The Secretary of State’s 6 April 2023 decision to refuse planning permission for Berkeley Homes’ proposed development of 165 new dwellings in Cranbrook, Kent (a decision in fact taken by planning minister Rachel Mclean on behalf of the Secretary of State) = a head on collision for sure.
Tunbridge Wells Borough Council had resolved to approve the scheme but Natural England, concerned as to the prospect of harm to the High Weald Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, secured its call in by the Secretary of State.
The council has slightly less than five years’ housing land supply. The scheme included 40% affordable housing: 50/50 rented and shared ownership.
To cut a long story short (read the decision letter and inspector’s report), the Secretary of State disagreed with the inspector’s recommendation that planning permission be granted.
On the main issues:
⁃ AONB: “Overall the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector at IR823 that there would be some harm to the HWAONB, which would be limited, and that the harm to the landscape and scenic beauty of the HWAONB attracts great weight.”
Tucked within his conclusions on AONB this turns out to be a crucial passage in the decision:
“The Secretary of State recognises that both the HWAONB Management Plan and the High Weald Housing Design Guide emphasise that housing development in the HWAONB should be landscape-led. Whilst he agrees with the Inspector that the proposed development would deliver landscape enhancements (IR826), he does not find the proposal to be of a high standard which has evolved through thoughtful regard to its context (IR723). Overall, he does not find that the scheme is sensitively designed having regard to its setting. He finds that the design of the proposal does not reflect the expectations of the High Weald Housing Design Guide, being of a generic suburban nature which does not reproduce the constituent elements of local settlements. He also considers that the layout of the scheme does not respond to its AONB setting. Rather than being a benefit of the scheme, as suggested by the Inspector, the Secretary of State considers that the design of the scheme is a neutral factor in the context of paragraphs 176 and 177 of the Framework and the planning balance.”
Not “sensitively designed”? “… of a generic suburban nature”? It’s worth looking at the scheme drawings, design and access statement etc on the council’s planning portal. I would disagree. More fundamentally, there is something very odd about a minister (and civil servants) arriving at a conclusion like this, in the face of the elected local planning authority and hands on consideration, site visits and so on conducted at that stage and in the face of the conclusions reached by an inspector after many inquiry days and a site visit. And in the face of Government assertions that it still wants to see 300,000 homes built annually. Frankly why bother with all that if this is the outcome?
⁃ Air quality: “…there would be very limited harm to air quality, and he affords this very limited weight in the planning balance.”
⁃ Site allocation strategy: Whilst he agreed with the inspector that the local plan policies should be treated as out of date because of the lack of five years’ housing supply, because the shortfall was slight he disagreed with the Inspector’s assessment that both the policies and the conflict with them carry limited weight.
⁃ Historic environment: “For the reasons given at IR767-774 the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector at IR773 that the proposed development would not harm any significant historic landscape resource and all of the individual features which could be of potential interest would be retained.”
⁃ Sustainable transport: “For the reasons given at IR790-793 the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that the development would promote sustainable transport in the terms of the Framework and accord with relevant development plan policy in that regard (IR794).”
Turning to the benefits of the scheme:
⁃ Housing delivery: “For the reasons given at IR763-764 the Secretary of State agrees with the Inspector that there is a clear need for both market and affordable housing in the Borough and that the proposed development would make a significant contribution to the delivery of both (IR764).”
⁃ Biodiversity: “…the proposed development would secure significant BNG such that it would accord with the Framework, including paras 174, 179 and 180 and development plan policy, as well as the eLP, in this regard (IR747).
⁃ Other benefits: “The Secretary of State agrees for the reasons given at IR774, IR720 and IR811 that the proposed reinstatement of hedgerows along historic boundaries and of the shaw in the southern fields would be beneficial to the time-depth character of the HWAONB (IR774). Furthermore, the proposed re-creation of Tanner’s Lane would also be beneficial in heritage terms as it would reinstate a historic feature in the local landscape (IR774). The Secretary of State agrees for the reasons given at IR720 and IR811 that the new woodland planting and management of existing woodland would be to the benefit of the environment and landscape. He further agrees for the reasons given at IR786 that the proposed highway works may result in improving highway safety. In addition, for the reasons given at IR811 the additional footpaths and substantial new publicly accessible amenity space would enhance recreational opportunities.”
Overall conclusion on benefits:
“The Secretary of State has had regard to the Inspector’s view at IR824 as to weight attaching to the benefits of the scheme, and notwithstanding his conclusion at paragraph 36 below that there is not a ‘very compelling case’ for the need for development of this type and in Cranbrook, overall he agrees that the combined weight of the benefits is substantial. However, he does not agree with the Inspector’s characterisation at IR826 that it constitutes ‘a package of exceptional benefits’.”
So “the combined weight of the benefits is substantial”….
Application of policies in the NPPF relating to development in the AONB:
⁃ Great weight should be given to conserving and enhancing landscape and scenic beauty in AONBs – conclusion that limited harm but that harm should be given great weight.
⁃ Planning permission for major development in the AONB should be refused unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the development, and where it can be demonstrated that the development is in the public interest – no exceptional circumstances, not in the public interest.
