Category: Development management

A Change Is Gonna Come (But Should It Really Need A Fresh Planning Permission?)

All change on Monday, with sight of the draft revised NPPF, but this blog post focuses on a more fundamental issue: how unnecessarily hard it can be to make changes to a scheme that has planning permission without having to go back to the very beginning again.
Why do schemes change post-permission in the first place? It’s unsurprising when you consider:
– the time that it takes to obtain planning permission for a large project, during which market demand or other circumstances may have changed;
– the extent to which relatively detailed parameters need to be fixed at such an early stage even for an outline application;

– the opportunities that often arise to increase densities or make other improvements once a house-builder or end-user takes over the reins from the initial applicant (for the avoidance of doubt strategic land promoters are a good and necessary thing – often no-one else is going to fulfil that upfront, high risk/high cost, role at the outset of long-term projects beyond a certain scale). 

These scheme changes are often to be welcomed and yet sometimes it seems as if the planning system conspires to prevent them. See Philip Barnes’ blog post ‘A simple way of increasing housing delivery‘ (11 January 2017) for an excellent articulation of the practical frustrations from a house-builder’s perspective. 
Of course there are two mechanisms available:
– section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 enables “applications for planning permission for the development of land without complying with conditions subject to which a previous planning permission was granted.”
– section 96A of the 1990 Act enables a local planning authority to approve a “change to any planning permission relating to land in their area if they are satisfied that the change is not material.”

But there are limitations to both procedures, some in the legislation itself (for instance section 73 applications cannot be used to extend the life of a planning permission and section 96A applications can only be made “by or on behalf of a person with an interest in the land to which the planning permission relates“), some by way of case law and some (the most problematic, because so uncertain) by reason of the breadth of discretion that local planning authorities have in determining whether the particular changes sought fall within the ambit of either procedure – not assisted at all by vague and unnecessarily restrictive advice in the current Planning Practice Guidance. 
The detailed position is set out in Town partner Clare Fielding’s 2015 paper to the Oxford Joint Planning Law Conference From concept to construction: the law and practice of amending planning permissions. It is disappointing that we are still in as uncertain a place as we were then. 

The main problem is the lack of any firm rules as to the extent of changes to a planning permission which can be secured under section 73. The leading case remains Coventry City Council ex p Arrowcroft Group plc (Sullivan J, 21 July 2000), where there is the often quoted passage from Sullivan J:
“It is true that the outcome of a successful application under section 73 is a fresh planning permission, but in deciding whether or not to grant that fresh planning permission the local authority ‘… shall consider only the question of the conditions subject to which planning permission should be granted’…Thus the Council is able to impose different conditions upon a new planning permission, but only if they are conditions which the Council could lawfully have imposed upon the original planning permission in the sense that they do not amount to a fundamental alteration of the proposal put forward in the original application.” 
So the guiding principle is what is a “fundamental” alteration? “Fundamental” is a big thing as far as lawyers are concerned – think from the law of contract the principles of “fundamental mistake”, “fundamental breach” and “fundamental lack of consideration – it’s not just millennial adjective-inflation along the lines of fabulous, awesome and great!
And yet successive Governments have since 2009 described the procedure as the making of “minor material amendments” (hence for those of us in the trade the inevitable acronym of “MMA” for section 73 applications – lose that please folks!). The current Planning Practice Guidance says this:
“There is no statutory definition of a ‘minor material amendment’ but it is likely to include any amendment where its scale and/or nature results in a development which is not substantially different from the one which has been approved.”
The roots of this are in the (now cancelled) document published first in 2009 and then updated in 2010, Greater Flexibility For Planning Permissions – a proportionate and timely response at the time to the financial crisis and its implications for house building and economic development more generally. Aside from re-introducing for a temporary period the ability to extend the duration of planning permissions, the document gave guidance on the use of the then new section 96A procedure for non-material amendments (introduced by the Planning Act 2008) and sought to “streamline and clarify” the section 73 procedure in the light of the Killian-Pretty review which had recommended that “the Government should take steps to allow a more proportionate approach to minor material changes in development proposals after permission has been granted” and some further work carried out by WYG, in which WYG had come up with that problematic wording:
“A minor material amendment is one whose scale and nature results in a development which is not substantially different from the one which has been approved”
The purpose of the guidance and the thrust of the Killian-Pretty and WYG work was not in any way to cut back on the use of section 73 but, by incorporating in guidance those references to “minor material amendment” and “not substantially different” the Government introduced confusion. “Minor material amendment” may be a handy phrase but a more accurate one, reflecting the law, would be:
“less than fundamental amendment, whether material or not“. 
As a result of the confusion we have a patchwork situation where many authorities have been comfortable approving significant changes by way of section 73 (for instance Barnet Council at Brent Cross Cricklewood) but others have been running scared or seeking legal advice which is ultimately of little assistance – the authority must consider whether the changes are a “fundamental alteration of the proposal put forward in the original application”. That is a matter of planning judgment, albeit in my view “fundamental” means “fundamental”!
There has been surprisingly little case law, although two cases from last year are helpful:
– R (Vue Entertainment Limited) v City of York Council (Collins J, 18 January 2017) where the court upheld a section 73 permission relation to a mixed use development, where the changes to the permitted scheme included increasing the size of a proposed cinema from 12 screens with a capacity of 2,000 people to 13 screens with a capacity of 2,400. 
– R (Wet Finishing Works Limited) v Taunton Deane Borough Council (Singh J, 20 July 2017) is also interesting – not just because a challenge to a approved change from 84 to 90 dwellings failed (how could that have been fundamental in anyone’s mind?) but because the 84 dwellings figure was included in the approved description of development and that was still not a bar on the change being approved via section 73. An area of repeated debate is whether a section 73 permission can achieve amendments to conditions which are inconsistent with the approved description of development and often a section 96A application is made to amend the description of development, replacing any reference in the description to numbers of, for instance, dwellings, with a condition to the same effect, so that that condition can then be amended by section 73. You begin to see the unnecessary bureaucracy, legalism (caused by fear of judicial review) and scope for uncertainty. 
So why not simply make a fresh application for planning permission rather than seeking to proceed under section 73? 
First and most importantly, inevitably there is less risk of being drawn back into a prolonged consideration of the merits of the proposal itself. This is of course another area that is not black and white. Whilst section 73(2) states that “[o]n such an application the local planning authority shall consider only the question of the conditions subject to which planning permission should be granted“, inevitably if policies have changed since the existing permission was approved the decision maker may seek to use the section 73 application as a means of applying them, asserting that the section 73 permission should only be granted with those additional or tightened conditions or obligations.
Secondly, rather than starting afresh with another full set of application documentation, it is likely to be acceptable simply to supplement the existing material where necessary, reducing significantly the scale of the application package for all concerned. Where the existing permission was supported by a viability appraisal that process will need to be updated (in London there is guidance on this in the affordable housing and viability SPG and policy H6 paragraphs G to J of the draft London Plan). A deed of variation to the existing section 106 agreement is more likely to be accepted, rather than requiring a fresh section 106 agreement. 
Thirdly, a section 73 application may be the only way of avoiding being hit for CIL on top of existing section 106 obligations which were intended to contribute to the same infrastructure requirements, where the local planning authority has adopted a CIL charging schedule since the original planning permission was issued. 
Fourthly, a flat £234 application fee rather than a fee of up to £150,000 for an application for outline planning permission. Maybe that £234 figure is too light, particularly where more than one condition will be changing from the original permission, but there is no basis on an amended scheme for paying the same fee as first time round. 
Of course, care is needed by the authority in drafting the section 73 permission (see my 14 October 2017 blog post Flawed Drafting: Interpreting Planning Permissions).

Why are there also arguments, in the context of section 96A, as to whether amendments are “material” or not? Well, section 96A is an extremely useful procedure, in that there a 28 day determination timescale (rather than the normal application timescale that applies for section 73 applications), there are no consultation requirements and it does not result in a fresh planning permission, meaning that there is no need to vary the existing section 106 agreement. Of course, again what is material (ie material in planning terms) is for the local planning authority to determine and as long as its determination on the issue is reasoned, any potential challenger to an approval faces an uphill struggle. Conversely, the applicant has no right of appeal to the Secretary of State. The authority is in a position, of (to be cynical) much power or (to be more realistic) being unclear as to what approach it should take – which again is a reason to consider whether clearer, more positive, guidance in the PPG is required rather than this:
“There is no statutory definition of ‘non-material’. This is because it will be dependent on the context of the overall scheme – an amendment that is non-material in one context may be material in another.”
In unveiling the draft revised NPPF (and potentially draft revised PPG alongside it) on Monday, will the prime minister take the opportunity to clarify for us that “non-material” means “non-material” and that “fundamental” does indeed mean “fundamental”? Probably not, she will focus on grander matters I’m sure, but the section 96A and section 73 procedures are two of the dull, forgotten but necessary, nuts and bolts of the process that have the most tendency to jam. Jam today, no homes tomorrow. 
Simon Ricketts, 3 March 2018
Personal views, et cetera

Restricting Pre-Commencement Conditions: It Will Be A Start

A few words on planning law before something more important. 

