurts a lot

We’ve got five years, that’s all we’ve got

(David Bowie)

The new NPPF introduces the requirement for local planning authorities to use a standard method to arrive at their local housing needs assessment, “unless exceptional circumstances justify an alternative approach which also reflects current and future demographic trends and market signals. In addition to the local housing need figure, any needs that cannot be met within neighbouring areas should also be taken into account in establishing the amount of housing to be planned for.”

However, the precise methodology and authority by authority figures are still a moving target. The Government said this in its “response to consultation” document, published alongside the new NPPF:

A number of responses to this question provided comment on the proposed local housing need method. The government is aware that lower than previously forecast population projections have an impact on the outputs associated with the method. Specifically it is noted that the revised projections are likely to result in the minimum need numbers generated by the method being subject to a significant reduction, once the relevant household projection figures are released in September 2018.

In the housing white paper the government was clear that reforms set out (which included the introduction of a standard method for assessing housing need) should lead to more homes being built. In order to ensure that the outputs associated with the method are consistent with this, we will consider adjusting the method after the household projections are released in September 2018. We will consult on the specific details of any change at that time.

It should be noted that the intention is to consider adjusting the method to ensure that the starting point in the plan-making process is consistent in aggregate with the proposals in Planning for the right homes in the right places consultation and continues to be consistent with ensuring that 300,000 homes are built per year by the mid 2020s.”

Inevitably, with change comes uncertainty as to how the new policies will be applied to applications and plans which are currently in the pipeline. There are three key transitional arrangements:

⁃ “The policies in the previous Framework will apply for the purpose of examining plans, where those plans are submitted [for examination] on or before 24 January 2019” (paragraph 214)

⁃ “The Housing Delivery Test will apply from the day following the publication of the Housing Delivery Test results in November 2018” (paragraph 215)

⁃ “The policies in this Framework are material considerations which should be taken into account in dealing with applications from the day of its publication” [ie 24 July 2018] (paragraph 212).

I want to look at a few specific issues of interest (to me at least):

The application of the new NPPF to the draft London Plan

The footnote to paragraph to paragraph 214 is more specific than the draft, in making it clear that the equivalent cut-off date for the London Plan is “the point at which the Mayor sends to the Panel copies of all representations made in accordance with regulation 8(1) of the Town and Country Planning (London Spatial Development Strategy) Regulations 2000“, meaning that the current Draft London Plan, for which a Panel of three inspectors has been appointed to hold an examination in public late this year, will be tested against the 2012 NPPF.

As underlined in his 27 July 2018 letter to the London Mayor, even when it is tested against the 2012 NPPF the Secretary of State is “not convinced” that the assessment of need in the current draft “reflects the full extent of housing need in London to tackle affordability problems.” He is looking to see modifications on a series of matters:

⁃ “A number of policy areas in the draft that are inconsistent with national policy, such as your policies allowing development on residential gardens and your policy on car parking. [NB whilst these might be areas of political difference they are not areas where the MHCLG’s approach would drive up numbers – far from it]

The detail and complexity of the policies within the draft London Plan have the potential to limit accessibility to the planning system and development.

⁃ The draft Plan strays considerably beyond providing a strategic framework.

⁃ The draft Plan does not provide enough information to explain the approach you will take to ensure your targets are delivered, including collaboration with boroughs and neighbouring areas.

⁃ There are a number of policies in the draft Plan which seek to deal with matters relating to building standards and safety. It is important that there is a consistent approach to setting building standards through the framework of Building Regulations

But, presumably as a quid pro quo for not sending the plan back to the drawing board to be tested against the methodology for assessing housing need in the new NPPF (which would arrive at significantly higher need figures than the basis for the draft plan), the Secretary of State is looking for the Mayor to review and revise the plan as soon as it is adopted:

It remains crucial however that you bring forward a revised London Plan that has regard to new national policies at the earliest opportunity. You will want to note paragraph 33 and annex 1 of the revised National Planning Policy Framework, which sets out that the Government expects plans to be reviewed early where all identified housing need is not being met and to ensure a plan is in place which reflects current national policy. I would therefore expect you to review the London Plan to reflect the revised National Planning Policy Framework immediately once the London Plan has been published. I remind you that if this is not forthcoming, I have powers to direct the review to ensure London delivers the plan and homes that communities need.”

Of course, since the current draft is not likely to be adopted until late 2019 and Sadiq Khan’s current term ends in May 2020, this will presumably increase the potential for politicking as between candidates and parties. Not good for consensus building, or perhaps other kinds of building, although if a new plan does not come forward presumably we can expect to see more MHCLG intervention in relation to major applications in London.

Other plans submitted for examination before 24 January 2019

Nothing in planning is of course black and white. Paragraph 214 of the new NPPF says that plans submitted for examination before 24 January 2019 will still be tested against the 2012 NPPF, but of course the 2012 NPPF allowed significant room for argument as to what the appropriate methodology might be for any authority “to use their evidence base to ensure that their Local Plan meets the full, objectively assessed needs for market and affordable housing in the housing market area, as far as is consistent with the policies set out in this Framework“. To what extent might inspectors allow the new standard method to be used for plans submitted before 24 January 2019?

Already since the publication of the new NPPF we have seen the East Cambridgeshire local plan inspector, Louise Nurser, issue her preliminary findings in a letter dated 30 July 2018 in which she accepts that the use of the new standard methodology is appropriate “in the particular circumstances of East Cambridgeshire” even though the plan was plainly submitted well before the relevant date. I set out her reasoning below:

“I conclude that it is a sound approach for the standard method to be used to set the OAN for housing within East Cambridgeshire at a minimum of 11,960 dwellings between 2016 and 2036. Indeed, in the context of a Strategic Housing Market Assessment (PE05) of considerable vintage (2013), which had already been used as the primary evidence base for the development strategy which is to be superseded by the Plan before me, it would not have been appropriate to update the evidence base in isolation of the wider HMA, so that it could be used a second time. Ideally, for the purposes of this plan, the housing needs of the wider Housing Market Area would have been thoroughly considered through a new Housing Market Assessment.

