What Are The Non-Airport Implications Of The Heathrow Ruling?

The Court of Appeal’s approach to the issues in the Heathrow cases last month was certainly a surprise to many.

The court found in the main “Plan B” ruling (27 February 2020) that the Secretary of State had acted unlawfully when, following the procedure in section 5 of the Planning Act 2008, on 26 June 2018 he designated the Airports National Policy Statement. The court’s basis for its finding was that the Secretary of State had not complied with section 5(8):

(7) A national policy statement must give reasons for the policy set out in the statement.

(8) The reasons must (in particular) include an explanation of how the policy set out in the statement takes account of Government policy relating to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change.”

The question was what was “Government policy” in relation to climate change as at 26 June 2018. The court found that the Secretary of State had acted unlawfully in not taking into account “its own firm policy commitments on climate change under the Paris Agreement”.

This is somewhat surprising given that at first instance the Divisional Court (Hickinbottom LJ and Holgate J, no slouches) had found that this submission was unarguable:

In our view, given the statutory scheme in the [Climate Change Act 2008] and the work that was being done on if and how to amend the domestic law to take into account the Paris Agreement, the Secretary of State did not arguably act unlawfully in not taking into account that Agreement when preferring the NWR Scheme and in designating the ANPS as he did. As we have described, if scientific circumstances change, it is open to him to review the ANPS; and, in any event, at the DCO stage this issue will be re-visited on the basis of the then up to date scientific position.” (paragraph 648 of the main judgment at first instance, known as “Spurrier” after the then first claimant, who had represented himself at first instance but had dropped out by the time of the appeal, which is why you will hear the appeal ruling called “Plan B” after the lead appellant, campaign group Plan B Earth).

(For a wider summary of the proceedings at first instance see my 4 May 2019 blog post Lessons From The Heathrow Cases).

The Court of Appeal has ordered that the Airports National Policy Statement “is of no legal effect unless and until the Secretary of State has undertaken a review of it in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Planning Act 2008.”

Heathrow Airport Limited has applied to the Supreme Court to appeal from the ruling although the Secretary of State has not (meaning that any appeal could be fairly irrelevant if the Secretary of State decides to review the NPS in any event). Whether permission to appeal is granted depends on whether the Supreme Court considers that there is an arguable point of law of general public importance.

So this is all significant as regards the proposal for a third runway at Heathrow. According to the Planning Inspectorate website the application for a development consent order under the Planning Act 2008 NSIP procedure is/was expected to be submitted in Q4 2020.

The main function of the NPS was to give formal national policy support to the proposal at Heathrow. The way that the Planning Act 2008 works is that, under section 104, the Secretary of State must decide a DCO application in accordance with any relevant national policy statement “except to the extent that one or more of subsections (4) to (8) applies.

(4) This subsection applies if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deciding the application in accordance with any relevant national policy statement would lead to the United Kingdom being in breach of any of its international obligations.

(5) This subsection applies if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deciding the application in accordance with any relevant national policy statement would lead to the Secretary of State being in breach of any duty imposed on the Secretary of State by or under any enactment.

(6) This subsection applies if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deciding the application in accordance with any relevant national policy statement would be unlawful by virtue of any enactment.

(7) This subsection applies if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the adverse impact of the proposed development would outweigh its benefits.

(8) This subsection applies if the Secretary of State is satisfied that any condition prescribed for deciding an application otherwise than in accordance with a national policy statement is met.

(9) For the avoidance of doubt, the fact that any relevant national policy statement identifies a location as suitable (or potentially suitable) for a particular description of development does not prevent one or more of subsections (4) to (8) from applying.

So the first thing to note is that the NPS would not have given Heathrow Airport Limited a free pass to a consent – in determining the application the Secretary of State would need to determine whether, notwithstanding the June 2018 NPS, the proposal is not in accordance with, for instance, up to date treaty obligations or domestic legislation – exactly the point made by the Divisional Court in the passage I quoted earlier.

This is relevant because the issue in the Heathrow cases very much turned on an historical question – what was the Government’s climate change policy as at 26 June 2018. Legislation and policy has plainly moved on since then, and will continue to move on. I referred in my 10 August 2019 blog post The Big CC to Theresa May’s tightening in June 2019 of the Government’s commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, by making the Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019 which changed the duty of the Secretary of State under the Climate Change Act 2008 from being to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline, to being at least 100% lower, ie net zero. The target does not include international aviation or shipping: paragraph 10.5 of the explanatory notes published with the order states that there is a “need for further analysis and international engagement through the international networks. For now, therefore we will continue to leave headroom for emissions from international aviation and shipping in carbon budgets…” By the time that any Heathrow DCO application is to be/would have been determined, the Secretary of State would have to take into account climate change legislation and international commitments at the time.

It can all of course get messy/political, as demonstrated by former Energy Secretary Andrea Leadsom’s approval last year, against her inspectors’ recommendations, of the Drax gas-fired power stations DCO, a decision which is now being challenged in the High Court by ClientEarth (see Drax legal case: We’re taking the UK government to court over Europe’s largest gas plant, ClientEarth, 30 January 2020).

Although it would be a risky strategy to adopt, given it would entail acknowledging loss of any formal statutory policy support for Heathrow as the favoured option, Heathrow Airport could in theory decide to proceed with a DCO application without the support of an NPS (this appears to be Gatwick’s strategy with its proposed northern runway). In the absence of an NPS, section 105 applies:

(2) In deciding the application the Secretary of State must have regard to—

(a) any local impact report (within the meaning given by section 60(3)) submitted to the Secretary of State before the deadline specified in a notice under section 60(2),

(b) any matters prescribed in relation to development of the description to which the application relates, and

(c) any other matters which the Secretary of State thinks are both important and relevant to the Secretary of State’s decision.”

How even to begin to scope the appropriate approach to decision-making in that situation…

Any wider relevance?

So does this ruling have repercussions away from Heathrow and airports?

People threaten to bring judicial review proceedings, and often end up bringing them for all sorts of reasons. Lord Reed, President of the Supreme Court, made some topical comments to the House of Lords Constitution Committee last week:

Judges are very well aware of the risk of challenges being brought in what are political rather than legal grounds. They are repelling them and are careful to avoid straying into what are genuine political matters. When this is a matter that is to be considered it should not start from the premise that judges are eager to pronounce on political issues. The true position is actually quite the opposite.” (Law Society Gazette, 4 March 2020).

Since the ruling we have seen these stories:

Environmentalists follow Heathrow ruling by calling on government to end fossil fuel developments (Ecotricity, 4 March 2020) (The Secretary of State has a discretion in section 6 of the 2008 Act as to whether and when to review NPSs, and indeed since June 2019 Government climate change targets have been clear regardless of what the position was at June 2018 – which is surely the only relevance of the Heathrow rulings – if the point made by the prospective claimants is a good one, it has been a good one for some time now).

HS2 legal challenge launched by Chris Packham (Guardian, 3 March 2020) (There is surely no duty on a minister to take into account Government climate change targets in making a decision to continue with the construction of an existing project which has already, phase 1 at least, been authorised by Parliament).

What did it for the Secretary of State in relation to the Heathrow NPS was the specific statutory duty to take into account “government policy” on climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Regardless of whether the Court of Appeal was right to determine that Government support for the Paris Agreement (international) targets could be construed as government policy for any particular domestic targets, there is not the same statutory duty when it comes to the Town and Country Planning Act system.

When it comes to plan-making, section 19(1A) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 imposes a statutory duty on local planning authorities that development plan documents must include policies that contribute to mitigation and adaptation to climate change, and this duty is reflected in paragraph 149 of the National Planning Policy Framework, stating in footnote 48 that policies should be “in line with the objectives and provisions of the Climate Change Act 2008”.

There are no specific equivalent requirements in relation to decision making, just the general statement in paragraph 148, stating that the “planning system should support the transition to a low carbon future in a changing climate” and “should help to: shape places in ways that contribute to radical reductions in greenhouse emissions”.

Beware those who wave about the Heathrow ruling as some kind of game changer in relation to the battle against climate change. It is certainly a game changer in relation to Heathrow Airport’s aspirations, as to project timescale at the very least, but, wider than that? The Court of Appeal determined that a specific statutory duty, peculiar to the making of NPSs, was breached. The question of whether there was a breach depended on determining what government policy on climate change was in June 2018, when it was not as advanced as it is now. Finally, it is not obvious to me that the Court of Appeal’s conclusions would be safe against an appeal to the Supreme Court – but of course all that could well be largely hypothetical, depending upon what steps the Government now takes.

The awaited national infrastructure plan, which was to be published alongside the budget on 11 March, is to be delayed but reportedly could still be “before May” (Government delays Budget infrastructure plan, BBC, 5 March 2020). It will be interesting to see whether any hints are dropped in our new Chancellor’s budget statement as to the Government’s direction of travel.

