Tag: planning appeals;

Planning Appeal Timescales: Better Faster (But Harder?)!

I tried DLUHC in wordle but the app didn’t accept it.

Never mind – there was one significant announcement from the Department this week which I thought would cause more of a stir than it did, an announcement which could be really positive news for all of us who have been anxious for a long time that one of the operational failings of the current planning system is how long appeals take, such that in many instances, no matter how difficult it may be to make progress with the local planning authority, appeal is not a practical remedy (and perversely the delays are currently worse for smaller schemes than for schemes where any appeal is likely to be determined by way of inquiry).

The Department has now announced by way of a letter from housing minister Christopher Pincher to Sarah Richards, chief executive of the Planning Inspectorate dated 20 January 2022 (but published on 26 January 2022) that:

“As an initial milestone in making more consistent, timely decisions The Planning Inspectorate should be working towards consistently achieving decisions in these ranges:

· Appeals decided entirely using writing evidence in 16 – 20 weeks

· Appeals decided including at least some evidence through hearing or inquiry 24 – 26 weeks (30 weeks to recommendation for called in or recovered cases)”

These targets for written representations appeals and hearings are new.

Detailed measures are set out for:

• The proportion of appeals which are valid on first submission

• How long appeal decisions take from valid receipt to decision

• Customer satisfaction.

These measures apply regardless of the legislative basis for the appeal, for example whether it is in relation to enforcement or resulting from the refusal of a planning application.

These targets and measures should make a real difference.

But there is a much more radical coda to the letter:

“As you know, the Government is also committed to improving and modernising the planning system. The work you are undertaking to develop twenty-first century digital public services is an important part of this. I would welcome you complementing that by identifying what steps might be necessary to achieve a further significant consistent improvement in appeal timescales beyond those above so that most appeals could be consistently decided in 4 – 8 weeks, or faster, whilst maintaining good standards of decision. Consideration can then be given to whether these steps might be appropriate.”

Yes, you read that correctly – an aspirations that “most appeals could be consistently decided in 4 – 8 weeks, or faster”. PINS director operations Graham Stallwood spoke at a Clubhouse session last week about what steps PINS is taking towards digitalising its processes (a replay of the whole event is here and Graham’s comments are from 53 minutes in). It will be interesting to see what further changes will be recommended to procedures to achieve anything like those timescales.

The Planning Inspectorate’s response dated 27 January 2022 welcomes the new measures. PINS will “start reporting on them to ministers and customers straight away as part of our monthly statistical release and performance updates.”

There is this statement from Sarah Richards:

“I welcome the minister’s request to report to him on what would be necessary to support a further significant improvement in appeals. This recognises the importance of a fair appeal system to the nation’s economy and is an important opportunity to reflect on how the appeal system can be reframed to operate sustainably for the future. We will engage with key stakeholders on this in due course before we report to the minister.”

My understanding is that PINS is likely to be starting that process this Spring. There will be no Bridget Rosewell overseeing it all this time round. No doubt it will in part be an equivalent series of pragmatic incremental gains in terms of efficiencies and timescales but I would have thought that some statutory timescales set out within secondary legislation may need to be revisited. And let’s not be under any illusion: “4-8 weeks appeal timescales” are going to need significant changes in terms of processes but also behaviour:

• (As discussed by Graham at the Clubhouse event) how can we get to a position where on appeal a link can simply be provided to the documents on the LPA’s planning portal rather than starting a wholly new paper chase, and appeal submission can be pass/fail in terms of submission of the correct documents, as if you were applying for a passport?

• What fresh evidence should be allowed to be submitted at the appeal stage (and what does this mean in practice for those preparing their applications – at application stage your documents will need to be forensically prepared so as to be “appeal ready”)?

• What should decision letters look like?

• How do we avoid unintended consequences given that on these timescales, it will usually be quicker to appeal as soon as you can rather than engage in protracted negotiations with the LPA – and so will the appeal system very quickly get clogged up?