However, it is clear from the different stages in which the constituent plan making bodies find themselves that such a scenario would be unrealistic, particularly in the context of the clear indication from the recently published Framework that the standard method should be used in plan making in the future, and as a consequence, it is highly improbable that a completely new HMA would ever be commissioned.

I draw particular comfort from the fact that the annual dwelling requirement using the revised OAN figure of October 2016, for the district, which is based on the SHMA, is 586 dwellings per annum (PE06). This is comparable with the figure of 598 dwellings per annum, using the standard method (PE07). As such, the use of the standard method to determine East Cambridge’s housing needs is an acceptable and a pragmatic approach to determining the district’s needs. In coming to this conclusion, I must stress that my conclusions relate to the particular circumstances of East Cambridgeshire, which has already adopted a plan on the basis of the 2013 SHMA evidence.

I can see that there does not seem to be a significant difference in the case of East Cambridgeshire as to the outcome under the two approaches, but is her reasoning essentially, as she says, pragmatic – it would have been impractical to expect the 2013 strategic housing market assessment to have been updated as a base for the new plan? Might this be a position that various other authorities find themselves in? Does the new standard method amount to an appropriate evidence base for these purposes?

What now of the tilted balance?

Paragraph 11 of the new NPPF of course contains an amended form of what was paragraphs 14 and 49 of the 2012 document, the presumption in favour of sustainable development (or the “tilted balance” in the jargon) which applies where there is a shortfall in housing supply.

There is a shortfall where:

⁃ the “local planning authority cannot demonstrate a five year supply of deliverable housing sites” (with a 5 to 20% buffer – see paragraph 73); or where

⁃ (for decisions after the publication of the Housing Delivery Test results in November 2018) the Housing Delivery Test indicates that the delivery of housing was substantially below the housing requirement over the previous three years (with “substantially below” defined in paragraph 215 – starting at 25% of what is required and ratcheting up first to 45% and then to 75%).

Where there is a shortfall, the “policies which are most important for determining the application” are deemed to be out of date, meaning that planning permission should be granted unless (i) the application of policies in the NPPF that protect a defined list of categories of areas or assets of particular importance provides a clear reason for refusing the development proposed or (ii) “any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed the policies in this Framework taken as a whole“.

In my view this wording is clearer than the 2012 NPPF and should be easier to apply.

However, the effects of a shortfall are much reduced where there is a neighbourhood plan (which, after 11 December 2018, must be less than two years old) which contains policies and allocations to meet its identified housing requirement, the local planning authority has at least a three year supply of deliverable housing sites and the authority’s housing delivery was at least 45% of that required over the previous three years (25% until December 2019). (See paragraphs 14 and 216). In these circumstances, “the adverse impact of allowing development that conflicts with the neighbourhood plan is likely to significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits“.

Relevance of degree of shortfall

In deciding an appeal against the refusal of planning permission for housing development, how far does the decision-maker have to go in calculating the extent of any shortfall in the five-year supply of housing land? That was precisely the question considered last week by the Court of Appeal in Hallam Land Management Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 31 July 2018). The case concerns the policies within the 2012 NPPF but the principles are just as applicable to the new NPPF.

In his decision letter dated 9 November 2016 the Secretary of State had dismissed an appeal by Hallam Land against refusal of planning permission by Eastleigh Borough Council for a development of up to 225 dwellings, a 60-bed care home and 40 care units together with associated development in Hamble.

His conclusions as to the degree of shortfall in housing supply simply stated this:

The Secretary of State notes the Inspector’s comment (IR108) that at the time of inquiry the Council were not able to demonstrate more than a four and a half years supply of deliverable housing land, and that there is evidence of an existing need for affordable housing. Whilst the Secretary of State notes that the Council are now of the view that they are able to demonstrate a 4.86 year supply...”

Weighing this shortfall into the balance he dismissed the appeal on the basis that the adverse impacts of the proposal would significantly and demonstrably outweigh its benefits.

Had he reached a properly reasoned decision on the housing supply question or had he just ducked it? At the inquiry there had been much argument as to the extent of housing supply. Hallam asserted that it was between 1.78 and 2.92 years. In post inquiry representations, the council asserted that the figure was now 4.86 years. However two inspectors’ appeal decisions in the borough had concluded otherwise. In the 24 May 2016 Bubb Lane decision letter the inspector had found that the council had a “considerable way to go to demonstrate a five year supply of deliverable sites”. In the 7 October 2016 Botley Road decision letter the inspector had concluded that there were 4.25 years of supply.

It is not necessary for the decision maker to arrive at a precise conclusion as to the level of shortfall. As Lindblom LJ states:

Relevant authority in this court, and at first instance, does not support the proposition that, for the purposes of the appropriate balancing exercise under the policy in paragraph 14 of the NPPF, the decision-maker’s weighting of restrictive local plan policies, or of the proposal’s conflict with such policies, will always require an exact quantification of the shortfall in the supply of housing land.

Accordingly, Lindblom LJ did not “think that in this case the Secretary of State could fairly be criticized, in principle, for not having expressed a conclusion on the shortfall in the supply of housing land with great arithmetical precision. He was entitled to confine himself to an approximate figure or range – if that is what he did. Government policy in the NPPF did not require him to do more than that. There was nothing in the circumstances of this case that made it unreasonable for him in the “Wednesbury” sense, or otherwise unlawful, not to establish a mathematically exact figure for the shortfall. It would not have been an error of law or inappropriate for him to do so, but if, as a matter of planning judgment, he chose not to do it there was nothing legally wrong with that.”