Simon Ricketts, 7 March 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Stansted Airport

This blog post covers yesterday’s High Court ruling in Ross & Sanders (obo Stop Stansted Expansion) v Secretary of State for Transport (Dove J, 7 February 2020), where the issue before the court was whether an application for planning permission for development at Stansted Airport, made to the local planning authority, Uttlesford District Council, by the airport under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, should instead have been pursued as a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP), to be determined by the Secretary of State for Transport. I also set out the timeline as to the council’s decision-making in relation to the planning application. I have limited what I say to a factual account, given that my firm is acting for the airport (alongside Tom Hill QC and Philippa Jackson from 39 Essex chambers).

The airport is subject to a cap of 35 million passengers per annum (mppa) and a cap of 274,000 air traffic movements (ATMs) per annum. On 22 February 2018 the airport submitted an application for planning permission which involved “building two new taxiway links, being a rapid entry taxiway and a rapid exit taxiway, and nine additional aircraft stands. These new developments are planned to take place in four separate locations within the existing footprint of Stansted Airport. It is uncontentious that these developments would increase the use of Stansted Airport’s single runway and its potential to handle aircraft movements. The planning application also includes a request for the planning cap of 35 million passengers per annum (“mppa”) to be increased to 43 mppa.” It was not proposed to increase the ATMs cap.

The relevant part of section 23 of the Planning Act 2008 provides that airport-related development is to be treated as an NSIP in the case of any “alteration” to an airport the effect of which is “to increase by at least 10 million per year the number of passengers for whom the airport is capable of providing air passenger transport services”.

Section 23(6) provides that “”alterationin relation to an airport, includes the construction, extension or alteration of:


(a) a runway at the airport,

(b) a building at the airport, or

(c) a radar or radio mast, antenna or other apparatus at the airport.”

The Secretary of State for Transport determined on 28 June 2018 that the 10 mppa threshold would not be exceeded and that he would not exercise his discretionary power under section 35 of the Act to treat the proposals as nationally significant and therefore subject to the 2008 Act decision-taking process and a decision at a national level. The latter determination was taken against the background of the Secretary of State’s publication on 5 June 2018 of the government’s “”Airports National Policy Statement: new runway capacity and infrastructure at airports in south-east of England” (NPS) together with the policy “Beyond the horizon: The future of UK aviation-Making best use of existing runways” (“MBU”).The MBU policy paper stated that the government would be using its Aviation Strategy to progress its wider policy towards tackling aviation carbon. “”[T]o ensure that our policy is compatible with the UK’s climate change commitments we have used the DfT aviation model to look at the impact of allowing all airports to make best use of their existing runway capacity.” The paper stated:

Airports that wish to increase either the passenger or air traffic movement caps to allow them to make best use of their existing runways will need to submit applications to the relevant planning authority. We expect that applications to increase existing planning caps by fewer than 10 million passengers per annum (mppa) can be taken forward through local planning authorities under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. As part of any planning application airports will need to demonstrate how they will mitigate against local environmental issues, taking account of relevant national policies, including any new environmental policies emerging from the Aviation Strategy. This policy statement does not prejudice the decision of those authorities who will be required to give proper consideration to such applications. It instead leaves it up to local, rather than national government, to consider each case on its merits.”

Stop Stansted Expansion challenged the Secretary of State’s 28 June 2018 determination on two grounds: that the airport’s proposals would in fact lead to the 10 mppa cap being exceeded and that the Secretary of State should have used his discretionary power to treat the proposals as an NSIP, the claimant relying, amongst other things on a “suggestion that the application was in truth part of a wider project for expansion of passenger throughput in excess of the NSIP definition, and the ramifications of increased carbon emissions as a result of increased air travel which ought to have led to the conclusion that the development should be treated as an NSIP.”

On the first ground, the court accepted that the proposed works amounted to an “alteration” of an airport (the argument was as to whether the definition was for the purposes of these proposals limited to alterations to a runway but Dove J accepted a wider definition, given the word “includes” in sub-section (6)). However, the court found that the Secretary of State was correct to conclude that the 10 mppa threshold would not be breached:

I am satisfied that the submissions of the Defendant in this respect are undoubtedly correct. The language of the statute in relation to whether the alteration will “increase by at least 10 million per year the number of passengers for whom the airport is capable of providing air passenger transport services” requires the Defendant to form a judgment in relation to that question. In my view that judgment is to be formed by asking what increase in capacity could realistically be achieved, not what might technically or arithmetically be possible. It requires an analysis based on how the infrastructure is likely to perform, not a hypothetical approach assuming speculative figures in relation to each aspect of the calculation of capacity to show what might be possible rather than what is likely to occur in practice.”

On the second ground, the court noted that from the statutory language of section 35 of the 2008 Act “the Defendant is granted a broad discretion as to whether or not to treat an application for development which does not otherwise meet the definitions for an NSIP as a project which requires development consent on the basis of national significance. Bearing in mind the prescriptive nature of the definitions for various types of NSIP contained in the 2008 Act, the discretion under section 35 is a broad one. Given the nature of the Defendant’s decision, as one which was exercised using a relatively broad discretion, the task of the Claimants to show that the judgment which the Defendant reached was unlawful is daunting.

The court concluded that similarly ground 2 was not made out. One of the claimant’s submissions was that the MBU carbon emissions modelling was flawed and had “underestimated the effects of growth in aircraft traffic at Stansted airport”. The judge accepted the Secretary of State’s submission that in “reality this aspect of the Defendant’s decision was essentially based on reliance on the MBU policy, and that the substance of the Claimants’ case is in fact a challenge to the legality of that policy in disguise (see paragraphs 95 and 96 above). Certainly, the legality of that policy is now beyond argument. As such I accept that the Defendant was, lawfully, entitled to reach the conclusion which he did, based squarely on the MBU policy that “an increase in the planning cap at [Stansted]…could be adequately mitigated to meet the CCC’s 2050 planning assumption”. That was a conclusion which applied the provisions of the MBU policy (see paragraphs 38 to 40 above) which had considered that proposals of this scale would not imperil the achievement of climate change targets in the light of the modelling work which had informed the policy.”

The Defendant has provided in the evidence a clear and coherent explanation of the purpose of the modelling (namely for long-term forecasting at a national level) and the basis on which it was constructed so as to inform and justify the policy in MBU relating to whether planning proposals at airports could be adequately mitigated and dealt with at the local level. Once this background to the technical work is understood, then it becomes clear that the criticisms of the Claimants, based upon short-term analysis or examination of individual years is without substance.”

Accordingly, the airport had been correct to pursue the proposals by way of an application for planning permission to the local planning authority, and the Secretary of State had not acted unlawfully in declining to intervene by way of directing that the proposals should proceed as an NSIP.

So was the local planning authority, Uttlesford District Council, now free to determine the application? Well this would have been the case if it had not resolved, against officers’ recommendations, to refuse planning permission on 24 January 2020, the decision notice then having been issued on 29 January 2020.

It has been a twisting route, summarised in the report prepared for Extraordinary Planning Committee meetings that were held on on 17 and 24 January 2020 (the passages in quotation marks below), with additional factual insertions by me:

The claimant made requests on 19 April and 14 June 2018 to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government for the application to be called in. He responded that the Secretary of State for Transport should first determine whether the application should be treated as an NSIP.

The Secretary of State determined on 28 June 2018 that the application was not to be treated as an NSIP. Stop Stansted Expansion issued judicial review proceedings in relation to that decision (those proceedings eventually being dismissed on 7 February 2020 as described above).

On 14 November 2018, the Planning Committee resolved to grant the application, subject to conditions and subject to completion of an agreement imposing legally binding planning obligations (“section 106 agreement”). The Report and Supplementary Reports identified the planning obligations required. The precise form that the section 106 agreement should take, in accordance with the amended recommendation, was resolved to be delegated to officers. Subsequently, a proposed S106 Agreement was drawn up between the Council, Essex County Council (as relevant highway authority) and Stansted Airport Ltd.”

On 20 March 2019 the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government decided not to call in the application. Stop Stansted Expansion issued judicial review proceedings in relation to that decision (Legal bid lodged after Government rejects ‘call in’ of Stansted Airport planning application, Saffron Walden Reporter, 28 March 2019). Those proceedings were subsequently withdrawn.

The purdah period commenced ahead of local government elections on 2 May 2019.

5. An Extraordinary Meeting of the Council was called for 25 April 2019 to consider the following motion:

“To instruct the Chief Executive and fellow officers not to issue a Planning Decision Notice for planning application UTT/18/0460/FUL until the related Section 106 Legal Agreement between UDC and Stansted Airport Limited and the Planning Conditions have been scrutinised, reviewed and approved by the Council’s Planning Committee after the local elections.

The motion was defeated by 14 votes to 18 votes.

6. A further Extraordinary Meeting was called to consider the following motion:

To instruct the Chief Executive and fellow officers not to issue the Planning Decision Notice for planning application UTT/18/0460/FUL until members have had an opportunity to review and obtain independent legal corroboration that the legal advice provided to officers, including the QC opinion referred to by the Leader of the Council on 9th April 2019, confirms that the proposed Section 106 Agreement with Stansted Airport Limited fully complies with the Resolution approved by the Planning Committee on 14 November 2018 such that officers are lawfully empowered to conclude and seal the Agreement without further reference to the Planning Committee.

