CIL The Merciless

Failing to serve a CIL notice can have huge consequences, as R (Shropshire Council) v Secretary of State (Mr C M G Ockleton, vice president of the Upper Tribunal, sitting as a High Court judge, 16 January 2019) illustrates.

Mr Jones, a self-builder, secured planning permission for a large new home with triple garage. Good news.

He received a liability notice for CIL assessing the amount of CIL that would be payable on commencement of the development as £36,891.43. Bad news.

He then applied for and secured full relief from CIL, relying on the self-building exemption. Good news.

In order not to lose the benefit of the relief, regulation 54B (6) provides that a “person who is granted an exemption for self-build housing ceases to be eligible for that exemption if a commencement notice is not submitted to the collecting authority before the day the chargeable development is commenced.”

You can see what is going to come next.

There was a section 106 agreement under which Mr Jones was obliged to notify the council when works pursuant to the planning permission were to begin, as the commencement date triggered a contribution of £9,000 under the agreement. Mr Jones sent the council an email with a heading referring to the section 106 agreement, notifying the council that works would commence the next day, which the council acknowledged, under the same heading.

Mr Jones didn’t send a separate commencement notice in the form required by the CIL Regulations.

The worst of news: he then receives a demand notice requiring the full £39,891.43 on the ground that the development had commenced without a commencement notice being sent to the council plus a surcharge of £2,500 for “invalid commencement“.

Mr Jones responded with a letter of horror and apology, saying that he knew about the Regulations and thought that he had given sufficient notice of commencement by his email of 10 July. The relevant Council official replied in sympathetic terms but pointing out that the CIL process is separate from the planning process and is controlled very precisely by national regulations in relation to which the local authority had no discretion.”

Mr Jones, then instructed solicitors and counsel (good money after bad) and after various exchanges his representatives appealed against the demand notice (or rather a replacement demand notice that the council issued, given that the deadline for appealing against the first demand notice had passed).

Good news: The inspector allowed his appeal: the inspector “accepted that “on a literal interpretation of the Regulations” the email did not include particulars required by Form 6 (the form specified for the purpose under reg 67) and failed to identify the LN reference, but that the “oversight” was not fatal to Mr Jones’ case, because the email did refer to the relevant site and planning permission and unambiguously specified the intended date of commencement. In these circumstances, at para 10, he held that “in practice, substance, form and all intent and purposes the email communication has the same effect as Form 6”. He said he was content that “the purpose behind CIL reg 67 has been satisfied in spirit at least” and “the apparent failure to strictly comply with the terms of reg 67(2) should be put aside”. There was in any event no prejudice to the collecting authority because it was aware of the date.”

Alarm bells ring – “satisfied in spirit at least” when you are dealing with the CIL Regulations??

Bad news: the council challenges the appeal decision in the High Court and the Secretary of State consents to judgment, leaving poor Mr Jones to fight on. Potentially £40k+ down and now in High Court litigation, with exposure to paying the council’s legal costs if he loses.

Even worse news: the High Court finds for the council:

First, the email did not amount to a valid commencement notice because it did not comply with the requirements of regulation 67 (2, which requires that it must:

(a) be submitted in writing on a form published by the Secretary of State (or a form to substantially the same effect);

(b) identify the liability notice issued in respect of the chargeable development;

(c) state the intended commencement date of the chargeable development; and

(d) include the other particulars specified or referred to in the form.”

Secondly, the case law does “not justify a process of simply looking to see the apparent purpose of the regulations and treating any act fulfilling that purpose as sufficient to comply with them. The Regulations make perfectly clear that the consequence of failure to comply is loss of the exemption; and failure to comply means failure to submit a notice under reg 67.

Finally the judge rejected the submission by Saira Sheikh QC “that in the circumstances of the present case the court should in its discretion refuse to grant relief to the Council. The requirements and the forms for fulfilling them are readily available, were made available to Mr Jones, and he accepted that he knew a commencement notice needed to be given. Only when the consequences of his failure were brought home to him in a substantial charge did Mr Jones claim that an email sent to the Council on an entirely different topic was his attempt to comply with the detailed requirements of which he was aware. There is no trace of any waiver or attempted waiver by the Council, and I do not see that Mr Jones could properly have interpreted the reply to his email in relation to s 106 as a waiver of the obligation to submit a commencement notice if he wished to maintain his self-build exemption. The argument based on the Inspector’s view that the Council should have told him (again) that he needed to submit a commencement notice is without merit: the Inspector was simply wrong about that. No system of administration could survive a duty imposed on a recipient of an email on one subject to remind its sender of all other notices on different subjects that he might want to send. The fact that the penalties are discretionary does not mean that the imposition of CIL itself is discretionary: it is not. The Council seems to have behaved as sympathetically as they could, imposing a minimum interest charge; and maintaining the imposition of the surcharge, in the absence of which Mr Jones would have no right of appeal. His difficulties have been caud maintaining the imposition of the surcharge, in the absence of which Mr Jones would have no right of appeal. His difficulties have been caused entirely by his own acts and I see no good reason to relieve him from the consequences at the expense of the ratepayers of Shropshire.

What an unforgiving process this is. As commented by solicitor David Brock in a tweet when Town Legal circulated this case yesterday:

The complications and traps of the CIL Regulations and self-builders are not really compatible. Which is odd given that Government encourages self- and custom-house building

Of course, the Government will say that it already has proposals in hand to deal with injustices such as this, in its consultation document Reforming developer contributions: Technical consultation on draft regulations. In Mr Jones’ situation there would now be (once the draft regulations are finalised and in force) “a surcharge equal to 20 per cent of the notional chargeable amount or £2,500, whichever is the lower amount.”

Clearly, the proposals will assist but cases such as that of Mr Jones illustrate both the absurdly rigid nature of the system but also the curious approach of charging authorities, on the one hand sympathetic, but on the other hand going out of the way to take court proceedings to overturn an inspector’s decision that might be said to have arrived at a morally right outcome by the wrong legal reasoning (which would admittedly have created a terrible precedent). And as for that sentence in the judgment…

“His difficulties have been caused entirely by his own acts and I see no good reason to relieve him from the consequences at the expense of the ratepayers of Shropshire“.