It was not clear “whether the Secretary of State reached any concluded view on the scale of the “acknowledged shortfall”. His reference in paragraph 17 to “the limited shortfall in housing land supply” suggests he had not found it possible to accept Hallam Land’s case at the inquiry, as recorded by the inspector in paragraph 62 of his report, that the supply of housing land was as low as “2.92 years, or 1.78 years if the need for affordable housing is included”, or even the “material shortfall” to which the inspector had referred in paragraph 108, in the light of the council’s concession that it was “not able to demonstrate more than a four and a half years supply of deliverable housing land”. A “limited shortfall” could hardly be equated to a “material shortfall”. It would have been a more apt description of the shortfall the council had now acknowledged in conceding, or contending, that it was able to demonstrate a supply of 4.86 years – the figure to which the Secretary of State referred in paragraphs 19 and 30 of his decision letter.”

If he did adopt, or at least assume, a figure of 4.86 years’ supply of housing land, or even a range of between four and half and 4.86 years, his approach could not, I think, be stigmatized as unlawful in either of those two respects. It could not be said, at least in the circumstances of this case, that he erred in law in failing to calculate exactly what the shortfall was. In principle, he was entitled to conclude that no greater precision was required than that the level of housing land supply fell within a clearly identified range below the requisite five years, and that, in the balancing exercise provided for in paragraph 14 of the NPPF, realistic conclusions could therefore be reached on the weight to be given to the benefits of the development and its conflict with relevant policies of the local plan. Such conclusions would not, I think, exceed a reasonable and lawful planning judgment.”

However, “even if that assumption is made in favour of the Secretary of State, there is in my view a fatal defect in his decision in his failure to engage with the conclusions on housing land supply in the recent decisions in the Bubb Lane and Botley Road appeals.”

In both decision letters the shortfall was characterized as “significant”, which plainly it was. This was more akin to saying that it was a “material shortfall”, as the inspector in Hallam Land’s appeal had himself described it in paragraph 108 of his decision letter. Neither description – a “significant” shortfall or a “material” one – can be squared with the Secretary of State’s use of the adjective “limited”. They are, on any view, quite different concepts.”

“Quite apart from the language they used to describe it, the inspectors’ findings and conclusions as to the extent of the shortfall – only “something in the order of four year supply” in the Bubb Lane appeal and only “4.25 years’ supply” in the Botley Road appeal – were also substantially different from the extent of the shortfall apparently accepted or assumed by the Secretary of State in his decision in this case, which was as high as 4.86 years’ supply on the basis of evidence from the council that had been before the inspector in the Botley Road appeal and rejected by him.”

“One is left with genuine – not merely forensic – confusion on this important point, and the uncomfortable impression that the Secretary of State did not come to grips with the inspectors’ conclusions on housing land supply in those two very recent appeal decisions.”

In a short judgment, agreeing with the lead judgment of Lindblom LJ, Davis LJ makes the position plain:

I have the greatest difficulty in seeing how an overall planning judgment thereafter could properly be made without having at least some appreciation of the extent of the shortfall. That is not to say that the extent of the shortfall will itself be a key consideration. It may or not be: that is itself a planning judgment, to be assessed in the light of the various policies and other relevant considerations. But it ordinarily will be a relevant and material consideration, requiring to be evaluated.

The reason is obvious and involves no excessive legalism at all. The extent (be it relatively large or relatively small) of any such shortfall will bear directly on the weight to be given to the benefits or disbenefits of the proposed development.”

The decision was quashed.

Was David Bowie writing for the Secretary of State, or for all of us?

My brain hurt like a warehouse, it had no room to spare

I had to cram so many things to store everything in there

Simon Ricketts, 5 August 2018

Personal views, et cetera

The NPPF & Eleven Other Documents Published By MHCLG On 24 July 2018

I declare after all there is no enjoyment like reading!” (Jane Austen)

Happily the House of Commons did not after all rise a few days early, because on the last day before the summer recess the revised NPPF was duly published as the Secretary of State James Brokenshire had promised.

We have since all been busy getting to grips with what it all means – an urgent task given that its policies have immediate effect in relation to the determination of planning applications and appeals (whilst for plan-making the document is only relevant in relation to plans submitted for examination after 24 January 2019). I have already seen many good online summaries and blog posts as to the substance of the document and there are plenty of issues to delve into in coming months. The purpose of this post is simply to provide links to the various documents that were published by MHCLG alongside the NPPF.

Alongside the publication of the NPPF itself, there was a press release, “Government’s new planning rulebook to deliver more quality, well-designed homes“, as well as James Brokenshire’s short written ministerial statement, entitled “housing policy” (although the NPPF is of course about far more than housing and is hardly a “rulebook”).

There is no official marked up version showing the changes that have been made to the 2012 version or to the March 2018 draft, although various of us have our own internal versions – after all the detailed wording matters. Whilst the Government has published its response to the draft revised National Planning Policy Framework consultation, setting out its summary of consultation responses received to the March draft and “the Government’s view on the way forward“, the document only identifies the main substantive changes (not for instance the expunging of references to European Union directives – of no substantive relevance but an interesting reminder that the new NPPF may outlive our membership of the European Union).

The response document is interesting for some of the pointers it provides as to further guidance that may be on the way. For instance, in relation to:

⁃ ensuring the vitality of town centres: “The support for the policy changes is welcomed and the Government intends to implement the changes as set out in the consultation. On the specific request for clarity in relation to ‘reasonable period’, further advice will be set out in updated national planning guidance to assist with the application of the policy. ”

⁃ making effective use of land: “We will publish national planning guidance to enable local authorities to maximise opportunities that arise from delivering increased densities.

⁃ the implications of the European Court of Justice’s People Over Wind judgment, bearing in mind that the draft NPPF (substantively unchanged in the final version) disapplies the presumption in favour of sustainable development where appropriate assessment is required, which will more frequently be the case as a result of the judgment): “The Government notes representations it has received on the impact of the People Over Wind judgement. The Government notes that this judgement concerns both the Habitats Regulations and the Framework. The Government is examining the implications of this judgement closely and is not proposing any changes to the Framework at this stage. ”

⁃ conserving and enhancing the historic environment: “We have also revised the reference to ‘optimum viable use’ and will set out in guidance where its use could be appropriate. We note the concerns about clarifying the policy approach to the assessment of the impact of proposed development on the significance of heritage assets and we will consider this issue further in revising national planning guidance.”

