Category: Development management

Route 62A

It’s like Route 66 but with more roundabouts. 

My Town Legal colleague Charlie Austin recently wrote a piece in Estates Gazette, The beginning of the end for localism? (18 May 2026, behind paywall). He goes through various strands of MHCLG’s current programme, including expanded delegation of decision-making to officers (see my 13 June 2026 blog post Delegation Nation), new referral requirements to the Secretary of State and London Mayor (see my 5 April 2026 blog post Further Measures To Discourage LPA Refusals Of Large Housing Schemes…Activated) and the more prescriptive thrust of the draft revised NPPF.

To that list could be added MHCLG’s designation on 15 June 2026 pursuant to section 62A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, of nine local planning authorities where applications for planning permission for major development may now be made direct to the Planning Inspectorate.

The list is:

• Cherwell

• Dacorum

• Epping Forest

• Hertsmere

• Malvern Hills

• Rossendale

• South Tyneside

• Staffordshire Moorlands

• Wychavon

All of which join Lewes, which was designated back on 8 May 2024.

This week’s designation notices all have the same text:

“On 4 December 2024 the Secretary of State laid before Parliament a document setting out the criteria for designation and de-designation under section 62B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the designation criteria”). Neither House of Parliament resolved that the designation criteria should not be approved within the 40-day period referred to in that section.

In applying the designation criteria, the Secretary of State has considered data for the two year period ending on 31 March 2025 and subsequent appeals decisions to 31 December 2025 on the quality of decision making by local planning authorities on applications for planning permission for major development. The Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 62A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and by reference to the designation criteria mentioned above, considers that there are respects in which the local planning authority specified below is not adequately performing their function of determining applications for planning permission for major development under Part 3 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and therefore, it is appropriate to make the following designation:

[ ] Council in respect of applications for planning permission for major development. Duration of designation This designation has effect from 09:00 on 15 June 2026 and shall remain in force until revoked.”

MHCLG’s designation criteria guidance is here.

For the purposes of this week’s designation: “The threshold for designation on applications for both major and non-major development, above which a local planning authority is eligible for designation, is 10 per cent of an authority’s total number of decisions on applications made during the assessment period [the 12 months up to and including the most recent quarter for which data on planning application decisions are available at the time of designation] being overturned at appeal.”

Planning magazine provided the useful table below in their designation day news piece (Pennycook places nine councils in planning performance ‘special measures’ for poor quality decision-making, 15 June 2026 (behind paywall)):

What are the implications of designation?

The applications can now be made direct to the Planning Inspectorate are those for major development, namely:

  • for housing, development where 10 or more homes will be provided, or the site has an area of 0.5 hectares or more
  • the provision of a building or buildings where the floor space to be created by the development is 1,000 square metres or more; or
  • development carried out on a site having an area of 1 hectare or more.

We have a good picture both from the procedural requirements and guidance but also given previous designations (Fareham de-designated in March 2024, Chorley, St Albans and Uttlesford de-designated in June 2025 and Bristol de-designated in January 2026).

The Planning Inspectorate has procedural guidance for applicants, designated authorities and interested parties . In broad summary:

  • Applicants can secure pre-application advice from PINS at £134 per hour. PINS appoints a case officer who is then the main point of contact and requests necessary background documentation from the authority. The planning inspector reviews the pre-application submission (there is a form and a list of necessary documentation) and carries out a site visit, holds a meeting with the applicant and issues formal advice to the applicant. Pre-application community consultation by the applicant is strongly encouraged as well as “meaningful” consultation with statutory consultees.
  • The application can then be submitted (with at least ten working days’ advance notification given). The fee is the same as for submission to the local planning authority.
  • PINS carries out consultation with statutory consultees and the designated local planning authority, advertises the application in a local newspaper (how quaint), and publishes any consultation responses online.
  • The local planning authority must provide a substantive response to the consultation within 21 days, including matters it considers should be addressed by way of section 106 agreement or conditions and should “work constructively with the applicant to ensure any Section 106 agreement is completed within the required timescales”.
  • “When submitting an application to the Planning Inspectorate, applicants must ensure that it is ready for determination. A decision will be made on the application as submitted. There is no specific provision in the process for amendments or revision to the application once it has been submitted. Applicants should ensure that the relevant information is submitted with the application, as we will not accept any additional information once the application has been submitted, other than in exceptional circumstances.”
  • At the end of the consultation period, PINS will determine the procedure to be followed. “Planning applications relating to development of a significant scale, and which raise issues which cannot be clearly understood from the written submissions will require a hearing.”
  • “It is the responsibility of the applicant and the LPA to ensure that a completed agreement is in place so that it can be taken into account in reaching a decision. For applications dealt with by the written representations procedure, the completed agreement should be submitted within two weeks of the end of the representation period. Where there is a hearing the agreement should be submitted in advance of the hearing date.”
  • “The Planning Inspectorate will issue a formal decision notice incorporating a statement setting out the reasons for the decision. If the application is approved the decision will also list any conditions which are considered necessary.”
  • There is no provision to appeal the decision.
  • CIL processes work as if the decision were taken by the authority.
  • “Where planning permission has been granted under Section 62A the LPA continues to have the responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the permission, ensuring that it is carried out in accordance with the approved plans and any attached conditions. Applications for the approval of details required by condition must be submitted to the LPA. Applications for variation or removal of conditions can also be made to the LPA.”

What all this means in practice is that potential applicants have much to weigh up in deciding or not whether to make their application direct to PINS.

On the plus side, for a scheme that is straight-forward with little risk of subsequent refinements being required, there is more time certainty (and particularly in relation to negotiation and completion of any section 106 agreement), a straight-forward approach to the pre-application engagement and, if the sense is that the application may need to go to appeal anyway, it gets you before an inspector without that initial application stage.

On the minus side, many applicants may wish to maintain a constructive relationship with the particular local planning authority, and will be rightly concerned about the lack of any ability to revise applications or submit further material during the process, as well as the fact that there is just the one roll of the dice, with no subsequent right of appeal. For the local planning authority, the loss of planning application fees can of course have a significant impact.

If you would like to see some examples of applications made, timescales and the relevant documentation there are links here to all applications made in relation to Uttlesford before that authority was eventually de-designated.

Simon Ricketts, 20 June 2026

Personal views, et cetera

Delegation Nation

The new rules (for England) limiting which planning applications can be determined by local councillors come into force on 31 October 2026, a month later than previously intended.

The draft Regulations are accompanied by statutory guidance (1 June 2026) and a draft impact assessment which arrives at the following calculation:

““[Net present social value] (2025 prices, 2026 base year): £509.4 million (Low: £102.6 million and

High: £1,352.3 million)

Central direct monetised impacts (NPSV in 2025 prices, 2026 base year):

• Reduction in costs of holding capital related to determination times (to developers): £329.5 million

• Reduction in costs of holding capital related to appeals (to developers): £127.8 million

• Reduction in costs related to appeals (to developers): £46.0 million

• Reduction in costs related to appeals (to public sector): £6.1 million

• Familiarisation costs (to public sector): <£100,000”

Half a billion pounds is not to be sneezed at.

There is (of course) a comprehensive Lichfields blog setting out how the new system will work (Delegation default: power to the Chief Planner, 11 June 2026). Schedule 1 applications must always be delegated to officers. With Schedule 2 applications there is a presumption that applications will also be delegated, unless (1) unless the nominated officer and nominated member agree the application should be referred to a planning committee or sub-committee for determination and (2)  it meets at least one of the criteria in regulation 5(3), namely:

  • A: where the application raises an economic, social or environmental issue of significance to the local area; and/or
  • B: where the application raises a significant planning matter having regard to the development plan and any other material considerations.