First of all, whilst mercy is not possible under the regulations and it is difficult to see how the legal answer could have been any different, surely a little sympathy expressed for Mr Jones might have been appropriate and secondly, this betrays some degree of misunderstanding as to the modern system of local government finance and I wonder how much money from CIL receipts Shropshire Council already has sitting in its accounts, to which it now adds this windfall?

Simon Ricketts, 19 January 2019

Personal views, et cetera

PS Good news last week: obviously subscribe to Tom Dobson’s new blog, Man Plans God Laughs, last week’s piece being on that consultation document. (NB pic below is of Charles Middleton as Ming the Merciless – who would obviously have enjoyed CIL – rather than of Tom, where the relationship is more nuanced).

Some Blog Post Postscripts

I’m conscious that these posts (this is the 149th) sometimes don’t age well – they try to capture a point in time and I don’t go back to change them unless I’ve got something really wrong or, worse still, there’s a misplaced apostrophe (they’re written on an ipad, on a train or at the kitchen table, as fast as my two fingers can move, so bear with).

So I thought I’d take the opportunity to note a few post-post updates…

CIL

Since my 15 December 2018 CIL Life post, the claimant in Giordano has applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal, having been refused it by Lang J. Will 2019 see the Court of Appeal grapple for the first time with the joys of CIL liability?

Since my 9 November 2018 An Update On CIL: Reform Promised, Meanwhile Continuing & Increasingly Expensive Uncertainties post the Government published Reforming developer contributions: technical consultation on draft regulations (20 December 2018). The purpose of the consultation is to “ensure that the draft regulations deliver the intended policy changes and do not give rise to unforeseen consequences.” The consultation runs until 31 January 2019. Supporting guidance will accompany the final regulations.

As well as delivering on the proposals announced in October 2018 (I assume – I haven’t yet worked through some of the algebraic amendments), the draft regulations exempt starter homes from the levy, where the dwelling is sold to individuals whose total household income is no more than £80,000 (£90,000 in central London). The draft regulations also make a number of other clarifications to address various glitches.

The Trinity One litigation

My 8 September 2018 What If? The Trinity One Case post commented on a situation where a developer had sought to resist a claim for an affordable housing commuted payment on the ground that the basis for calculating the payment, the Total Cost Indicator figures previously published by the Housing Corporation, had ceased to exist. I mentioned that the position could change as a result of separate litigation underway in relation to the developer’s attempt to reduce its section 106 liability by way of the section 106BA/BC procedure.

Well, the position did indeed then change as a result of R (City of York Council) v Secretary of State (Kerr J, 22 October 2018). The case is of little general interest now given that it concerns the mechanism whereby developers could apply for modification or discharge of affordable housing obligations in a section 106 agreement on the basis that modification or discharge was required to achieve an economically viable development, which mechanism was brought to an end on 30 April 2016. But it will have been immense interest to the parties. Kerr J accepted Trinity One’s position that (1) its appeal against refusal of its section 106BA application was not out of time because it was sufficient for the application to have been made by 30 April 2016 and (2) the application could be made even after the development had been completed.

Land value capture

My 31 August 2018 Market Value Minus Hope Value = ? post was written whilst the House of Commons Communities and Local Government Select Committee was taking evidence in relation to its land value capture inquiry. The committee reported on 13 September 2018 and the Government’s response was published on 29 November 2018.

The Committee urged that the Government should consider appropriate mechanisms:

Our view is that there is scope for central and local government to claim a
greater proportion of land value increases through reforms to existing taxes and charges, improvements to compulsory purchase powers, or through new mechanisms of land value capture
.”

However, the response is a classic straight bat:

“The Government agrees that there is scope for central and local Government to claim a greater proportion of land value increases. The Government’s priority is delivery, in line with the Housing Minister’s commitments to provide more higher quality housing more quickly.


Changes to land value capture systems can have profound impacts on the land market in the short term, even where they are sensible for the longer term. Accordingly, the Government’s priority is to evolve the existing system of developer contributions to make them more transparent, efficient and accountable. It will of course continue to explore options for further reforms to better capture land value uplift, providing it can be assured that the short-run impact on land markets does not distract from delivering a better housing market
.”

Raynsford Review

My 9 June 2018 Judicious Review post commented on the interim report published by the Raynsford Review. The final report was published on 19 November 2018.

Public procurement

Finally, a long time ago, in my 6 September 2016 section 123…Go! post, I commented on Holgate J’s ruling in Faraday. That judgment has now been overturned in R (Faraday Development Limited) v West Berkshire Council (Court of Appeal, 14 November 2018) – see the Landmark Chambers summary.

2019

Plenty happened in planning law in 2018, despite much political focus being away from domestic issues. What will 2019 bring? Feel free to subscribe to this blog to get one quick take a week on what seems interesting to me at least. (And, shameless plug, do subscribe as well to Town Legal’s weekly updates of planning law cases and/or of Planning Inspectorate appeal decision letters).

Here’s to another year.

Simon Ricketts, 28 December 2018

Personal views, et cetera

CIL Life

One of the many frustrating aspects of the Community Infrastructure Levy regime is the confusing and limited nature of any right to appeal, which is particularly concerning given the varying interpretations given to the Regulations by different collecting authorities.

The first difficulty is working out what the appeal route in any particular situation is.

Appeals lie to the Valuation Office Agency in relation to:

⁃ Regulation 114 (where an interested person has asked the collecting authority for a review of the chargeable amount as is aggrieved at the decision on the review)

⁃ Regulation 115 (apportionment of liability)

⁃ Regulation 116 (charitable relief)

⁃ Regulation 116A (exemption for residential annexes)

⁃ Regulation 116B (exemption for self-build housing).

Recent VOA appeal decisions are here.

Appeals lie to the Planning Inspectorate in relation to:

⁃ Regulation 117 (decisions by the collecting authority to impose a surcharge)

⁃ Regulation 118 (determinations by the collecting authority of a deemed commencement date)

⁃ Regulation 119 (imposition by the collecting authority of a CIL stop notice).

Recent Planning Inspectorate appeal decisions are here.

A common theme in relation to the VOA and PINS appeals decisions is the frequency of misunderstandings as to the CIL regime on the part of those carrying out minor developments, the frequency of notices being missed or overlooked and forlorn attempts to avoid or reduce liability at a stage when development has already commenced and the horse has bolted.