⁃ the definition of “deliverable” in the light of recent case law: “The Government has considered whether the definition of ‘deliverable’ should be amended further, but having assessed the responses it has not made additional changes. This is because the wording proposed in the consultation is considered to set appropriate and realistic expectations for when sites of different types are likely to come forward.”

So, plainly, work is still very much in hand in updating the Planning Practice Guidance and other advice. So far, two main sections have been updated, namely those relating to:

housing and economic development needs assessments (albeit with further guidance to come); and

viability

MHCLG has also published its “Housing Delivery Test Measurement Rule Book“, setting out its method “for calculating the Housing Delivery Test result“.

Aside from the above summer reading we have also been given some homework. MHCLG has now published a call for evidence in relation to the Independent Review of Planning Appeal Inquiries chaired by Bridget Rosewell. The deadline for responses is 18 September 2018.

The call for evidence is accompanied by some fascinating additional material which will no doubt be the subject of a future blog post, namely:

Key appeal statistics

Planning appeal statistics

Planning appeals inquiries process timeline (illustrative)

Annex – Case Studies which provide illustrations of when delays in the process can occur

What is right to be done cannot be done too soon.” (Jane Austen)

Simon Ricketts, 25 July 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Challenging Plans Before They Are Hatched

Can you challenge a draft local plan in the High Court before it is submitted to the Secretary of State for examination? When does the ouster in section 113 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 kick in, which prevents development plan documents from being “questioned in any legal proceedings” except by way of an application for leave made before the end of six weeks beginning with the date that the document is adopted by the local planning authority?

These ouster provisions in legislation cause problems. For instance, in my 4 February 2017 blog post Hillingdon JR: Lucky Strike Out?, I reported on a case where the equivalent provision in relation to challenges to national policy statements under the NSIPs regime was relied upon to strike out a challenge to the Government’s announcement of a decision to publish a draft airports NPS.

R (CK Properties (Theydon Bois) Limited) v Epping Forest District Council (Supperstone J, 29 June 2018) concerned a challenge by a developer to Epping Forest District Council’s decision on 14 December 2017 to proceed with regulation 19 consultation of the submission version of its draft local plan prior to its submission to the Secretary of State for examination.

For those not familiar with the process, in summary authorities first have to carry out consultation in relation to their proposed development plans under Regulation 18 of the Town and Country Planning (Local Planning) (England) Regulations 2012 and take that consultation into account in preparing a revised version either for further Regulation 18 consultation or, if they consider that the document is ready for examination, for submission to the Secretary of State – in which case they must then carry out further consultation, under Regulation 19, before submitting the plan along with the representations received in response to that further consultation.

Remember back when many local planning authorities were racing to submit their local plans before a deadline of 31 March 2018, when the Government was indicating that its proposed standardised methodology for assessing housing needs would need to be used for plans submitted after that date? Of course that date then slipped with the delays to the draft revised NPPF to a date which will now be six months after the new NPPF is published but that’s another story.

Epping Forest was one of those authorities rushing to submit its plan, a district where the new standardised methodology would apparently increase the required housing provision over the plan period from some 11,400 to 20,306 homes. Some difference.

CK Properties have a site which was not allocated for residential development. Its complaint in the legal proceedings was that the appendix to the council’s site selection report that assessed the various sites considered for allocation and explaining its reasoning was not available at the time the council made its decision to consult on the submission version of its plan, despite assurances in its statement of community involvement that such background documents would be made available. The claimant secured an order from the Planning Court on 20 March 2018 restraining the council from submitting the plan for examination until the claim had been determined.

At the full hearing, the council sought to argue that regardless of the position in relation to the matters complained of, the effect of section 113 was that any challenge would have to await adoption of the plan.

It’s an important issue – can those aggrieved by a decision by a local planning authority to submit its plan to the Secretary of State for examination, challenge that decision by way of judicial review or do they have to store up their complaint until the plan is finally adopted?

The High Court had previously considered a challenge to a decision taken at an earlier stage in the development plan process in The Manydown Company Limited v Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council (Lindblom J, 17 April 2012), allowing judicial review proceedings to be brought of a decision by a council to approve a pre-submission draft core strategy for consultation (the equivalent of what is now the regulation 18 stage under the 2012 Regulations). The judge postulated that the position might be different in relation to the submission draft of a plan but considered that section 113 did not preclude challenges to pre-submission drafts.

Indeed the judge saw good sense not closing out the potential for an early challenge:

In a case such as this, an early and prompt claim for judicial review makes it possible to test the lawfulness of decisions taken in the run-up to a statutory process, saving much time and expense – including the expense of public money – that might otherwise be wasted. In principle it cannot be wrong to tackle errors that are properly amenable to judicial review, when otherwise they would have to await the adoption of the plan before the court can put them right.”

The High Court had also considered in IM Properties Development Limited v Lichfield District Council (Patterson J, 18 July 2014) the different question as to whether judicial review proceedings could be brought in relation to main modifications to a local plan or whether the challenge could only be brought post plan adoption by way of section 113. The court determined that the latter position was correct:

Once a document becomes a Development Plan document within the meaning of section 113 of the 2004 Act the statutory language is clear : it must not be questioned in any legal proceedings except in so far as is provided by the other provisions of the section. Sub-section (11)(c) makes it clear that for the purposes of a Development Plan document or a revision of it the date when it is adopted by the Local Planning Authority is the relevant date from when time runs within which the bring a statutory challenge.

It is quite clear, in my judgment and not inconsistent with the Manydown judgment, that once a document has been submitted for examination it is a Development Plan document. The main modifications which have been proposed and which will be the subject of examination are potentially part of that relevant document. To permit any other interpretation would be to give a licence to satellite litigation at an advanced stage of the Development Plan process.”