The meeting was originally scheduled for 3 June but was deferred until 28 June to allow further time for consideration of legal advice.

7. An informal meeting was held on 30 April with members who had requisitioned the Extraordinary Meeting. It was agreed:

⁃ that officers would not complete the section 106 agreement and issue the

planning consent for the time being;

⁃ That the legal advice previously obtained from Christiaan Zwart, barrister,

would be circulated to all members;

⁃ That a briefing session would be held for all members, with Christiaan Zwart in attendance to answer questions about his advice;

⁃ That, if need be, further advice would be sought at Q.C. level and a further briefing for all councillors would be held. This advice would focus on whether the planning obligation requirements made by the Planning Committee have been incorporated fully and effectively into the s106 agreement, and on the origin and consequences of any “gaps” if any between the Planning Committee Resolution and the resulting S106 Agreement.”

At the local government elections on 2 May 2019, the council came under the control of Residents 4 Uttlesford by a substantial majority.

8. A briefing meeting for all councillors was called for 14 May. Advice obtained from the Council’s barrister, Christiaan Zwart, was circulated prior to the meeting. He spoke to his advice on 14 May and answered questions.

9. Further advice was then obtained from Stephen Hockman Q.C. working jointly with Christiaan Zwart. Their joint advice was sent to members prior to a second briefing meeting held on 21 May. They answered questions raised by members at that briefing. Issues raised at the briefing meeting by members, and by Stop Stansted Expansion separately, led to additional further advice from Stephen Hockman, Q.C. and Christiaan Zwart. This also was shared with all members of the Council. In all cases information was shared on a legally privileged and confidential basis.

10. At the Extraordinary Meeting of Full Council on 28 June officers were instructed not to issue a Planning Decision Notice for planning application UTT/18/0460/FUL until the Planning Committee had considered:

(i) the adequacy of the proposed Section 106 Agreement between UDC and Stansted Airport Ltd, having regard to the Heads of Terms contained in the resolution approved by the Council’s Planning Committee on 14th November 2018;

(ii) any new material considerations and/or changes in circumstances since 14 November 2018 to which weight may now be given in striking the planning balance or which would reasonably justify attaching a different weight to relevant factors previously considered.

11. Since that meeting further expert legal advice has been obtained from Philip Coppel QC at the request of Members, and officers have been supporting members of the Planning Committee in preparing to consider the two matters set out above through a series of workshop sessions, in part owing to the significant change in membership of the committee. These sessions have taken members through the content of the draft obligations and issues that might be raised as potential new material considerations and regarded as a material change in circumstances since 14 November. They have provided opportunities for councillors and officers to ensure the obligations and issues are fully understood.

12. This report seeks to set out the issues comprehensively, to enable the Committee to comply with the Council resolution and authorise the release of the appropriate decision notice on the planning application.”

Officers recommended the following:

The Assistant Director – Planning be authorised to issue the decision notice approving the planning application subject to the planning conditions as resolved by the Planning Committee on 14 November 2018 on signing of the amended S106 Agreement appended to this report.”

The Committee sat on 17 and 24 January 2020. Members rejected the officers’ recommendation (ten members voting to reject it, with two abstentions).

The reasons for refusal set out on the decision notice are as follows:

1 The applicant has failed to demonstrate that the additional flights would not result in an increased detrimental effect from aircraft noise, contrary to Uttlesford Local Plan Policy ENV11 and the NPPF.

2 The application has failed to demonstrate that the additional flights would not result in a detrimental effect on air quality, specifically but not exclusively PM2.5 and ultrafine particulates contrary to Uttlesford Local Plan Policy ENV13 and paragraph 181 of the NPPF.

3 The additional emissions from increased international flights are incompatible with the Committee on Climate Change’s recommendation that emissions from all UK departing flights should be at or below 2005 levels in 2050. This is against the backdrop of the amendment to the Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) to reduce the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 to net zero from the 1990 baseline. This is therefore contrary to the general accepted perceptions and understandings of the importance of climate change and the time within which it must be addressed. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to approve the application at a time whereby the Government has been unable to resolve its policy on international aviation climate emissions.

4 The application fails to provide the necessary infrastructure to support the application, or the necessary mitigation to address the detrimental impact of the proposal contrary to Uttlesford Local Plan Policies GEN6, GEN1, GEN7, ENV7, ENV11 and ENV13.

If you are interested in the debate that led to these conclusions, you are out of luck: No webcast or sound recording of the 24 January session is apparently available. There is an apology on the council’s website:

Unfortunately the broadcasting of today’s meeting failed. Officers worked throughout the day, in liaison with the supplier, to identify and rectify the problem without success.

It has now been established that the back-up local recording of the meeting also failed, meaning an audio recording of the meeting will not be available on the council’s website.

We sincerely apologise to those who had wanted to ‘listen in’ or ‘listen again’ to the meeting.”

From lack of sound to lack of soundness…

The inspectors examining Uttlesford’s local plan concluded in their 10 January 2020 post stage 1 hearings letter as follows:

Unfortunately, despite the additional evidence that has been submitted during the examination and all that we have now read and heard in the examination, including the suggested main modifications to the plan (ED41) put forward by the Council, we have significant concerns in relation to the soundness of the plan. In particular, we are not persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Garden Communities, and thus the overall spatial strategy, have been justified. We therefore cannot conclude that these fundamental aspects of the plan are sound.”

But that, friends, is for another blog post.

Simon Ricketts, 8 February 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Don’t Print The Environment Bill

Two reasons not to press print:

It’s long. The Environment Bill, which had its First Reading on 15 October 2019, comprises 232 pages. It has 130 sections and 20 schedules. If you want a quicker read, the Explanatory Notes are only 212 pages.

Its shelf life may be short. Of course, we are likely to see a General Election before the Bill has made much progress (although there has been rumour that it may proceed quickly to Second Reading this month) and it will at that point fall unless a motion is passed to carry it over to the next Parliamentary session.

However, there is much within it of interest, and much of direct relevance to the operation of the planning system. I’m sure I’ll come back to various elements in different blog posts. The purpose of this post is to flag the main parts to be aware of from a planning lawyer’s perspective and first to look in particular at the improvements (yes improvements) that have been made to the first part, which sets out the new, post-Brexit regime that would apply to environmental principles and governance.

I am focusing on the relevance of the Bill to English planning law. For a detailed explanation of the territorial extent of each of its provisions, see Annex A of the Explanatory Notes, and the detailed table contained in Annex A.

NB There is no additional protection for the natural environment that could not have been secured with us still in the EU, and there are obvious risks of replacing protections in international obligations with protections in domestic legislation that (even if it is enacted in this form and brought into law) is vulnerable to political short-termism, but I set that issue to one side for the purposes of this summary.

Environmental Governance (Part 1 of the Bill)

This covers the ground previously mapped out in the December 2018 draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill which I covered in my 22 December 2018 blog post The Office For Environmental Protection, although the ground has moved substantially.

Some of the changes, and the reasoning for them, are summarised in the Government’s Response (published alongside the Bill on 15 October 2019) to the House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee’s Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill (30 April 2019).

Having flicked through Part 1 and compared it to the December 2018 draft, I would note the following:

Clause 1 to 6 are entirely new, enabling the Secretary of State to set long-term (at least 15 year) “environmental targets” in respect of any matter which relates to (a) the natural environment or (b) people’s enjoyment of the natural environment. At least one target must be set in each of the following priority areas: air quality; water; biodiversity, and resource efficiency and waste reduction. A target in relation to particulate matter in ambient air must also be set. The Secretary of State must take independent advice before setting targets, must be satisfied that the target can be met and there are restrictions on his ability to lower the target. Draft statutory instruments containing the targets must be laid before Parliament by 31 October 2022. There are provisions in relation to reporting and regular reviews of the targets.

Interim targets must be set out in the environmental improvement plans which the Secretary of State must prepare pursuant to clauses 7 to 14 (which largely reflect the draft).

As per the draft, the Secretary of State must prepare a policy statement on environmental principles, which he must be satisfied will contribute to the improvement of environmental protection and sustainable development. The list of “environmental principles” is reduced to the following:

(a) the principle that environmental protection should be integrated into

the making of policies

(b) the principle of preventative action to avert environmental damage

(c) the precautionary principle, so far as relating to the environment

(d) the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and

(e) the polluter pays principle.

The following were in the draft but no longer appear:

⁃ the principle of sustainable development

⁃ the principle of public access to environmental information

⁃ the principle of public participation in environmental decision-making, and

⁃ the principle of access to justice in relation to environmental matters

I get why the principle of sustainable development has been removed from the list and made an overarching requirement (and I support that as otherwise we would have risked detailed principles set out in a policy statement that may have conflicted with the NPPF, although I wonder how the overarching requirement will be interpreted without further explanation), but why the removal of those Aarhus Convention principles?