Appeals can then proceed to the High Court if either of the parties considers that the decision of the VOA or PINS was wrong in law.

In relation to decisions of the collecting authority which are not listed above, for instance as to whether any exemption or relief should be granted other than charitable relief, the exemption for residential annexes and self-build housing – say social housing relief – the only possibility for challenge is for by way of an application to the High Court for judicial review. Not only is that a disproportionately cumbersome route for challenge when the issue could surely be dealt with by the VOA or PINS but, given that the possibility for claiming a relief or exemption is lost if it is not granted before development is commenced, few developers have the luxury of being able to wait for resolution of a disagreement over the relief or exemption before starting construction.

Surely all of this needs looking at again and simplifying as part of the Government’s current review.

I started thinking about all of this when reading what may be only the third High Court ruling in relation to CIL liability issues, R (Giordano Limited) v London Borough of Camden (Lang J, 13 December 2018). It’s a pretty straightforward case but I’m still not sure whether there was a VOA decision (and if not why the challenge was allowed to proceed) – maybe someone out there can help?

The issue was whether, in determining the relevant floorspace within the chargeable development, the test in Regulation 40 (7) (ii) was met as to whether there were “retained parts where the intended use following completion of the chargeable development is a use that is able to be carried on lawfully and permanently without further planning permission in that part on the day before planning permission first permits the chargeable development.” The floorspace represented by such parts wouldn’t attract CIL.

The claimant was intending to implement a planning permission for “change of use of third floor offices (class B1a) and vacant first and second floors (class B8) to create 3 x three bedroom flats.” Having received a liability notice for £547,419.09, it argued that the test was met because there was a previous planning permission which had been lawfully commenced for “change of use of third floor offices (class B1a) and vacant first and second floors (class B8) to create 6x two-bedroom flats (class C3), including rear extensions at first, second, third and fourth floors and associated external alterations.

Under the previous (pre-CIL) permission, the rear extension and alterations to the elevations of the building had been completed, and steel beams refitted internally, but the first, second and third floors were just stripped out, unpartitioned floors and were not yet capable of being used for residential purposes.

The claimant was attempting to rely on the floorspace deduction provided for in Regulation 40 (7) (ii) because it couldn’t show that any part of the building had been lawfully occupied for at least six months in the previous three years.

Lang J found that because the floorspace was currently incapable of being used for residential purposes it did not meet the test – a “potential” future use was not sufficient.

Stepping back, I would say that was a pretty large windfall for the local authority!

The only other two High Court cases I’m aware of are:

R (Orbital Park Swindon Limited) v Swindon District Council (Patterson J, 3 March 2016), where the claimant succeeded in mitigating its potential CIL liability by securing two separate planning permissions for its proposed works to a retail store, one of which permissions, for the introduction of additional space by way of a mezzanine, was not liable for CIL.

Patterson J had no difficulty with the deliberate CIL mitigation strategy adopted:

There is […] no manipulation of the system for any ulterior and/or illegal motive in accordance with the submissions of the defendant. Rather, the claimant has taken advantage of the legislative scheme which permits it to submit, in this case, two separate planning applications for each act of operational development that it wished to pursue. If it was not the intention of the legislature to permit that to occur then it is for the legislature to change it. At present, in my judgment, that is the consequence of the current statutory scheme.”

R (Hourhope Limited) v Shropshire Council (HHJ David Cooke, 2 March 2015), where the claimant failed in its submissions that the “in lawful use” requirement for deduction of floorspace would be met by anything less than actual use – it was not sufficient that the building (a former pub) was still available for lawful occupation, or that there was some residual storage of items left behind from when the pub had closed.

Is anyone aware of any others?

MCIL2

While talking about CIL, I thought it might be worth a brief post script about the Mayor of London’s MCIL2 (previously covered in part of my 9 November 2018 blog post An Update On CIL: Reform Promised, Meanwhile Continuing & Increasingly Expensive Uncertainties). The report of the examiner, Keith Holland, has now been published, recommending, with one minor modification, that the submitted charging schedule is appropriate, meaning that we can expect it to be adopted and take effect on 1 April 2019.

Despite the increasingly big question mark that there must be over whether Crossrail 2 (the basis for MCIL2) is politically deliverable at present (see my 1 July 2017 blog post Crossrail 2, Where Are You?) Mr Holland has no difficulty on that score:

In 2016 the National Infrastructure Commission recommended that Crossrail 2 be taken forward as a priority with the aim of opening in 2033. Costings for the project have recently been subject to an independent review. The results of the review are not yet public and at this stage there is no formal government approval for Crossrail 2. However, the need for new infrastructure to support the region’s growth was endorsed by the Secretary for State for Transport in July 2017 and there is no doubt that an extremely strong case can be made for Crossrail 2. Moreover, there is general endorsement for Crossrail 2 from those making representations.”

Of course many of us want to see Crossrail 2 proceed. But what if it doesn’t? That’s a lot of money being raised without a defined objective as to the transport projects to which it is to be applied and surely it would be wrong for it to end up being used, for instance, to address cost overruns in relation to Crossrail 1?

Simon Ricketts, 15 December 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Charles Alfred Meurer, Still life with money, pipe and letters, 1914

An Update On CIL: Reform Promised, Meanwhile Continuing & Increasingly Expensive Uncertainties

Well done for getting past the heading.

Someone recently asked me whether the Government ever changes its proposals as a result of a consultation process. For an example of just such a thing, I was able to point to the Government response to supporting housing delivery through developer contributions: a summary of consultation responses and the Government’s view on the way forward (29 October 2018). The proposals set out in the Government’s March 2018 consultation paper (summarised in my 10 March 2018 blog post Developer Contributions, CIL, Viability: Are We Nearly There Yet?) have been modified significantly as a result of consultation, mostly for the better in my view at least.

This blog post focuses on the changed proposals and then looks at some looming issues facing phased developments in areas where charging authorities are looking to increase rates (I’m focusing on the Mayor of London’s MCIL2 but I’m sure the issue is of wider application).

The Government response

The document acknowledges some of the flaws of the current system:

The complexity and uncertainty of the current system of developer contributions is acting as a barrier to the delivery of housing. The system does not react quickly to changes in market conditions or allow local authorities to effectively secure the contributions needed to support new development. It is also not as transparent as it should be; local communities are not clear what infrastructure is provided alongside new development. And the current system could also be more effective in securing funding towards strategic infrastructure and supporting cross boundary planning.”