Having considered the scope of section 113 and these two previous authorities (neither covering the situation of an authority’s decision to proceed with a submission draft plan), Supperstone J concluded that the authority’s decision to prepare for submission of the plan could indeed be challenged by way of judicial review and was not closed out by section 113.

Whilst the claim ultimately failed because the judge did not find any of the grounds of challenge to be made out, the potential implications of the ruling are significant. There is very clearly now a window for judicial review of a local planning authority’s decision to embark on regulation 19 consultation (the formal precursor to submission of the plan for examination). The window closes when the plan is submitted for examination and any subsequent challenge can only be brought once the plan has been adopted. If there are clear grounds for challenge (for instance on the basis of procedural failings in the process to that date) why wait for submission of the plan and its eventual adoption? Indeed, might claimants challenging an adopted plan be criticised and even denied relief if they could have brought proceedings at the earlier stage?

Whilst there is something to be said for the Lindblom LJ (as he now is) view, expressed in Manydown, that early challenge (rather than having potential challenges stored up) can be a good thing, it can surely also be a bad thing if it slows down the process, particularly if, as is so often the case, the challenge is ultimately dismissed.

I assume that one reason why the claimant brought the early challenge in Epping Forest, and secured the interim order obtained from the court preventing submission of the plan until the full hearing had taken place into the challenge, was to seek to ensure that the plan was not submitted until the deadline had passed after which the Government’s standardised methodology for assessing housing needs had been introduced – given that the new methodology would require additional housing sites to be found. However, such have been the delays with the introduction of that methodology and such has been the speed of the court process to date (I do not know whether permission to appeal is being sought) it is very likely that the council will still be in a position to submit its plan on the basis of the old methodology.

Simon Ricketts, 30 June 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Sajid Javid: Agent Of Change?

Sajid Javid’s statement Strengthened planning rules to protect music venues and their neighbours on 18 January 2018, confirming that the “agent of change” principle would be included in the revised NPPF, was widely supported. 
But this was hardly news was it? Go back to the February 2017 housing white paper:

Noise and other impacts on new developments 

A.140 The National Planning Policy Framework, supported by planning guidance, already incorporates elements of the ‘agent of change’ principle (this provides that the person or business responsible for the change should be responsible for managing the impact of that change) in relation to noise, by being clear that existing businesses wanting to grow should not have unreasonable restrictions put on them because of changes in nearby land uses since they were established. 

A.141 We propose to amend the Framework to emphasise that planning policies and decisions should take account of existing businesses and other organisations, such as churches, community pubs, music venues and sports clubs, when locating new development nearby and, where necessary, to mitigate the impact of noise and other potential nuisances arising from existing development. This will help mitigate the risk of restrictions or possible closure of existing businesses and other organisations due to noise and other complaints from occupiers of new developments.

The latest statement takes this further forward not one jot. I was blogging about the agent of change principle back in October 2016 in my post Noise Annoys.

The prod for the 18 January announcement was the introduction into the House of Commons on 10 January 2018 of a private members’ bill, the Planning (Agent of Change) Bill, by Labour MP John Spellar. Following the debate on 10 January, the Bill (which has not actually been published at this stage, as is often the case with private members’ bills of this nature which are largely intended just intended to draw attention to an issue) was due to receive a second reading on 19 January but this has now been postponed until 16 March. Presumably the intention of the bill was simply to keep the Government focused on what it had already indicated to do. If this is how politicians have to spend their time but it all seems odd to this outsider. 
The agent of change concept really now does have momentum, with a strong campaign run by the Music Venue Trust and supported by the Local Government Association. It is frustrating that even such an apparently simple change to policy (oversold in Javid’s statement as a new “rule”) takes so long to introduce. 
The Welsh Assembly was able to move rather faster, introducing an equivalent policy change by its letter letter Supporting the Night Time Economy and the Agent of Change Principle (26 May 2017):
Existing policy in Planning Policy Wales already says new uses should not be introduced into an area without considering the nature of existing uses. Under the agent of change principle, if new developments or uses are to be introduced near a pre-existing business, such as a live music venue, it is the responsibility of the developer to ensure solutions to address and mitigate noise are put forward as part of proposals and are capable of being implemented. 

PPW also encourages local planning authorities to consider the compatibility of uses in areas and afford appropriate protection where they consider it necessary, as part of their development plans. The revisions to PPW will add to this and allow for the designation of areas of cultural significance for music through development plans.”



The letter advises Welsh planning authorities that they “should begin to apply this principle, where it is a relevant consideration, with immediate effect.” Javid could have taken this approach with his 18 January announcement and it is a disappointment that he did not.  
The Mayor of London has also of course introduced a policy into the draft London plan. 



There has also been coverage this week of the supposed news of further slippage in the publication of the draft NPPF, which would cause further delay to the final document. Senior MCHLG servant Melanie Dawes was reported in Planning magazine as saying to the CLG Commons Select Committee that it would be “ready for consultation in the next few months – I hope just before Easter or thereabouts”, meaning that we should assume it may be at the end of March (“or thereabouts”!). But again, this wasn’t news, given that Government chief planner Steve Quartermain’s 21 December 2017 letter to local authorities had promised the draft “early” in 2018. The letter states that the final version of the revised NPPF would be “before the end of the summer“. In my view this is careful wording: we should not necessarily assume that we will see it this side of the Parliamentary recess (which starts on 20 July). Which of course has an immediate influence on those authorities who had either been rushing to submit their local plans by the end of March 2018 or waiting until after that deadline, depending on their tactical judgment as to how they would be affected by the proposed standardised methodology for assessing housing needs – that end of March deadline is now a late summer deadline. 