Government ministers were to be required to “have regard” to the policy statement. As explained in the Government’s Response, this has been beefed up to “have due regard”. I hadn’t appreciated that this was a higher legal threshold but will bow to others. There is still surely a question as to whether this is strong enough.

The principal objective of the Office for Environmental Protection and exercise of its functions is now set out, as “to contribute to –

(a) the protection of the natural environment, and

(b) the improvement of the natural environment”.

One of my concerns as to the potential scope of the OEP’s operations was that it might get drawn into individual planning disputes. The Government addresses this in its Response:

We agree, however, with the core of the Committee’s comments around avoiding the OEP becoming inundated with complaints relating to local matters. This is not our intention. Clause 20(7) in the Bill introduced today (formerly clause 12(4)) already directs the OEP to prioritise cases with national implications. We believe this already guards to a significant extent against the Committee’s concerns regarding the OEP having to take on too many complaints relating to local matters or being at too much risk of challenge over its own judgements. However, we have considered this matter further, and have now amended the Bill to provide that the OEP’s enforcement policy must set out how it intends to determine whether a failure to comply with environmental law is serious for the purpose of subsequent clauses (clauses 20(6)(a) and (b) in the Bill introduced today). This should provide greater transparency in relation to the OEP’s approach to the meaning of the term “serious”, and guard against this further.”

My main concern as to the previously proposed procedures was that it was envisaged that the OEP might bring judicial review proceedings in the High Court, a year or more after the decision under challenge, and secure the quashing of the decision, as one of the remedies available. Plainly, this would have introduced unwelcome and unworkable uncertainty into the development process.

I have been impressed at the openness of DEFRA and MHCLG civil servants during this process. Indeed we at Town held last year a breakfast event and, after sharing the concerns of many around the table on precisely this issue, I suggested that “statement of non-conformity” outcome might be more workable, drawing upon the approach in the Human Rights Act 1998.

To my pleasant surprise, the proposed judicial review mechanism has been replaced with provision for an “environmental review” to be brought in the Upper Tribunal.

(5) On an environmental review the Upper Tribunal must determine whether the authority has failed to comply with environmental law, applying the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.

(6) If the Upper Tribunal finds that the authority has failed to comply with environmental law, it must make a statement to that effect (a “statement of non-compliance”).

(7) A statement of non-compliance does not affect the validity of the conduct in respect of which it is given.

(8) Where the Upper Tribunal makes a statement of non-compliance it may grant

any remedy that could be granted by the court on a judicial review other than damages, but only if satisfied that granting the remedy would not—

(a) be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person other than the authority, or

(b) be detrimental to good administration.”

The Government’s Response said this:

The approach will have a number of benefits compared to that of a traditional judicial review in the High Court. In particular, taking cases to the Upper Tribunal is expected to facilitate greater use of specialist environmental expertise.”

Judicial review will still be available if the OEP considers that a public authority’s conduct “constitutes a serious failure to comply with environmental law”.

There are now fewer exclusions to what falls within the ambit of “environmental matters” for the purposes of Part 1. Unlike the draft, the Bill does not exclude matters relating to:

⁃ the emission of greenhouse gases within the meaning of the Climate Change Act 2008

⁃ taxation, spending or the allocation of resources within government.

Thumbnail sketch of the rest of the Bill

Part 3 covers waste and resource efficiency, including:

⁃ producer responsibility obligations

⁃ deposit schemes and charges for single use plastic items

⁃ managing waste

⁃ waste enforcement

Part 4 covers air quality and the environmental recall of motor vehicles.

Part 5 covers water, including powers to direct water undertakers to prepare joint proposals for the purpose of improving the management and development of water resources.

Part 6 covers nature and biodiversity, including:

⁃ biodiversity

⁃ local nature recovery strategies

⁃ tree felling and planting (including requirements for local highway authorities in England to consult before felling trees).

The biodiversity net gain provisions introduced by clause 88 are particularly important. My 30 March 2019 blog post Biodiversity Net Gain: A Ladybird Guide summarised DEFRA’s proposals at the time. Clause 88 states:

Schedule 15 makes provision for biodiversity gain to be a condition of planning permission in England”.

Schedule 15 sets out that every planning permission shall be deemed to have been granted subject to a condition that the developer has submitted a biodiversity gain plan to the planning authority and the authority has approved it. The plan must demonstrate that the biodiversity value attributable to the development exceeds the pre-development biodiversity value of the onsite habitat by at least 10%. Certain types of development are excluded, including our old friend: development deemed to be permitted by virtue of a development order.

More anon.

Part 7 covers conservation covenants.

These provisions will also be important for users of the planning system. The provisions follow DEFRA’s February 2019 consultation paper and seek to provide a legal mechanism for landowners to give binding conservation covenants.

As described in the consultation paper, “a conservation covenant is a private, voluntary agreement between a landowner and a “responsible” body, such as a conservation charity, government body or a local authority. It delivers lasting conservation benefit for the public good. A covenant sets out obligations in respect of the land which will be legally binding not only on the landowner but on subsequent owners of the land.

Again, more anon.

Concluding remarks

So sorry to have kept you from the rugby, Brexcitements or other more healthy Saturday activities – perhaps even enjoying the natural environment.

Admission: I did press print.

Simon Ricketts, 19 October 2019

Personal views, et cetera

Urgent Agenda/Urgenda

There appears to be a new domestic political urgency about climate change (to the extent that there is space for anything other than the B word). After saying as little as possible about the politics, the focus of this blog post is on law, and specifically, climate change litigation, although as can be the case with some constitutional law cases (not to mention judicial reviews in our little Planning Court world), climate change law is an area where the purpose of the proceedings, succeed or fail, is often simply to change the politics.

The politics

Party members backed a radical “Green New Deal” motion at last week’s Labour party conference Labour set to commit to net zero emissions by 2030 (Guardian, 24 September 2019). If that is to form part of the next manifesto, some serious thinking is going to be required as to how to turn headlines into costed, politically and socially acceptable reality, but the starting gun has perhaps been fired.

Ahead of the Conservative party conference this week, as I write this morning we are waiting for a series of Government announcements, trailed overnight in pieces such as ‘21st Century Conservatism’: Tories unveil fresh wave of net zero measures (Business Green, 28 September 2019) and Tories ignore tough climate change recommendations in 2050 net zero plan, but promise nuclear fusion instead (Independent, 28 September 2019), which follows Theresa May’s June 2019 tightening of the minimum 80% reduction against 1990 levels figure in the Climate Change Act 2008 Act to 100% ie net zero greenhouse emissions by 2050, with an announcement on 12 June 2019 and the making of the Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019 on 26 June 2019. The amended target excluded international aviation and shipping pending further analysis and international engagement. The Committee on Climate Change on 24 September 2019 published advice to the Secretary of State for Transport as to how emissions from these sectors could be brought within the 2050 target.

UN

It was of course also the UN Climate Action Summit last week, with a series of actions announced, trackable via this detailed portal.

Convention on the Rights of the Child petition

Greta Thunberg announced at the UN that proceedings were being brought under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child against Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany and Turkey, as G20 countries which are alleged not to have kept previously made pledges in international climate change conventions and agreements. The detailed petition (96 pages of reasoned argument, with evidence) to the Committee on the Rights of the Child (which monitors states’ compliance with the Convention) alleges that:

⁃ “each respondent has failed to prevent foreseeable human rights harms caused by climate change by reducing its emissions at the “highest possible ambition.” Each respondent is delaying the steep cuts in carbon emissions needed to protect the lives and welfare of children at home and abroad.”

⁃ “as members of the G20, which makes up 84% of all global emissions, each respondent has failed to use all available legal, diplomatic, and economic means to protect children from the life-threatening carbon pollution of the major emitters (China, the U.S., the E.U., and India) and other G20 members. As G20 members, the respondents have diplomatic, legal, and economic tools at their disposal. Yet, none of the respondents have used, much less exhausted, all reasonable measures to protect children’s rights from the major emitters”.

By recklessly causing and perpetuating life-threatening climate change, the respondents have failed to take necessary preventive and precautionary measures to respect, protect, and fulfill the petitioners’ rights to life (Article 6), health (Article 24), and culture (Article 30) and are thus violating the Convention. Under the Convention, states must “limit ongoing and future damage” to these rights, including those caused by environmental threats.”

The five states were selected as the five largest emitters of carbon that are signatories to the Convention. China, USA, Saudi Arabia and Russia are not signatories.

Obviously, steps like these are taken for a variety of motives – direct legal redress is unlikely, but it all adds to the political pressure and of course shines a more direct light publicly on the relevant issues. It also made me realise that I should perhaps write this follow up to my 10 August 2019 climate change blog post The Big CC (which, I’m sorry, was a bit of a monster) to reference some of the other climate change litigation that we have been seeing.