This week it was good to see MHCLG’s consultation document Improving the use of planning conditions: consultation on draft regulations (30 January 2018). Unnecessary pre-commencement conditions and the jams caused to project programmes are a pain. However, I’m not sure that this remedy is the panacea (I’m trying to resist the temptation to coin the term “planacea”, oh..). 

 What is proposed is that any decision maker cannot grant planning permission containing a pre-commencement condition unless the applicant has either agreed to the terms of the condition or hasn’t responded within ten working days.

 That is positive and should reflect good practice, certainly on bigger schemes where lists of draft conditions are shared by officers for discussion with the applicant prior to permission being issued. However, as usual, if you delve into the legal detail, I’m not sure that the mechanism will be as broad in its scope as you might think, due to the definition of “pre-commencement condition” in the parent legislation. Section 100ZA(8) Town and Country Planning Act 1990, introduced by section 14(1) of the Neighbourhood Planning Act 2017, defines “pre-commencement condition” as:

 “a condition imposed on a grant of planning permission (other than a grant of outline planning permission within the meaning of section 92) which must be complied with—

 (a) before any building or other operation comprised in the development is begun, or

 (b) where the development consists of a material change in the use of any buildings or other land, before the change of use is begun.”

 This rules out use of the procedure on outline planning permissions! That certainly isn’t identified in the consultation paper. I can see why the procedure shouldn’t apply to the standard condition setting out the matters for which reserved matters approval is required but for all other pre-commencement conditions the position is the same as for full planning permissions.

The definition also has the effect of restricting the process to “pure” pre-commencement conditions. The requirement would not apply to a condition that prevented any development from proceeding save for defined initial works which might be very minor, but for which discharge might still be critical to the overall development programme, or to conditions that might need to be discharged before particular phases of development could proceed. “Pure” pre-commencement conditions are indeed a particular evil for developers as they will often be in the way of the planning permission being kept alive by the carrying out of an initial material operation (and may indeed lead to difficult CIL liability issues – set out in a good 5 January 2018 blog post CIL – false starts can be punishing by Roy Pinnock) but they are no more problematic for the timely carrying out of the whole development than other conditions.

What if an applicant resists a requested pre-commencement condition? Of course it is to be hoped that a compromise will be found. But if not, ultimately the decision maker’s only option may be refusal of the application.

What if a decision maker fails to follow the procedure and issues a permission with an unwelcome pre-commencement condition? In theory of course the applicant might consider challenging the permission by way of judicial review but surely this would be a sledgehammer to crack a nut as opposed to a section 96A or 73 application to amend the condition.
So that was all I had to say on a short consultation paper.
But what really has been on my mind this week has been the sad news of the death of retired Court of Appeal judge Sir Henry Brooke. As a lawyer and more specifically in the last few years as a legal blogger he was an inspirational figure to me. I didn’t know him personally but felt as if I did. His humanity, intellectual generosity, and wisdom – along with a healthy and undimmed preparedness to put technological advances and social media to practical use – was evident in all he blogged and tweeted. For instance, if you’ve benefited from the use of technology in court, or clicked into Bailii case transcripts? Thank Sir Henry. In the time I’ve saved you by this short post, do dip into his “musings, memories and miscellanea” blog, within which you will find this transcript of his 2008 Peter Boydell memorial lecture on The role of Mediation in Planning and Environmental Disputes. My condolences to Sir Henry’s family.

 Simon Ricketts, 2 February 2018

 Personal views, et cetera

Brownfield Land Registers: A Bit Of Progress

I last blogged about the new brownfield land regime back in April 2017. Back then, the deadline of 31 December 2017 had been set for local planning authorities to publish their first registers. We were also waiting for the final set of regulations that would set out the procedure by which, if your land is listed in part 1 of the register, you can apply for “permission in principle” (if your land is in part 2 of the register it is automatic). 
This blog post takes a quick look at some of the registers that have been published to see the approaches that authorities are taking – after all, whilst authorities had the 31 December deadline for publishing their registers, there was no minimum number of sites to be included, whether on part 1 or part 2 and no procedure for appeal or independent scrutiny if a land owner considers that their land has been wrongly overlooked. 
In the longer term, I hope that something will be done about authorities that only pay lip service to the process, although it is difficult to see what, without a more prescriptive system, or other sticks and carrots being applied. DCLG’s planning update newsletter published on 21 December 2017 stated:
“DCLG will assess progress in January, and it will be important that published registers contain up-to- date information on brownfield land suitable for housing. 

In July we published planning guidance, a data standard, and a template , to support local planning authorities in preparing and publishing their registers, and to ensure registers are published in a consistent and open format which can be aggregated by users of the data.”
From a quick google, it seems to me that authorities have met the deadline. However:
– the sites included do not appear to go beyond sites which were already in play by virtue of either having permission, an allocation or having featured in the authority’s strategic housing land availability assessment
– sites have not yet been included in part 2

– whilst the government’s data standard and template have been followed, the supporting information is pretty sparse. 

These are three authorities that I chose to look at, by way of a random selection:
Elmbridge Borough Council’s register only contains sites that already have planning permission. 
Milton Keynes Council has decided not to include any sites on part 2 of its register. Its part 1 sites all come from its SHLAA as well as unimplemented planning permissions. 
The notes to Islington Council’s register set out uncertainties as to the required methodology:
“The Regulations and PPG are not clear about whether the 5 dwelling threshold for inclusion on the BLR refers to net or gross dwellings. Regulation 4 of the Regulations merely requires sites to be included if they have an area of at least 0.25 hectares or is capable of supporting at least 5 dwellings. This suggests the threshold is a gross figure. 

However, Schedule 2 of the Regulations requires sites on the BLR to set out the minimum net number of dwellings which, in the authority’s opinion, the land is capable of supporting. 

This is an important distinction as there are several sites – all extant permissions – which are less than 0.25 hectares, and permit 5 or more dwellings gross but less than 5 dwellings net. Hence the decision to enter these sites onto the BLR hinges on whether we assume the 5 dwelling threshold is net or gross. 

Islington have assumed that the Regulations refer to the gross figure in terms of assessing capability under Regulation 4, although a site’s net figure is used for the ‘MinNetDwellings’ column. The council will monitor changes to guidance and other boroughs BLRs for best practice, and may revert to a net figure in future in terms of assessing sites against the Regulations.”

Islington identifies all of the sites on its register as in unknown ownership:
“The BLR identifies all sites as unknown ownership, which reflects the lack of access to up-to-date Land Registry records for these sites. Islington will aim to secure ownership data for sites on future iterations of the BLR.”
These approaches are not untypical and it is underwhelming. DCLG will need to turn the thumbscrews in time for the first annual update of the registers if this process is going to do anything other than round up the usual suspect sites. 
The formatting does at least allow for some useful data gathering, such as this map of London brownfield sites.

Barton Willmore have carried out some interesting analysis as to the numbers of homes identified by the Manchester authorities in their register. 

Of course one of the benefits of finding your land within part 1 of the register is the idea that you will be able to apply for “permission in principle” as a supposedly quick route to planning approval. However this is only relevant if the site is very small, given that the cap is nine dwellings – and given that the minimum size for inclusion on the register is five dwellings this is all pretty niche. Be that as it may, the Town and Country Planning (Permission in Principle) (Amendment) Order 2017 was laid before Parliament on 21 December 2017 and will come into force on 1 June 2018. The order sets out the procedure for applying for PiPs. Lichfields’ 2 January 2018 blog post Take a chance on me: what we know about permission in principle on application is a good summary, also covering the fee rates for applications. 

On reading my April 2017 blog post again, I was surprisingly optimistic about the brownfield land registers. Nine months on, I suppose at least we now have the initial registers in place but surely now we need to see:
– greater engagement between land owners and LPAs so as to begin to use the process to unlock sites which are not already in play.

– consultation in relation to moving appropriate sites onto part 2 so that they secure automatic permission in principle (and without the nine units cap there is in relation to part 1, although they must be below the threshold for EIA).

– a real incentive for development of sites on the register, including supportive policies in the forthcoming revised NPPF. 