Honestly, it would be enough to make one scream, if it wasn’t for the neighbours. 
Simon Ricketts, 19.1.18
Personal views, et cetera

Dear Mr Raab, This Case Illustrates Much Of What Is Wrong With Planning

Spare a thought for Dominic Raab, who was appointed minister for housing on 9 January 2018. (Is he also minister for planning as his predecessors were? Who knows?). Linklaters-trained lawyer, he may have thought that the EU was byzantine in its tiers of policy making but that is surely as nothing compared to the English planning system. 
I do hope that Mr Raab sits down to read Dove J’s judgment in Richborough Estates Limited (and 24 other co-claimants) v Secretary of State (12 January 2018). This is of course the challenge by various land promoters and house-builders to the written ministerial statement made on 12 December 2016 (without prior consultation) by Mr Raab’s predecessor but one, Gavin Barwell. I blogged about the WMS at the time (That Written Ministerial Statement, 29 December 2016). 
For me the case illustrates the unnecessary policy complexities arising from unclear statements, ad hoc glosses to previous policies and the unclear inter-relationship between the NPPF, PPG and written ministerial statements. It also evidences the obvious tension between on the one hand the Government’s desire to increase housing land supply by ensuring that failure by authorities to provide adequately has real consequences and on the other hand the Government’s desperation to retain public confidence in neighbourhood planning. If that wasn’t enough, you have within it the attempt by policy makers to take into account the implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Suffolk Coastal – that one should also definitely be on Mr Raab’s reading list. 
You will recall that, despite the policy in paragraph 49 of the NPPF that relevant policies for the supply of housing should not be considered up-to-date if the local planning authority cannot demonstrate a five-year supply of deliverable housing sites (triggering the presumption in favour of sustainable development in paragraph 14), the WMS provided that relevant policies for the supply of housing in a neighbourhood plan should not be deemed to be ‘out-of-date’ where the WMS is less than two years old or the neighbourhood plan has been part of the development plan for two years or less; the neighbourhood plan allocates sites for housing; and the local planning authority can demonstrate a three-year supply of deliverable housing sites.
Effectively the five year housing land supply target was being significantly watered down, to a three year target, where an up to date neighbourhood plan, allocating sites for housing (however few) was in place. The policies in that plan would still have full effect. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Suffolk Coastal, which clarified the operation of paragraphs 14 and 49, the Government changed its PPG but policies in neighbourhood plans which met the criteria in the WMS were still to be given ‘significant weight’ notwithstanding there not being a five years’ housing supply. 

Richborough and the other claimants sought to quash the WMS on various grounds. They argued:

– the WMS was inconsistent with paragraphs 14 and 49 of the NPPF and in having the effect of amending paragraph 49 without explicitly doing so represented an approach which was irrational and unlawful;

– the Government had made errors of fact in the research that was relied upon in formulating the policy;

– the WMS was invalid for uncertainty and confused given a lack of clarity as to how the three years’ supply was to be calculated;

– irrationality in the face of the stated intention of the NPPF to “boost significantly the supply of housing“;

– breach of legitimate expectation that there would be public consultation before planning policy for housing was changed by the WMS. 

Dove J found for the Government on all grounds. He found that the Government has a very wide discretion in the way that it brings forward planning policy:
Provided […] that the policy produced does not frustrate the operation of planning legislation, or introduce matters which are not properly planning considerations at all, and is not irrational, the matters which the defendant regards as material or immaterial to the determination of the policy being issued is [sic] a matter entirely for the defendant“. 
The policy was capable of “sensible interpretation“: three years’ housing land supply was to be calculated using the same methodology as for calculating five years’ supply. 
The judge did not interpret the WMS, with the subsequent addition of the guidance in the PPG, as amending paragraph 49 or 14 of the NPPF, albeit that it did “change national policy in relation to housing applications in areas with a recently made [neighbourhood plan]“. I am still struggling with this one – undoubtedly the WMS has changed the application of the NPPF in areas with a neighbourhood plan that meets the NPPF criteria. Even if this is not unlawful, surely this approach to policy making is to be discouraged – the NPPF does not now mean what it says. 
The judge found that there was an adequate evidential basis for the WMS and errors of fact had not been made. The bar was low given that the WMS had only stated that ‘recent analysis suggests…“. 
As regards the suggestion of irrationality in the face of the stated intention of the NPPF to “boost significantly the supply of housing“, the judge noted that this “is not an objective which exists on its own and isolated from the other interests addressed by the Framework…Amongst the other concerns for which the Framework has specific policies is, of course, Neighbourhood Planning...”
The judge set out the circumstances in which a legitimate expectation to consultation arises and found that such an expectation did not arise because a limited number of other policy announcements in relation to housing and planning matters had not been preceded by consultation. I understand that the claimants are likely to seek permission to appeal on this last ground. 
So, there is disappointment for those of us who saw Gavin Barwell’s WMS as an inappropriate attempt to rewrite (without the consultation which would have been so helpful in arriving at a workable policy) a key protection that is within the NPPF against authorities that fail properly to plan for housing. The disappointment is reduced since the Suffolk Coastal ruling and the change to the PPG which followed (no doubt largely because the Government was faced with this litigation) where the Government sought to clarify that the WMS did not change the operation of paragraph 49, although “significant weight” should be given to the neighbourhood plan. 
But, stepping back, the planning system has become as tangled again as it was at the time of the great bonfire of the previous planning policy statements and circulars in 2012 – we are having to pick uncertainly through unclear passages in the NPPF, the PPG and the WMS, reliant on regular revelations from the courts as to what the documents actually mean; decision-makers are having to ascertain the relative weight to be applied to various, often inconsistent, policies at national, local and neighbourhood level, and in the meantime the Government apparently has carte blanche to change its policies without prior consultation (policies were meant to be just in the NPPF, guidance in the PPG if you remember…).
There is a heavy burden on the shoulders of those drafting the new NPPF, that’s for sure! And a massive and important job to do for our new housing minister.
Simon Ricketts, 12 January 2018
Personal views, et cetera

How Much Weight Does The Draft London Plan Have In Decision-Making?

There’s a facetious answer, a political answer, a legal answer and a practical answer. 
The facetious answer? 

2 kg. (It’s a whopper). 