• Will any necessary trade-offs as between on the one hand an element of procedural flexibility and on the other hand speed prove counter-productive for prospective appellants? Is there a point at which appeals become too quick? And what resources will be required on the part of LPAs and third parties to be able to participate effectively?

• Not mentioned, but are we going to see appeal fees introduced, at least for some types of appeal?

This is all a long way from the current performance statistics (20 January 2022):

We will be talking about all of this at our Clubhouse session at 6 pm on Tuesday 1 February. At this session we don’t have any special guests because we want to hear from you. Your current experiences of the system, good and bad, and what you think of these proposals. Whether you are a planning consultant, local authority planner, community group representative, advocate or developer, what do you think? Link to app here.

Simon Ricketts, 28 January 2022

Personal views, et cetera

PS I know there have been distractions around those parts recently but it is still startling to see a ministerial letter with a phrase such as “until such time as me or my successors agree new measures”. Yuck. (Or should that be YUHC?).

Courtesy Daft Punk

MAD World: Mapped Appeal Decisions

We launched Mapped Appeal Decisions today.

It’s a click-through interactive map that seeks to show the location of every planning appeal decision in England made between 1 January 2017 and 12 December 2021 following a public inquiry, with links to the relevant decision letter. Best viewed on a proper screen!

The data is drawn from our weekly Town Library planning appeal decisions updates over the period (free subscription still available via the link) and for all this work we at Town Legal are very grateful both to the Planning Inspectorate for the information publicly available on its website, which makes these sorts of applications possible, to OpenStreetMap for the base mapping and of course to our friends Simmons Wavelength for the legal engineering (in particular Joy Bradley for pitching the initial idea to me last year).

Any feedback would be very helpful. So far the extent of Green Belt across the country is shown on the map base but of course the possibilities are almost limitless.

Health warning: there are some decision letters where a postcode is not shown for the relevant site – they are not currently shown on the map. If you spot any other glitches do let me know.

Feel free to share the link or indeed this post with colleagues.

The only other thing I am going to mention in this week’s very short blog post is, as always, clubhouse Planning Law Unplanned. This Tuesday, 18 January at 6pm, the subject is SECRET WORLD OF BARRISTERS’ CHAMBERS, with as our guests, Paul Coveney (senior clerk, Francis Taylor Building), Marie Sparkes (head of business development and marketing, Keating Chambers), Gary Smith (chief clerk, Kings Chambers) and Mike Gooch (senior practice manager, Landmark Chambers). Everything you ever wanted to know but never dared to ask…

A link to the clubhouse app and event is here.

Simon Ricketts, 14 January 2022

Personal views, et cetera

Covid-19 As A Material Consideration

The idea for this blog post started by way of a search we did this week for inspectors’ appeal decision letters that take into account the economic and other effects arising from the current pandemic.

There does not seem to have been any proper analysis on that at present (and this post doesn’t fill the gap!). Instead most people’s focus has been on the specific legislative measures that have been introduced by the Government and its narrow policy exhortations (for instance in relation to limited aspects of the CIL regime).

Before I turn to that appeals search, can I say two more things on the legislative changes.

First, a further round of amendments to the GPDO were laid before Parliament on 11 November (the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2020). Aside from extending some temporary permitted development rights (outdoor markets; takeaway food operations from restaurants, cafes and drinking establishments, and some emergency development rights), there are two permanent amendments:

⁃ introduction from 6 April 2021 of a requirement that dwellings created by way of the operation of permitted development rights must meet the nationally described space standard

⁃ Prohibition on the demolition of any building is used, or was last used, for the purpose of a concert hall, venue for live music performance or theatre. (“This permanent change is to protect these venues, preventing their unnecessary loss as a result of having to close due to the coronavirus pandemic.” As a trustee of the Theatres Trust I am particularly pleased to see this now in legislation, following the initial ministerial statement on 14 July 2020).