The Government intends to consult on draft regulations “later this year” to implement the changes set out in the March 2018 consultation document, as now modified. It is important to note that the Government will “also consider whether changes could be made to the Community Infrastructure Levy to incentivise the build out of developments.” (perhaps something that Sir Oliver Letwin might have looked at but…).

The Government has now modified its proposed changes as follows:

1. The previous proposal to replace charging authorities’ current statutory consultation requirements, in relation to proposed charging schedules, with self-certification as to whether it has sought “an appropriate level of engagement” has been amended. The Government “intends to take forward a modified proposal to ensure that regulations continue to require charging authorities to consult on draft charging schedules, whilst removing the current statutory requirement for two separate rounds of consultation in every circumstance.”

2. The pooling restriction will now be removed in its entirety in all areas. Hooray! Although of course there is the risk that tariff-type section 106 contribution requirements will again become more prevalent, in my view the pooling restriction led to many unnecessary problems and uncertainties, which would have continued under the Government’s March 208 idea of only removing the restriction in in areas where specified criteria were met.

3. The Government had intended to introduce a two month grace period for developers to submit a commencement notice in relation to exempted development, to address disproportionately severe problems arising for eg self-builders who, if they fail to meet procedural requirements, find not only that they fail to qualify for any exemption but that all CIL due has become immediately payable. The Government will not now introduce the grace period (which local authorities considered could lead to practical complications) but instead will be “making changes to the penalties associated with the failure to submit a Commencement Notice prior to development being started. This will ensure that any penalty is set at a proportionate level and will not result in the whole liability becoming payable immediately.”

There may also be more guidance as to potential exemptions: “A number of responses sought additional exemptions to address the unintended viability impacts of Levy liabilities on particular forms of development. The Government will consider how guidance could be used to manage these effects by encouraging authorities to take account of these issues when setting Levy rates and choosing how they use existing powers for discretionary social housing relief. In addition, the Government has already committed to bring forward legislation to exempt Starter Homes from the Community Infrastructure Levy.”

4. The complicated proposal in the March 2018 consultation document that charging schedules might be set with reference to the existing use of land has been dropped. “However, the Government has reviewed this proposal and considers there are existing flexibilities in the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations that, through the use of differential Levy rates, will allow local authorities to go some way towards achieving the objective of the proposed reform. The Government therefore proposes to make changes to guidance to support local authorities to set differential rates more effectively.

5. At the time that it publishes the draft amendment regulations, the Government intends to “consult on changes to indexation of Levy rates and the way in which it would be implemented“. Its current preference is to index CIL rates “for residential development to the House Price Index using local-level data on an annual basis” and to index rates for non-residential development to the Consumer Price Index. It recognises the transitional issues that will arise.

6. The Government still intends to remove the restriction in relation to section 106 obligations that relate to an infrastructure project or type of infrastructure that is set out in the authority’s Regulation 123 list. “New reporting standards, which are set out in the Infrastructure Funding Statement, will address concerns about double dipping by ensuring that there is transparency over how developer contributions from both CIL and section 106 planning obligations are being used, rather than by placing formal restrictions in regulations.” We need to watch this one with care!

In relation to one specific issue that often leads to wrangles: “The Government also recognises the need to address existing uncertainty around using section 106 planning obligations to collect monitoring sums. The Government therefore intends to take forward proposals to make clear that local authorities can seek a fee from applicants towards monitoring planning obligations. In developing these proposals, the Government will consider how best to ensure that monitoring sums are set at an appropriate level.”

7. The Government had intended to give combined authorities and joint committees with strategic planning powers the ability to charge a Strategic Infrastructure Tariff. “The Government has decided to take forward a modified proposal, to enable Combined Authorities with strategic planning powers to take forward a Strategic Infrastructure Tariff, and to encourage groups of charging authorities to use existing powers to more effectively support the delivery of strategic infrastructure through the pooling of their local Community Infrastructure Levy receipts. In the longer term, the Government will bring forward proposals for allowing joint planning committees to charge the tariff, and will review options for giving other groups the power to levy a Tariff.”

The Government had also included a final “catch all” question seeking any other comments. Particular issues that were raised in responses included “the definition of gross internal area, implementation of the Levy in particular circumstances (such as in relation to development that takes place in a number of phases or there is a change of use), and the operation of exemptions and reliefs, indexation and in-kind payment.

Issues such as these are indeed causing much uncertainty.

The implications of increased rates/MCIL2

Whilst we wait for eventual reform of the system, of more immediate focus are the implications of gradual increases by charging authorities in CIL rates.

In London, the Mayor of London is waiting for the inspector’s report following the examination into the draft charging schedule for MCIL2. MCIL2 is proposed to part-fund Crossrail 2, in the way that MCIL1 (together with a related policy of seeking section 106 contributions in relation to some areas and types of development) is part-funding Crossrail 1.

The charging schedule for MCIL1 was adopted on 1 April 2012 (which is why there are many section 106 agreements and permissions dated March 2012, as developers and boroughs scrambled to ensure that permissions were not subject to the levy!).

This table sets out borough by borough the significant sums of money that MCIL1 has now raised:

The section 106 contributions policy for Crossrail (set out in the Mayor’s Crossrail Funding SPG, updated March 2016) predated MCIL1 and provided for section 106 contributions based on the following table and plans:

The standardised wording included in relevant section 106 agreements provides that any MCIL1 which is payable reduces the contributions which are required to be made under the relevant section 106 agreement.

As long as the inspector’s report is received on time and gives it a clean bill of health, MCIL2 will be adopted on 1 April 2019. The changes in rates, compared to where the 2012 rates currently sit with indexation applied, are mostly not huge, but they are significant in some areas. In areas where the increases are material, I am sure we will see a similar rush to beat the deadline.

One uncertainty is of course whether the examination inspector will accept a charging schedule that is predicated on Crossrail 2 coming forward. Little has progressed on the project since my 1 July 2017 blog post, Crossrail 2: Where Are You? We are all still awaiting outcome of an independent affordability review being chaired by Mike Gerrard. The Mayor is hedging his bets, simply indicating:

Should the Crossrail 2 project not be taken forwards, the Mayor would be able to apply the MCIL 2 proceeds to fund other strategic infrastructure.”

