“Boy, you’re gonna carry that weight
Carry that weight a long time
Boy, you’re gonna carry that weight
Carry that weight a long time”
(Lennon & McCartney, 1969)
Three interesting decision letters have been issued in the last ten days by the Planning Inspectorate in relation to large residential development projects in London:
- Decision letter dated 14 May 2026, dismissing an appeal in relation to a proposed part 10 storey, part 28 storey building at 1 Battersea Bridge Road, including 110 new dwellings
- Decision letter dated 18 May 2026, dismissing an appeal in relation to the proposed redevelopment of the Aylesham Centre Peckham, including 867 new dwellings
- Decision letter dated 18 May 2026, allowing an appeal against a refusal to grant planning permission under section 73 for an amended version of an existing planning permission for the Camden Goods Yard development in Camden so as to be able to implement fire safety requirements, reducing the number of dwellings from 644 to 636 and reducing the affordable housing provision from 38% to 15%.
There has been much commentary, aimed at taking from those decisions pointers for other projects. But in my view the messaging from them is inevitably as mixed as the weather last week in Leeds.
Because, however much we all try to, and indeed often are paid to, forecast the outcome of particular applications and appeals, there are two particular aspects which make it in reality almost impossible (particularly in relation to larger, complex, projects):
- What largely subjective assessment will the decision-maker reach on aspects such as the degree of harm caused to e.g. heritage and townscape and the significance of that harm?
- What weight will the decision maker give to particular competing factors before arriving at an assessment of the overall planning balance?
Bear in mind those two questions as you read these extracts from the inspectors’ conclusions in these three appeals:
1 Battersea Bridge Road:
“187. Having regard to NPPF paragraph 215 and London Plan Policy D9, I must weigh the moderate, low and negligible levels of less than substantial harm to the significance of designated heritage assets, against the public benefits. All the aforementioned benefits should be regarded as public benefits. 188. The benefits of market and affordable housing delivery are substantial. These alone outweigh the harm to significance notwithstanding the considerable importance and weight I give to that harm. While NPPF paragraph 212 indicates that great weight should be afforded to the assets’ conservation, there is clear and convincing justification for the harm to these designated heritage assets as required by NPPF paragraph 213.
189. Accordingly, the proposal would have an acceptable effect on the setting and the significance of designated heritage assets. Despite the identified conflict with London Plan Policies D9 and HC1 and WLP Policies LP3 and LP4, the proposal would accord with NPPF paragraphs 212, 213 and 215.
190. Regarding the moderate indirect adverse effect on the significance of 10 – 14 and 24 – 52 Westbridge Road, 52 – 68 Battersea Bridge Road, and 11 – 35 and 61 – 71 Battersea Church Road as non-designated heritage assets and the conflict with London Plan Policies D9 and HC1 and WLP Policies LP3 and LP4, this would be significantly outweighed by the proposal’s benefits, having had regard to NPPF paragraph 216.
191. Although the heritage balance has been passed, the harms to the aforementioned heritage assets are included in the overall planning balance below.
192. While I have had regard to the appellant’s and the Council’s views on full or partial compliance with London Plan Policy D9 or with WLP Policy LP4, I do not pursue this debate further as the proposal clearly fails to comply with several of the elements of London Plan Policy D9 Part C [“visual, functional, environmental, and cumulative impacts… requires consideration of long, mid-range and immediate views; the local and wider context’s spatial hierarchy; wayfinding; architectural quality and materials; and protection and enhancement of the river’s open quality, public realm, and views”] and WLP Policy LP4 [“proposals for tall buildings will only be appropriate in tall building zones identified in WLP Appendix 2, where there would not be any resulting adverse visual, functional, environmental, or cumulative impacts”].
193. The proposal would provide the benefits of market and affordable housing, both of which individually carry substantial weight. There would be other benefits to which I have afforded significant and moderate weight and these are outlined above. However, I have afforded very substantial weight to the adverse effects on the character and appearance of the area. There are moderate, low and negligible levels of less than substantial harm to designated heritage assets which carries considerable weight and moderate indirect adverse effects on non-designated heritage assets which carry moderate weight.