Secondly, I covered the Rights: Community: Action judicial review of the previous recent GPDO and Use Classes Order changes in my 5 September 2020 blog post Lights Camera Action: The Planning Changes – Parliamentary Scrutiny, That JR. That claim was rejected by Lewis LJ and Holgate J last week in R (Rights: Community: Action) v Secretary of State (Divisional Court, 17 November 2020). There are plenty of other summaries of that judgment and there is nothing particularly novel about it but I was interested in the references to the evidence submitted by MHCLG as to the Covid-19 factors that led to the legislation being introduced in the form and way that it was, and the weight that was given to these matters in the judgment:

“Mr Simon Gallagher is the Director of Planning for MHCLG. In paragraph 10 of his witness statement he states that during the period January to March 2020 the first patients in the UK tested positive for Covid-19 and the first transmissions in the UK were confirmed. He says that the pandemic “has generated an economic emergency and upheaval of a scale and intensity not previously known in peacetime.” He continues by stating that, as a consequence, the Government has had to intervene urgently in the economy as a whole in unprecedented ways in order to avert or minimise potentially very severe and long term impacts on the lives of citizens and the prospects for future economic growth. Forecasts for economic growth were reduced substantially. Indeed, one key forecast made in summer 2020 predicted a reduction in the economy for 2020 of 9.9% (paragraph 13). Through regular discussion with representatives of the housing and construction sectors, the MHCLG became aware of particular difficulties faced by the construction sector as a result of the pandemic. There was a record monthly decline of 40.2% of construction output in April 2020. Whilst the output of that sector had increased in May, June and July, it was still 11.6% lower in July 2020 compared with February 2020 (paragraph 14).

On 20 July 2020 a submission was put to the Minister for Housing asking him to approve the three statutory instruments. The submission records that it had been decided that in order to support economic renewal and regeneration and to respond to the economic crisis caused by the pandemic, additional PD rights for the redevelopment of vacant buildings for residential purposes and a broad Use Class of business, commercial and service uses would be introduced without consultation (paragraphs 2 to 3). The Minister’s attention was drawn to criticisms that the recently enacted PD right for allowing the addition of 2 storeys to blocks of flats lacked any requirement for the provision of affordable housing (paragraph 7). The submission referred to the same point when discussing the application of the PSED to the proposed statutory instruments (paragraph 10). The PSED assessments and impact assessments for each statutory instrument were provided to the Minister.

The Explanatory Memoranda for SI 2020 No. 755 and SI 2020 No. 756 stated that the new PD rights were being introduced to speed up the delivery of housing, reduce the need to develop on greenfield land and to support economic recovery from the pandemic by encouraging development. The Explanatory Memorandum for SI 2020 No. 757 stated that the UCO 1987 was being amended to better reflect the diversity of uses found on high streets and in town centres, to provide flexibility for businesses to adapt and diversify to meet changing demands and to help town centres recover from the economic impact of the pandemic.”

The judges had in part to consider whether the lack of a further consultation stage, which had been previously intended in relation to some of the measures, was justified:

“The explanatory memorandum for the draft SI 2020 No 755 and SI 2020 No. 757 again summarised briefly the degree of support for, and opposition to, the proposal, and the concerns that had been raised. The explanatory memorandum for the draft SI 2020 No 756 referred to the consultation responses and noted that there was to have been a further consultation but it had been decided to introduce the PD right without further consultation in order to support economic regeneration. It noted that the Government had considered the range of matters to be left to planning authorities for prior approval while maintaining a simplified planning system. In those circumstances it is not arguable that the defendant failed conscientiously to consider the consultation responses. The decision on whether to proceed, and if so what provisions to include in the SIs, in the light of the consultation responses and other relevant matters were questions for the defendant to determine.”