Assuming that MCIL2 is waved through and the charging schedule is adopted on 1 April, the relevant point at which it takes effect is determined by everyone’s least favourite phrase in the CIL Regulations: “at the time planning permission first permits the chargeable development“.

For a non-phased permission, this is the date of the permission – easy.

For a phased outline permission, this is either “the date of final approval of the last reserved matter associated with that phase” or “if earlier, and if agreed in writing by the collecting authority before commencement of any development under that permission, on the day final approval is given under any pre-commencement condition associated with that phase“.

For a phased full permission, this is either “the day final approval is given under any pre-commencement condition associated with that phase” or “where there are no pre-commencement conditions associated with that phase, on the day planning permission is granted“.

It will be seen that (1) the revised charging schedule is liable to bite in respect any phase of an existing phased permission if sufficient progress has not been made in relation to reserved matters or discharging pre-commencement conditions in relation to that phase and (2) that there are inherent uncertainties in the drafting, eg

⁃ What does “associated with that phase” mean?

⁃ Does “any” mean “any” or, in fact, “all“?

As a final example of the inadequacies of the legislation: where there is a phased permission and a revised charging schedule is subsequently adopted, the only indexation that applies is of the amount arising from the initial charging schedule up to the end of the year prior to the date of the permission. There is no further indexation through to commencement of development or any indexation of the revised charging schedule insofar as it applies to the phases! Would it not be simpler and more predictable if indexation were not to stop at the initial grant of the permission and instead to continue through to final approval (or even commencement of development) in relation to each phase, but if the potential application of revised charging schedules were removed?

In case anyone has made it down this far…

In conclusion:

⁃ the proposed reforms, and most recent proposals, look to be mainly positive

⁃ but the whole regime really does still need simplifying: to state the obvious, significant liabilities can unexpectedly arise for the unwary – and large sums of money can turn on uncertain issues of interpretation.

Simon Ricketts, 9 November 2018

Personal views, et cetera

Developer Contributions, CIL, Viability: Are We Nearly There Yet?

Bookends to this last week:
On Monday 5 March 2018 the draft revised NPPF , accompanying consultation proposals document and the Government’s response to the housing white paper consultation were all published, as well as the two documents I’ll focus on in this blog post:
Supporting housing delivery through developer contributions: Reforming developer contributions to affordable housing and infrastructure (which also addresses proposed reform to CIL); and 

Draft Planning Practice Guidance for Viability 
On Friday 9 March 2018 Draft Planning Practice Guidance: Draft updates to planning guidance which will form part of the Government’s online Planning Practice Guidance was published. 

The draft revised NPPF itself says very little on developer contributions, CIL and viability. 
On contributions, paragraph 34 of the draft (headed, in contrast to the “developer contributions” document, “development contributions” – consistency of terminology would be good!) states:
Plans should set out the contributions expected in association with particular sites and types of development. This should include setting out the levels and types of affordable housing provision required, along with other infrastructure (such as that needed for education, health, transport, green and digital infrastructure). Such policies should not make development unviable, and should be supported by evidence to demonstrate this. Plans should also set out any circumstances in which further viability assessment may be required in determining individual applications.”

On viability:

58. Where proposals for development accord with all the relevant policies in an up-to- date development plan, no viability assessment should be required to accompany the application. Where a viability assessment is needed, it should reflect the recommended approach in national planning guidance, including standardised inputs, and should be made publicly available.”
The Developer Contributions consultation document (responses sought by 10 May) addresses both contributions by way of section 106 planning obligations and by way of CIL. The document is accompanied by a research report commissioned from the University of Liverpool, The Incidence, Value and Delivery of Planning Obligations and Community Infrastructure Levy in England in 2016-17 which has some interesting statistics, underlining for me the scale of monies already being secured from development, over £6bn in 2016/2017:

It is clear from the consultation document that we are still on a journey to an unknown destination:
“The reforms set out in this document could provide a springboard for going further, and the Government will continue to explore options to create a clearer and more robust developer contribution system that really delivers for prospective homeowners and communities accommodating new development. 

One option could be for developer contributions [towards affordable housing as well as infrastructure] to be set nationally and made non negotiable. We recognise that we will need to engage and consult more widely on any new developer contribution system and provide appropriate transitions. This would allow developers to take account of reforms and reflect the contributions as they secure sites for development. 

The proposals in this consultation are an important first step in this conversation and towards ensuring that developers are clear about their commitments, local authorities are empowered to hold them to account and communities feel confident that their needs will be met.”
First step in a conversation??
Contributions via section 106 planning obligations
The document sets out perceived disadvantages of relying on section 106 planning obligations, including:
– delays (but there is no mention of how these could easily be reduced by prescriptive use of template drafts and more robust guidance and the Government’s previous proposal for an adjudication process to resolve logjams in negotiations has been dropped)
– the frequency of renegotiations, most frequently changing the type or amount of affordable housing (but with no analysis of why this is so – often in my experience for wholly necessary reasons, often linked to scheme changes or reflection of changed government affordable housing priorities or funding arrangements)

– a concern that they may “only have captured a small proportion of the increase in value” that has occurred over the time period covered by the University of Liverpool research report (but, aside from where the scale of contributions has been depressed from a policy compliant position due to lack of viability, why is this relevant? Planning obligations should be about necessary mitigation of the impacts from development, not about capture of uplifts in land value ). 

– lack of transparency. 

– lack of support for cross boundary planning. 