194. Accordingly, the proposal would be contrary to the development plan taken as a whole, and there are no material considerations that indicate that planning permission should otherwise be granted.”
Aylesham Centre:
“98. Contrary to the appellant’s primary contentions, I have found that there is only partial compliance with the adopted development plan for the area, taken as a whole, bearing in mind all disputes made by LBSC and the Rule 6 party combined. Specifically, I find conflict with: SP Policy NSP74 in respect of CLT homes, design, heritage, tall buildings, and retention of retail; and LP Policies HC1, D1, D4 and D9, and SP Policies P13, P17, P20 and P21 and Area Vision AV.14 regarding harmful heritage and townscape impacts.
99. Although there would be some conflict with LP Policies NSP74, SD6 and E9, and SP Policies P32 and P35 I do not find that the appeal development would be deleterious to town centre vitality and viability, or to local business interests overall. Equally, the appellant’s underlying viability position is material. Accordingly, I find no harm from the reduced affordable housing provision as a result.
100. Consequently, linked to the appellant’s other contentions when applying paragraph 11 (d) of the Framework the policies which are most important for determining the application are not out-of-date. And in other respects, the site is already allocated for housing development.”
“103. Factoring significance evidence there would be less than substantial heritage asset harm to a range of relevant designated and non-designated heritage assets. I give great weight to the conservation of designated heritage assets. And substantial weight to the non-designated asset harm and overall townscape harm interlaced in the arguments made.
104. The collective public benefits on offer carry substantial overarching weight. They include: the delivery of the SP site allocation developed over a 10 year horizon with the aim of rejuvenating the area; more efficient use of previously developed land in a highly sustainable location; increased pedestrian permeability and connectivity; the facilitation of air quality improvements owing to greater reliance on sustainable modes of transport and with the promotion of cycling; increasing housing supply for Londoners as well as Peckham’s residents via 867 new homes, allowing for family provision as well as wheelchair accessibility needs; increasing much needed affordable housing provision (albeit at 12%); some urban greening betterment as well as ecological and notable BNG improvements; new external play space; plus the overall linked social and economic benefits from large scale town centre investment supporting its primary retail function and infrastructure which would provide and sustain employment in the process.
105. However, in this case such benefits do not outweigh the harm to the relevant designated heritage assets important to the area. Having regard to the Framework, there is no reason for me to conclude a design better responding to those heritage assets could not be achieved.”
“107. In undertaking the balancing exercise, I am cognisant there is a critical need to provide new homes of all tenures for Londoners urgently and at scale coordinated by SP allocation policies and the strategic policies of the LP. Moreover, there is acute affordable housing need in Peckham which some of the new home provision would alleviate. I accept that the totality of benefits would be considerable in this context.
108. Nonetheless, the direct benefits arising from the development comparative to harm to the RLPCA including designated and non-designated asset harm and to the townscape give me insufficient reasons to allow the appeal. From a Framework application perspective, the proposal would not be a sustainable form of development in light of such harms.
109. The circumstances of the case do not lead me to accept new housing and other associated betterments at all costs. Furthermore, SP Policy NSP74 entails a generational opportunity for Peckham which should be carefully managed to ensure a more optimally designed scheme for future generations.
110. For clarity, even with 35% affordable housing as initially proposed in the planning application process and accepting a worsening housing land supply position of less than 5 years purported by the appellant, I would still have found that the level of harm in this case would not be overridden.
111. Although the appeal scheme does have some positive design attributes and high order benefits, the elements of harm identified are not outweighed. There are no other material considerations for me to conclude otherwise.”
Camden Goods Yard:
[Also procedurally interesting given that it is another example of section 106 agreement renegotiation by the section 73 back door – see for more background my 1 March 2026 blog post And Another Thing….Another Misconception About Amending Section 106 Agreements]
“80. With regards the heritage balance, I have found a modest level of less than substantial harm to various heritage assets, to which I have afforded considerable importance and weight. The Framework requires any harm to designated heritage assets to be weighed against the public benefits of the proposal.