Simon Ricketts, 5 January 2018
Personal views, et cetera

Planning Law In 2018: This Is Not A Love Song

This is not a proper simonicity blog post but a quick review of the year that was 2017, followed by a comment-free look at 2018, which promises, conversely, to be the year of the review.
2017: review of the year

To use the popularity or otherwise of simonicity blog posts during the year as a proxy, these were some of the main issues that engaged us:
NPPF Paras 49 & 14: So What Is The Supreme Court Really Saying? (1,588 views) (10 May 2017)
20 Changes In The Final Version Of The London Mayor’s Affordable Housing & Viability SPG (731 views) (20 August 2017)
Viability Assessment Is Not A Loophole, It’s A Noose (707 views) (4 November 2017)
Housing Needs: Assessed Or Assumed? (694 views) (20 September 2017)
Five Problems With Neighbourhood Plans (565 views) (19 February 2017)
Green Belt Policy: Will It Change?  (520 views) (11 November 2017)
Money For Nothing? CPO Compensation Reform, Land Value Capture (509 views) (20 May 2017)
Courts Interpret NPPF Paras 14, 133/134, 141 (But Couldn’t It Be Clearer In The First Place?) (492 views) (8 July 2017)
Slow Train Coming: Strategic Rail Freight Interchanges In The South East (442 views) (6 May 2017)
The New EIA Regulations (357 views) (29 April 2017)
2018: year of the review?
The policy agenda for the coming year includes:
* the Government’s green paper on social housing, announced by Sajid Javid in September 2017, which he described as a “wide-ranging, top-to-bottom review of the issues facing the sector, […] the most substantial report of its kind for a generation“. 
 • recommendations from a review panel, chaired by Sir Oliver Letwin “to explain the significant gap between housing completions and the amount of land allocated or permissioned, and make recommendations for closing it”. An interim report is expected for the Government’s Spring statement in 2018 and full report by the time of the Autumn budget in 2018. 

 • the Labour party’s review of the planning system, “People and Planning”, announced by Roberta Blackman-Woods at its 2017 party conference.

 • Nick Raynsford’s review for the Town and Country Planning Association “to identify how the Government can reform the English planning system to make it fairer, better resourced and capable of producing quality outcomes, while still encouraging the production of new homes.” A report is to be formally presented at all major party conferences in autumn 2018.

 • a revised version of the National Planning Policy Framework for consultation in the Spring of 2018 with a final version in the Summer.

 • a consultation process in Spring 2018 on detailed proposals to reform the Community Infrastructure Levy.

* further implementation of existing legislation as well as an amendment to the General Permitted Development Order to give deemed permission (subject to criteria and limitations yet to be spelt out) to the demolition of existing commercial buildings and their replacement with residential development.
Away from England:
* The Law Commission is consulting until 1 March 2018 on proposals to simplify and consolidate planning law in Wales at the request of the Welsh Government, which is drafting a planning code to consolidate existing planning legislation. 
* The Planning (Scotland) Bill was introduced into the Scottish Parliament on 4 December 2017, following an independent review of the system. As well as progress in 2018 on the Bill, which proposes wide-ranging changes to the planning process in Scotland, we can also expect an amended version of Scotland’s National Planning Framework.

All of this is going to take some unpacking.
Happy new year and thanks for continuing to read, comment, share and follow. Let’s continue to join the dots and call out the spin within this increasingly diffuse policy area. Not a love song – more of a wail…
Simon Ricketts, 30 December 2017
Personal views, et cetera

The Age Of Reasons

Two recent cases have considered the extent to which decision-makers in relation to planning matters are under a duty to give reasons for their decisions. This has never been an easy question and the answer has practical consequences because:
 – for decision-makers, articulating reasons is time consuming and sometimes not to easy to get right

– for those benefiting from a decision, there is the risk that the decision is opened up for legal challenge if those reasons appear to be flawed

– for those objecting to a decision, without reasons being given to explain how it was reached, legal challenge, or even proper scrutiny, is made much more difficult. 

There is also often a dilemma on the part of decision-makers because if reasons are volunteered, even if not required, they need to be rational and can render a decision susceptible to challenge, which would not have been if no reasons were given. 
Dover
Lord Carnwath’s Supreme Court’s judgment in Dover District Council v CPRE Kent (6 December 2017) dismissed an appeal from the Court of Appeal ruling that I blogged on last September in Avoiding Dover-type reasons JRs where a planning permission for a major development proposal had been quashed that had been resolved by councillors to be approved against the recommendation of their officers, who wished substantially to reduce its scale due to perceived effects on an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty and an ancient monument. In granting permission to appeal, the Supreme Court had indicated that it “would wish to consider generally the sources, nature and extent of a local planning authority’s duty to give reasons for the grant of planning permission“.

In a nutshell, the main implication of the case is that even where there is no statutory requirement to give reasons for granting planning permission, it is now prudent to assume that reasons should always be given by a local planning authority, and particular care is needed where the decision is not fully in accordance with the reasoned recommendations made to the authority by its planning officers. 
The judgment itself starts:
“1. When a local planning authority against the advice of its own professional advisers grants permission for a controversial development, what legal duty, if any, does it have to state the reasons for its decision, and in how much detail? Is such a duty to be found in statutory sources, European or domestic, or in the common law? And what are the legal consequences of a breach of the duty? “
The judgment does not confine itself to that question but ranges widely over various decision-making procedures:
“23. The statutory rules relating to the giving of reasons are all to be found in subordinate legislation. It is hard to detect a coherent approach in their development. 

The main categories are: 

i) Secretary of State decisions (including those delegated to inspectors) – 

a)  following an inquiry or hearing; 


b)  on written representations. 


ii)  Decisions by local planning authorities – 

a)  Refusing planning permission or imposing conditions; 


b)  Granting permission; 


c)  Officer decisions under delegated powers. 

iii)  Decisions (at any level) on applications for EIA development.”

Working through these one by one:

In relation to appeals determined by inquiry or hearing, there is a specific statutory duty upon the Secretary of State and his inspectors to give reasons for their decisions. 
There is no corresponding rule in relation to written representations appeals, although it is the practice for a fully reasoned decision to be given, giving rise in practice to an enforceable duty. 
When a local planning authority refuses planning permission there is a statutory requirement that the authority must in their decision notice state “clearly and precisely their full reasons”. 
Aside from a blip between 2003 and 2013 (when there was legislation requiring authorities to include on their decision notice “a summary of their reasons for the grant of permission” and “a summary of the policies and proposals in the development plan which are relevant to the decision“), there is no statutory requirement for local planning authorities to give their reasons for granting planning permission, save that:
– since 2014, in the case of officers’ delegated decisions there has been a duty by virtue of the Openness of Government Bodies Regulations 2014

– in relation to EIA development, decision-makers must not grant planning permission “unless they have first taken the environmental information into consideration” and “they shall state in their decision that they have done so“. 

As for the necessary standard of reasons, Lord Carnwath sets out the famous passage of Lord Brown in South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (2004):
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.” 
Lord Carnwath explains that even where there is no statutory duty to give reasons, in the interests of transparency (and with reference to, for instance, the requirements of the Aarhus Convention) a common law duty arises upon local planning authorities to give reasons (to that exacting standard) where the circumstances justify it. What circumstances? That is where the judgment is more problematic. The court approves the approach taken by the Court of Appeal earlier this year in Oakley v South Cambridgeshire District Council (15 February 2017) where it held that a duty did arise in the particular circumstances of that case: where the development would have a “significant and lasting impact on the local community”, and involved a substantial departure from Green Belt and development plan policies, and where the committee had disagreed with its officers’ recommendations. 
I don’t find the following passage in Lord Carnwath’s judgment helpful in drawing any practical dividing line between situations where reasons will or will not need to be given for departing from officers’ recommendations, which leads me to the conclusion that the only safe assumption is that they will now always need to be given (to the South Bucks v Porter standard):
“As to the charge of uncertainty, it would be wrong to be over-prescriptive, in a judgment on a single case and a single set of policies. However it should not be difficult for councils and their officers to identify cases which call for a formulated statement of reasons, beyond the statutory requirements. Typically they will be cases where, as in Oakley and the present case, permission has been granted in the face of substantial public opposition and against the advice of officers, for projects which involve major departures from the development plan, or from other policies of recognised importance (such as the “specific policies” identified in the NPPF – para 22 above). Such decisions call for public explanation, not just because of their immediate impact; but also because, as Lord Bridge pointed out (para 45 above), they are likely to have lasting relevance for the application of policy in future cases.”
The judgment certainly reinforces the care that needs to be taken by an authority where a decision is taken to grant planning permission against officers’ recommendations, if judicial review is to be avoided. It also risks delaying the taking of such decisions, referring to the “important legal principle that a decision-maker must not only ask himself the right question, but “take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly” (Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014, 1065B). That obligation, which applies to a planning committee as much as to the Secretary of State, includes the need to allow the time reasonably necessary, not only to obtain the relevant information, but also to understand and take it properly into account.”

If members are now going to depart from officers in resolving to grant permission, or in their reasons for doing so, in most cases it may now be prudent for the application to return to a subsequent committee meeting for reasons to be properly formulated. 
Save
The Dover judgment confines itself to decisions as to whether to approve or refuse planning applications but of course there are many other important decisions within the development management process. Lang J’s judgment in Save Britain’s Heritage v Secretary of State (29 November 2017) concerned a challenge by Save Britain’s Heritage to the decision by the Secretary of State not to call in for his own determination the Paddington Cube application, which had been resolved to be approved by Westminster City Council.
She sets out the statutory position as follows:
“19. There is no statutory duty to give reasons for not calling in an application. However, the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure)(England) Order 2015 envisages that reasons may be given when the minister decides to call in an application. By article 17, if an application is called in, the local planning authority is required to serve on the applicant a notice “setting out the terms of the direction and any reasons given by the Secretary of State for issuing it“.