Despite these criticisms, the document does not propose significant changes to the section 106 process (or provide any timescale for the further review it alludes to) save for proposing to remove the pooling restriction (Regulation 123 of the CIL Regulations 2010) in areas:

* “that have adopted CIL; 


* where authorities fall under a threshold based on the tenth percentile of 
average new build house prices, meaning CIL cannot feasibly charged; 


* or where development is planned on several strategic sites

The Government is consulting on what approach should be taken to strategic sites for this purpose, the two options being stated as:
“a) remove the pooling restriction in a limited number of authorities, and across the whole authority area, when a set percentage of homes, set out in a plan, are being delivered through a limited number of large strategic sites. For example, where a plan is reliant on ten sites or fewer to deliver 50% or more of their homes; 

b) amend the restriction across England but only for large strategic sites (identified in plans) so that all planning obligations from a strategic site count as one planning obligation. It may be necessary to define large strategic sites in legislation.”
I would prefer to see the pooling restriction dropped across the board. If authorities choose not to adopt a CIL charging schedule but to rely on section 106 planning obligations to make contributions towards infrastructure then why not let them, subject to the usual Regulation 122 test? I thought we wanted a simpler system?
There are sensible proposals for summaries of section 106 agreements to be provided in standard form (although we do not yet have the template), so that information as to planning obligations can be more easily made available to the public, collated and monitored. 
Contributions via CIL
The Government’s thinking on CIL continues along the lines set out alongside the Autumn 2017 budget and summarised in my 24 November 2017 blog post CIL: Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For ie wandering dangerously away from the CIL review panel’s ideas of a simpler, more uniform but lower charge regime. The proposed ability for authorities to set different CIL rates based on the existing use of land is inevitably going to make an overly complex system even worse, introducing another uncertainty, namely how the existing use of the land is to be categorised. The Government recognises that risk:

Some complex sites for development may have multiple existing uses. This could create significant additional complexity in assessing how different CIL rates should be apportioned within a site, if a charging authority has chosen to set rates based on the existing use of land. 

In these circumstances, the Government proposes to simplify the charging of CIL on complex sites, by: 

* encouraging the use of specific rates for large strategic sites (i.e. with a single rate set for the entire site) 


* charging on the basis of the majority use where 80% of the site is in a single existing use, or where the site is particularly small; and 


* other complex sites could be charged at a generic rate, set without reference to the existing use of the land, or have charges apportioned between the different existing uses.”

One wonders how this would play out in practice. 

It seems that the requirement for regulation 123 lists (of the infrastructure projects or types of infrastructure which the authority intends to fund via CIL – and which therefore cannot be secured via section 106) is to be removed, which is of concern since regulation 123 lists (the use of which should be tightened rather than loosened) serve at least some degree of protection for developers from being double-charged. 
 The Government is proposing to address one of the most draconian aspects of the CIL process – the current absolute requirement for a commencement notice to be served ahead of commencement of development, if exemptions and the right to make phased payments (where allowed by the authority) are not to be lost, is to be replaced by a two months’ grace period. However, this does not avoid all current problems as any exemptions would still need to be secured prior to commencement.

A specific problem as to the application of abatement provisions to pre-CIL phased planning permissions is to be fixed. These flaws in the legislation continue to emerge, a function of the complexity and artificiality of the whole edifice, which the panel’s proposals would significantly have reduced. In the meantime, we are some way away from actual improvements to the system we are all grappling with day by day, with no firm timescale for the next set of amending Regulations. 
Viability
The thrust of the draft planning practice guidance for viability is understood and reflects what had been heralded in the September 2017 Planning for the right homes in the right places consultation document – focus viability consideration at allocation stage, standardise, make more transparent – but there are some surprising/interesting passages:
– Is the Government contemplating review mechanisms that don’t just ratchet upwards? Good if so:
It is important that local authorities are sufficiently flexible to prevent planned development being stalled in the context of significant changes in costs and values that occur after a plan is adopted. Including policies in plans that set out when and how review mechanisms may be included in section 106 agreements will help to provide more certainty through economic cycles. 

For all development where review mechanisms are appropriate they can be used to amend developer contributions to help to account for significant changes in costs and values over the lifetime of a development. Review mechanisms can be used to re- apportion or change the timing of contributions towards different items of infrastructure and affordable housing. This can help to deliver sites that would otherwise stall as a result of significant changes in costs and values of the lifetime of a development.”
– Review mechanisms are appropriate for “large or multi phased development” in contrast to the ten homes threshold in draft London Plan policy H6 (which threshold is surely too low). 
– The document advises that in arriving at a benchmark land value, the EUV+ approach (ie existing use value plus premium) should be used. The London Mayor will have been pleased to see that but will then have choked on his cornflakes when the Government’s definition of EUV+ is set out. According to the Government, EUV is not only “the value of the land in its existing use” (reflecting the GLA approach) but also “the right to implement any development for which there are extant planning consents, including realistic deemed consents, but without regard to other possible uses that require planning consent, technical consent or unrealistic permitted development” (which is more like the GLA’s approach to Alternative Use Value!). 
Then when it comes to assessing the premium, market comparables are introduced:
When undertaking any viability assessment, an appropriate minimum premium to the landowner can be established by looking at data from comparable sites of the same site type that have recently been granted planning consent in accordance with relevant policies. The EUV of those comparable sites should then be established. 

The price paid for those comparable sites should then be established, having regard to outliers in market transactions, the quality of land, expectations of local landowners and different site scales. This evidence of the price paid on top of existing use value should then be used to inform a judgement on an appropriate minimum premium to the landowner.”

I am struggling to interpret the document as tightening the methodologies that are currently followed, or indeed introducing any material standardisation of approach. 

The EUV+ position is covered in more detail by George Venning in an excellent blog post.
– There is a gesture towards standardisation in the indication that for “the purpose of plan making an assumption of 20% of Gross Development Value (GDV) may be considered a suitable return to developers in order to establish viability of the plan policies. A lower figure of 6% of GDV may be more appropriate in consideration of delivery of affordable housing in circumstances where this guarantees an end sale at a known value and reduces the risk.” However, there is no certainty: “Alternative figures may be appropriate for different development types e.g. build to rent. Plan makers may choose to apply alternative figures where there is evidence to support this according to the type, scale and risk profile of planned development.
More fundamentally, I am sceptical that viability-testing allocations at plan-making stage is going to deliver. At that stage the work is inevitably broad-brush, based on typologies rather than site specific factors, often without the detailed input at that stage of a development team such that values and costs can be properly interrogated and without an understanding of any public sector funding that may be available. If the approach did actually deliver, significantly reducing policy requirements, so much the better, but that isn’t going to happen without viability arguments swamping the current, already swamped, local plan examination process.
Indeed, as was always going to be the case with the understandable drive towards greater transparency, the process is becoming increasingly theoretical (think retail impact assessment) and further away from developers opening their books to demonstrate what the commercial tipping point for them is in reality, given business models, funding arrangements, actual projected costs (save for land), and actual projected values. “Information used in viability assessment is not usually specific to that developer and thereby need not contain commercially sensitive data“. 
The document contains more wishful thinking:
A range of other sector led guidance on viability is widely available which practitioners may wish to refer to.”
Excellent. Such as?
Topically, this week, on 6 and 7 March, Holgate J heard Parkhurst Road Limited’s challenge to the Parkhurst Road decision letter that I referred to in my 24 June 2017 blog post Viability & Affordable Housing: Update. The challenge turns on the inspector’s conclusions on viability. Judgment is reserved. 