Overall conclusions:
“Weighing in favour of the development are the need for and delivery of housing, the Biodiversity Net Gain, enhanced recreation opportunities, improvements in highway safety, heritage benefits to the historic landscape and landscape benefits by way of woodland planting and management, which collectively carry substantial weight.
Weighing against the proposal is the harm to the landscape and the scenic beauty of the HWAONB which attracts great weight. There is further harm by way of conflict with the spatial strategy which attracts moderate weight, harm to air quality which is afforded very limited weight and harm to the plan making process through prematurity which is afforded very limited weight.
The Secretary of State has concluded for the reasons given above that exceptional circumstances do not exist to justify the proposed development in the AONB and that the development would not be in the public interest. Therefore, paragraph 177 of the Framework provides a clear reason for refusing the development proposed and as such under paragraph 11(d)(i) of the Framework the presumption in favour of sustainable development is no longer engaged.
Overall, the Secretary of State’s conclusion on section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 is that the conflict with the development plan and the material considerations in this case indicate that permission should be refused.”
The decision appears to have been the final straw for housebuilders, already riled by the overtly anti-housebuilding theme of the proposed amendments to the NPPF (final version soon to emerge). See for example Builders lambast Michael Gove after he blocks plan for ‘generic’ homes in Kent (The Times, 15 April 2023 – behind paywall).
There were no costs applications in this decision but I do note that costs applications and awards appear to becoming more frequent. Often of course these are in favour of appellants where the case against grant of planning permission simply has not been made out by the relevant local planning authority (particularly where the decision to refuse was against officers’ recommendations) – e.g for one example amongst many this decision letter dated 20 April 2023, plus accompanying costs decision letter in relation to a student housing scheme in Bath.
But it’s not just appellants who achieve costs awards. Did people see this recent costs decision letter where Mid Suffolk District Council achieved a full award of costs against the appellant, arising from flooding and access issues which led the inspector to conclude that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success? Proceed with caution.
By way of reminder (ok gratuitous plug), if you sign up to our free Town Library appeal decisions service you get a list each week of the most recent major planning appeal decisions (namely all those arising from inquiries as opposed to hearings or the written representations process) with links to the decision letters themselves.
Oh finally, another mind blowing decision: the Government continuing to press on with the proposed Infrastructure Levy. Truly a terrible proposal. You may have logged on to our recent clubhouse discussion (hopefully soon to emerge as a 50 Shades of Planning podcast), ahead of the 9 June deadline for responses to the Government’s current technical consultation. If there is anyone out there who can articulate why IL would be an improvement over the current system I would love to hear from you.
DLUHC published a consultation paper on 13 April 2023 setting out its proposal to create a new use class, “C5 Short Term Let“, to cover short term lets, and on related proposals to introduce new permitted development rights. So there will be a distinction between use classes C3 and C5. The Government will at the same time introduce permitted development rights into the General Permitted Development Order to allow changes from C3 to C5 and vice versa without the need for planning permission, unless the relevant local planning authority disapplies one or both of the permitted development rights by way of an article 4 direction.
It is vital that all those engaged in relevant businesses understand what is proposed, for instance serviced apartment operators; Airbnb type businesses and individual hosts, and build to rent businesses where there is a short-term letting element. There are opportunities, but also risks.
The tl:dr appears to be that in principle any flat or house in England (outside London) would be able to be used for Airbnb style short-term accommodation up to 365 days a year without the need for planning permission unless the local planning authority makes, with the necessary justification, an article 4 direction.
But it is all a bit confusing! At least, a number of us at Town Legal have been scratching our heads. Thanks incidentally to my colleague Aline Hyde for much work on this today – and for some of the text which follows.
I think some of the confusion is down to the way that the proposal is trying to be all things to all people. The press statement is headed:
“New holiday let rules to protect local people and support tourism
New proposals will introduce a requirement for planning permissions for short term lets in tourist hot spots”
It explains:
“The government has listened to calls from local people in tourist hotspots that they are priced out of homes to rent or to buy and need housing that is more affordable so they can continue to work and live in the place they call home. The proposed planning changes would support sustainable communities, supporting local people and businesses and local services.
The proposed planning changes would see a planning use class created for short term lets not used as a sole or main home, alongside new permitted development rights, which will mean planning permission is not needed in areas where local authorities choose not to use these planning controls.
Both of these measures are focussed on short term lets, and therefore the planning changes and the register will not impact on hotels, hostels or B&Bs.”
On the face of it then, the Government is both seeking to regulate use of residential properties as short-term, Airbnb type accommodation but also to liberalise the use of residential properties for that purpose. Hmm.
First word of warning: this is not just about “tourist hot spots”. Subject to the ability for local authorities to make article 4 directions (more below), the proposals cover the whole of England.