81. In this regard I have considered the economic, social and environmental benefits of the appeal scheme, the uppermost being the delivery of housing and affordable housing. While the quantum of housing and affordable housing is reduced from the earlier consented scheme, I am nonetheless satisfied that this public benefit in itself, which I afford great weight, does outweigh the harm to the heritage assets. As such the appeal scheme is not contrary to CLP Policy D2 and London Plan HC1 that seeks to protect designated heritage assets.
82. Turning to the overall planning balance, the appeal scheme would not provide the full quantum of affordable housing usually required by the Development Plan and would be at a lower level than that previously granted consent. 83. However, I am satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated, with regards the viability evidence submitted, that the appeal scheme makes appropriate provision for affordable housing and is therefore in accordance with the provisions of policy H4 of the Camden Local Plan and policy H5 of the London Plan and National Planning Guidance.
84. As such, in the context of an absence of a 5-year housing land supply and a continued high demand for affordable housing I afford the provision of housing and affordable housing, even at a reduced quantum, great weight.
85. Therefore, it is readily apparent that any adverse impacts of varying the conditions would not, by some considerable margin, significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework taken as a whole and other material considerations.
86. For the reasons given above I conclude that the appeal should succeed.”
Could any of you have accurately predicted ahead of these decisions what these outcomes would be? Is that uncertainty inevitable? Could national and/or local policy provide even more direction? Or indeed do parties sometimes need that lack of policy certainty given the inevitability that policies will never be wholly up to date and appropriate for all circumstances?
Whilst in my view it is encouraging that the draft revised NPPF will herald a simpler, more prescriptive, national policy approach (and encouraging indeed that ministers committed last week that the final version will be published by the summer – which I interpret to be by summer recess on 16 July), unless we are going to see some detailed calibration in policy as to, for instance, how specific levels of heritage harm are to be assessed against specific levels of housing undersupply (for which the present “tilted balance” has been, I would say, ultimately ineffective), those two aspects I referred to above are going to dampen down any hope of predictability.
And if the truth is that the decision-maker always has the whip-hand due to that black box within which subjective assessments and conclusions as to weighting of competing considerations can be reached, and that accordingly when we say decision-making is quasi-judicial that word “quasi” is doing some heavy lifting, it’s odd that the precise nature of the decision-maker in our system and whether they have any form of democratic mandate is ultimately random:
- Most applications for planning permission: officers taking the decisions under delegated powers – applying section 38(6), presumably trying to arrive at a “correct” assessment of policy compliance, harms, benefits and arriving at an overall planning balance, presumably without “political” influence.
- Other applications: elected councillors in planning committee – the same legal duty, so is it right that there be the room for politically-influenced judgment, particularly where there is an up-to-date local development plan and/or a clear and up to date national planning policy framework? Why is their decision “better” than that of trained officers?
- Most appeals: decisions taken by civil servants, i.e. a single inspector, again applying section 38(6), presumably trying to arrive at a “correct” assessment of policy compliance, harms, benefits and arriving at an overall planning balance, without “political” influence. Again, why is their decision “better” than either that of local councillors or trained officers?
- Some recovered appeals, and applications which have been called-in: decisions taken by ministers in line with national “political” objectives, in practice with significant input from civil servants, at least on technical aspects and ensuring that the ministers’ decision, whatever it may be, is legally defensible. Again, why is the minster’s decision “better” than either that of the inspector who has made recommendations or indeed that of local councillors or trained officers?
If our development management system is intended to be predictable and indeed properly quasi-judicial, such that most applications can be determined by officers and such that call-ins and recovered appeals only happen in utterly exceptional cases, wouldn’t we need to move towards (1) even more calibration in policy and (2) a much stronger duty on councillors to have an up to date local development plan in place with well-evidenced policies?
Otherwise, on these sorts of decisions, on complex sites with often conflicting imperatives, isn’t the truth that we are unfairly leaving a huge amount of weight on the shoulders of officers and, even possibly even more unfairly, individual inspectors? I was interested to see from the list of inquiry documents that, after the close of the 1 Battersea Bridge Road inquiry, the appellant sought unsuccessfully to have the appeal recovered by the Secretary of State – presumably in the hope that he would reach a different conclusion as to the relative weight that various considerations carried than the direction in which the inspector may have been thought to be heading..
Simon Ricketts, 25 May 2026
Personal views, et cetera
SIMONICITY 