Heathrow

The appeals from the Heathrow court rulings that I summarised in my 4 May 2019 blog post Lessons From The Heathrow Cases will be heard by the Court of Appeal on 17, 18, 22, 23, 24 & 25 October 2019. They will be live streamed.

Whilst the attacks by the various claimants to the Secretary of State’s decision to designate the Airports National Policy Statement were wide-ranging, challenges brought by Plan B Earth and Friends of the Earth focused on climate change arguments.

Plan B Earth sought to establish that “government policy” to be taken into account in designating the NPS included a commitment to the Paris Agreement limit in temperature rise to 1.5oC and “well below” 2oC. The Secretary of State acted unlawfully in not taking into account that commitment; and in taking into account an immaterial consideration, namely the global temperature limit by 2050 of 2oC above the pre-industrial level which, by the time of the designation, had been scientifically discredited as recognised by the UK Government as a party to the Paris Agreement and other announcements of support for the 1.5oC limit upon which the Paris Agreement was based (Plan B Earth Ground 1).

However, the Divisional Court held that “the Secretary of State was not obliged to have foreshadowed a future decision as to the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement by way of a change to the criteria set out in the CCA 2008 which can only be made through the statutory process; and, indeed, he may have been open to challenge if he had proceeded on a basis inconsistent with the current statutory criteria. Nor was he otherwise obliged to have taken into account the Paris Agreement limits or the evolving knowledge and analysis of climate change that resulted in that Agreement.”

Plan B Earth also sought to argue that the “Secretary of State erred and failed to act in accordance with section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires legislation to be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the ECHR rights, by failing to read and give effect to the phrase in section 5(8) of the PA 2008, “Government policy relating to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change”, as including the Paris Agreement” and that “in any event, irrespective of the terms of the PA 2008, the Secretary of State acted irrationally in taking into account the discredited 2oC limit and not taking into account the 1.5oC limit to which, by the time of the designation, the Government was committed.” Both grounds were also rejected.

Friends of the Earth argued, unsuccessfully, that the NPS did not adequately explain how the 2050 carbon target as set out in section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008 had been taken into account and /or that in a number of respects the NPS was “internally contradictory or otherwise unclear” as to its compatibility with the 2050 emissions target.

They also argued that section 10 of the Climate Change Act 2008 “requires the Secretary of State, on the basis of up to date information and analysis, to take into account the ability of future generations to meet their needs, which includes taking into account international agreements such as the Paris Agreement and the underlying science of climate change which bear upon that question.” However, the court held that “international commitments were a consideration in respect of which he had a discretion as to whether he took them into account or not.

It is well-established that where a decision-maker has a discretion as to whether to take into account a particular consideration, a decision not to take it into account is challengeable only on conventional public law grounds. In our view, given the statutory scheme in the CCA 2008 and the work that was being done on if and how to amend the domestic law to take into account the Paris Agreement, the Secretary of State did not arguably act unlawfully in not taking into account that Agreement when preferring the NWR Scheme and in designating the ANPS as he did. As we have described, if scientific circumstances change, it is open to him to review the ANPS; and, in any event, at the DCO stage this issue will be re-visited on the basis of the then up to date scientific position.

Lastly, Friends of the Earth argued unsuccessfully that the obligations of the Paris Agreement should have been taken into account in the environmental report that was prepared for the purposes of the strategic environmental assessment that informed the Secretary of State’s decision to designate the NPS.

Generally, the passages in the judgment in relation to climate change (paragraphs 558 to 660) are well worth reading. Will the Court of Appeal hold to the same line?

Plan B Earth “carbon target” litigation

Plan B Earth had previously brought a challenge to the Secretary of State’s refusal to revise the 2050 carbon target under the 2008 Act, on the basis that he was obliged to do so following the Paris Agreement.

The proceedings, Plan B Earth v Secretary of State (Supperstone J, 20 July 2018), were dismissed as unarguable.

One of the grounds of challenge was that the Secretary of State’s refusal to amend the 2050 target constitutes a violation of the claimants’ human rights. “The Claimants rely on the rights conferred by Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR, and by Article 1 of the First Protocol, both individually and in conjunction with Article 14. Mr Crow submits that in so far as the Secretary of State is acting inconsistently with his Treaty obligations and with general principles of international law, he is in breach of his positive obligations to uphold the Claimants’ Convention rights. This ground, Mr Crow acknowledges, raises a novel issue under the HRA 1998. However he observes that it is difficult to conceive of any issue that would be of greater significance to each member of the British public than the threat of climate change, which the Government has acknowledged as constituting an “existential threat”. In this context, he submits that the Government’s delay is inexcusable (Ground 4).

Mr Palmer submits that the decision not to amend the 2050 target at this time does not amount to an interference with any identifiable victim’s rights under any of the Articles relied upon. Mr Crow accepts there is no interference with any identifiable victim’s rights, but submits that there has been a violation of those rights, which have an environmental dimension. The Claimants do not identify any interference to which that decision gives rise, but only to the effects of climate change generally. The violation arises, it is said, because of the failure of the Secretary of State to take proper preventive measures. I reject this submission. The Government is committed to set a net zero emission target at the appropriate time. I agree with Mr Palmer that this is an area where the executive has a wide discretion to assess the advantages and disadvantages of any particular course of action, not only domestically but as part of an evolving international discussion. The Secretary of State has decided, having had regard to the advice of the Committee, that now is not the time to revise the 2050 carbon target. That decision is not arguably unlawful, and accordingly the human rights challenge is not sustainable.”

Permission to appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal on 22 January 2019.

Urgenda

It is interesting to contrast these two rulings with the Dutch proceedings brought by campaign group, Urgenda. As summarised by the LSE/Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, the Hague Court of Appeal ruled (unofficial English translation, 9 October 2018) “that by failing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by end-2020, the Dutch government is acting unlawfully in contravention of its duty of care under Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR. The court recognized Urgenda’s claim under Article 2 of the ECHR, which protects a right to life, and Article 8 of the ECHR, which protects the right to private life, family life, home, and correspondence. The court determined that the Dutch government has an obligation under the ECHR to protect these rights from the real threat of climate change. The court rejected the government’s argument that the lower court decision constitutes “an order to create legislation” or violation of trias politica and the role of courts under the Dutch constitution. In response to these appeals, the court affirms its obligation to apply provisions with direct effect of treaties to which the Netherlands is party, including Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR. Further, the court found nothing in Article 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that prohibits a member state from taking more ambitious climate action than the E.U. as a whole, nor that adaptation measures can compensate for the government’s duty of care to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, nor that the global nature of the problem excuses the Dutch government from action.

An appeal was heard by the Dutch Supreme Court in May 2019 and its ruling is anticipated before the end of the year.

The end of the year? I think they need a Lady Hale.

Simon Ricketts, 28 September 2019

Personal views, et cetera

The Big CC

I’m on holiday and it’s hot. There was going to be no blog post this week.

But the hotel room world news channels were covering the latest IPCC report, published on Thursday, and I realised I needed to join some dots for myself on climate change. So here is another blog post after all, before I lose the thread again.

I’m no expert but I hope the links at least are helpful. Many of you will know all this and more, and will find my summarising simplistic. I have tried to remain factual, or at least evidence-based, but there is inevitably some subjectivity in selecting passages to quote from long reports.

Some preliminary thoughts:

⁃ Allowing average global temperatures to rise more than 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels is not a sensible option. The implications have now been mapped out to a high level of scientific certainty.

⁃ Through an unprecedented amount of international effort, ground work has been done to work out how temperature rises can be contained. But achieving international consensus is slow, lagging behind the science, and given the absence, pretty much, of any international supervisory regime, it is

now for each country to work out how, and whether it wants, to play its part.

⁃ It is not that successive UK governments have done nothing. But have they done enough? How best do we move forward at the right pace, potentially no longer in coordination with our nearest trading partners (in the way that many measures to date have been) and given that this Government, and governments to come, are focused on Brexit and its practical and economic implications?

⁃ Business will not be as usual, but if we get it right, many outcomes will be beneficial in any event – more pleasant places to live, healthier lifestyles.

⁃ The challenge will inevitably increasingly influence much of national policy-making as well as our funding and taxation regimes – the only arguments are about how hard and how fast the measures should be. If we are not very careful, those arguments will become increasingly entrenched and politicised.

⁃ Much of our approach to infrastructure and planning will be affected.

⁃ All of this will help to define what it means to be a planning lawyer for the rest of my career.

Think Global

Some important stepping stones.

Creation of the IPCC, 1988

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation and United Nations Environment Programme. As set out in its principles:

The role of the IPCC is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation. IPCC reports should be neutral with respect to policy, although they may need to deal objectively with scientific, technical and socio-economic factors relevant to the application of particular policies.”

The IPCC does not carry out its own original research but bases its extremely detailed assessment reports (of which there now have been five, as well as a special report last year which I’ll come to in a moment) on peer-reviewed analysis, by thousands of scientists, working on a voluntary basis, of published scientific literature.