For B, “the following circumstances are unlikely to raise a significant planning matter:

  • where the application for development broadly complies with a detailed site allocation and other relevant policies set out in a local or neighbourhood plan and national decision making policies set out in the National Planning Policy Framework. Significant planning matters may arise if new material considerations are raised by the application.
  • where a specific planning matter (e.g. highways or flood risk) was initially raised by a statutory consultee as a concern, but the development proposal has been modified to make it acceptable in the view of the statutory consultee (unless the nominated officer has compelling reasons to consider otherwise).”

Schedule 1 includes applications for householder development, minor commercial development, minor residential development (fewer than ten dwellings), most reserved matters, condition discharges, prior approvals, permissions in principle, NMAs and certificates of lawfulness.

There are a few changes in the make-up of the schedules since the draft proposals that I summarised in my 31 May 2025 blog post Small Changes , for example:

  • reserved matters applications in relation to phased outline planning permissions will only be in Schedule 2 if the outline permission scheme is for the provision of 500 or more dwellings or buildings with 50,000 sq m or more floorspace.
  • section 73 applications will now be in the same schedule as the application for the original permission.

Local authorities will need to adopt appropriate processes to get this right. This table in the Lichfields blog post gave me a familiar sinking feeling…

What can go wrong?

Well, as set out in the statutory guidance:

“For the avoidance of doubt, where local planning authorities do not comply with the Regulations from the date they come into force (31 October 2026) and their planning committees make decisions on applications which must be delegated officers [sic], those decisions may be subject to judicial review by anyone aggrieved by the decision. This may lead to the quashing of the decision.”

Let’s look at a couple of permutations:

  • Planning committee makes a decision which should have been delegated to an officer. If the decision is to approve, that gives rise to the potential for third parties to challenge the decision. If the decision is to refuse, what does the applicant do? If the authority does not agree to re-determine the application (at least before the decision is formally issued), yes it could judicially review the decision but its more effective remedy may simply be to appeal (and in so will have to grapple with the dilemma of potentially being in a position where it is submitting an appeal in relation to an unlawful refusal notice).
  • Officer makes a decision on a Schedule 2 application without having considered with the nominated member, in accordance with its published procedures, whether it should be determined by committee. First of all, to state the obvious, in many contentious cases there is going to be much pressure placed on the nominated officer and member (usually from objectors, sometimes potentially even from the applicant) for the application to go to committee. If there are grounds for asserting that the process has not been carried out lawfully, you can bet that they will be relied upon. Officers really will need to be robust and clear in their approach and to have the full support of members in order for these changes to work as envisaged and not to lead to unnecessary delays.

Last comment: I googled to find that previous blog post I did on these proposals. This is how reliable or not Google AI is, folks. Matt, if you wrote it I’m sure the blog would be more popular!

Simon Ricketts, 13 June 2026

Personal views, et cetera

Carry That Weight

“Boy, you’re gonna carry that weight

Carry that weight a long time

Boy, you’re gonna carry that weight

Carry that weight a long time”

(Lennon & McCartney, 1969)

Three interesting decision letters have been issued in the last ten days by the Planning Inspectorate in relation to large residential development projects in London:

  • Decision letter dated 14 May 2026, dismissing an appeal in relation to a proposed part 10 storey, part 28 storey building at 1 Battersea Bridge Road, including 110 new dwellings
  • Decision letter dated 18 May 2026, dismissing an appeal in relation to the proposed redevelopment of the Aylesham Centre Peckham, including 867 new dwellings
  • Decision letter dated 18 May 2026, allowing an appeal against a refusal to grant planning permission under section 73 for an amended version of an existing planning permission for the Camden Goods Yard development in Camden so as to be able to implement fire safety requirements, reducing the number of dwellings from 644 to 636 and reducing the affordable housing provision from 38% to 15%.

There has been much commentary, aimed at taking from those decisions pointers for other projects. But in my view the messaging from them is inevitably as mixed as the weather last week in Leeds.

Because, however much we all try to, and indeed often are paid to, forecast the outcome of particular applications and appeals, there are two particular aspects which make it in reality almost impossible (particularly in relation to larger, complex, projects):

  • What largely subjective assessment will the decision-maker reach on aspects such as the degree of harm caused to e.g. heritage and townscape and the significance of that harm?
  • What weight will the decision maker give to particular competing factors before arriving at an assessment of the overall planning balance?

Bear in mind those two questions as you read these extracts from the inspectors’ conclusions in these three appeals:

1 Battersea Bridge Road:

“187. Having regard to NPPF paragraph 215 and London Plan Policy D9, I must weigh the moderate, low and negligible levels of less than substantial harm to the significance of designated heritage assets, against the public benefits. All the aforementioned benefits should be regarded as public benefits. 188. The benefits of market and affordable housing delivery are substantial. These alone outweigh the harm to significance notwithstanding the considerable importance and weight I give to that harm. While NPPF paragraph 212 indicates that great weight should be afforded to the assets’ conservation, there is clear and convincing justification for the harm to these designated heritage assets as required by NPPF paragraph 213.

189. Accordingly, the proposal would have an acceptable effect on the setting and the significance of designated heritage assets. Despite the identified conflict with London Plan Policies D9 and HC1 and WLP Policies LP3 and LP4, the proposal would accord with NPPF paragraphs 212, 213 and 215.

190. Regarding the moderate indirect adverse effect on the significance of 10 – 14 and 24 – 52 Westbridge Road, 52 – 68 Battersea Bridge Road, and 11 – 35 and 61 – 71 Battersea Church Road as non-designated heritage assets and the conflict with London Plan Policies D9 and HC1 and WLP Policies LP3 and LP4, this would be significantly outweighed by the proposal’s benefits, having had regard to NPPF paragraph 216.

191. Although the heritage balance has been passed, the harms to the aforementioned heritage assets are included in the overall planning balance below.

192. While I have had regard to the appellant’s and the Council’s views on full or partial compliance with London Plan Policy D9 or with WLP Policy LP4, I do not pursue this debate further as the proposal clearly fails to comply with several of the elements of London Plan Policy D9 Part C [“visual, functional, environmental, and cumulative impacts… requires consideration of long, mid-range and immediate views; the local and wider context’s spatial hierarchy; wayfinding; architectural quality and materials; and protection and enhancement of the river’s open quality, public realm, and views”] and WLP Policy LP4 [“proposals for tall buildings will only be appropriate in tall building zones identified in WLP Appendix 2, where there would not be any resulting adverse visual, functional, environmental, or cumulative impacts”].

193. The proposal would provide the benefits of market and affordable housing, both of which individually carry substantial weight. There would be other benefits to which I have afforded significant and moderate weight and these are outlined above. However, I have afforded very substantial weight to the adverse effects on the character and appearance of the area. There are moderate, low and negligible levels of less than substantial harm to designated heritage assets which carries considerable weight and moderate indirect adverse effects on non-designated heritage assets which carry moderate weight.

194. Accordingly, the proposal would be contrary to the development plan taken as a whole, and there are no material considerations that indicate that planning permission should otherwise be granted.”

Aylesham Centre:

“98. Contrary to the appellant’s primary contentions, I have found that there is only partial compliance with the adopted development plan for the area, taken as a whole, bearing in mind all disputes made by LBSC and the Rule 6 party combined. Specifically, I find conflict with: SP Policy NSP74 in respect of CLT homes, design, heritage, tall buildings, and retention of retail; and LP Policies HC1, D1, D4 and D9, and SP Policies P13, P17, P20 and P21 and Area Vision AV.14 regarding harmful heritage and townscape impacts.

99. Although there would be some conflict with LP Policies NSP74, SD6 and E9, and SP Policies P32 and P35 I do not find that the appeal development would be deleterious to town centre vitality and viability, or to local business interests overall. Equally, the appellant’s underlying viability position is material. Accordingly, I find no harm from the reduced affordable housing provision as a result.