The judges, did not consider that the Government had acted unlawfully in not carrying out further consultation:

“First, the defendant has established that there were good reasons for departing from the promise in the present case and not having a second consultation on the proposals for PD rights for demolition of commercial or residential buildings and rebuilding for residential use. The coronavirus pandemic had led to severe economic difficulties including a reduction in the rate of construction and planning applications. The government decided to grant the PD rights in order to stimulate regeneration at a time of great economic difficulty arising out of the pandemic. That appears from the terms of the explanatory memorandum to SI 2020 No. 576.The matter is fully explained in the witness statement of Mr Gallagher who refers to the large-scale public health emergency created by the coronavirus pandemic which in turn generated an economic emergency and upheaval on a scale not previously known in peacetime. The Government had sought to intervene in the economy in unprecedented ways to minimise the very severe effects of the pandemic. In the light of that, the decision was taken in favour of urgent action rather than further consultation.

Secondly, the reasons are proportionate in the circumstances. On the one hand, the decision to depart from the promise deprived the public of the opportunity of making further representations on the proposed PD rights and deprived the Government of further, potentially helpful, input into the policy decision. On the other hand, the economic situation was grave. The grant of PD rights was intended to encourage developers to start the process of taking steps to carry out developments. That in turn would contribute to addressing the economic effects arising out of the pandemic. That was a proportionate course of action in the circumstances. It is correct that developments could not be begun until prior approval of certain matters had been obtained. But the aim was to stimulate the process of development in circumstances of economic urgency. It is correct that the PD rights would continue after the end of the current pandemic (unless amending legislation is enacted) but that does not render departure from the promise of further consultation disproportionate. It is correct that there was a proposal to create PD rights which involved further consultation. But circumstances had changed because of the pandemic. The reasons given for departing from the promise of further consultation were good and were proportionate.”

The economic situation is indeed “grave”!

So how are inspectors responding to it in their appeal decisions, and in the absence of any general guidance from Government which might for instance have advised decision makers to give additional weight to the interests of economic development and the provision of housing? JLL’s Asher Ross drew attention on LinkedIn last week to the Government’s publication on 18 November 2018 of the latest Planning Inspectorate Statistics. I haven’t delved into them yet but reproduce below a table that Asher posted, showing the reduced percentage of appeals that have been allowed over a period when I would have hoped to see exactly the opposite.

One trend that is apparent from the appeal decisions is in the context of enforcement appeals, where a longer period is frequently being given for compliance because of difficulties residents may have finding alternative accommodation due to the pandemic, although not always – in a recent decision in Ealing the inspector held that the nature of the “cramped and sub-standard living conditions“ was such as to outweigh that consideration (10 Torrington Gardens, 17 November 2020).

An appeal in relation to a proposed single dwelling in the countryside in Horsham District was dismissed in part because the inspector accepted the concerns of a nearby dog kennel business that the construction noise could affect the health of their dogs and indirectly affect the business economically if it had to close during this period, especially when considered in conjunction with the downturn in business they had generally suffered due to the coronavirus pandemic (The Mount, Ifield, Crawley, 27 July 2020).

An appeal in relation to five proposed flats in Cambridge was dismissed with the inspector noting that, although the appellant claimed that there was a need to promote economic growth as a result of the Covid -19 pandemic, this did not justify allowing harmful development (Mere Way, Cambridge, 1 October 2020).

An appeal to allow changes to proposed dwelling layouts in Eastbourne was allowed. Whilst the nationally described space standard was breached for a three bedroom home, the inspector placed weight on the need for a ”home office”, noting Covid-19 – a separate room was recognised as useful also for homework and hobbies, noting the “open plan” living room layout at present (land south of Langney shopping centre, 10 September 2020).

An appeal in relation to three proposed self build dwellings in Breckland was dismissed, with the inspector noting that there was little substantive evidence to demonstrate the longer term effects of Covid 19 on housing delivery rates or that that these developments would not be deliverable over the five year period , rather than just delayed (land to the north east of Fakenham Road, Beetley, 9 September 2020).