The IPCC has proved essential to climate change thinking, where the science is liable be hijacked by those with their own agendas.

Rio, 1992

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted at the Rio Summit in 1992.

Article 2 sets out that the “ultimate objective” of the Convention is “to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent

dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”

Developed countries agreed that they would stabilise their greenhouse gas emissions at verified 1990 benchmark levels by 2000.

Kyoto, 1997

The Kyoto Protocol extended the scope of the Convention. Whilst negotiated in 1997, it did not come into force until 2005. Its parties, which included the UK and the EU, were committed to reducing emissions of six identified greenhouse gases from the 1990 benchmark in the initial commitment period of 2008 to 2012, each by an identified percentage, that for the UK being 12.5%.

Doha, 2012

An amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted by a number of states, including the UK and EU, in 2012. It covers the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, from 2013 to 2020, with commitments to more stringent reductions – 20% from 1990 levels for EU states.

Paris, 2016

The Paris agreement was negotiated in 2015 and signed by almost 200 participating countries in 2016.

For the first time there was a defined target in an international treaty, of holding global warming below 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, despite there being a large amount of international consensus well before that this was an appropriate target (for example, this was an outcome of a 1996 Council of the European Union conference in Luxembourg, as well as 2009 and 2010 UN Copenhagen climate change conferences in Copenhagen and Cancún respectively). However, understanding of the science was moving on: the evidence in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, published in 2014, implied that 2 degrees might not be an adequate target.

The objectives of the agreement are set out in Article 2:

1. This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:

(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

(b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and

(c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”

Cutting and pasting from Wikipedia (I’m on holiday):

Under the Paris Agreement, each country must determine, plan, and regularly report on the contribution that it undertakes to mitigate global warming. No mechanism forces a country to set a specific target by a specific date, but each target should go beyond previously set targets. In June 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the agreement. Under the agreement, the earliest effective date of withdrawal for the U.S. is November 2020, shortly before the end of President Trump’s current term. In practice, changes in United States policy that are contrary to the Paris Agreement have already been put in place.”

IPCC special report, October 2018

The sixth IPCC assessment report is not due until 2022, but as part of the Paris agreement negotiations the IPCC was requested to publish a special report on the impact of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels . The evidence in the report sets out plainly the relative implications and likelihoods of a 1.5 or 2 degrees rise in global warming and the consequences, largely projected with a stated high degree of certainty. The evidence inevitably points to the need for the current Paris agreement cap of 2 degrees being reduced to a cap of 1.5 degrees – just a more ambitious longterm target of 1.5 degrees in the agreement.

Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. (high confidence).”

Climate-related risks for natural and human systems are higher for global warming of 1.5°C than at present, but lower than at 2°C (high confidence). These risks depend on the magnitude and rate of warming, geographic location, levels of development and vulnerability, and on the choices and implementation of adaptation and mitigation options (high confidence).”

Climate models project robust differences in regional climate characteristics between present-day and global warming of 1.5°C, and between 1.5°C and 2°C. These differences include increases in: mean temperature in most land and ocean regions (high confidence), hot extremes in most inhabited regions (high confidence), heavy precipitation in several regions (medium confidence), and the probability of drought and precipitation deficits in some regions (medium confidence).

By 2100, global mean sea level rise is projected to be around 0.1 metre lower with global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (medium confidence). Sea level will continue to rise well beyond 2100 (high confidence), and the magnitude and rate of this rise depend on future emission pathways. A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation in the human and ecological systems of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas (medium confidence).

On land, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including species loss and extinction, are projected to be lower at 1.5°C of global warming compared to 2°C. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to lower the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater and coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their services to humans (high confidence).

Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to reduce increases in ocean temperature as well as associated increases in ocean acidity and decreases in ocean oxygen levels (high confidence). Consequently, limiting global warming to 1.5°C is projected to reduce risks to marine biodiversity, fisheries, and ecosystems, and their functions and services to humans, as illustrated by recent changes to Arctic sea ice and warm-water coral reef ecosystems (high confidence).

Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase further with 2°C.

Most adaptation needs will be lower for global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (high confidence). There are a wide range of adaptation options that can reduce the risks of climate change (high confidence). There are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity for some human and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, with associated losses (medium confidence). The number and availability of adaptation options vary by sector (medium confidence).”

IPCC special report, climate change and land, 8 August 2019

As part of the Paris agreement negotiations, the IPCC was also asked to prepare a special report on Climate Change, Desertification, Land Degradation, Sustainable Land Management, Food Security, and Greenhouse gas fluxes in Terrestrial Ecosystems”. Its report was published on 8 August 2019.

First of all, it sets out its findings as to the present position:

A1.1. People currently use one quarter to one third of land’s potential net primary production for food, feed, fibre, timber and energy. Land provides the basis for many other ecosystem functions and services, including cultural and regulating services, that are essential for humanity (high confidence). In one economic approach, the world’s terrestrial ecosystem services have been valued on an annual basis to be approximately equivalent to the annual global Gross Domestic Product (medium confidence). {1.1, 1.2, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1, 5.5, Figure SPM.1}

A1.2. Land is both a source and a sink of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and plays a key role in the exchange of energy, water and aerosols between the land surface and atmosphere. Land ecosystems and biodiversity are vulnerable to ongoing climate change and weather and climate extremes, to different extents. Sustainable land management can contribute to reducing the negative impacts of multiple stressors, including climate change, on ecosystems and societies (high confidence). {1.1, 1.2, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1, 5.5, Figure SPM.1}

A1.3. Data available since 1961 show that global population growth and changes in per capita consumption of food, feed, fibre, timber and energy have caused unprecedented rates of land and freshwater use (very high confidence) with agriculture currently accounting for ca. 70% of global fresh-water use (medium confidence). Expansion of areas under agriculture and forestry, including commercial production, and enhanced agriculture and forestry productivity have supported consumption and food availability for a growing population (high confidence). With large regional variation, these changes have contributed to increasing net GHG emissions (very high confidence), loss of natural ecosystems (e.g. forests, savannahs, natural grasslands and wetlands) and declining biodiversity (high confidence). {1.1, 1.3, 5.1, 5.5, Figure SPM.1}

A1.4. Data available since 1961 shows the per capita supply of vegetable oils and meat has more than doubled and the supply of food calories per capita has increased by about one third (high confidence). Currently, 25-30% of total food produced is lost or wasted (medium confidence). These factors are associated with additional GHG emissions (high confidence). Changes in consumption patterns have contributed to about 2 billion adults now being overweight or obese (high confidence). An estimated 821 million people are still undernourished (high confidence). {1.1, 1.3, 5.1, 5.5, Figure SPM.1}

A1.5. About a quarter of the Earth’s ice-free land area is subject to human-induced degradation (medium confidence). Soil erosion from agricultural fields is estimated to be currently 10 to 20 times (no tillage) to more than 100 times (conventional tillage) higher than the soil formation rate (medium confidence). Climate change exacerbates land degradation, particularly in low-lying coastal areas, river deltas, drylands and in permafrost areas (high confidence). Over the period 1961-2013, the annual area of drylands in drought has increased, on average by slightly more than 1% per year, with large inter-annual variability. In 2015, about 500 (380-620) million people lived within areas which experienced desertification between the 1980s and 2000s. The highest numbers of people affected are in South and East Asia, the circum Sahara region including North Africa, and the Middle East including the Arabian peninsula (low confidence). Other dryland regions have also experienced desertification. People living in already degraded or desertified areas are increasingly negatively affected by climate change (high confidence). {1.1, 1.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, Figure SPM.1}

As to future risks:

Climate change creates additional stresses on land, exacerbating existing risks to livelihoods, biodiversity, human and ecosystem health, infrastructure, and food systems (high confidence). Increasing impacts on land are projected under all future GHG emission scenarios (high confidence). Some regions will face higher risks, while some regions will face risks previously not anticipated (high confidence). Cascading risks with impacts on multiple systems and sectors also vary across regions (high confidence). {2.2, 3.5, 4.2, 4.4, 4.7, 5.1, 5.2, 5.8, 6.1, 7.2, 7.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 6, Figure SPM.2}”.

What can be done?

Sustainable land management, including sustainable forest management, can prevent and reduce land degradation, maintain land productivity, and sometimes reverse the adverse impacts of climate change on land degradation (very high confidence). It can also contribute to mitigation and adaptation (high confidence). Reducing and reversing land degradation, at scales from individual farms to entire watersheds, can provide cost effective, immediate, and long-term benefits to communities and support several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with co-benefits for adaptation (very high confidence) and mitigation (high confidence). Even with implementation of sustainable land management, limits to adaptation can be exceeded in some situations (medium confidence). {1.3.2, 4.1.5, 4.8, Table 4.2}.