Save relied on two grounds for their challenge:

“Ground 1. The Claimant submitted that the Defendant’s decision was unlawful because he failed to give reasons for not calling in the applications, in breach of the Claimant’s legitimate expectation that reasons would be given. The legitimate expectation arose from a change in practice, announced in a Green Paper and in Parliament in December 2001. Thereafter, ministers began to give reasons for not calling in planning applications, when previously they had not done so.”

“Ground 2. Alternatively, the Claimant submitted that the court should find that there was a general common law duty to give reasons under section 77(1) TCPA 1990”
Lang J reaches the conclusion that where there is no statutory duty, government practice can change: there was previously a government policy to give reasons but “…in February 2014, in the course of preparation for the High Court case of Westminster City Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWHC 708 (Admin), a departmental decision was made to cease the practice of giving reasons.” Accordingly she could not “accept Mr Harwood QC’s submission that the practice of giving reasons remains in force because it has not been formally and publicly revoked by a ministerial statement or published policy document. It is a fundamental principle of public law that public bodies cannot lawfully fetter the future exercise of their discretion under statutory powers, by adopting policies which cannot be changed.”
The 2014 case was of course the challenge to the decision not to call in the Elizabeth House redevelopment application that had been resolved to be approved by the London Borough of Lambeth. In setting out his reasons for not intervening (even though there was no statutory requirement to give reasons), the then Secretary of State made a number of errors and the challenge only narrowly failed on the strange basis that the reasoning was so bad that it should not be taken as a formal attempt to give reasons, for which there was no statutory requirement:
“Mr Cameron understandably expressed surprise that it was said that the letter was so obviously wrong that the defendant could not have meant what is set out in it. However, I am satisfied that regrettably that is the case. The letter cannot be regarded as one which was intended to give reasons. The defendant was relying on his right not to give reasons and the letter must be read accordingly. It is plain when the advice to him is seen that he could not have been unaware of nor could he have misunderstood his policy. It follows that the first three grounds relied on must fail since in addition there is no question of giving reasons. While it may be that it would be desirable if the defendant were required to give reasons why he decided not to call-in in a case which did meet the criteria for call-in but it is not open to me in the light of the existing authorities to impose such a duty.” (Collins J)
It is interesting to consider Collins J’s comment in that final sentence, and Lang J’s reasoning, in the light now of Lord Carnwath’s judgment. Lang J distinguished decisions in relations to planning applications from decisions not to call in applications in the following way:
“I accept the submissions of the Defendant and the Second Interested Party that Oakley is distinguishable since a call-in decision is a very different type of decision to a decision by a local planning authority to grant planning permission. A call-in decision is in essence a procedural decision by the Secretary of State on whether to intervene in the planning process; it does not result in the grant of any substantive rights.”
Wouldn’t it be clearer if we had a comprehensive statutory framework that dealt with these basic questions?

Simon Ricketts, 9 December 2017
Personal views, et cetera

PSI-Apps

Nothing in this blog post is intended to suggest in any way that planning in London is a game of psychology, politics and process but here are the basic rules, as applied this month by Sadiq Khan in Wandsworth and Barnet. 
PSI applications are defined in the Mayor of London Order 2008 as applications of “potential strategic importance” that fulfil at least one of the criteria set out in the Schedule to the Order. 

PSI applications have to be referred to the Mayor before they are determined by the borough council (I include in that term for ease the Corporation of the City of London and Westminster City Council) and referred again, if he requires it, after their determination and before the permission or refusal is issued – stage 1 and stage 2 referral respectively. 
The Mayor has two special powers:
First, subject to various detailed criteria and procedural requirements he can direct refusal (see my 9 September 2017 blog post Policing The SPG: New Scotland Yard). The borough council must then issue a refusal notice and the applicant has its usual right of appeal to the Planning Inspectorate. Advanced players of the game (not a game) take the view that the Mayor’s direction is potentially revocable, so in some circumstances the borough may hold off issuing its refusal notice and further negotiations will ensure. (I note for example that the New Scotland Yard refusal notice has not yet been issued). 
Secondly, again subject to various detailed criteria and procedural requirements, he can direct that he should be the local planning authority and then determine it himself (almost inevitably by granting planning permission) following a representation hearing (before which there is a stage 3 report). Until this month he had only determined two applications by this route, Hale Wharf in Haringey and Palmerston Road in Harrow (see my 18 March 2017 blog post London Calling: Mayoral Interventions).
We now have two more examples: 
Homebase site, Swandon Way, Wandsworth 
As set out in his press release, the Mayor has resolved on 17 October 2017 to approve a scheme by National Grid UK Pension Scheme next to Wandsworth Town railway station for 348 homes. Wandsworth Council had resolved to refuse permission for the development of the site due to the height and scale of the development and its proximity to a nearby conservation area. The development included 23% affordable homes. The developer has now agreed to increase that figure to 35%, with the majority in the first phase of development, and with review mechanisms as per the Mayor’s SPG. 
He had called in the scheme on 26 June 2017, noting that Wandsworth was significantly underperforming against its borough 33% affordable housing target. 
The Stage 1, 2 and 3 documents are at this link.
National Institute for Medical Research site, Mill Hill



The Mayor resolved to approve on 6 October 2017 a scheme by Barratt London for 460 homes on the National Institute for Medical Research site, the Ridgeway, Mill Hill. Barnet Council’s planning committee had resolved to refuse planning permission against officers’ advice, with the proposed reasons for refusal referring to effect on a conservation area, on green belt and on trees. In his 2 May 2017 call in letter he stated that Barnet Council is “currently significantly under-delivering against its annualised housing completions targets and the borough’s affordable housing targets.” The Mayor secured an increased affordable housing commitment, from 20% plus off-site financial contribution, to 40%. 
The Stage 1, 2 and 3 documents are at this link.
So it may be said that the Mayor is achieving on these schemes the percentages that he has flagged in the SPG. But I do have some open questions:
1. Where is the developer’s focus now to be in preparing proposals – on meeting local and borough concerns and aspirations or on achieving, via density, a development that is sufficiently viable to deliver the affordable housing percentages that may lead to the Mayor stepping in to assist if local discussions become difficult?
2. By his pragmatic actions, is the Mayor giving more weight to the SPG (non-statutory guidance, not policy) than it deserves, particularly in insisting on fairly rigorous adoption of the review mechanisms in the SPG?

3. When we see the draft London Plan at the end of next month, are we going to see various policies that cannot be said to be “strategic” but are drilling down to issues which should be left to be addressed at borough level?

4. Where deals are done to ensure an increased affordable housing percentage, will the increased pressure on viability in fact delay those schemes coming to fruition?

5. In some circumstances, will we see developers either seeking to ensure that their schemes meet the PSI application threshold, so as to come within the Mayor’s ambit, or conversely, seeking to ensure that they remain below the radar? Where will the balance lie – more big schemes, or fewer?

6. To what extent is party politics relevant? Is the Mayor more likely to intervene in Conservative boroughs such as Wandsworth and Barnet?

In the meantime, there are plenty of rumours about the Mayor’s planning policy direction, from tightening up on the criteria for student housing schemes to scrapping density matrices. All will no doubt be revealed on 29 November. 
Simon Ricketts, 21 October 2017
Personal views, et cetera

Flawed Drafting: Interpreting Planning Permissions

“What are words worth? Words

Words of nuance, words of skill”

Some of the most difficult cases in every area of law arise from flawed drafting and drafting which does not adequately anticipate future eventualities. 
I will leave for another blog post the issues that arise in relation to the drafting and interpretation of section 106 agreements and undertakings, although the Secretary of State’s 12 September 2017 decision letter dismissing an appeal for planning permission for 705 dwellings at King George’s Gate, Surbiton was a salutary lesson, and essential reading, for every planning lawyer.
In the light of Lang J’s judgment this month in London Borough of Lambeth v Secretary of State, this blog post limits itself to the question as how literally should planning permissions be interpreted? Is the planning permission in fact wider in its scope than the local authority intended when granting it? Have restrictions that were initially imposed fallen away by virtue of not being reapplied to subsequent permissions for the permitted buildings or to a permission for amendments to that initial permission? 

There have been many examples where the courts have determined that the legal effect of a permission was not what the authority may have intended, applying what might be regarded as a classically pure planning law approach:

– where a planning permission is clear, unambiguous and valid on its face, regard may only be had to the planning permission itself, including the conditions imposed upon it and the reasons given for the imposition of those conditions 
– an extreme reluctance to imply extra wording into conditions (Widgery LJ’s statement in Trustees of Walton Charities v. Walton & Weybridge DC (1970): “I have never heard of an implied condition in a planning permission and I believe no such creature exists. Planning permission… is not simply a matter of contract between the parties. There is no place…within the law relating to planning permission for an implied condition. Conditions should be expressed, they should be clear, they should be in the document containing the permission.”)