100. Consequently, linked to the appellant’s other contentions when applying paragraph 11 (d) of the Framework the policies which are most important for determining the application are not out-of-date. And in other respects, the site is already allocated for housing development.”

“103. Factoring significance evidence there would be less than substantial heritage asset harm to a range of relevant designated and non-designated heritage assets. I give great weight to the conservation of designated heritage assets. And substantial weight to the non-designated asset harm and overall townscape harm interlaced in the arguments made.

104. The collective public benefits on offer carry substantial overarching weight. They include: the delivery of the SP site allocation developed over a 10 year horizon with the aim of rejuvenating the area; more efficient use of previously developed land in a highly sustainable location; increased pedestrian permeability and connectivity; the facilitation of air quality improvements owing to greater reliance on sustainable modes of transport and with the promotion of cycling; increasing housing supply for Londoners as well as Peckham’s residents via 867 new homes, allowing for family provision as well as wheelchair accessibility needs; increasing much needed affordable housing provision (albeit at 12%); some urban greening betterment as well as ecological and notable BNG improvements; new external play space; plus the overall linked social and economic benefits from large scale town centre investment supporting its primary retail function and infrastructure which would provide and sustain employment in the process.

105. However, in this case such benefits do not outweigh the harm to the relevant designated heritage assets important to the area. Having regard to the Framework, there is no reason for me to conclude a design better responding to those heritage assets could not be achieved.”

“107. In undertaking the balancing exercise, I am cognisant there is a critical need to provide new homes of all tenures for Londoners urgently and at scale coordinated by SP allocation policies and the strategic policies of the LP. Moreover, there is acute affordable housing need in Peckham which some of the new home provision would alleviate. I accept that the totality of benefits would be considerable in this context.

108. Nonetheless, the direct benefits arising from the development comparative to harm to the RLPCA including designated and non-designated asset harm and to the townscape give me insufficient reasons to allow the appeal. From a Framework application perspective, the proposal would not be a sustainable form of development in light of such harms.

109. The circumstances of the case do not lead me to accept new housing and other associated betterments at all costs. Furthermore, SP Policy NSP74 entails a generational opportunity for Peckham which should be carefully managed to ensure a more optimally designed scheme for future generations.

110. For clarity, even with 35% affordable housing as initially proposed in the planning application process and accepting a worsening housing land supply position of less than 5 years purported by the appellant, I would still have found that the level of harm in this case would not be overridden.

111. Although the appeal scheme does have some positive design attributes and high order benefits, the elements of harm identified are not outweighed. There are no other material considerations for me to conclude otherwise.”

Camden Goods Yard:

[Also procedurally interesting given that it is another example of section 106 agreement renegotiation by the section 73 back door – see for more background my 1 March 2026 blog post And Another Thing….Another Misconception About Amending Section 106 Agreements]

“80. With regards the heritage balance, I have found a modest level of less than substantial harm to various heritage assets, to which I have afforded considerable importance and weight. The Framework requires any harm to designated heritage assets to be weighed against the public benefits of the proposal.

81. In this regard I have considered the economic, social and environmental benefits of the appeal scheme, the uppermost being the delivery of housing and affordable housing. While the quantum of housing and affordable housing is reduced from the earlier consented scheme, I am nonetheless satisfied that this public benefit in itself, which I afford great weight, does outweigh the harm to the heritage assets. As such the appeal scheme is not contrary to CLP Policy D2 and London Plan HC1 that seeks to protect designated heritage assets.

82. Turning to the overall planning balance, the appeal scheme would not provide the full quantum of affordable housing usually required by the Development Plan and would be at a lower level than that previously granted consent. 83. However, I am satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated, with regards the viability evidence submitted, that the appeal scheme makes appropriate provision for affordable housing and is therefore in accordance with the provisions of policy H4 of the Camden Local Plan and policy H5 of the London Plan and National Planning Guidance.

84. As such, in the context of an absence of a 5-year housing land supply and a continued high demand for affordable housing I afford the provision of housing and affordable housing, even at a reduced quantum, great weight.

85. Therefore, it is readily apparent that any adverse impacts of varying the conditions would not, by some considerable margin, significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework taken as a whole and other material considerations.

86. For the reasons given above I conclude that the appeal should succeed.”

Could any of you have accurately predicted ahead of these decisions what these outcomes would be? Is that uncertainty inevitable? Could national and/or local policy provide even more direction? Or indeed do parties sometimes need that lack of policy certainty given the inevitability that policies will never be wholly up to date and appropriate for all circumstances?

Whilst in my view it is encouraging that the draft revised NPPF will herald a simpler, more prescriptive, national policy approach (and encouraging indeed that ministers committed last week that the final version will be published by the summer – which I interpret to be by summer recess on 16 July), unless we are going to see some detailed calibration in policy as to, for instance, how specific levels of heritage harm are to be assessed against specific levels of housing undersupply (for which the present “tilted balance” has been, I would say, ultimately ineffective), those two aspects I referred to above are going to dampen down any hope of predictability.

And if the truth is that the decision-maker always has the whip-hand due to that black box within which subjective assessments and conclusions as to weighting of competing considerations can be reached, and that accordingly when we say decision-making is quasi-judicial that word “quasi” is doing some heavy lifting, it’s odd that the precise nature of the decision-maker in our system and whether they have any form of democratic mandate is ultimately random:

  • Most applications for planning permission: officers taking the decisions under delegated powers – applying section 38(6), presumably trying to arrive at a “correct” assessment of policy compliance, harms, benefits and arriving at an overall planning balance, presumably without “political” influence.
  • Other applications: elected councillors in planning committee – the same legal duty, so is it right that there be the room for politically-influenced judgment, particularly where there is an up-to-date local development plan and/or a clear and up to date national planning policy framework? Why is their decision “better” than that of trained officers?
  • Most appeals: decisions taken by civil servants, i.e. a single inspector, again applying section 38(6), presumably trying to arrive at a “correct” assessment of policy compliance, harms, benefits and arriving at an overall planning balance, without “political” influence. Again, why is their decision “better” than either that of local councillors or trained officers?
  •  Some recovered appeals, and applications which have been called-in: decisions taken by ministers in line with national “political” objectives, in practice with significant input from civil servants, at least on technical aspects and ensuring that the ministers’ decision, whatever it may be, is legally defensible. Again, why is the minster’s decision “better” than either that of the inspector who has made recommendations or indeed that of local councillors or trained officers?

If our development management system is intended to be predictable and indeed properly quasi-judicial, such that most applications can be determined by officers and such that call-ins and recovered appeals only happen in utterly exceptional cases, wouldn’t we need to move towards (1) even more calibration in policy and (2) a much stronger duty on councillors to have an up to date local development plan in place with well-evidenced policies?

Otherwise, on these sorts of decisions, on complex sites with often conflicting imperatives, isn’t the truth that we are unfairly leaving a huge amount of weight on the shoulders of officers and, even possibly even more unfairly, individual inspectors? I was interested to see from the list of inquiry documents that, after the close of the 1 Battersea Bridge Road inquiry, the appellant sought unsuccessfully to have the appeal recovered by the Secretary of State – presumably in the hope that he would reach a different conclusion as to the relative weight that various considerations carried than the direction in which the inspector may have been thought to be heading..

Simon Ricketts, 25 May 2026

Personal views, et cetera

Further Measures To Discourage LPA Refusals Of Large Housing Schemes…Activated

Once we are the other side of the local elections, there are a couple of procedural changes to be aware of which take effect from 11 May, both flagged in my 8 March 2026 blog post Planning Committees That Refuse Planning Applications Against Officers’ Advice: 5 Impending Procedural Protections for Applicants.