An appeal in relation to the proposed redevelopment as 27 residential apartments of the Flapper and Firkin music venue in Birmingham was dismissed. Whilst the venue had closed in January 2020 and therefore the minister’s July 2020 statement on preventing the loss of such venues was not directly relevant, the inspector concluded that the community harm arising from the loss of the venue outweighed the social and economic effects of the new homes (Flapper and Firkin, Kingston Row, Birmingham, 2 September 2020).

An appeal in relation to 216 proposed new homes in Wokingham district was rejected, with the inspector not accepting the appellant’s case that the assumed housing supply should be reduced by almost 500 dwellings due to the effects of the pandemic. He considered that the pandemic’s impact would be short-term and that five-year supply would recover (land east of Finchampstead Road, Wokingham, 25 August 2020).

An appeal in relation to a proposed staff car park in connection with a hotel in North Somerset was dismissed, the inspector considering that approval would not significantly contribute towards the economic recovery of the hotel business (Doubletree by Hilton Bristol South Cadbury House, 17 August 2020).

There are earlier appeal examples as well, but with equivalent themes and none that I could see were allowed with any weight given to Covid-19 considerations.

A proper analysis of the patterns emerging would be useful. For instance, how should the effects of the pandemic be taken into account in assessing whether there is five years’ supply of housing land? Is any Government advice required as to particular issues, such as live-work accommodation? Is any temporary advice required on enforcement issues, and on deadlines for compliance? Should Government for instance encourage a liberalised approach in relation to particular types of proposals, with shorter implementation deadlines for permissions approved in that way?

Simon Ricketts, 21 November 2020

Personal views, et cetera

Thank you to my Town colleague Lida Nguyen for the appeal searches, carried out via Compass Online.

Jenrick Allows Two Further Large London Appeals, With Costs

Exactly a week after the Westferry Printworks decision letter (see my previous blog post) on 22 January 2020 the Secretary of State allowed two further appeals in relation to significant London residential development projects, this time both decisions following his inspectors’ recommendations, and with costs awards in favour of the appellants, again as recommended by his inspectors.

Given that an award of costs can basically only be made on the basis of unreasonable behaviour by a party to the appeal (see the detailed advice in the Government’s Planning Practice Guidance), lessons plainly need to be learned – in fact what happened in both cases was pretty shocking.

North London Business Park site, Barnet

This was an appeal by Comer Homes Group against Barnet Council’s refusal of a hybrid application for planning permission for the phased comprehensive redevelopment of the North London Business Park to deliver a residential led mixed-use development:

• detailed element comprising 376 residential units in five blocks reaching eight storeys, the provision of a 5 Form Entry Secondary School, a gymnasium, a multi- use sports pitch and associated changing facilities, and improvements to open space and transport infrastructure, including improvements to the access from Brunswick Park Road, and

• outline element comprising up to 824 additional residential units in buildings ranging from two to eleven storeys, up to 5,177m2 of non-residential floorspace (Use Classes A1-A4, B1 and D1) and 2.9 hectares of public open space, associated site preparation/enabling works, transport infrastructure and junction works, landscaping and car parking.

This is the Secretary of State’s decision letter and inspector’s report in relation to the appeal and this is the Secretary of State’s decision to make a full costs award against the council, following the inspector’s recommendations.

Members had refused the application against officers’s recommendations.

The council’s failing is set out starkly in the inspector’s costs report: no proper evidence was adduced to support its decision:

“Mr Griffiths, Principal Planning Officer at the Council of the London Borough of Barnet, was the Council’s only witness at the Inquiry. He stated, in his proof of evidence, that “It is not the intention for this document to represent my professional opinion and the evidence presented represents the views of elected members of the London Borough of Barnet Planning Committee”.