We also should watch out for Holgate J’s hearing on 1 and 2 May of McCarthy and Stone & others v Mayor of London, the judicial review you will recall that various retirement living companies have brought of the Mayor of London’s affordable housing and viability SPG. 
The great thing about about writing a planning law blog is that the well never runs dry, that’s for sure. (Nothing else is). 
Simon Ricketts, 10 March 2018
Personal views, et cetera

CIL: Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For

So now we know. We will all be continuing to scratch our heads over CIL. 
My 25 March 2017 blog post CIL: Kill Or Cure? summarised the main October 2016 (but only published February 2017) recommendations of the CIL review team: “the replacement of the current system with a more standardised approach of Local Infrastructure Tariffs (LITs) and, in combined authority areas, Strategic Infrastructure Tariffs (SITs). LITs would supposedly be set at a low level calculated by reference to a proportion of the market value per square metre of an average three bedroom property in the local authority area…For developments of ten dwellings or more, there would be a return to the flexibility of section 106 for provision of site-specific infrastructure (netting off LIT liability) and of course abolition of the pooling restriction.”

The team’s brief had been:
“Assess the extent to which CIL does or can provide an effective mechanism for funding infrastructure, and to recommend changes that would improve its operation in support of the Government’s wider housing and growth objectives.” 
In February, the Government promised to respond to the team’s recommendations alongside the Autumn 2017 budget.  Here we are, two years on from when the CIL review team’s work was commissioned in November 2015. The Autumn budget policy paper published on 22 November 2017 does indeed respond to the team’s recommendations, in the following terms:


Going through the proposals:

Removal of section 106 pooling restrictions, recommended by the CIL review team, is to be welcomed. Of course that should not be a green light for authorities in relation to a development proposal to revert to blanket tariff type section 106 requirements which would fail the regulation 123 test and wider principles recently set out by the Supreme Court in the Aberdeen case (see my 28 October 2017 blog post). 
Speeding up the process of setting and revising CIL, also recommended by the CIL review team, needs greater care in my view. It made sense as part of the review team’s concept of lower rates, arrived at in a more mechanistic manner than is currently the case. But there is no hint of lower rates in the Government’s proposal. Accordingly, close scrutiny is required. It is difficult enough as it is to have a meaningful influence on the process. The indication that higher zonal CILs could quickly be introduced to seek to capture land value uplifts around stations for instance is interesting but such interventions will need to be introduced with care if they are not in fact to discourage land owners from making their property available. 
Allowing authorities to set rates that better reflect the uplift in land values between a proposed and existing use was not a proposal that was considered by the CIL review team. It adds a further degree of complexity to the process. Charging schedules will have more categories. Precise floorspace calculations will be required not just of the proposed development but of the building that is to be replaced. Unintended consequences will inevitably arise and influence development strategies.  
A change of the indexation basis to house price inflation from build costs was not recommended by the CIL review team and will marginally complicate the process of calculating indexation, given that different areas will be experiencing differing inflation rates. And why is house price inflation relevant to non-residential floorspace?
Allowing combined authorities and planning joint committees with statutory plan-making functions the option to levy a Strategic Infrastructure Tariff was recommended by the CIL review team but that was against the backdrop of CIL being replaced with a lower “local infrastructure tariff”. Any additional net cost to owners and developers will directly affect viability, ie reduce the amount of affordable housing that schemes could otherwise afford. If the ability to rely on viability arguments is to be reduced, as the Government separately proposes, this is definitely going to impede delivery. Furthermore, why does affordable housing always lose out to infrastructure, particularly when charging authorities are proving very slow in spending the CIL monies that they have so far collected?
The proposals make no mention of the CIL Review team’s proposal, widely supported, of allowing infrastructure to be delivered via section 106 agreements in connection with larger developments, recovering the flexibility and opportunities for efficiency that the CIL system has removed. 
What next?
There will be detailed consultation on these and other changes, ahead of or possibly alongside the draft revised NPPF (rumoured now to have slipped to April 2018) before regulations are made which would probably now not come into force until early 2019. Earlier regulations are expected to deal with the specific ambiguity within regulation 128A affecting section 73 applications (highlighted in the VOA ruling mentioned in my CIL: Kill Or Cure blog post and since challenged by way of judicial review by the charging authority, Wandsworth) – but the transitional provisions within those regulations, and the extent to which the clarification should have retrospective effect, will need careful thought. 
For my part I find it incredibly disappointing that this whole process has been so slow and that the considered recommendations of the review team appear to have been cherry picked, destroying any internal coherence in what is proposed. Aside from correcting some obvious flaws, there appears to be nothing that will reduce CIL’s complexity, the problems arising from the multiplicity of exemptions, the straitjacket that it imposes in relation to more complex schemes and the high rates that are being set with little real scrutiny – indeed quite the reverse. The Government may have answers to these criticisms but simply relying on one paragraph in the budget policy paper really isn’t good enough.  
Simon Ricketts, 24 November 2017
Personal views, et cetera

Aberdeen: Supreme Court, Planning Obligations

Requiring developers to enter into planning obligations to make financial contributions to a pooled fund to be spent on infrastructure, including interventions at places where a particular development has only a trivial impact, is unlawful. 
This was the ruling of the Supreme Court this week in Aberdeen City and Shire Strategic Development Planning Authority v Elsick Development Company Limited (25 October 2017). Being a Scottish case, the relevant domestic legislation referred to was section 75 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 rather than (for England and Wales) section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, but the principles are the same. 

The case related to supplementary planning guidance, part of the statutory development plan, that sought financial contributions by way of planning obligations towards a strategic transport fund which was “to mitigate the cumulative impact of developments at specific “hotspots” in the network”. 
South of the border, CIL of course would be available as a mechanism but the case is still important:
– as a reminder that simply scrapping CIL and not replacing it with another mechanism for securing pooled contributions towards infrastructure is not a straight-forward option
– many English and Welsh authorities still use tariff style policies to secure all manner of section 206 contributions (and if/when the regulation 122 pooling restriction is removed this will only increase)

– what are its implications for the tendency, simply by way of planning policy, to draw in all manner of social requirements as planning obligations to be sought?