The Government has introduced requirements for local planning authorities to consult the Secretary of State before refusing applications for planning permission for developments of 150 or more homes, and to consult the Mayor of London before refusing applications for planning permission for developments for 50 or more homes in London. The relevant legislation comprises:

The Consultation Direction applies to applications for planning permission which (a) include provision of 150 or more houses and/or flats and (b) which have not been determined by a Local Planning Authority before 11 May 2026 (“Relevant Development”).

It provides that the LPA, where it proposes to refuse a planning application for Relevant Development, must consult the Secretary of State before finally determining the application.

The LPA must send the following as soon as practicable to MHCLG:

– Application documents;

– A copy of the requisite notice;

– A copy of representations made to the authority relating to the application;

– A copy of any report on the application made by an officer of the authority; and

– A statement of the LPA’s proposed reasons for refusal where not contained in a report.

The Mayor of London Order amends the powers under The Town and Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order 2008 which enable the Mayor of London to direct that he determine applications for certain developments himself.

Developments which fall under Category 3D, which includes development involving the construction of buildings with over 1,000 square metres of floor space or a material change of use of such a building, on land allocated as Green Belt or Metropolitan Open Land, and of Potential Strategic Importance (within the meaning of the 2008 Order), may now be called in for determination by the Mayor of London.

In addition, a new category of development is inserted into the Schedule to the 2008 Order: Category 3J. Category 3J concerns applications for the development of more than 50 houses and/or flats (“Relevant London Development”).

The Mayor of London Order requires an LPA to notify the Mayor of London when it receives a planning application for Relevant London Development. There is no requirement for the Mayor of London to respond.

The LPA will also be unable to refuse planning permission for Relevant London Development without (a) further notifying the Mayor of London, and (b) waiting for 21 days to pass beginning with the date the Mayor of London is notified in writing and which the relevant documents are received. The relevant documents required to be provided to the Mayor of London are slightly different to that required under the Consultation Direction. These include:

– A copy of representations made to the authority relating to the application;

– A copy of any report on the application made by an officer of the authority;

– A statement setting out the reasons the LPA proposes to refuse the applications, giving full reasons for that proposed refusal; and

– A statement setting out any proposed planning conditions, a draft of any proposed planning obligations, and details of any proposed planning contribution.

For Relevant Development, the appropriate point at which the documents should be sent will be once either the relevant LPA planning committee has resolved to refuse the application, or once an officer has reached that decision in exercise of the officer’s delegated powers.

The Secretary of State will then have an initial period of 21 days within which to decide whether to call-in for his own determination the application. Within that period, he could of course use his existing power under Article 31 of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015 to direct the local planning authority to delay further its decision in order to give himself further time to decide whether to exercise his call-in powers.

For Relevant London Development, notice must be provided to the Mayor of London at two points: (1) when the LPA receives an application for Relevant London Development and (2) when the LPA planning committee resolves to refuse an application for Relevant London Development, or once an officer reaches that decision under his delegated powers. In the latter case, notice of all the relevant documents listed above must be provided to the Mayor of London and he will similarly have a period of 21 days within which to decide whether to call-in the application for Relevant London Development for his own determination.

[Thanks to my colleague Adam Choudhury for allowing me to use for the above an internal summary he prepared this week for the Town Legal team].

So, this is an interesting ratcheting up of the level of scrutiny applied to decisions by local planning authorities to refuse planning permission for major housing development. But, in the timeless words of Morrissey, what difference will it make?

Of course, there may be some gaming of the system, when is there not? Some local planning authorities may choose to defer decisions, leaving applicants in a dilemma as to whether to appeal on the basis of non-determination. There will be even more need for applicants to make sure that application packages are robustly prepared and in a good state to be subject to the scrutiny of the Secretary of State or Mayor as the case may be, both in terms of legal compliance but also in terms of pressing the right political and planning policy buttons. And the Secretary of State and Mayor of London will need to play their part, by exercising those call-in powers appropriately and thereafter proceeding to determine applications without undue delay.

But, overall, surely, this is all positive…

[For more discussion on this subject I recommend yesterday’s 50 Shades of Planning podcast Some Things Just Take Time].

Since my 8 March 2026 blog post we also now of course MHCLG’s 26 March 2026 Planning committee reform: statutory consultation on draft Regulations and guidance, together with MHCLG’s response in relation to its earlier consultation process, as well as the draft Regulations which are due to come into force on 30 September 2026. Housing minister Matthew Pennycook made a written ministerial statement  the same day. In basic summary, Schedule 1 of the draft Regulations lists those applications which must be determined by an officer. Schedule 2 lists those applications which may be determined by an officer unless the authority’s nominated officer and nominated member agree that the proposal raises:

  • one or more issues of economic, social or environmental significance to the local area
  • one or more significant planning matters having regard to the development plan and any other material consideration

When taken with the new procedures for written representations appeals now in effect for applications submitted from 1 April (see my 15 April 2026 blog post Don’t Be An April Fool: Written Reps Planning Appeals Are About To Get Faster But Also Riskier), Mr Pennycook is soon going to be in a position to say to developers (again in the words of Morrissey):

You’ve got everything now.

Simon Ricketts, 5 April 2026

Personal views, et cetera

NB Thank you to subscribers who have already bought tickets for our 1 June event. In fact, we have been blown away with the interest. If it’s not already sold out it soon will be, so I don’t yet know whether any tickets will be left for general sale on Tuesday. Well I wonder.

The A In Section 106A

A is for…

There was an interesting planning appeal decision letter last week concerning a section 106B appeal against refusal of an application made under section 106A to amend a section 106 agreement on the basis that it no longer served a “useful purpose” (the statutory test in section 106A).

This post will look briefly at that decision but first I thought some legislative archaeology might assist.

Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is of course the statutory successor of section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971. Under section 52, the commitments had no specific description but were treated effectively as covenants analogous to restrictive covenants given by a landowner to a neighbouring landowner but (unlike usual property law covenants) able to contain positive requirements enforceable against successors in title rather than just restrictions – and, as is the case under section 106, enforceable by the local planning authority.

The only statutory method for amending or removing commitments given within a section 52 agreement was to make an application to what was then the Lands Tribunal (now the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber)) under section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925. In order for such an application to succeed, the Tribunal has to be satisfied (in summary – there are other tests which are less relevant for the purposes of this post) “that by reason of changes in the character of the property or the neighbourhood or other circumstances of the case which the Upper Tribunal may deem material, the restriction ought to be deemed obsolete”.

The section 84 process is slow, uncertain, outside the usual planning system and so on. When section 106 of the 1990 Act came into force on 24 August 1990 the only statutory process remained section 84 of the 1925 Act.

Then in the first of so many waves of amendments to the 1990 Act, along came the Planning and Compensation Act 1991, which came into force on 25 September 1991. The 1991 Act replaced section 106 with, basically, what we have now. Those commitments given by landowners on behalf of themselves and successors were the first time called “planning obligations”.

In those changes, the scope of what could be secured was expanded. Compare the original formulation of what could be secured via section 106 with what it became:

Original:

“(1) )A local planning authority may enter into an agreement with any person interested in land in their area for the purpose of restricting or regulating the development or use of the land, either permanently or during such period as may be prescribed by the agreement.

(2) Any such agreement may contain such incidental and consequential provisions (including financial ones) as appear to the local planning authority to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of the agreement.”

What it became:

“(1) Any person interested in land in the area of a local planning authority may, by agreement or otherwise, enter into an obligation (referred to … as “ a planning obligation ”), enforceable to the extent mentioned in subsection (3)—

  1. restricting the development or use of the land in any specified way;
  1. requiring specified operations or activities to be carried out in, on, under or over the land;
  1. requiring the land to be used in any specified way; or
  1. requiring a sum or sums to be paid to the authority (or, in a case where section 2E applies, to the Greater London Authority) on a specified date or dates or periodically.”