– applying the judge-made principle of a “new chapter in the planning history” of a site, effectively wiping the slate clean of previous planning condition restrictions where a significant change of use or other development has occurred.

This has led over the years to many outcomes which, whilst logical on a dispassionate reading of the relevant document by a lawyer, were certainly not anticipated by the unfortunate planning officer. For instance:
– in Carpet Décor (Guilford) Limited v Secretary of State (Sir Douglas Frank QC, 17 July 1981) a condition “that no variations from the deposited plans and particulars will be permitted unless previously authorised” by the local planning authority was held not to be sufficiently unequivocal as to exclude the operation of the Use Classes Order. 
– in Dunoon Developments Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 18 February 1992) a condition on a planning permission for a car showroom that stated that the use of the premises would be limited to the display, sale and storage of cars was not sufficient to exclude the operation of the General Permitted Development Order.
– in I’m Your Man Limited v Secretary of State (Robin Purchas QC, 4 September 1998) it was held that for a planning permission to be construed as limited to a temporary period, it was not sufficient for the restriction to be set out in the description of development rather than in a condition. 
– in Stevenage Borough Council v Secretary of State (HHJ Waksman QC, 3 June 2010) the owner of a retail park was held to be free of various restrictions on the types of goods which could be sold, by virtue of planning permissions having been granted for subdivision of units and other alterations, which did not reimpose restrictions from the original permission. As with a number of similar cases and CLOPUD appeal decision letters, the ruling partly relied on a liberal application of section 75(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which provides that where the proposed use of a building (or part of) a building is not specified in a permission for its erection (or alterations), “the permission shall be construed as including permission to use the building for the purpose for which it is designed“.
– in Prudential Assurance v Sunderland City Council (Wyn Williams J, 15 July 2010) the High Court held that, through the windfall of a local planning authority’s mistake faced with successive planning applications, Peel Holdings had become free of section 106 restrictions on the types of goods that could be sold from its retail park in Washington, Sunderland. 
The tide then started to turn with the Court of Appeal in Peel Land and Property Investments Plc v Hyndburn Borough Council (19 December 2013). Peel, no doubt hoping for an equivalent outcome as achieved in Sunderland, argued that the failure of the local authority, in drafting a permission for works of alteration to retail park units, to reimpose a condition restricting the goods that could be sold, meant that the restriction had been removed. However the court rejected the submissions. The works did not create a new chapter in the planning history of the units and on the facts (with no indication in the application documents that unrestricted retail use was intended) section 75(3) could not be relied upon in the way that was sought. 

The Supreme Court in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Limited v The Scottish Ministers (16 December 2015) then indicated a more nuanced approach to interpretation:

“When the court is concerned with the interpretation of words in a condition in a public document such as a section 36 consent, it asks itself what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole. This is an objective exercise in which the court will have regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the relevant words, the overall purpose of the consent, any other conditions which cast light on the purpose of the relevant words, and common sense. Whether the court may also look at other documents that are connected with the application for the consent or are referred to in the consent will depend on the circumstances of the case, in particular the wording of the document that it is interpreting. Other documents may be relevant if they are incorporated into the consent by reference … or there is an ambiguity in the consent, which can be resolved, for example, by considering the application for consent.

Interpretation is not the same as the implication of terms. Interpretation of the words of a document is the precursor of implication. It forms the context in which the law may have to imply terms into a document, where the court concludes from its interpretation of the words used in the document that it must have been intended that the document would have a certain effect, although the words to give it that effect are absent” (Lord Hodge)

Against this background it is therefore interesting to see this month another case in which the owner of a retail investment, in this case a Homebase DIY store, has achieved an outcome which was not intended by the local planning authority, and which could have been avoided by competent drafting of the decision notice. In London Borough of Lambeth v Secretary of State (Lang J, 3 October 2017), a planning permission had been granted varying conditions attached to an earlier permission. The purported effect of the widened conditions was set out in the description of development on the face of the permission:

” For: Variation of condition 1 (Retail Use) of Planning Permission Ref: 10/01143/FUL (Variation of Condition 6 (Permitted retail goods) of planning permission Ref. 83/01916 (Erection of a DIY retail unit for Texas homecare and an industrial building for cow industrial polymers) granted on 17.09.85 to allow for the sale of a wider range of goods to include DIY home and garden improvements, car maintenance, building materials and builders merchants goods, carpets and floor coverings, furniture, furnishings, electrical goods, automobile products, camping equipment, cycles, pet and pet products, office supplies and for no other purpose in Class A1 of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (as amended) Granted on 30.06.2010.


Original Wording:
 The retail use hereby permitted shall be used for the retailing of DIY home and garden improvements and car maintenance, building materials and builders merchants goods, carpets and floor coverings, furniture, furnishings, electrical goods, automobile products, camping equipment, cycles, pet and pet products, office supplies and for no other purpose (including the retail sale of food and drink or any other purpose in Class A1 of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (as amended) or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order. 


Proposed Wording:
 The retail unit hereby permitted shall be used for the sale and display of non-food goods only and, notwithstanding the provisions of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 (or any Order revoking or re-enacting that Order with or without modification), for no other goods.”

However, for some reason, whoever drafted the permission did not bother to go on and include the proposed wording as a condition. Lang J applied I’m Your Man and held that the purported restriction was of no effect. Lambeth Council’s “intended purpose was not given legal effect by the wording of the 2014 permission, because of flawed drafting.”
As set out in Landmark Chambers’ helpful summary , Lang J has granted permission for the case now to go to the Court of Appeal:
“I do not accept the Claimant’s critique of my judgment, and the application of the current law to the facts of this case. However, I am left with some unease about the result.  The principle established in I’m Your Man Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment 77 P & CR 251, and its application, merits consideration in a higher court which is not bound by precedent in the same way as the High Court. The interpretation and application of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd & Anor. v The Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 74, [2016] 1 WLR 85 is still evolving, and merit consideration by the Court of Appeal in this case.”

It is worth noting two post-Trump cases where the Court of Appeal has rejected submissions that a narrow interpretation should be given to specific conditions.
First, R (XPL Limited) v Harlow Council (Court of Appeal, 13 April 2016), where a condition preventing “repairs or maintenance of vehicles or other industrial or commercial activities (other than the parking of coaches and other vehicles …” outside specified hours at a coach depot was held to extend to a prohibition on the running of engines. 

Secondly, Dunnett Investments Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 29 March 2017) where the court had to determine whether the following condition is to be interpreted as excluding the operation of the General Permitted Development Order so as to allow change of use from offices to residential by way of the prior approval process:

“This use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained“.

Did prior approval from the local planning authority pursuant to the GPDO amount to “express planning consent” for the purposes of the condition?
The Court of Appeal reviewed the case law on interpretation of conditions:
“In relation to the interpretation of, specifically, a planning condition which is said to exclude the operation of the GPDO, other authorities are of some assistance. From them, the following themes can be discerned.


i) It is rightly common ground that a planning condition on a planning consent can exclude the application of the GPDO (see Dunoon Developments v Secretary of State for the Environment and Poole Borough Council (1993) 65 P&CR 101 (“Dunoon Developments”)).


ii) Exclusion may be express or implied. However, because a grant of planning permission for a stated use is a grant of permission for only that use, a grant for a particular use cannot in itself exclude the application of the GPDO. To do that, something more is required (see, e.g., Dunoon Developments at [107] per Sir Donald Nicholls VC). 


iii) In Carpet Décor (Guilford) Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 261 EG 56, Sir Douglas Frank QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge said that, because in the absence of such a condition the GPDO has effect by operation of law, the condition should be in “unequivocal terms”. Although “unequivocal” was used by Mr Katkowski in his written argument, during the course of debate he accepted that that term was now less appropriate, given the modern trend away from myopic focus upon the words without proper reference to their full context. However, he submitted (and I accept) that, to exclude the application of the GPDO, the words used in the relevant condition, taken in their full context, must clearly evince an intention on the part of the local planning authority to make such an exclusion.”