Response options throughout the food system, from production to consumption, including food loss and waste, can be deployed and scaled up to advance adaptation and mitigation (high confidence). The total technical mitigation potential from crop and livestock activities, and agroforestry is estimated as 2.3-9.6 GtCO2e.yr-1 by 2050 (medium confidence). The total technical mitigation potential of dietary changes is estimated as 0.7-8 GtCO2e.yr-1 by 2050 (medium confidence). {5.3, 5.5, 5.6}”

“Future land use depends, in part, on the desired climate outcome and the portfolio of response options deployed (high confidence). All assessed modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5oC or well below 2°C require land-based mitigation and land-use change, with most including different combinations of reforestation, afforestation, reduced deforestation, and bioenergy (high confidence). A small number of modelled pathways achieve 1.5oC with reduced land conversion (high confidence) and, thus, reduced consequences for desertification, land degradation, and food security (medium confidence). {2.6, 6.4, 7.4, 7.6; Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 6; Figure SPM.4}.

Policies that operate across the food system, including those that reduce food loss and waste and influence dietary choices, enable more sustainable land-use management, enhanced food security and low emissions trajectories (high confidence). Such policies can contribute to climate change adaptation and mitigation, reduce land degradation, desertification and poverty as well as improve public health (high confidence). The adoption of sustainable land management and poverty eradication can be enabled by improving access to markets, securing land tenure, factoring environmental costs into food, making payments for ecosystem services, and enhancing local and community collective action (high confidence). {1.1.2, 1.2.1, 3.6.3, 4.7.1, 4.7.2, 4.8, 5.5, 6.4, 7.4.6, 7.6.5}.

“The effectiveness of decision-making and governance is enhanced by the involvement of local stakeholders (particularly those most vulnerable to climate change including indigenous peoples and local communities, women, and the poor and marginalised) in the selection, evaluation, implementation and monitoring of policy instruments for land- based climate change adaptation and mitigation (high confidence). Integration across sectors and scales increases the chance of maximising co-benefits and minimising trade-offs (medium confidence). {1.4, 3.1, 3.6, 3.7, 4.8, 4.9, 5.1.3, Box 5.1, 7.4, 7.6}.”

There is a third special report that remains to be published, on “The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate”.

Act Local

So what of the UK, in this international context?

It is striking to read this 1989 speech by then prime minister Margaret Thatcher, with her expressed concerns as to the risks of climate change and support for the work of the nascent IPCC.

In 2005, then Chancellor Gordon Brown commissioned economist Nicholas Stern to carry out a Review on the Economics of Climate Change. Published in 2006, the review sets out the economic benefits of acting sooner rather than later in combatting climate change.

The Climate Change Act 2008 received Royal Assent in November 2008. From its explanatory notes, a summary of the mechanisms in the Act:

The Act sets up a framework for the UK to achieve its long-term goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and to ensure steps are taken towards adapting to the impact of climate change. Its main elements are as follows:

Setting emissions reduction targets in statute and carbon budgeting. The Act establishes an economically credible emissions reduction pathway to 2050 and beyond by putting into statute medium and long-term targets. In addition, the Act introduces a system of carbon budgeting which constrains the total amount of emissions in a given time period. Carbon budget periods will last five years, beginning with the period 2008–2012, and must be set three periods ahead. The Secretary of State is required to give indicative ranges for the net UK carbon account in each year of a budgetary period, to set a limit on use that can be made of international carbon credits in each budgetary period and to develop and report on his proposals and policies for meeting carbon budgets.

A new reporting framework. The Act provides for a system of annual reporting by the Government on the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions. The new Committee on Climate Change will have a specific role in reporting annually on progress, with the Government required to lay before Parliament a response to this progress report.

The creation of an independent advisory body. The Act creates a new independent body, “the Committee on Climate Change”, to advise the Government and devolved administrations on how to reduce emissions over time and across the economy and, on request, on any other matter relating to climate change, including adaptation to climate change. This expert body will advise on the optimum trajectory to 2050, the level of carbon budgets, and on how much effort should be made by the part of the economy covered by trading schemes and by the rest of the economy, as well as reporting on progress.

Trading scheme powers. The Act includes powers to enable the Government and the devolved administrations to introduce new domestic trading schemes to reduce emissions through secondary legislation. This increases the policy options which the Government could use to meet the medium and long-term targets in the Act.

Adaptation. The Act sets out a procedure for assessing the risks of the impact of climate change for the UK, and a requirement on the Government to develop an adaptation programme on matters for which it is responsible. The programme must contribute to sustainable development. The Act also gives powers to direct other bodies to prepare risk analyses and programmes of action, and advisory and progress-reporting functions to the Committee on Climate Change.

Policy measures which reduce emissions. The Act will be used to support emissions reductions through several specific policy measures: amendments to improve the operation of the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligations; a power to introduce charges for single use carrier bags; a power to pilot local authority incentive schemes to encourage household waste minimisation and recycling; amendments relating to the Certified Emissions Reductions Scheme; powers and duties relating to the reporting of emissions by companies and other persons; a duty to make annual reports on the efficiency and contribution to sustainability of buildings on the civil estate.”

Section 1(1) provided as follows:

It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline.”

That duty was formulated after intense debate, against the context of the global objective of an average mean temperature rise of no more than 2 degrees. A 60% target was originally proposed before the minimum 80% target was introduced. Section 30 provides that the target excludes include greenhouse gases from international aviation or international shipping “except as provided by regulations made by the Secretary of State.

Immediately following the October 2018 IPCC special report, the government commissioned a report from the Committee on Climate Change:

This advice will inform consideration of the UK’s long term targets, and should include options for the date by which the UK should achieve a) a net zero greenhouse gas target and/or b) a net zero carbon target in order to contribute to the global ambitions set out in the Paris Agreement, including whether now is the right time for the UK to set such a target. Your advice should also provide options for:

• the range which UK greenhouse gas emissions reductions would need to be within, against 1990 levels, by 2050 as an appropriate contribution to the global goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and

• the range which UK greenhouse gas emissions reductions would need to be within, against 1990 levels, by 2050 as an appropriate contribution towards global efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

Your report should provide evidence on:

• how reductions in line with your recommendations might be delivered in key sectors of the economy; and

• the expected costs and benefits across the spectrum of scenarios in comparison to the costs and benefits of meeting the current target.”

The CCC published its report Net Zero – The UK’s contribution to stopping global warming on 2 May 2019. It advised as follows:

The UK should legislate as soon as possible to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The target can be legislated as a 100% reduction in greenhouse gases (GHGs) from 1990 and should cover all sectors of the economy, including international aviation and shipping

The report’s key findings are that:

• The Committee on Climate Change recommends a new emissions target for the UK: net-zero greenhouse gases by 2050.

• In Scotland, we recommend a net-zero date of 2045, reflecting Scotland’s greater relative capacity to remove emissions than the UK as a whole.

• In Wales, we recommend a 95% reduction in greenhouse gases by 2050.

A net-zero GHG target for 2050 will deliver on the commitment that the UK made by signing the Paris Agreement. It is achievable with known technologies, alongside improvements in people’s lives, and within the expected economic cost that Parliament accepted when it legislated the existing 2050 target for an 80% reduction from 1990.

However, this is only possible if clear, stable and well-designed policies to reduce emissions further are introduced across the economy without delay. Current policy is insufficient for even the existing targets.”

The report sets out in some details the options available to meet the 80% or 100% reduction targets, categorising them as follows:

Core options are those low-cost low-regret options that make sense under most strategies to meet the current 80% 2050 target. They also broadly reflect the Government’s current level of ambition (but not necessarily policy commitment).

• Further Ambition options are more challenging and on current estimates are generally more expensive than the Core options.

• Speculative options currently have very low levels of technology readiness, very high costs, or significant barriers to public acceptability. It is very unlikely they would all become available.

The report then analyses various business sectors individually. I set out some selective passages from the document, focusing on identified potential delivery mechanisms, ie what we may well see in practice by way of legislative and policy changes in due course:

Power

We find that emissions from the UK’s electricity system can be reduced to almost zero whilst meeting increased electricity demands from the transport and heat sectors, potentially doubling the size of today’s electricity system. Our findings in part reflect new research on the impact of heat pumps and electric vehicles on the UK’s electricity system.

Reducing electricity emissions close to zero will require sustained and increased deployment of renewables and possibly nuclear power and the decarbonisation of back-up generation. Improvements in system flexibility – such as battery storage, interconnection and flexible demands – can help accommodate large volumes of variable renewables in the system at low cost. However some flexible power generation will continue to be required and will need to be decarbonised, probably via carbon capture and storage (CCS) and hydrogen.

Hydrogen (as either hydrogen or ammonia) can be used as a low-carbon fuel in the buildings, industrial, transport (including shipping) and power sectors. Producing hydrogen at low cost can be done with low emissions, by the development of advanced methane reformation facilities with CCS. Our hydrogen analysis draws mainly on our 2018 hydrogen report.”

(See also the subsequent Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy announcement Innovative funding models and technologies to drive investment in new wave of low carbon energy (23 July 2019)).