[When we think about how the use of section 106 planning obligations to secure financial contributions has exploded over the last 30 or so years, it is worth comparing what is now section 106 (1) (d) above with what it replaced: section 106 (2) above. Was this intended at the time? An open question…]

Note also the reference to “by agreement or otherwise” in the first line of the changed version of section 106 (1). This opened up the possibility of the landowner entering into planning obligations by unilateral undertaking rather than just by agreement.

Alongside the reformulation of section 106 was the introduction of section 106A and B (from 10 December 1992), providing a procedure to applying to “modify or discharge” planning obligations in place of using the Law of Property Act 1925 procedure. As I know you know, section 106A allows an application to be made once at least five years have passed since the obligation was entered into – with an available appeal route (although it is worth noting that the Secretary of State can prescribe – very easily in legislative terms, simply a ministerial direction would surely suffice – a period shorter or longer than five years).  An application may be made before five years have passed, but in those circumstances there is no right of appeal. If an application is made, the local planning authority has to determine either:

  1. that the planning obligation shall continue to have effect without modification;
  1. if the obligation no longer serves a useful purpose, that it shall be discharged; or
  1. if the obligation continues to serve a useful purpose, but would serve that purpose equally well if it had effect subject to the modifications specified in the application, that it shall have effect subject to those modifications.

Section 106B provides for appeals to be made to the Secretary of State. (Interestingly, sub-section 106 (5) requires that before determining the appeal “the Secretary of State shall, if either the applicant or the authority so wish, give each of them an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by a person appointed by the Secretary of State for the purpose”. I interpret that as the parties having a right for any appeal to be determined bother than by written representations, i.e. by a hearing or inquiry).

What is meant by “no longer serves a useful purpose”? What did Parliament intend to connote by the use of those words? Was this just intended as a modernisation and abbreviation of the test in section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925? Should this be treated as a “useful planning purpose” or will any useful purpose do? Those words “No longer”: What if the obligation never served a useful purpose? And why five years? Of course, given the lack of any other statutory route to amend section 106 agreements and unilateral undertakings, all of this has come under increasing scrutiny both by inspectors on appeals and by the courts.

I have been looking back today at Hansard reports of debates in parliament that led to the Planning and Compensation Act 1990 to see whether legislators gave any of this specific thought. It would have been good if they had done but I can’t see that they did.

All this is particularly topical at the moment, at a time where many schemes are stalled through lack of viability and where development may be able to progress if planning obligations previously entered into are modified or discharged to the extent necessary to achieve viability. The government of course (a) missed any opportunity during the course of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 to reintroduce the section 106BA and BC procedure that we had between April 2013 and April 2016 to allow developers to apply to modify or discharge affordable housing obligations in Section 106 agreements where those obligations made a development economically unviable and (b) is still not exactly welcoming section 73 applications with open arms that serve as a vehicle to achieve that outcome (see Matthew Pennycook’s 18 December 2025 letter to the Planning Inspectorate) so, if the local planning authority is not willing to engage in such a renegotiation of its own volition, section 106A and B are the only game in town.

Which now takes me to that recent appeal decision I mentioned. This is a decision letter dated 20 January 2026 dismissing appeals by Hodson Developments and Chilmington Green Developments against the non-determination  by Ashford Borough Council and Kent County Council of applications made under section 106A to make a total of 122 modifications to a section 106 agreement dated 27 February 2017 in connection with planning permission which had been granted for a large development including 5,750 homes together with commercial and other uses. Central to the inspector’s decision was the question as to whether the viability or otherwise of the scheme and the effect of an obligation and other obligations on viability, is relevant to whether an obligation serves a useful purpose.

The appeals have a long history, which I suspect is far from concluded. The position is not wholly clear but it seems that an initial application to modify or discharge various obligations was submitted in 2022 before the expiry of five years when the local planning authority at that time would have had a broad discretion as to whether to agree to the application (given that an appeal would not lie under section 106B in relation to such an application). After an initial judicial review that was settled, the applicant commenced a second set of judicial review proceedings, alleging that Ashford Borough Council and Kent County Council were wrong to conclude that viability of the development was not a relevant consideration under section 106A and that in any event in their consideration of the issue they erred in law. Following a renewal hearing in March 2022, the claim was held by Lieven J to be unarguable. On the specific point as to whether viability is a material consideration, she “remain[ed] unconvinced that it is not a material consideration”. However she considered that the councils had properly taken it into account. “I am not going to consider whether or not viability was legally a material consideration because that is a somewhat complicated point of law and would involve considering a number of previous cases. It is sufficient for the purposes of ground 1 that the local authorities in this case did consider viability with some care and detail…”

There was then a further application, presumably by which time the five years had expired, which was the subject of the appeals considered by the inspector (two appeal references – one for obligations in the agreement enforceable by Ashford Borough Council, the other for obligations enforceable by Kent County Council). Some of the requests for modifications were withdrawn but there was still a long list.

After an eight day inquiry the inspector (solicitor Grahame Kean) disagreed that the effect of an obligation and other obligations on viability, may be relevant to whether an obligation serves a useful purpose (see paragraph 33). He goes on:

“34. An obligation must itself be soundly based on established criteria, ie it must be necessary to make a development acceptable in planning terms, directly related to the development, and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the development. If, say an obligation fails these criteria but requires some act unconnected to or at odds with the development, the obligation would be liable to be struck down as invalid. However, in a s106A application the question is different from the legitimacy of the obligation itself. As counsel for the Appellant accepted, the obligation must have been entered into for a planning purpose in the first place.10 It would be rare for the useful purpose not to be a planning one but as noted, the question under s106A is whether the obligation serves any useful purpose, not just a useful planning purpose.

35. The Appellant’s counsel claims that “in the present case, frustrating the development goes to the planning purpose”. Counsel might not have intended to refer to a deliberate attempt to frustrate a development as much as an objectively assessed outcome due to acts or omissions of local planning authorities. At any rate there is no evidence of any deliberate attempt to frustrate the development and if there were, s106A would not be the appropriate way to deal that scenario.

36. Furthermore, if a planning obligation is duly completed, although it may have the effect of “frustrating” the development in the sense that it prevents progress in the eyes of a developer unless and until certain acts are performed, and although ultimately circumstances may obtain such that it is no longer regarded (by some at least) as a viable project, that seems to me a consequence, and not part of the original purpose or reason for exacting the obligation in the first place.

37. The existence of an obligation, in the context of a development scheme, is to make development acceptable in planning terms. That is its quintessential purpose. The statutory criteria are simple and do not refer to the viability of the development. The obligations have a contractual nature, albeit statutorily based, which it is in the interests of the parties to be able to enforce, the one against the other, and subject only to limited exceptions set out in s106 that allow discharge or modification. Since they are limited exceptions that derogate from the principle of contractual enforceability, it also seems arguable that exceptions should be strictly applied.

38. An obligation can have a useful purpose of preventing development or further development until performed. This may make it inherently impossible, for financially viability reasons, to carry out or complete a development, but that does not necessarily deny the usefulness of the purpose in preventing a development that would otherwise be unacceptable in planning terms. Circumstances may throw light on whether the purpose continues to be “useful” but viability issues would not transcend the basic question of whether the obligation continues to meet any useful purpose.”

Faced with such a spread of requested modifications (including, in relation to affordable housing, requested modifications as to tenure requirements and delivery triggers), the inspector considered that the “evidence is not so clear and unambiguous as to persuade me that unless the obligations in the s106 Agreement were discharged or modified all as requested, the scheme would in fact be rendered financially unviable and unable to proceed.”