The court did not accept the claimant’s arguments:
“The first part of the condition sets out the scope of the permission. I respectfully agree with Patterson J (at [60]), the second part (“…and for no other purpose whatsoever…”) is not, as Mr Katkowski would have it, merely emphatic of the scope of the planning permission, but is rather a clear and specific exclusion of GPDO rights. Whilst, as I have described, each case depends upon its own facts, it is noteworthy that, in Dunoon Developments (at pages 105-6), in finding that the words “limited to” a particular purpose did not exclude GPDO rights, Farquharson LJ compared that phrase with “… and for no other purpose…” as considered in the earlier case of The City of London Corporation v Secretary of State for the Environment (1971) 23 P&CR 169, which he considered was far more emphatic and (he suggested) possibly sufficient to exclude the operation of the GPDO. In this case, we have a more emphatic phrase still, namely “… and for no other purpose whatsoever…”. Further, although we are concerned with rights under the GPDO and not the UCO, the interpretation of that phrase to exclude the operation of the GPDO is at least consistent with R (Royal London Mutual Insurance Society) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2013] EWHC 3597 (Admin); [2014] JPL 458, in which Patterson J held that a condition which restricted use to “only” particular uses within Use Class A1 excluded the right to use the land for other Class A1 uses, because it effectively evinced an intention to identify acceptable uses within the class whilst prohibiting other unacceptable uses within that class unless and until the merits of such use had been tested by the planning authority upon an application for planning permission (see also The Rugby Football Union v The Secretary of state for Local Government, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 927; [2002] JPL 740, in which Ouseley J, at [56], found that the words “for no other use” had similar effect, on the basis that such words “have no other sensibly discernible purpose than to prevent some other use which might otherwise be permissible without planning permission”). The third part of the condition before this court makes it the more abundantly clear that automatic or direct GPDO rights are excluded, by requiring a planning application if such uses are to be pursued.”
Furthermore, “”express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority” cannot sensibly include planning permission granted by the Secretary of State through the GPDO. It means what it says, i.e. planning permission granted by the local planning authority.”
What are the odds on Lang J’s judgment in Lambeth surviving the Court of Appeal?
In the meantime, and possibly whatever the outcome of that case, there is unpredictability. This is particularly unhelpful given the pressures on local planning authorities to issue permissions without unnecessary delay, and without the resources for a lawyer to check what may often on their face appear to be approvals of minor revisions and alterations. Mistakes happen. The extreme reluctance of authorities to issue revocation or modification orders to put mistakes right, a reluctance born of the liability to pay compensation that thereby arises, is another story – and in my view a large part of the problem. 
Simon Ricketts, 14.10.17
Personal views, et cetera

First World Problems 2: Amalgamations And Deconversions

Securing planning permission for your proposed super-basement is definitely a first world problem (see my previous 5 December 2016 blog post). 
As is seeking to knock two or more flats or houses into one.
There’s that scene in Help! where John, Paul, George and Ringo each open their separate front doors in a terraced street, which all open into one enormous Beatle mansion. (Illusions shattered: in reality Ailsa Road, St Margarets followed by a set at Twickenham Film Studios.).

Until 2000, the general view was that amalgamations like this, as well as deconversions of flats back into single dwellinghouses, probably didn’t amount to development requiring planning permission. The statutory definition of development specifically includes sub-division of dwellings (“the use as two or more separate dwellinghouses of any building previously used as a single dwellinghouse involves a material change in the use of the building and of each part of it which is so used“, section 55(3)(a), Town and Country Planning Act 1990) but is silent as to amalgamation. 
The way in which that position has changed, without any change in legislation is an interesting example of the way in which the scope of planning law and of relevant planning considerations can change over time to reflect social priorities and concerns.
The judgment of Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge in London Borough of Richmond v Secretary of State (28 March 2000) was a significant turning point. “It is undoubtedly the law that material considerations are not confined to strict questions of amenity or environmental impact and that the need for housing in a particular area is a material consideration…” The case involved a conversion from seven flats to one dwelling. 
It was then thought that this case could often be distinguished in terms of the number of units that were to be lost in that case and that LPAs would face an uphill struggle where they did not have policies in place restricting amalgamations resulting in the loss of dwellings. 
For instance, Kensington and Chelsea’s consolidated local plan currently states that the council will “resist development which results in the net loss of five or more residential units”. Until August 2014, the council took the view that this constrained its ability to argue that amalgamations leading to the loss of less than five units did not amount to development requiring planning permission. In R (Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea) v Secretary of State (Holgate J, 15 June 2016), Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC was representing the owners of two flats in Stanhope Gardens SW7 seeking to defend a certificate of lawfulness of proposed use which they had won on appeal. The inspector had considered that without a formal change in policy, the loss of a unit by way of amalgamation could not be relevant, even though the inspector accepted that “the scale of amalgamation in the Borough may be having a material effect on the number of dwellings in the Borough“. Holgate J held that this approach was wrong – whilst the nature of the policy would be relevant to whether planning permission should be granted, this did not mean that the housing need concerns raised by the council were not significant “for the threshold purpose of deciding whether planning permission even applied“. All was not however lost for the owners – the inspector had also granted planning permission for the amalgamation and the council’s challenge to that decision was rejected. 
RBKC’s local plan partial review, which is currently under examination, proposes a more restrictive policy that would only allow any amalgamation where the resulting dwelling is less than 170 sq m. Westminster City Council takes a different approach. Policy S14 of its city plan indicates that:
“Proposals that would result in a reduction in the number of residential units will not be acceptable, except where: 

* the council considers that reconfiguration or redevelopment of affordable housing would better meet affordable housing need; 


* a converted house is being returned to a family-sized dwelling or dwellings; or 


* 2 flats are being joined to create a family-sized dwelling.”

Amalgamations are a drag on net housing supply in both boroughs. Housing in London 2015: The evidence base for the Mayor’s Housing Strategy (Mayor of London, September 2015) reports:

“Between 2011/12 and 2013/14 a net 5,010 homes were created through conversions and a net 1,160 homes were lost through de-conversions.

Conversions were most common in accessible Inner London locations, and de-conversions in high price areas. The ward with the most conversions in this period was St. Leonard’s in Lambeth with 74 followed by Childs Hill in Barnet with 65. The three wards with the highest numbers of de- conversions were all in Westminster – Hyde Park (with 42), Knightsbridge and Belgravia (27) and Bayswater (26).”


Planning Resource briefly reported (subscriber only content) a ruling by Lang J on 27 July 2017 in Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Secretary of State, where she apparently quashed the decision of a planning inspector, who had allowed an appeal against refusal of planning permission partly on the basis of a certificate of lawfulness of proposed use or development for a proposed amalgamation that had been issued before the council’s August 2014 change in stance. Presumably she considered that circumstances had materially changed such that the certificate could no longer be relied upon. 

The battle has moved now to whether planning permission should be granted, rather than whether it is necessary. On 13 July 2017, in Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Secretary of State and Noell and Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Secretary of State and Lahham Deputy High Court Judge Neil Cameron QC quashed two decisions where separate inspectors had granted permission on appeal. The inspector had made a mistake of fact in both decisions when calculating housing land supply as he deducted vacant units returning to use from the requirement whilst including those units in the supply and by stating that the housing land supply would be boosted further by recent deliverable planning permissions when those planning permissions were already accounted for in the calculated supply. The Secretary of State did not defend either claim. Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC acted for the owners (if there’s a golden thread that runs through the case-law on amalgamation, it’s Christopher). 
Pending a tighter policy being in place, Inspectors have indeed still been allowing appeals in Kensington and Chelsea. For instance:
– Warwick Gardens, Kensington, 17 May 2017:
“In regards to the development plan, whilst I find conflict with Local Plan Policy CH3 and London Plan Policy 3.14 in that a unit of residential accommodation would be lost, and saved UDP Policy H17, the appeal proposal would not prejudice the Council’s ability to meet its housing supply targets or give rise to unacceptable harm in regards to housing choice. Indeed, it would assist to address the imbalance in the housing stock in regards to 3 bedroom dwellings. Consequently, I do not consider that the appeal proposal conflicts with the development plan when taken as a whole.”

– 15 Cheyne Place, Kensington, 10 April 2017:

“The proposal would conflict with Policy CH3 of the CLP and 3.14 of the LP, which seek to ensure that that there is a sufficient supply and choice of housing. Notwithstanding this conflict, I do not find that, in this instance, the proposal would undermine the Council’s ability to achieve its housing targets. In addition, it would also make a contribution towards an identified need for three bedroomed units. Moreover, the emerging Local Plan Partial Review indicates that the Council intend to accept amalgamation development of this scale. Therefore, in culmination, I attribute significant weight to these matters which outweighs the moderate conflict the proposal has with the CLP and LP.”
– 28 Victoria Road, Kensington, 11 January 2017:
“I saw at the site visit that the garden arrangement as existing is not ideal. There are presently no separate areas that 2 individual units could use and, if shared, residents of the upper floors would be able to gain views into the bedroom window of the ground floor flat whilst using the garden. To restrict the use of the garden to the ground floor occupants would leave the larger unit with no outdoor amenity space apart from a small terrace at first floor level.”