Buildings

Near-full decarbonisation of heat for buildings is one of the biggest challenges in reducing emissions from the energy system to net zero by 2050. The policies put in place to drive the required changes will determine how the costs of this decarbonisation are allocated between consumers and taxpayers. Government must review the plan for the distribution of these costs as an early priority to ensure that the wider transition – for workers and energy bill payers – is perceived to be fair.

It is critical that measures to reduce emissions are not viewed in isolation. A holistic approach is required to deliver buildings which are low-carbon, thermally-efficient, better adapted to a changing climate, with safe moisture levels and excellent indoor air quality”.

Industry

The Government must urgently establish an overall framework to support long- term industrial decarbonisation, as committed to in the Government’s Clean Growth Strategy, if it is to enable decarbonisation towards the Committee’s recommended net-zero target. Delay will mean less decarbonisation of industry is possible or a greater role for scrapping assets.

‒ The design of the policy framework to reduce UK industry emissions must ensure it does not drive industry overseas, which would not help to reduce global emissions, and be damaging to the UK economy. This will require either consumers or taxpayers to bear much of the cost of decarbonisation of industrial subsectors or sites so long as they are at risk of carbon leakage.

‒ Policies should include a funding mechanism for industry decarbonisation, to support near-zero emission technologies, including use of hydrogen, electrification and CCS (including BECCS), a mechanism to support CO2 transport and storage infrastructure by the end of 2019, and support for energy and resource efficiency.

‒ CO2 transport and storage infrastructure should be operational in at least one industrial cluster by 2026 and available to all major industrial clusters soon afterwards, alongside hydrogen for all clusters where it is the best fuel-switching option for some sites. A network to provide hydrogen to industry outside the main industrial clusters should be established by 2035, or potentially slightly later if ‘hydrogen-ready’ appliances can be deployed in industry prior to this.

‒ By providing an attractive investment environment, including stable policy, the UK can become a leader in production of low-carbon goods, attract increased investment in new and existing industries, and develop new businesses and products. This should involve encouraging subsectors and technologies where the UK may have a competitive advantage.”

Transport

The following priority actions should be taken as soon as possible to support the transition to zero emission technologies across road transport:

‒ Commit to end the sale of conventional cars and vans by 2035, including ending the sale of hybrid and plug-in-hybrid vehicles. End the use of petrol and diesel vehicles (including hybrid and plug-in-hybrid vehicles) on UK roads by 2050.

‒ Announce plans for the continuation of financial incentives for electric vehicles, through a commitment to continued grant schemes or through greater differentiation in the tax system, e.g. vehicle excise duty (VED), VAT and fuel duty, which will still be required in the near-term to support the early market.

‒ Continue development of charging infrastructure provision, especially improving reliability of current provision and rolling out of chargers in towns and cities to provide for people without off-street parking.

‒ Trials of zero emission HGVs with associated infrastructure within the UK

Aviation and shipping

A mix of UK and international policies will be required to deliver the Further Ambition scenarios in ways that avoid perverse outcomes (e.g. carbon leakage).

‒ Both aviation and shipping will need to strengthen the current internationally agreed policies. Aviation should set a global long-term objective for emissions. Shipping should put in place a policy framework to deliver the agreed target for 2050. A more ambitious global target in shipping would be needed to deliver the technical potential that exists in the Further Ambition scenario.

‒ The Government should ensure their forthcoming Aviation Strategy and Clean Maritime Plan support innovation, research and deployment to ensure new technologies are brought to market in a timely fashion. The Aviation Strategy will also need to set out an approach to limiting growth in aviation demand. We will set out our recommended approach for aviation in follow-up advice to DfT later in 2019.”

Agriculture, land use, land-use change and forestry

The following actions should be taken to support deep emissions reduction in agriculture and the LULUCF sectors:

‒ Develop a post-Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) framework that incentivises the take- up of low-carbon farming practices and promotes transformational change in land use that rewards land owners and managers for deep emissions reduction and removals and delivering wider ecosystem benefits.

‒ Continued investment in R&D, testing and piloting of options to deliver agricultural productivity improvements and enhanced forest productivity. Develop low-carbon agricultural machinery and robotics with artificial intelligence.

‒ Provide support to help land managers transition to alternative land uses through skills, training and information. Along with financial support for alternative land uses with high up-front costs and long pay-back periods.

‒ Government should introduce consumer-focused policies to encourage healthier diets and reduce food waste more proactively. The public sector should take a strong lead for example, by providing plant-based and lower-meat options in schools and hospitals.”

Waste

The following priority actions should be taken as soon as possible to support the transition to zero emissions across waste management:

‒ Government and the DAs [devolved administrations] should legislate a mandatory ban on biodegradable waste from key waste streams going to landfill by 2025 at the latest. In order to achieve this, separate waste collection should be introduced by 2023 and supporting measures to increase municipal recycling rates to 70% by 2030 at the latest.

‒ Policies and measures should be introduced to achieve a 20% reduction in avoidable food waste by 2025 including more proactive waste avoidance measures.

‒ Government and the DAs should work with waste water companies to develop a strategy to reduce non-CO2 emissions from waste water handling by at least 20% by 2050.”

Theresa May acted on the CCC’s recommendation that the minimum 80% reduction figure in the 2008 Act be amended to 100% ie net zero greenhouse emissions by 2050, with an announcement on 12 June 2019 and the making of the Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019 on 26 June 2019.

The target still excludes greenhouse gases from international aviation or international shipping. There is this statement in the explanatory notes to the Order:

The Government recognises that international aviation and shipping have a crucial role to play in reaching net zero emissions globally. However, there is a need for further analysis and international engagement through the appropriate frameworks. For now, therefore, we will continue to leave headroom for emissions from international aviation and shipping in carbon budgets to ensure that emissions reduction strategies for international aviation and shipping can be developed within International Maritime Organisation and International Civil Aviation Organisation frameworks at the appropriate pace, and so that the UK can remain on the right trajectory for net zero greenhouse gas emissions across the whole economy.

Finally, the CCC has reacted (8 August 2019), to the IPCC’s land use and climate change report, referring back to its November 2018 report Land use: Reducing emissions and preparing for climate change, which made the recommendation that “land use policy should promote transformational land uses and reward land- owners for public goods that deliver climate mitigation and adaptation objectives. New policies should also reflect better the value of the goods and services that land provides. The key measures that have clear, multiple benefits are: afforestation and forestry management; restoration of peatlands; low-carbon farming practices; improving soil and water quality; reducing flood risks and improving the condition of semi-natural habitats. These measures should be rewarded if they go beyond a minimum standard that land-owners should already be delivering.”

The net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 target is of course, save in relation to international aviation and shipping, in line with the CCC’s recommendations but there has been intense lobbying for more stringent measures.

The Extinction Rebellion campaign group has three published aims:

1. “Government must tell the truth by declaring a climate and ecological emergency, working with other institutions to communicate the urgency for change.”

2. “Government must act now to halt biodiversity loss and reduce greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2025.

3. “Government must create and be led by the decisions of a Citizens’ Assembly on climate and ecological justice.”

Almost half the local authorities in the country have formally declared a “climate emergency.” The Campaign Against Change Change website has a list of authorities that have made a formal declaration and an indication of the contents of each declaration.

What do these declarations look like? Here is Cornwall’s, by way of example:

On the 22nd January 2019, a motion was passed by Cornwall Councillors to declare a climate emergency. The minutes of that meeting are available online for you to view. The motion resolved that the council would:

1. Declare a climate emergency

2. Call on Westminster to provide the powers and resources necessary to achieve the target for Cornwall to become carbon neutral by 2030 and commit to work with other Councils with similar ambitions

3. Provide adequate staff time and leadership to prepare a report within six months to establish how Cornwall can sufficiently reduce carbon emissions through energy and other Council Strategies, plans and contracts within a timescale which is consistent with an ambition to restrain Global Warming to 1.5oC. This will draw together the actions Cornwall Council is already and will continue to take; and where possible, outline partners’ commitments to move towards a carbon neutral Cornwall by 2030

No doubt we will be seeing statements such as these feed through into emerging policy. So what is it likely to mean for planning? The TCPA’s Planning for climate change: a guide for local authorities (May 2018) provides useful advice, but against the backdrop of the previous 80% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 target, not the new “net zero” target or the even more ambitious targets that these declarations would imply.

So, returning from holiday, plenty of practical questions:

1. What prospects for a new or amended international agreement reflecting a 1.5 degree target, particularly given the current stance of the US and others?

2. What will be the approach of Boris Johnson’s government, in its precarious, preoccupied, state, to the immediate challenges ahead?

3. What will be in the government’s aviation strategy, expected later this year?

4. How rapidly will business grasp some of the opportunities set out in some detail in the CCC’s May 2019 report and what will the government be doing to facilitate the necessary measures?

5. What will come of these local authority “climate emergency” declarations and to what extent will the Government seek to constrain individual authority stances, where they run contrary to other planning objectives?

Simon Ricketts, 10 August 2019

Personal views, et cetera