The proof of evidence focusses on a particular view contained within a TVIA submitted by the Applicant and states that “Within View 11, the 8-storey height of Blocks 1E and 1F stands in harmful juxtaposition with the two-storey height of the properties on Howard Close”. But the proof acknowledges “…that buildings of up to 7 storeys in height could be acceptable in this location therefore it is pertinent to outline the additional harm that would arise from the 8 and 9 storey buildings proposed within the development and why these heights are unacceptable”.

The written evidence fails to substantiate why the extra storey on Blocks 1E and 1F would cause harm and fails to consider the effect of buildings over seven storeys in height elsewhere in the development. The proof simply repeats the assertion made in the sole reason for refusal of the application that “The proposed development, by virtue of its excessive height, scale and massing would represent an over development of the site resulting in a discordant and visually obtrusive form of development that would fail to respect its local context…to such an extent that it would be detrimental to the character and appearance of the area”.

Under cross examination Mr Griffiths refused to answer some questions put to him and to give his professional view on the effect of the proposed development on the character and appearance of the area. The Appellant was not thus afforded the opportunity, at the Inquiry, to explore the unsubstantiated assertions made in the proof of evidence and did not learn anything more about members concerns. Crucially, no member of the Planning Committee appeared at the Inquiry to substantiate their views that was unsubstantiated in the proof of evidence.

The Council has failed to produce either written or verbal evidence to substantiate the reason for refusal of the application, and has provided only vague and generalised assertions, unsupported by an objective analysis, about the proposed development’s impact. The Council has behaved unreasonably and the Appellant has incurred unnecessary expense in the appeal process. A full of award of costs against the Council is justified.”

It was hardly surprising that the Secretary of State decided to allow the appeal:

“32. The development plan restricts tall buildings to identified locations, and the proposal would include them on a site not identified as suitable for them. This conflict carries significant weight against the proposal.

33. The proposal has been designed to respect the existing character of the local area, while maximising the potential for delivering homes. It would deliver a replacement secondary school alongside new open space, sports facilities and community space. The local authority is unable to demonstrate a five-year supply of housing land without taking account of this site, and the proposal would provide 1350 new homes. The provision of the housing and the ancillary facilities both carry significant weight in favour of the proposal.

34. The Secretary of State considers that there are material considerations which indicate that the proposal should be determined other than in accordance with the development plan, and therefore concludes that the appeal should be allowed and planning permission granted.”

The inquiry sat for four days in October and November 2018 (why the inordinate delay since then?), with the appellant team comprising Christopher Katkowski QC and Robert Walton (now QC), calling four expert witnesses. The costs award will amount to a sum that would be ruinous for many private sector bodies, well into six figures – because council members took a decision without evidence and without considering whether proper evidence, or a different approach, might be required in the face of an appeal. And a scheme for well over a thousand homes and a school (first applied for in December 2015!) has been delayed for absolutely no reason.

Conington Road, Lewisham

This was an appeal by MB Lewisham Limited against Lewisham Council’s decision to refuse its application for planning permission for the construction of three buildings, measuring 8, 14 and 34 storeys in height, to provide 365 residential dwellings (use class C3) and 554 square metres (sqm) gross of commercial/ community/ office/ leisure space (Use Class A1/A2/A3/B1/D1/D2) with associated access, servicing, energy centre, car and cycle parking, landscaping and public realm works.

This is the Secretary of State’s decision letter and inspector’s report and this is the Secretary of State’s decision to make a partial award of costs against the Mayor of London, and inspector’s report.

The procedural position here was a little more complicated. After Lewisham had refused this application, the applicant had submitted a further application for planning permission which sought to address the reasons for refusal. The scheme would secure 20.19% affordable housing by habitable room, which the council accepted, on the basis of viability appraisal, was more than the maximum reasonable provision. The Council resolved to approve the application but the Mayor directed refusal, not satisfied that the viability work justified that level of affordable housing.