The political answer?
I’ve heard Deputy Mayor Jules Pipe confirm at a London First event that the Mayor will immediately take it into account. The Mayor’s website says:
The current 2016 consolidation Plan is still the adopted Development Plan. However the Draft London Plan is a material consideration in planning decisions.  It gains more weight as it moves through the process to adoption, however the weight given to it is a matter for the decision maker.”
The legal answer?
It’s not totally totally up to the decision maker. That statement suggests that the Mayor or the boroughs could give controversial new policies in the plan (for instance increased restrictions in relation to student housing schemes) significant weight even at this stage, before the outcome of the consultation process which runs to 2 March 2018 or before the inspector has reported following the examination in public anticipated for Autumn 2018. That is not quite right. 
In my view, paragraph 216 of the NPPF undoubtedly applies to the London Plan as a statutory development plan:

 “From the day of publication, decision-takers may also give weight to relevant policies in emerging plans according to:

•the stage of preparation of the emerging plan (the more advanced the preparation, the greater the weight that may be given);

•the extent to which there are unresolved objections to relevant policies (the less significant the unresolved objections, the greater the weight that may be given); and

•the degree of consistency of the relevant policies in the emerging plan to the policies in this Framework (the closer the policies in the emerging plan to the policies in the Framework, the greater the weight that may be given).”

The application of paragraph 216 was closely examined by the High Court in Woodcock Holdings Limited v Secretary of State (Holgate J, 1 May 2015). A decision by the Secretary of State to dismiss (against his inspector’s recommendations) an appeal for 120 homes and related development in West Sussex was quashed. One of the grounds relied upon by the court was that the Secretary of State, in deciding to place significant weight on an emerging neighbourhood plan which had not undergone examination had not considered the second and third criteria within paragraph 216:
In my judgment, the policy in paragraph 216 of the NPPF should be read as a whole. It is not a policy which simply makes the trite point that decision-makers may give weight to relevant policies in emerging plans. Rather it is a policy that they may do so “according to” the three criteria or factors which follow. The policy clearly stipulates that the three criteria are relevant in each case. Of course, when dealing with a particular planning proposal it may be the case that the relevant policies in a draft plan have not attracted any objections and so it would not be necessary to consider the second criterion beyond that initial stage. But plainly the second criterion is material in each case in order to ascertain whether a relevant draft policy has attracted any objections and if so, their nature, before going on to make an assessment of the significance of any such objections.”
(As an aside, following the quashing the Secretary of State redetermined the appeal, dismissing it again. That second decision was again challenged and the Secretary of State consented to judgment. Lo and behold, third time round the Secretary of State has now finally allowed the appeal in a decision letter dated 7 December 2017. Never give up!)
Applying Woodcock, I do not see how a decision maker can apply significant weight to the draft London Plan’s policies before knowing what objections have been made to them. It is presently a wish list (although of course, unlike with for instance local plans, the Mayor can reject the recommendations of the inspector who examines the plan, meaning that if he is sufficiently determined, those wishes are likely to be granted). 
The practical answer?

Aside from being able to reject the plan examiner’s recommendations, the Mayor holds another trump card: time. Given the current delays on the part of the Planning Inspectorate, if he directs refusal of a scheme that is referable to him, on the basis of inconsistency with the draft plan, by the time any appeal is heard the plan is likely to have at least reached the examination stage. 
The Planning Inspectorate’s most recently published stats make depressing reading:

You can add to that the further delays that often happen with appeals recovered for the Secretary of State’s own determination. 
When it comes to challenging decision makers’ reliance on emerging draft policies, justice delayed is justice denied. 
Notwithstanding the likely timing difficulty facing anyone seeking to challenge formally the Mayor’s approach, we should surely not accept assertions that the emerging London Plan should be accorded significant weight in decision making, particularly when inconsistent with the current statutory development plan (namely the current London Plan, any adopted borough plan and any made neighbourhood plan). Otherwise, will people feel that it is worthwhile investing time and resources in the examination process? What will be the point of the examination?
Simon Ricketts, 15 December 2017
Personal views, et cetera
 

What’s For The Plan, What’s Supplementary?

A blog post in two halves:

– the increasing risk that SPDs (supplementary planning documents) and other policy documents will be struck down by the court if their policies should in fact be in a local plan or other DPD (development plan document)

– in the wake of the draft London Plan, a reminder that it should only contain “strategic” policies, as well as another look at the affordable housing and viability SPG (supplementary planning guidance), now subject to a judicial review. 

Bottom drawer plans

It is tempting for local planning authorities to fill policy gaps or update their policies by way of an SPD given that there is only a consultation requirement and no independent examination, or indeed by more informal plans. But care is needed. There are stringent rules as to what is appropriate for inclusion in an SPD or other policy document and what needs to be in a DPD. 

There have been two examples this year of policies having been quashed by the High Court on this basis. 
On 23 November 2017 in William Davis Limited & Others v Charnwood Borough Council Gilbart J quashed a policy in Charnwood’s Housing SPD which specified the required size mix for market and affordable homes. 
On 20 March 2017 in R (Skipton Properties Limited) v Craven District Council Jay J quashed Craven’s entire Negotiating Affordable Housing Contributions 2016 interim policy document. 

The issues turn on interpreting the Town and Country Planning (Local Planning) (England) Regulations 2012 about which Jay J says:
“Frankly, those responsible for these regulations should consider redrafting them”. 

Gilbart J agrees “with Jay J that the drafting of these Regulations is very poor and can lead to confusion, or to lengthy arguments on interpretation with not much regard being had to the realities of development control“. 

You’ve been warned. 
Regulations 5 and 6 read as follows:
 “5. (1) For the purposes of section 17(7)(za)(1) of the Act the documents which are to be prepared as local development documents are—



(a) any document prepared by a local planning authority individually or in cooperation with one or more other local planning authorities, which contains statements regarding one or more of the following -



(i) the development and use of land which the local planning authority wish to encourage during any specified period;



(ii) the allocation of sites for a particular type of development or use;



(iii) any environmental, social, design and economic objectives which are relevant to the attainment of the development and use of land mentioned in paragraph (i); and



(iv) development management and site allocation policies, which are intended to guide the determination of applications for planning permission;

(b) ………………………………………………………………



(2) For the purposes of section 17(7)(za) of the Act the documents which, if prepared, are to be prepared as local development documents are—



(a) any document which—



(i) relates only to part of the area of the local planning authority;



(ii) identifies that area as an area of significant change or special conservation; and



(iii) contains the local planning authority’s policies in relation to the area; and



(b) any other document which includes a site allocation policy.