The Aberdeen supplementary guidance allowed developers to choose to undertake a bespoke assessment of the cumulative impact of their schemes outwith the fund: 
“Developers can elect to assess and mitigate their cumulative impact outwith the [Fund], although this will require a considerably more comprehensive Transport Assessment and the design and delivery of the mitigation measures shown to be necessary. This will definitely be more time-consuming and almost certainly more expensive, if it can be achieved at all.” 
However the court rejected the argument that this made the contribution voluntary. 
Nor was the court impressed by the authority’s reliance on this assurance in the guidance that the policy was in fact voluntary for developers:
“No contributions from development sites will be used to support projects where the development in question is predicted to gain no mitigation benefit from the infrastructure being provided and therefore is un-related to the development making the contribution...”
This long passage sets out the court’s approach to section 75/106 agreements and also to conditions:
38.              The express words of section 75 require a relationship between the planning obligation and the land to be burdened by the obligation because the obligation must in some way restrict or regulate the development or the use of that land. But those restrictions or regulation do not necessarily relate to a particular permitted development on the burdened land. A planning obligation may prohibit the development of the land in a particular way or the use of the land for particular purposes. A planning obligation may keep the burdened land free from any development and may be entered into in circumstances which are not connected with any planning application.

39.              Restrictions may validly be imposed in the context of the development of another site. Thus, to take an example discussed in Good v Epping Forest District Council, the owner of two farms, A and B, within the area of a planning authority might apply for planning permission to develop and operate an intensive breeding establishment on farm A. The owner of the farms might offer, or the planning authority might require, a section 75 planning obligation preventing the use of farm B for that purpose. The restriction would relate to farm B and would be justified for the planning purpose of preventing an undesirable number of such establishments in the same area.

40.              A planning obligation may also regulate the development or use of the burdened site. An example, in the context of a planning application, is where a planning obligation requires the developer to provide affordable housing as a component of a development on its site or to create specified infrastructure on its land to meet the needs of that development.

41.              Similarly, a planning authority may contract for the payment of financial contributions towards, for example, educational facilities, healthcare facilities, sewerage or waste and re-cycling: requiring a development to contribute to, or meet, its own external costs in terms of infrastructure involves regulating the development of the land which is burdened by the obligation. The financial contribution can be applied towards infrastructure necessitated by the cumulative effects of various developments, so long as the land which is subject to the planning obligation contributes to that cumulative effect and thereby creates a sufficient relationship between the obligation in question and the land so that one can fairly speak of the obligation as regulating the development of the land.

42.              In each of the examples in paras 38-41 above the restriction or regulation serves a purpose in relation to the development or use of the burdened site. In this appeal a question of principle arises: can a restriction or regulation of a site be imposed in the form of a negative suspensive planning obligation, analogous to the negative suspensive planning condition in the Grampian Regional Council case, for a purpose which does not relate to the development or use of the site? In particular, is it lawful by planning obligation to restrict the commencement of the development of a site until the developer undertakes to make a financial contribution towards infrastructure which is unconnected to the development of the site? Alternatively, is it lawful to require contributions towards such infrastructure in a planning obligation which does not restrict the development of the site by means of a negative suspensive obligation?

43.              The answer to each question is no. Dealing first with the latter question, a planning obligation which required a developer to contribute to infrastructure unconnected with its development but did not make the payment of the contribution a pre-condition of development of the site would not fall within section 75 as it would neither restrict nor regulate the development or use of the site….

44. A planning obligation, which required as a pre-condition for commencing development that a developer pay a financial contribution for a purpose which did not relate to the burdened land, could be said to restrict the development of the site, but it would also be unlawful. Were such a restriction lawful, a planning authority could use a planning obligation in the context of an application for planning permission to extract from a developer benefits for the community which were wholly unconnected with the proposed development, thereby undermining the obligation on the planning authority to determine the application on its merits. Similarly, a developer could seek to obtain a planning permission by unilaterally undertaking a planning obligation not to develop its site until it had funded extraneous infrastructure or other community facilities unconnected with its development. This could amount to the buying and selling of a planning permission. Section 75, when interpreted in its statutory context, contains an implicit limitation on the purposes of a negative suspensive planning obligation, namely that the restriction must serve a purpose in relation to the development or use of the burdened site. An ulterior purpose, even if it could be categorised as a planning purpose in a broad sense, will not suffice. It is that implicit restriction which makes it both ultra vires and also unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense for a planning authority to use planning obligations for such an ulterior purpose.”

The court then went on to consider the relevance of planning policies in a local planning authority’s decision as to whether to require a planning obligation. If the policy itself fails the legal tests set out above it cannot be taken into account by the authority:
The inclusion of a policy in the development plan, that the planning authority will seek such a planning obligation from developers, would not make relevant what otherwise would be irrelevant.”
The judgment indicates that “there is much that can be said in favour” of the Aberdeen scheme, but the statutory regime does not allow for it. It ends with a pointed final paragraph:
“If planning authorities in Scotland wish to establish a local development land levy in order to facilitate development, legislation is needed to empower them to do so.
This case is going to cause people to look long and hard at planning obligations policies to ascertain whether there is indeed the necessary causal link between the development in question and the financial contribution or other obligation being sought. 
For instance, this will reinforce the need for policy requirements in relation to provision of contributions towards SANGs (suitable alternative natural greenspace) in the vicinity of SACs and SPAs to be framed with care. Would the decision in R (Smyth) v Secretary of State  (Court of Appeal, 5 March 2015) now be different?
Similarly, the Mayor of London’s policies in relation towards securing climate change mitigation contributions. 
Simply including a standardised wish list in policy is not going to be a sufficient basis for securing contributions. But problems remain. Many matters, for instance the provision of affordable housing, are only relevant planning considerations because the inclusion in planning policy of a requirement for them. When is this a legitimate basis for a planning obligation and when is it not?
Food for thought for the Secretary of State ahead of any announcement in relation to CIL, promised in February to be alongside the Autumn budget which is on 22 November. 
Simon Ricketts, 28.10.17
Personal views, et cetera