– 77 Drayton Gardens, Kensington, 4 November 2016:

“As part of its Local Plan Partial Review, the Council is about to consult on a policy which would permit the amalgamation of two residential units to one, if the gross floorspace of the resulting unit would not exceed 170 sqm. Mr Burroughs’ unchallenged evidence is that the resulting unit in this case is 99 sqm. ”

“The amalgamation of two residential units (second and third floor flats) into a single residential unit conflicts with CLP Policy CH3, saved UDP Policy H17 and LP Policy 3.14B, which aim to ensure an adequate supply and choice of housing to meet identified needs. The Framework also requires Council to boost significantly the supply of housing. However, on the evidence before me, the amalgamation will not, on the balance of probability, affect the Council’s ability to meet its housing targets. Furthermore, it will contribute to meeting a current identified need for larger dwellings in the borough, whilst improving the quality of accommodation, in accordance with LP 3.14A. Furthermore, in the light of the terms of a policy now being proposed as part of the Local Plan Partial Review, the Council appears to consider that amalgamations of this kind could be acceptable. On balance, these are material considerations which indicate that I should allow the appeal on ground (a) and grant planning permission, notwithstanding the conflict with the development plan.”

Simon Ricketts, 6 August 2017
Personal views, et cetera

Planners & Pubs

“…That is the best of Britain and it is part of our distinctive and unique contribution to Europe. Distinctive and unique as Britain will remain in Europe. Fifty years from now Britain will still be the country of long shadows on county grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pools fillers and – as George Orwell said – “old maids bicycling to Holy Communion through the morning mist” and if we get our way – Shakespeare still read even in school. Britain will survive unamendable in all essentials.” (John Major, speech to Conservative Group for Europe, 2003)

The Government is determined that he is proved right about the warm beer at least: drinking establishments will have more protection against changes of use than almost any other use, once recent additions to the Neighbourhood Planning Bill come into effect. 

When the Bill returned to the Commons from the Lords on 28 March 2017, a Lords amendment that sought to remove permitted development rights from A4 uses (“public houses, wine bars or other drinking establishments (but not night clubs)”) was replaced by Commons amendment 22A  :

“(1)    As soon as reasonably practicable after the coming into force of this section, the Secretary of State must make a development order under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 which:

 (a)    removes any planning permission which is granted by a development order for development consisting of a change in the use of any building or land in England from a use within Class A4 to a use of a kind specified in the order (subject to paragraph (c)),

(b)    removes any planning permission which is granted by a development order for a building operation consisting of the demolition of a building in England which is used, or was last used, for a purpose within Class A4 or for a purpose including use within that class, and

 (c)    grants planning permission for development consisting of a change in the use of a building in England and any land within its curtilage from a use within Class A4 to a mixed use consisting of a use within that Class and a use within Class A3.”

The Bill is likely to receive Royal Assent in late April/early May 2017 and, if the clause survives (there is a “ping pong” procedure on 26 April where the Lords decide whether to accept it), we will need to see how quickly (1) it comes into force and (2) the amended development order is made. The provisions will not affect development which is carried out pursuant to the current General Permitted Development Order before the amended development order comes into force. 

Whilst apparently supported by all parties and (of course) by CAMRA,  it is noteworthy that the provision (1) has been shoehorned into a Bill which covers unrelated matters and (2) has not been the subject of consultation – seldom a recipe for good legislation. 
This is yet another area where successive Governments have been constantly fiddling. 
Amendments to the Use Classes Order in 2005 split the old use class A3 into:
 — A3 Restaurants and cafés – For the sale of food and drink for consumption on the premises – restaurants, snack bars and cafes

— A4 Drinking establishments – Public houses, wine bars or other drinking establishments (but not night clubs)

This was primarily to prevent restaurants turning into drinking places rather than to provide any protection for pubs. Amendments to the General Permitted Development Order included a permitted development right to change from A4 to A3. 
The assets of community value regime introduced by the Localism Act 2011 has been used energetically in relation to pubs in particular, with over 850 pubs registered by 2015 (and much encouragement and cheerleading by Government) but, despite being time consuming for communities and authorities alike, was largely toothless until the changes introduced by the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015  pursuant to which, in relation to any drinking establishment, the permitted development rights to change use to A1 or A2, or to demolish, do not apply if it is registered as an asset of community value. Even if it not registered, there is a prior approval requirement to serve as a check as to whether any nomination for registration has been received. 
The Carlton Terrace saga was a salutory lesson for owners and developers. Prior approval for demolition wasn’t obtained and by a 6 July 2016 decision letter  an inspector upheld Westminster City Council’s enforcement notice requiring the pub to be rebuilt. Isn’t it just genuinely “community” pubs, often with heritage value, such as the Carlton, that deserve particular protection?
More recently we have also seen increasingly widespread use by local planning authorities of Article 4 Directions to remove permitted development rights in relation to pubs (most recently for example Southwark Council, which resolved on 7 March 2017 to make a direction).
So what is the justification for further changes?
Gavin Barwell in a debate in the House of Commons on 28 March 2017 explained the Government’s proposed amendments to the Bill as follows:

“I wish to turn to permitted development rights for the change of use or demolition of pubs, and to update the House on the steps we are taking in respect of the permitted development rights for the change of use from office to residential. First, I will speak to the Government amendment in respect of permitted development rights for the change of use or demolition of pubs. Let me start by assuring hon. Members that we have listened to both Houses and to the support that Members have expressed for valued community pubs. They will see that we have accepted the principle of the amendment introduced into the Bill in the other place. Our amendments in lieu therefore set out the detail of how we will take that principle forward.



The amendment commits us to update the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 to remove the permitted development rights for the change of use or demolition of drinking establishments, including pubs. In tabling the amendments in lieu, I reassure hon. Members that we have continued to engage through the passage of the Bill with interested Members and bodies, such as the Campaign for Real Ale and the British Beer and Pub Association. I can confirm that we will remove the permitted development rights to change to a restaurant or cafe, financial or professional service, or a shop. We will also remove the permitted development rights to change to an office for up to two years and to a school for a single academic year.



In making these changes, the Government are keen to avoid any potential unintended consequences. As such, we are clear that the best way to support pubs is to retain the A4 “drinking establishments” use class for pubs, wine bars and other types of bars. Doing so will allow pubs to innovate and intensify their use, for example by opening a pub garden or starting to provide live music, without facing a risk that this will be a change of use that requires a full planning application. Our intention in retaining the A4 use class is to allow pubs to develop within this use class without having to seek planning permission, thus avoiding unintended consequences, and unnecessary cost and bureaucracy. “




“The changes in respect of permitted development rights for the change of use or demolition of pubs mean that in future a planning application will be required in all cases. This will also be the case for premises in mixed use, for example as a pub and a restaurant. This addresses the long-standing call that there should be local consideration and an opportunity for the community to comment on the future of their local pub. It is important that local planning authorities have relevant planning policies in place to support this decision taking. Once we have made the changes, the current provisions, which remove permitted development rights for the change of use or demolition of pubs that are listed as assets of community value, are no longer necessary and will fall away.”



 “Importantly, we have listened to the points made about the need for pubs to be able to expand their food offer in order to meet changing market need and support their continued viability—the issue that my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham is concerned about. Therefore, at the same time as getting rid of the permitted development rights that allow for demolition or change of use, we will introduce a new permitted development right to allow drinking establishments to extend their food offering so as to become a mixed A4 pub and A3 restaurant. The Government believe that this will ensure that pubs have nothing to fear when it comes to requiring planning permission or enforcement against the change of use where a pub is extending its food offer. This will give them vital additional flexibility.”
Of course the measure won’t just apply to “valued community pubs” but to all drinking establishments that fall within use class A4. Is that proportionate?

The proposal that there should be deemed permission to change from A4 to a mixed A3/A4 use has attracted some criticism. Whilst there does need to be flexibility to allow dining pub type operations, is there the risk of opening the door to uses which are actually A3, as a stepping stone to A1 or A2? The concern is overstated in my view but these use distinctions are increasingly difficult in practice. 
Indeed, for the bigger picture in relation to changing trends in drinking and eating, the House of Lords Select Committee report on the Licensing Act 2003 dated 4 April 2017 makes fascinating reading. Who knows when Parliament will have the time to set matters right but the report is a sustained attack on the 2003 licensing reforms and the abject failure of that legislation to achieve its objectives:
“During the passage of the Licensing Bill one of the much over-used expressions was that it was going to change the UK to a “café culture”, by which was meant the imagined Continental habit of modest and leisurely consumption of alcohol at any civilised hour, preferably in clement weather. The fact that this has not materialised seems to have come as no surprise to any of our witnesses, nor to us; it takes more than an Act of Parliament to change the habits of generations, and this country’s climate was never going to favour such a change. The café culture which has grown up takes a rather different form and is confined to town centres, where between 2011 and 2016 a fall of 2,000 in the number of bars, pubs and night clubs has been accompanied by an increase of 6,000 in the number of cafés, fast food outlets and restaurants.”
To what extent is the loss of drinking establishments down to our planning regime and how much is it down to consumer trends? Who is going to operate – and drink in – all of these protected pubs?
At the moment of course licensing is a separate world from planning (and from planners and planning lawyers). Woe betide the objector who raises an issue in the wrong forum. 
For those of us who may wonder from time to time whether the planning system is perhaps a little unpredictable, there are some real horror stories in the report as to the operation of local authority licensing committees. Indeed the Select Committee advocates that the present procedures be replaced by something much more aligned with our current planning system, with licensing committees merged with planning committees and appeals to planning inspectors:
“Previous committees of this House conducting scrutiny of statutes have found that the Act in question is basically satisfactory, but that its implementation is not. In the case of the Licensing Act our conclusion is that, while the implementation of the Act leaves a great deal to be desired, to a large extent this is caused by an inadequate statutory framework whose basic flaws have, if anything, been compounded by subsequent piecemeal amendments. A radical comprehensive overhaul is needed, and this is what our recommendations seek to achieve.”