This may all be justified on the particular facts, I don’t know. However, standing back, if the inspector’s approach is that an obligation relating to, say, the provision of a particular percentage of affordable housing, still serves a useful purpose if the evidence were to show that unless that percentage is reduced (or for instance the tenure mix altered or the trigger delayed) the development will not proceed, and that with the modification there is every prospect of the development proceeding, resulting in actual provision of affordable housing (albeit a lower percentage than was initially promised), is this approach correct? And if so, where is there any common sense in it – where really is the “useful purpose”? – and what can be done? In a situation like this, rather than defer progress on development indefinitely, is the developer really to go back to the very beginning, to prepare and submit a fresh application for planning permission, delaying any delivery for many years and at frankly massive cost? The lack of any proportionate mechanism to reflect current economic circumstances, with any necessary protections, would be surely a scandal?

Simon Ricketts, 25 January 2026

Personal views, et cetera

If It’s Not One Thing It’s The Other

Cyber attacks.

Almost two months on, the incident on 24 November 2025 which affected an IT system shared by Westminster City Council, the Royal Borough of Kensington and the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham is still causing delays in the processing of planning applications.

Westminster City Council confirmed on 14 January 2026 that many of its functions continue to be impeded. As to its planning functions, it is currently relying on manual processes and is only “making decisions on those [planning applications] that don’t require public or external consultation”(so, not many at all I assume!). It states in a series of FAQs that section 106 agreements are not being completed and CIL liability notices are unable to be issued. I’m sure that this is stressful for those working within the organisation but imagine the knock-on implications for development and for those of us advising those developers affected!

Similarly, RBKC has confirmed that it is unable to start processing planning applications that are submitted. Some data has apparently been copied and taken – and one can only assume that this may include personal information that would be redacted from that which would otherwise be publicly available. I hope this doesn’t impede people’s willingness in the future to engage in sensitive planning issues.

I can’t see equivalent advice on Hammersmith and Fulham Council’s website as to any current implications for its service, but Planning magazine reported on 13 January 2026 that the council has said that while it shares “some legacy systems” with the affected authorities, it had been able to “successfully isolate and safeguard our network.”

This is of course not the first time that local government IT systems have been compromised like this. That Planning magazine piece references attacks on Tewkesbury Borough Council and Gloucestershire City Council in 2022. People may also remember a disruptive attack on Hackney Council’s system in 2020 and there was also one on Redcar and Cleveland Council that year which is reported to have cost the council over £10m.

I’m sure this is all front of mind both for existing councils’ IT teams and for those planning for the move to unitary authorities. I just wonder if the associated business risk is being fully factored in by developers and investors. Does their insurance cover losses caused by resultant delays in receiving planning decisions? And what if a similar incident were to affect the Planning Inspectorate for instance? What back-up plans do organisations have?

And, finally, a point not directly related to any of this but relating to local government IT systems. Are the resources being made available to make sure that local government reorganisation includes full integration of authorities’ digital services? Search for a planning application on Buckinghamshire Council’s planning portal for instance and almost six years on you still undertake a memory test as to the geographic boundaries of its three former constituent authorities…

This is the 500th Simonicity post. Subscription is still free and, once we finalise the planning, subscribers should be receiving an email before too long now with details of a special event that is being planned to mark the blog’s tenth anniversary in June.

Simon Ricketts, 17 January 2026

Personal views, et cetera

Consultee Consultation

Consultation deadline approaching: responses are due by Tuesday 13 January 2026 to MHCLG’s 18 November 2025 consultation document on reforms to the statutory consultee system .

The RTPI has already published its response which makes some sensible points.

The current statutory consultees list is a long one. However,  I hope the government won’t just focus on reducing the number of applications where input from statutory consultees is required, and on the timeliness of initial responses from statutory consultees. To my mind it’s as much about the quality of those responses (constructive, informed by an understanding of the application in question, with the potential for swift dialogue to address issues raised),  about those statutory consultees having stable, clear, positively-minded guidance to manage potential applicants’ expectations) and about those statutory consultees being well-resourced with experienced, accessible, people.

Some quick and random thoughts:

The actions of Natural England in giving advice that has led in recent years to immediate vetoes on development in relation to e.g. the impact of nutrients or recreational pressure or indeed water abstraction issues on protected areas: why was advance notice not given, an “amber” warning, before such disruption was caused? Could solutions have been found faster? Is there going to be any sort of Parliamentary inquiry into how this was all allowed to happen? Will the impending work on environmental delivery plans mark any sort of turning point? We shall see.

As a former trustee of Theatres Trust I was disappointed to see the proposal that the trust should have its statutory consultee status removed. I can’t see what will be gained by this and indeed I see risks arising of unacceptable, or ill-advised, development slipping through the net. Theatres have high community value. TT always responds within the statutory deadline and in recent years (in 345 responses between 2022 and 2024) has only objected to one residential scheme (and that was only for seven homes!). Conversely TT’s responses have secured necessary changes to schemes to protect the operation of theatres. Isn’t this how the system is meant to work?

Conversely, I’ve heard depressing stories about the approach of, for instance, the Environment Agency on flood risk issues – objecting to applications for approval of reserved matters or the discharge of conditions on the back of changes in its flood maps. Memories perhaps of the nutrient neutrality vetoes affecting consented schemes that led to C G Fry & Son Limited v Secretary of State (Supreme Court, 22 October 2025) – issues of principle really should have been resolved by the time planning permission has been granted, rather than being re-opened by the backdoor.

Where are these thoughts leading? Maybe just to a conclusion that there is no “one size fits all” approach to this. With powers should come responsibility and so, as is indeed proposed in the consultation paper, the performance of every statutory consultee should regularly be scrutinised, including as to how constructively it is engaging with the application process – that is what will make the difference. And to have experienced planners within each local planning authority who can weigh consultee responses in the balance, pushing back and questioning where necessary.

Finally, it’s worth bearing in mind the potential impact of the draft NPPF once it is finalised. Paragraph DM3(d) of the draft:

“Consult statutory or internal consultees only where it is necessary to do so. Decisions on development proposals should not be delayed in order to secure advice from a statutory or internal consultee beyond their statutory deadlines unless there is insufficient information to make the decision or more detailed advice may enable an approval rather than a refusal.”

Simon Ricketts, 11 January 2026

Personal views, et cetera

SDO Speedwagon

This is about a vehicle for consenting major projects fast.

I don’t know if you have caught up yet with Sam Stafford’s and Zack Simons KC’s end of year chat: the #Planoraks Awards 2025 50 Shades of Planning podcast episode? In their analysis of the year just past, our small corner of it anyway, Zack awarded “Consent of the Year” to the Special Development Order laid before Parliament on 16 December 2025, due to come into force on 12 January 2026, which will authorise the construction of Universal’s proposed theme park and associated works at Kempston Hardwick, Bedford.

The relevant documents are worth reading, not just in case the same procedure may one day be appropriate for another mega-development, but to understand the structure adopted, in case elements can read across to other consenting processes.

Let’s start with the basics.

The Secretary of State has the power to make a special development order (“SDO”) under existing powers in section 59(3)(b) of the TCPA 1990. SDOs have been used to grant permission for various specified developments over the years.  Recently, SDOs have been used, for instance,  to grant temporary permission for inland border facilities and for providing facilities for the accommodation of asylum seekers. An SDO may only apply to the development of the land specified in the SDO. An SDO may (a) grant planning permission for a specified development or class of development or (b) provide for the local planning authority to grant planning permission in accordance with the provisions of the SDO. An SDO is made by statutory instrument which is subject to the negative resolution process i.e. it becomes law on the day the Secretary of State signs it and automatically remains law unless a motion – or ‘prayer’ – to reject it is agreed by either House of Parliament within 40 sitting days.