By that time the first application had been refused and the appellant revised the scheme to reflect the changes introduced into the second application. Accordingly, whilst the appeal was technically against Lewisham’s initial decision on the first application, in reality the only live issues were those raised by the Mayor on affordable housing and viability, including whether a late stage review mechanism was necessary in line with its policy requirement.

I suspect that you needed to be at the inquiry to appreciate the full horror as events unfolded (I wasn’t) but it appears that the viability case against the appellant’s position completely collapsed at the inquiry following exchange of evidence and cross-examination by Russell Harris QC. But that wasn’t the only problem. Presumably to save costs, the council and the Mayor both engaged the same advocate at the inquiry and, once it understood the real position on viability, the council wished to concede various issues but the Mayor was not willing so to do, meaning that the advocate immediately had a conflict of interest and, mid-inquiry, had to recuse herself from acting for the Mayor! The Mayor’s team continued to participate in the inquiry but without challenging the evidence provided by the appellant.

This is from the inspector’s report on the appellant’s costs application:

“On day 2 of the Inquiry, following cross-examination of the Council’s construction costs witness Mr Powling, the advocate representing the Council and the Greater London Authority (GLA) advised that due to a conflict of interest, the GLA would no longer be represented. The GLA however wished to continue with their objections as an unrepresented principal party. Later in the afternoon, following cross-examination by the appellant of Ms Seymour for the GLA, the Council formally withdrew its objections to the proposal on viability grounds. The Council took no further part in the Inquiry.”

“Where the operation of a direction to refuse is issued, the GLA is to be treated as a principal party. Without the GLA direction, the London Borough of Lewisham (LBL) would have granted a planning permission for a now identical scheme. This appeal only arises thus as a result of the change of the resolution to grant to reflect the terms of the GLA’s direction.

6. In its letter to the Inspectorate indicating its intention to attend, the GLA made it clear that was prosecuting its direction in terms and was expecting LBL to do the same. Therefore for all practical legal and policy purposes, the GLA must be treated as a main party prosecuting the terms of its direction at this appeal. Without that direction LBL would not have opposed this scheme and this inquiry would not have been necessary.

7. Their conduct therefore falls to be considered in accordance with the provisions for principal parties.

8. Its conduct was unreasonable in substantive terms in relation to its directed main reason for refusal. Its conduct during the inquiry was also unreasonable. Both levels of unreasonableness resulted in the inquiry and the appellant having to incur significant unnecessary expense in relation to the affordable housing issue.

9. In substantive terms, the GLA produced no evidence which met or came close to the requirements of the PPG on the issue of construction costs to support its reason for refusal.

10. Its ‘evidence” failed to meet the threshold properly to be called “evidence” It failed to engage with the agreed evidence of others that the construction costs were fair and reasonable and during the proceedings failed to read understand or engage with evidence which clearly established that its evidence was incorrect and unreasonable.

11. In terms of the double count issue, the GLA persisted with its case irrespective of evidence suggesting that it was wrong and in an unreasonable fashion after the only other relevant party advised by Leading Counsel had accepted that the point was simply not properly arguable. It chose not to read and understand the clear evidence, notwithstanding it had insisted on the reason for refusal and that it be a party at the inquiry.”

“The Greater London Authority shall pay to MB Homes Lewisham Ltd its partial costs of the inquiry proceedings, limited solely to the unnecessary or wasted expense incurred in respect of the costs of the appeal proceedings related to dealing with the issue of affordable housing after the Council decided not to represent the Greater London Authority, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement as to the amount thereof.”

Oof!

The Secretary’s conclusions on viability were as follows:

“17. The Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that the essential differences on viability between the parties lies in a variation of around £11m in construction costs (including fees and profit); and private residential values (IR127).

Construction costs

18. The Secretary of State notes that CDM (for the GLA) consider build costs to be overstated (IR129). However, the Secretary of State also notes that independent costs estimates produced by 3 firms of costs consultants were within 2 percentage points of each other. He agrees with the Inspector that no evidence has been produced in any later analyses to show that those build costs, or any element of them considered for viability purposes, are unreasonable (IR128-131).