“For five hundred years the licensing of persons and premises was the task of justices of the peace. Those who devised the new policy in 2000 thought, rightly, that this was not a task for the judiciary but for local administration. If they had looked to see how local authorities regulate the responsible use of land in other situations, they would have seen that the planning system, already well established and usually working efficiently, was well placed to take on this additional task. 

Instead the legislation established new licensing committees for each of 350 local authorities. The councillors sitting on these new committees, and the staff assisting them, had no experience of the complex new law they were administering. Our evidence shows that, while most members of licensing committees no doubt attempt to apply the law justly and fairly, too often standards fall short. Many councillors have insufficient training; all should undertake compulsory training. We were told of cases of clear inadequacies in fulfilling their functions, resulting in a haphazard decision-making process. 

The planning system has its detractors, but planning committees are well established, with better support from experienced staff. Our main recommendation is that there should be a trial merger of licensing committees with planning committees. To be clear, we are not recommending a merger of licensing law and planning law; we are suggesting that the councillors who sit on planning committees, using the same procedure and practice and with the same support as they already have, should deal with proceedings under the Licensing Act in the same way that they already deal with planning legislation. 

Appeals from decisions of licensing committees now go to the same magistrates who, until 2005, dealt with the applications. This not only defies logic; it leads to unsatisfactory results, as many of our witnesses have testified. Planning appeals go to inspectors who have the training for this, and for whom this is a full time job. We recommend that they should hear licensing appeals as well. ”

Trebles all round!

Simon Ricketts 13.4.17

Personal views, et cetera

Great Expectations: Pip & The Brownfield Land Registers

“We changed again, and yet again, and it was now too late and too far to go back, and I went on“. (Charles Dickens, Great Expectations)
Permissions in principle will change our planning system significantly, mark my words. In my 11.6.16 blog post  I posed a series of questions arising from the legislative skeleton that is sections 150 and 151 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. 
Victorian part-work style, we now have had the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (Permission in Principle etc) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (England) Regulations 2017  (made 6 March 2017, in force 27 March 2017), the Town and Country Planning (Brownfield Land Register) Regulations 2017  (made 20 March 2017, in force 16 April 2017) and the Town and Country Planning (Permission in Principle) Order 2017 (made 20 March 2017, 15 April 2017). The statutory instruments don’t yet give effect to all of what sections 150 and 151 enable, but we now have some answers. 
This blog post is not a full summary of how the regime will operate. There are various good summaries but I particularly recommend the Lichfields 27 March 2017 ‘essential guide‘.
A few headlines from the new regime:
1. Local planning authorities will be under a statutory duty to publish their brownfield land registers by 31 December 2017 and then maintain them, reviewing the entries at least annually. 
2. The registers will be in two parts:
– Part 1: previously developed land with an area of at least 0.25 hectares that is suitable and available for residential development and where residential development is achievable (all defined terms)
– Part 2: land in Part 1 where the local planning authority has exercised its discretion to enter the land in Part 2 and has decided to allocate the land for residential development having followed defined publicity, notification and consultation procedures. 

3. The information that must be recorded for each entry is specified and includes

– “the minimum and maximum net number of dwellings, given as a range, which in the authority’s opinion, the land is capable of supporting”

– “where the development includes non-housing development, the scale of any such development and the use to which it is to be put“. 

4. Part 2 will not include sites where the development would require environmental impact assessment. So, if the proposed development falls within Schedule 2 column 1 of the 2011 EIA regulations (for most purposes, more than 150 dwellings or on more than 5 hectares), a negative screening opinion or direction must first be obtained (but remember, indicative screening thresholds as to when significant environmental effects are likely to arise allow for the possibility of projects much larger than 150 dwellings). 

5. There are no statutory rights of appeal if the local planning authority refuses to include land on the register (ECHR article 6 compliant?). Judicial review would, as always with any decision of a public body, be available but the decision to include land on Part 2 is at the local planning authority’s discretion so that would not be easy.  

6. Once land is on Part 2 it has automatic “permission in principle” for five years. In order to be able to carry out the development, application for technical details consent is required, particularising “all matters necessary to enable planning permission to be granted”. The statutory determination period for technical details consent is ten weeks for major development and otherwise five weeks, so deliberately shorter than the equivalent periods in relation to “traditional” non-EIA planning applications (thirteen and eight weeks respectively). A section 106 agreement may be required if the usual tests are met. 

7. There is no defined limit on the extent of non-housing development that can benefit from the procedure, alongside residential development. 

8. The procedure applies to conversion and extension of existing buildings as well as development. 

For a wider overview of where this mechanism is heading, there are also useful references in DCLG Planning Update Newsletter March 2017, from which it is clear that further regulations will follow to (1) allow applications for permission in principle to be made for minor development (ie basically less than ten homes) for sites on part 1 of a brownfield land register and to (2) allow automatic permission in principle to stem from allocation in defined categories of statutory development plans rather than just from designation on a brownfield land register. Guidance is also in the offing (dovetailed with the revised NPPF? We can but hope). 
We also await the Government’s response to its February 2016 technical consultation on implementation of planning changes  chapter 2 (permission in principle) and chapter 3 (brownfield register). It was originally promised to be published alongside the regulations. In the meantime, a number of passages in the consultation document are useful in putting flesh on the bones:

“The result of a grant of permission in principle is that the acceptability of the ‘prescribed particulars’ cannot be re-opened when an application for technical details consent is considered by the local planning authority. Local planning authorities will not have the opportunity to impose any conditions when they grant permission in principle. It will therefore be important for the development granted in principle to be described in sufficient detail, to ensure that the parameters within which subsequent application for technical details consent must come forward is absolutely clear.”

“We expect that the parameters of the technical details that need to be agreed, such as essential infrastructure provision, will have been described at the permission in principle stage and will vary from site to site”

“We are proposing that local planning authorities should use existing evidence within an up to date Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment as the starting point for identifying suitable sites for local brownfield registers. To support this, we will encourage authorities to consider whether their Assessments are up to date and, if not, to undertake prompt reviews. 


While sites contained within the Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment are a useful starting point, we will encourage local authorities to ensure they have considered any other relevant sources if these are not included in their Assessments. This could include sites with extant planning permission and sites known to the authority that have not previously been considered (for example public sector land). 


We will also expect authorities to use the existing call for sites process to ask members of the public and other interested parties to volunteer potentially suitable sites for inclusion in their registers. We propose that this would be a short targeted exercise aimed at as wide an audience as is practicable. That will enable windfall sites to be put forward by developers and others for consideration by the authority. 

Authorities that have recently undertaken a full Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment may not consider this to be necessary when initially compiling a register. However, in areas without up to date evidence and for all authorities completing subsequent annual reviews of their register, the process of volunteering potentially suitable sites will play an important role in refreshing the evidence base and help ensure all suitable sites, including windfall sites, are included.”

“We intend to introduce measures that will apply where additional action is needed to ensure that sufficient progress is being made. These measures could include a policy based incentive which would mean that local planning authorities that had failed to make sufficient progress against the brownfield objective would be unable to claim the existence of an up-to-date five year housing land supply when considering applications for brownfield development, and therefore the presumption in favour of sustainable development would apply.

“We propose that the measures we adopt would take effect fully from 2020, and would apply to any local planning authority that had not met the 90% commitment by that date. However, in light of the need for local planning authorities to make continuous progress towards the 90% commitment, we are also interested in views on any intermediate objectives and actions that might apply. “

Be in no doubt, eventually we will have a mechanism that:

– imposes hard statutory deadlines on authorities to publish and regularly update their registers
– whilst light on statutory recourses for developers whose land is not included, will be focused on by Government – woe betide authorities that do not play ball

– will in many cases provide a quicker route to development than the familiar allocation, outline permission, reserved matters approach

– will be potentially relevant for establishing the development credentials of a site even if in due course a traditional planning application is intended

If you have residential development or conversion in mind, the first step is to seek to ensure that your property is on Part 1 of the first round of brownfield land registers, to be published by 31 December 2017. Within the 73 authority pilot areas  this process is well underway. Although care is needed to secure reference to an appropriate scale of development, that’s a pretty immediate way to secure acceptance that your site is suitable for residential development!

Simon Ricketts 1.4.17
Personal views, et cetera