The SDO procedure is subject to the potential requirement for environmental impact assessment (with the same criteria applying as for usual planning applications).  Unless EIA is required (in which case the environmental statement must be publicised for at least 30 days), there are no formal consultation or publicity requirements in relation to SDOs. It is for the Secretary of State to determine what if any, consultation and public engagement it would be appropriate in the circumstances to carry out. Similarly, there is no prescription as to the minimum level of detail to be provided in supporting documentation before the Secretary of State proceeds to make an SDO. MHCLG’s website just has this page with a brief summary of the background and links to recent Orders.

Universal’s proposal is vast. As described in the explanatory memorandum to the Order:

“The instrument grants planning permission (subject to conditions and limitations) for an Entertainment Resort Complex (ERC) and associated development at the former brickworks and neighbouring land at Kempston Hardwick, Bedford (‘the site’). The site is around 268 hectares, and the proposal includes theme park(s), visitor accommodation, retail, dining, sports and conference facilities and associated landscaping and utility infrastructure. It also provides improvements to the travel network including new entrances and exits from the A421, a bigger train station on the Thameslink / Midland Main Line at Wixams, and upgrades to Manor Road and other local roads.”

“The ERC would accommodate at least 8.5 million visitors a year and serve a domestic and international market. While there are several theme parks in the United Kingdom, there is nothing on the scale of the proposed development. The nearest similar development is Disneyland Paris.”

Universal submitted its formal request to MHCLG for an SDO on 26 June 2025, comprising a cover letter, ownership certificates, a guide to the planning proposal, proposed conditions, parameter plans, a series of proposed operative and controlling documents, a 19 chapter long environmental statement and various other documents including a planning statement, design and access statement etc etc – a package that will be familiar to anyone used to major outline or hybrid planning applications. There is a public engagement report setting out the extent of engagement undertaken to that point with relevant authorities and organisations and the public, starting with Bedford Borough Council (supportive throughout) and “strategically important bodies” from September 2022. Agreement in principle between the government and Universal as to the nature of Universal’s investment was announced in a written ministerial statement on 22 April 2025.

As set out in the explanatory memorandum, following submission of the formal SDO request in June 2025:

“Public consultation took place from 3 July 2025 for 8 weeks. The plans, drawings, Environmental Statement (ES) and other documents that accompanied the request for planning permission were published on Gov.uk and made available at local and national offices for in-person viewing and consideration. Representations were invited from the public as well as specific individuals and organisations notified directly by MHCLG. Those notified included statutory bodies, landowners and occupiers of property on, and next to, the site, railway operators, and interested or affected parties.

Just over 500 representations were received by the close of the consultation period; late representations were received and also considered. Most of the representations (circa 80%) were submitted via an online Citizen Space survey. Of the circa 400 Citizen Space survey responses, around 75% supported the development, around 16% objected, the rest were neutral. Two-thirds of online respondents said they lived locally.”

The Secretary of State has published a statement of reasons for the grant of planning permission. The statement summarises the results of the consultation undertaken and the extent to which measures have been incorporated or issues addressed in the Order, before reaching reasoned conclusions on the project’s likely effects on the environment, conditions, mitigation and monitoring measures. The national and local policy context is considered as well as the main considerations including: transport, highway safety and capacity; ground conditions, land stability and contamination; heritage; ecology and biodiversity; population and human health; flood risk, drainage and water resources; design, parameters and standards; climate change and resilience; economy and employment; landscape and visual effects, and loss of agricultural land.

The Secretary of State then reaches his overall judgement as to the level of benefit/harm, and weight, he applies to each issue, before concluding as follows:

“There are several harms which weighed against the Proposal. These include highway capacity, heritage, landscape and visual effects, loss of BMV land, noise, air quality, effect on services and impacts upon the living conditions for some local residents. Several matters were neutral. A range of conditions and limitations was proposed to mitigate the adverse effects as far as practicable.  However, even after mitigation, it is almost inevitable that some harm would result from a development of this scale and nature. These adverse impacts, taken together, attract significant weight. 

On the other hand, the Proposal would deliver many benefits, including the delivery of a world class Entertainment Resort Complex to the benefit of the UK tourism industry and to the local and national economies, on an unprecedented scale; provide a substantial number of jobs; re-use previously developed land; and remediate contaminated land. Highway and rail improvements that would enhance local transport infrastructure and, potentially, mitigate constraints on other development have also been committed to as part of the Proposal. Together, these benefits attract very substantial weight.

The Secretary of State concluded that, overall, the benefits would far outweigh the identified harms and that planning permission should be granted subject to the necessary controls set out in the Order.”

Finally, it’s worth looking at the SDO itself, snappily titled The Town and Country Planning (Entertainment Resort Complex, Bedford) Special Development (No. 2) Order 2025, to understand the nature of the various controls in place. There are many definitions! The Order is most akin to a Development Consent Order for a nationally strategic infrastructure project (although functionally only delivers planning permission rather than any other consents and approvals that may be required under other legislation). Schedule 2 sets out the various classes of development permitted by virtue of the SDO. Certain categories of works may only be carried out in connection with defined functionally associated works.  The works may only be carried out in accordance with the 90 conditions and limitations set out in Schedule 3. Certain conditions and limitations require the “site controller” (which must initially be designated by Universal City Studios LLC before any authorised development may begin) to submit documents for approval or validation. There are procedures to be followed where the site controller wishes to modify any of the reference documents (set out in Schedule 1), controlling documents or any endorsement condition (i.e. a condition requiring any particular details to be approved or validated) and there are requirements as to publication of documents. The Order legislates for any overlap with General Permitted Development Order rights and with any development potentially to be carried out in connection with East-West Rail within a specified safeguarded area.

Formal approval for a project of this scale and complexity within six months or so of submission. Surely there are lessons to be drawn as to how in this country the consenting process is managed for other projects where significant public benefits arise?

Simon Ricketts, 3 January 2026

Personal views, et cetera

NB By way of explanation for those not of a certain age, REO Speedwagon are a US soft rock band that were formed, crumbs, 60 years ago. Responsible amongst other things for possibly one of the worst album titles ever: You Can Tune a Piano, but You Can’t Tuna Fish.

Announcements

Announcements from MHCLG are coming thick and fast ahead of this week’s budget and we had an announcement of our own at Town this week.

So, briefly, on 18 November 2025 there was:

Housebuilding around train stations will be given default “yes”

“Planning reforms to give greater certainty and strength for development around well-connected rail stations, including trains and trams, will be proposed through a new pro-growth and rules-based National Planning Policy Framework, which will be consulted on later this year.”

“The default “yes” will also apply equally across all local authorities, so that these benefits are seized across the country. The proposals will also include minimum housing density standards for these sites, expected to be exceeded in many cases, to make the most of sustainable growth opportunities for local housing, jobs, and businesses.”

This is all rolling the pitch for what will be in the consultation draft NDMPs next month (NB a convenient acronym – now that the NDMPs are to be non-statutory, I suspect that national development management policies may conveniently switch to national decision-making policies, perhaps less of a tongue twister or is that just me?).

What is “well-connected” and how will national minimum density standards be arrived at? We shall have to be patient and wait for the (large) pre-Christmas consultation package.

The announcement also included a separate proposal:

“Measures will also require councils to inform government when they’re inclined to block applications of 150 homes or more so ministers can decide whether to step in and make the decision instead, making sure that good housing projects don’t get lost. 

Particular attention will be paid to those applications where a planning committee intends to refuse it contrary to the advice of planning officers.

Applications called in by ministers will also be sped up through the removal of the mandatory requirement for inquiries, with the option to consider matters through written representations before reaching a decision where appropriate.”

This is big and will require legislation. But it could have a significant effect. In my view the biggest effect would be to create a cooling-off period where a planning committee has resolved to refuse a scheme for 150 homes or more against officers’ recommendations. Not only would the risk of call-in arise before the refusal could be issued but that delay would also lead to the opportunity in practice for the application to return to committee, potentially with a different outcome.