Fees

19. The Secretary of State notes that the level of fees remained a point of difference at the beginning of the Inquiry. The Secretary of State also notes that while detailed analysis of this issue did identify an overstatement of fees of less than £1m, this is far below the overstatement claimed by the Council and GLA. He further notes that, at the Inquiry no evidence was forthcoming from the GLA’s costs witness, CDM, to support their contention that preliminaries are set too high or that the level of professional fees of around 10% would be excessive for a project of this nature. In addition, the Council’s costs witness accepted that if a reasonable preliminaries figure of 17% or so was adopted then the whole argument in support of the £5.5m fees deduction from the overall level of costs fell away (IR132-133).

Profits

20. For the reasons given in IR134-135, the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that the proposed profit levels are reasonable for this scheme.

21. For the reasons given in IR136 the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that no evidence was offered by the Council or the GLA to counter the appellant’s build costs analysis or the level of fees or profit.

Private residential values

22. The Secretary of State has carefully considered the Inspector’s analysis in IR137-146 and agrees that the GLA’s suggested values would be unlikely to be achievable in the market (IR144).

23. The Secretary of State also notes that the GLA accepted at the Inquiry that if the £11m alleged surplus on fees and construction costs did not exist, then the claimed remaining £900,000 (IR132) would not have led to a direction to refuse from the Mayor’s office (IR146). For the reasons in IR147, the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that the 20.2% affordable housing proposed by the appellant is the maximum, if not somewhat more, than what can be reasonably provided, and he accordingly attaches very considerable weight to this benefit of the proposal. He finds no conflict with the requirements of LonP policy 3.12; the Mayor’s Affordable Housing and Viability SPG, Lewisham CS policy 1 and DMLP policy DM7.

Late stage review

24. For the reasons given in IR148-149, the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that there is no pressing case for a late stage review for a scheme such as this, where development is proposed to be completed in a single phase. He finds no conflict with the requirements of LP policy 3.12, the Mayor’s Affordable Housing and Viability SPG, Lewisham CS policy 1 and DMLP policy DM7.”

“In favour, the Secretary of State affords very considerable weight to the provision of market and affordable housing. He also affords moderate weight to the positive contribution to the character and appearance of the emerging Lewisham Town centre.”

And no late stage review!

In amongst the horror show for both the council and the Mayor seems to have been some simple lack of communication as between their witnesses. Quoting from the inspector’s summary of Lewisham’s case:

“When the appellant’s viability proof was received and reviewed it did not appear that the short reference in paragraph 7.2 to the Gardiner & Theobald review report raised any pertinent issue. This was particularly so as the proof suggested that the appellant’s basis for assessment of costs was unaltered.

As a consequence the Council’s viability witness did not send its costs witness the appellant’s viability proof (which dealt with numerous other issues not relevant to costs estimates). On review at the Inquiry, the Council’s build cost estimate was revised from £107,179,737 to £111,809,368 representing a difference of £4,629,631. The consequence of this was that it changed appraisal A – 2018 Residential Pricing to negative £1,155,982 and Appraisal B – 2017 residential pricing (less HPI) reduced to £ 3,111,251. This still represents a £20m disparity approximately with the appellant’s viability conclusions. It nonetheless reduced the margin of surplus on the Council’s assessment to fall within an acceptable margin of error“.

Oof.

Where would we be without the ability properly to test evidence at inquiry?

Simon Ricketts, 25 January 2020

Personal views, et cetera

PS not to be too London-centric, I should add that on the same day the Secretary of State also allowed an appeal for 850 homes near Tewkesbury.

The appeal stats for 2020 are already going to look more healthy than those for the last two years, which become apparent if you interrogate our Town Legal 2014-2019 housing inquiry appeals data visualisation tool.