6. Any document of the description referred to in regulation 5(1)(a)(i), (ii) or (iv) or 5(2)(a) or (b) is a local plan.”
So if a policy document meets any of the criteria in Regulation (1) (a) (i), (ii) or (iv) or 5 (2) it is in reality a local plan and will be at risk of being quashed if the procedures stipulated for a local plan have not been followed. This means that there are huge consequences for authorities whose policy documents fall within any of these criteria – rightly so, in my view (albeit with sympathy for authorities in relation to the difficulties inherent in working out whether a policy falls for instance within Regulation 5 (1) (a) (iii) – ok – or (i), (ii) or (iv) – not ok!).
In the words of Gilbart J:
“It has always been the case since the original TCPA 1947 that the policies of a proposed development plan should be the subject of consultation, and where objection is made, independent examination. PCPA 2004 and the related LP Regs 2012 made considerable changes to the mechanics of the system for bringing forward policies, whether those which have the status of development plan policies for the purposes of the legislative code, or have a less significant role.
Albeit that the procedures for the adoption of a development plan have altered over the years, it is still a fundamental feature of the system that policies which form part of the development plan must be subjected to proper scrutiny, including independent scrutiny.”
In William Davis, Gilbart J held that the relevant housing mix policy “sought to prescribe different percentages for all house sizes, and as between market and affordable housing. It related to “the development and use of land which the local planning authority wish to encourage during any specified period” and therefore fell within Reg 5(1)(a)(i). But it also contained “development management and site allocation policies, which are intended to guide the determination of applications for planning permission” and therefore also engaged Reg 5(1)(a)(iv). On that basis it could only be promoted by way of a local plan as defined.” It was therefore quashed. 
In Skipton, Jay J noted:
Affordable housing policies are ordinarily located in local plans because they relate to the development and use of land“. 
He found that even if he was wrong about the affordable housing contributions interim policy document being in fact a DPD (and failing the procedural requirements of a DPD), nor was it an SPD – policies in an SPD must be supplementary to policies in a DPD. There were no affordable housing policies that has been saved in Craven’s local plan: “it cannot logically supplement a black hole“.
He concluded:
“In my judgment, the correct analysis is that the NAHC 2016 contains statements in the nature of policies which pertain to the development and use of land which the Defendant wishes to encourage, pending its adoption of a new local plan which will include an affordable housing policy. The development and use of land is either “residential development including affordable housing” or “affordable housing”. It is an interim policy in the nature of a DPD. It should have been consulted on; an SEA should have been carried out; it should have been submitted to the Secretary of State for independent examination.”
There is a final coda to Jay J’s judgment:
“…I am not oblivious to the practical difficulties facing local planning authorities assailed by constant changes in the legislative regime and national policy. However, a local planning authority is required to keep its local plans under review. The correct course is to press on with the timeous preparation of up-to-date local plans, and in the interregnum between draft and adoption, deploy these as material considerations for the purpose of the rights and duties conferred by the 2004 Act.”



I take from these two cases that we should be scrutinising carefully policies that authorities seek to rely on that have not been tested as DPD policies undergoing proper independent scrutiny. For example management policies, site allocation policies and policies encouraging the development and use of land should all be restricted to DPDs so that they can be properly examined as the legislation requires. 
London: another kettle of fish


The above analysis is relevant to London boroughs but the position of the London Mayor is different, given that his plan making powers are not set out in the 2012 Regulations but in the Greater London Authority Act 1999. As I set out in my 23 April 2017 blog post Make No Little Plans: The London Plan, policies in the London Plan can only deal with “matters which are of strategic importance to Greater London”.
The draft London Plan was of course published on 29 November 2017. As you read its 500 plus pages, ask yourself in relation to each policy whether it truly does meet that “strategic importance to Greater London” test or are we seeing a further boxing in of the policy making powers which should be left to the boroughs?
Partly to seek to bring about changes ahead of progress with this plan and partly to seek to set out his required approach to a level of detail that would be wholly inappropriate for a “strategic” document, the Mayor has set out his approach to affordable housing and viability in a detailed, non statutory, SPG (the Greater London Authority Act does not provide for statutory SPDs). I covered the document in my 20 August 2017 blog post 20 Changes In The Final Version Of The London Mayor’s Affordable Housing & Viability SPG.
A legal challenge to the validity of the SPG has been brought by four retirement living providers (McCarthy & Stone, Churchill Retirement Living, Pegasus Life and Renaissance Retirement), based on three grounds:
– that the SPG “unlawfully represents substantive new policy, without going through the independent examination process which should apply to policy changes of this kind“. 

– lack of strategic environmental assessment

– breach of the Equality Act 2010 and other legislative requirements “since it introduces an unjustified and disproportionate new regulatory hurdle which leads to differential treatment for the elderly and women seeking to have their housing needs met in London“. 

Whether through this litigation or through the examination process that lies ahead for the London Plan itself, some interesting analysis lies ahead as to (1) what are “matters of strategic importance to Greater London” and (2) the extent to which the Mayor can lawfully go faster, or into a greater level of detail, in supplementary planning guidance. 
The examination process for DPDs, and indeed for the London Plan, can sometimes appear superficial in relation to individual policy issues, but at least there is some independent scrutiny. On the other hand where planning applications are refused on the basis of policies that the decision-maker has itself both made and approved, the position can defy any common sense notion of gravity. The authority has simply pulled itself up by its own bootstraps. 
Simon Ricketts, 1 December 2017
Personal views, et cetera