Given that almost 80% of appeals determined by inquiry are currently successful (possibly even higher when it comes to major residential appeals), this surely makes huge sense.

See the fascinating statistics published by Appeal Finder from which I have taken these screenshots:

Written representations determination of some call-ins is an interesting idea – a speedier call-in procedure would be so much more effective (see the way that the Mayor of London uses his call-in power for instance) but how many applicants, looking at these statistics will get nervous as to the prospect of their precious scheme being at the mercy of the written representations process?

Also on 18 November 2025, a consultation paper Reforms to the statutory consultee system was published, with responses due by 13 January 2026. Sport England, The Gardens Trust, and Theatres Trust are proposed no longer to be statutory consultees, with replacement “mitigations” put in place. The criteria are proposed to be tightened for consultation with seven national statutory consultees (see Anne1 for details): The Environment Agency, Natural England, Historic England, National Highways, the Health and Safety Executive, the Mining Remediation Authority and Active Travel England.

Lastly in terms of announcements, we at Town Legal seized that old 2010 concept of “open source planning” to publish our discussion document Simplifying & Standardising Section 106 Agreement Processes: Proposals for Reform which we were pleased to launch in the House of Commons this week through the auspices of the LPDF at an event sponsored by Mike Reader MP (and thank you Lord Charlie Banner for your supportive words too). What do you make of it? Do let us know. We are really keen to reduce the time it takes to conclude section 106 agreements, particularly in relation to small and medium sized schemes. I hope that MHCLG’s consultation package will touch on these issues as well. It is the unglamorous elements of the process that gum up the system, after all.

To quote always-glass-half-full Paul McCartney in that song from the Sergeant Pepper album: “It’s getting better all the time”. To quote John Lennon from the same song (maybe having seen MHCLG’ latest housing supply data on net additional dwellings – 6% decline in housing delivery from last year): “It can’t get no worse”.

Simon Ricketts, 22 November 2025

Personal views, et cetera

4 Key Asks For The London Housebuilding Support Package Consultation

Most chats this week have been about the 23 October 2025 homes for London policy note.

tl;dr summary: positive direction but concerns about potential complexities, uncertainties and as to whether it will all be in place speedily enough.

We’re all now waiting for the consultation to start “over six weeks from November” (fair play, at least no “by the end of Autumn” fudge).

There are plenty of detailed issues arising, and differing interests will want to re-prioritise the measures in different ways, but I thought I would set out four key asks that I have, which in my view should be specifically addressed in the consultation documents:

  1. Should there be more focus on stalled sites that already have planning permission?

This is the lowest hanging fruit. And yet all we have (in paragraphs 33 and 34) is a reference to the potential for renegotiating previously agreed arrangements by way of deed of variation and discouragement as to the use of section 73.

This isn’t enough. I set out the current procedural constraints in my 18 October 2025 blog post London Stalling.

Procedurally, bar reintroducing section 106BA or, for a temporary period, amending section 106A to reduce the 5 years’ requirement, at the very least we need:

  • Specific encouragement for local planning authorities to accept developers’ requests to engage with the process of varying existing agreements where specific criteria (consistent with the direction of the policy note) are met, linked to some sort of oversight, monitoring and/or route for complaint where authorities refuse to engage (given that unless your section 106 agreement is at least five years’ old, or unless this is in the context of a section 73 application (of which more in a moment) there is no right of appeal on the part of the developer)
  • Not the current suggestion that the section 73 process “should no longer be used as an alternative means of reconsidering fundamental questions of scheme viability or planning obligations” but rather a proper recognition of the real challenge of keeping planning permissions, and associated planning obligations packages, up to date as against changing circumstances and the important role that section 73 plays in this. Attempts to make currently unviable schemes viable invariably involve an intertwined mix of scheme changes and changes to planning obligations. Section 73B, introduced by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, is less useful as only the implications of the proposed changes are to be taken into account rather than considering the amended proposal holistically against the current development plan and other material considerations. This all needs to be connected up with the continuing problem that Hillside creates for amendments to projects (I was pleased to see Baroness Taylor confirm this week, on behalf of the government, in response to Lord Banner’s tabled amendment to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, that the government will “explore with the sector” a “statutory role for drop-in permissions to deal with change to large-scale developments”. This is so important!).
  1. Is late stage (as opposed to early stage) review necessary in relation to the proposed “time-limited planning route”?

In basic summary, this route is where a residential scheme can commit to at least 20% affordable housing with a 60/40 social rent/intermediate tenure split with planning permission issued by the end of March 2028. If the first floor of the scheme has not been built by 31 March 2030 (in the case of larger phased schemes, in the case of any phase where the first floor of buildings providing at least 200 dwellings has not been built by that date), “a late review will be undertaken once 75 per cent of homes within the scheme or the final phase are occupied to determine whether a higher contribution for affordable housing can be made”.

Why the late stage review mechanism in these circumstances, rather than the early stage review that is currently the case with fast track schemes that don’t achieve substantial implantation by the specified deadline under London Plan policy H5? Late stage reviews unnecessarily spook funders and lenders, leaving the eventual outcome too late in the process – and also having the public policy disbenefit of being too late to allow for any further affordable housing, that can be unlocked via the review, to be accommodated within the scheme. There is also inconsistency with paragraph 30 which suggests another approach for multi-phase schemes: “For multi-phase schemes, a review of the scheme will apply prior to the start of each phase for which the milestone in paragraph 27 has not been reached, to determine whether additional affordable housing can be provided in subsequent phases.”

Isn’t it better to keep things simple and follow, where possible, the existing mechanisms within policy H5, just with the thresholds temporarily reduced?

  1. Are there unnecessary difficulties with introducing a viability test into the proposed CIL relief?

Permissions which are secured via the new time-limited planning route that commence after the relief is in place and but before December 2028 will qualify for at least 50% relief from borough CIL (NB is this 50% after reliefs and exemptions have been applied and what will be the calibration to work out the higher level of relief where the scheme is delivering more than 20% affordable housing?), but the relief would be “contingent upon meeting proportionate qualifying criteria to ensure relief is targeted at schemes which would otherwise remain stalled or fail to come forwards, with a lower relief applicable where the full available amount is shown not to be warranted.” This sounds complicated. With this hurdle in place, not only would the developer not know whether they will qualify for the relief until planning permission is granted and they receive their liability notice, but it means that the purported advantage with the time-limited planning route of not having to undertake viability assessment is illusory, because the work will be needed in any event to secure the CIL relief – and the requirement will surely be very hard to turn into workable legislative drafting – we know how difficult exceptional circumstances relief is to secure due to the various criteria and requirements built into that particular mechanism.

  1. Are the proposed additional powers to be given to the Mayor enough?

Boroughs would be required to “refer planning schemes of 50 units or more where the borough is minded to refuse the application – this would be a more streamlined process operating alongside the existing referral threshold of 150 units which applies regardless of a borough’s intended decision, and would ensure that the Mayor was able to review whether the right decision had been reached in the context of the housing crisis.”

But there may well be cases where schemes are being held up at borough level, either pre-resolution or post resolution whilst for instance the section 106 agreement is being negotiated, and where securing planning permission by the end of March 2028 will be critical under this package of measures. Here, speedy intervention, or threatened intervention, by the Mayor could really help. So, for this time limited period at least, why not allow the Mayor to intervene at any time after the end of the statutory determination period in relation to any scheme comprising at least 50 dwellings? Otherwise, that absolute cut of the end of March 2028 for grant of planning permission will need to some flex built in to allow for the possibility of appeal etc.

I’ll confine myself to those four although I have others, and I know that you do too…

NB none of this is to be churlish as to the scale of the task that MHCLG and the GLA have before them. It is of course by no means easy to get this package right and to avoid unintended consequences.

Simon Ricketts, 1 November 2025

Personal views, et cetera