Second word of warning: can we first be clear as to what exactly is a “short term let”? The consultation paper states:
“The term “short term let” can encompass a range of activity associated with a dwelling. Some short term lets may be let out for a limited period while the owner themselves go on holiday. Others may be properties that provide for a series of lets for holidays etc or very short term overnight sleeping accommodation including renting an individual bedroom while the owners are in situ.“
So DLUHC envisages the term as covering situations:
where a property is let for a limited period whilst the owner is away
where the owner remains in situ and rents out an individual bedroom on a short-term basis (NB not longer term lodgers are excluded) or
where a property provides for a series of lets to holidaymakers.
However, its proposed wording for the new “short term let” C5 is as follows:
“Use of a dwellinghouse that is not a sole or main residence for temporary sleeping accommodation for the purpose of holiday, leisure, recreation, business or other travel.”
Nothing about short-term lets beyond the title itself. Nothing about the letting out of individual bedrooms on a short-term basis whilst the owner remains in residence , which appears to be unrestricted by the proposals. And why list those purposes except perhaps so that the list excludes reference to asylum…?
The anachronistic word “dwellinghouse” beloved of planning lawyers can confuse as well. It just means “dwelling” and so includes flats as well as houses.
How will it be determined whether a property falls within use class C5? The consultation document explains that at the time of commencement of the proposed secondary legislation, properties used for this purpose will automatically fall within use class C5 and that there will therefore be no need to apply for planning permission, though of course an application for a lawful development certificate may be advisable if there is any uncertainty. Thereafter, where there is no article 4 direction disapplying the permitted development right to switch between C3 and C5, the Government intends to require that the local planning authority is notified by the developer when a change of use occurs, but it does not propose that there be a requirement to seek prior approval. There will be no site size limits and no constraint-based exclusions.
DLUHC suggests that, where there is a local problem with the number of short term lets, one or both of these permitted development rights could be removed by way of an Article 4 direction. It is clearly anticipated that most areas will wish to retain the right allowing for change of use from short term let to dwellinghouse, even if they remove the opposing right. The consultation confirms that the policy tests for making an Article 4 direction, to be found within paragraph 53 of the NPPF, will not be amended and so an authority hoping to make one will need to be based on robust evidence and apply to the smallest geographical area possible.
Properties which fall within use class C5 will benefit from the permitted development rights which currently apply to the curtilage of a dwellinghouse such as rear and upward extensions, alterations to the roof, porches and outbuildings.
Another proposal the subject of consultation is for a limit on the number of nights for which a property within use class C3 and is a sole or main dwellinghouse may be let without there being a material change of use. DLUHC tells us it is open to suggestions as to how many nights this should be, but it will apparently only consider numbers divisible by 30 – listing 30, 60 and 90 as potential options. Two legal mechanisms for achieving this are proposed: the first is to create a new permitted development right allowing for the use of the C3 dwellinghouse for temporary sleeping accommodation for a fixed number of nights per year, the benefit of this being that the right could be removed by Article 4 direction. The second and alternative means is by incorporating the limitation on the number of nights into the wording of use class C3 itself.
DLUHC appears to be trying to be helpful by proposing a specific number of nights for which a property may be let, within which it says a material change of use will not have occurred. There is an obvious attraction to giving homeowners certainty that they may do this without planning consequence. Trying to achieve it in this way, however, reveals what must be a basic misunderstanding as to the law relating to material change of use. Supposing that the Government eventually settles on a limit of 30 days: it is not necessarily the case that the use of a dwellinghouse for short term let for, say 31 or 35 (or any other number of) days, will result in a material change of use. A change of use is only development if it is material, and materiality is assessed with reference to a range of factors which are often site- or proposal-specific. To make the use of a dwellinghouse as a short term let for 31 or 35 days a material change of use, would need specific legislative provision, absent which subjective judgments will remain determinative.
This has already been done in respect of properties in London, which can already be let for up to 90 days per year. Beyond 90 days, an application for permission to make a material change of use is required and the consultation confirms that this provision will be unaffected by the changes proposed within this consultation. One infers that DLUHC haven’t simply mirrored this approach across the country so that individual local planning authorities may elect to remove the permitted development right to let a main residence for the limited number of nights if they consider it necessary to do so.
Of course, the ability to use a dwellinghouse as a short term let is subject to the planning conditions and obligations which affect the site, and might be separately restricted, for example by way of covenants in a lease. Whether the changes proposed in the consultation affect the operation of existing planning conditions or obligations may depend on their specific wording.
So, stepping back for a moment, how is all this really going to work? So much is going to come down to the extent to which local planning authorities introduce article 4 directions removing the proposed permitted development right to go from C3 to C5 and indeed the Government intervenes (as it has in the past ) to restrict the scope of directions which it considers to be too wide or unjustified.
If there is no article 4 direction in an area, C3 properties will be able to be used for C5 short term let use without the need for planning permission – liberalising the current position where more than ancillary short-term accommodation use (more than 90 days of that use in London – a restriction which would remain) would amount to a material change of use. In such areas, use of properties in Airbnb type use could be maximised.
The onus is going to be on local planning authorities to do the work and justify appropriate article 4 directions.
There is a separate but related consultation currently underway on a registration scheme for short term lets, led by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. Having conducted a recent call for evidence, it considers that a registration scheme is necessary to enable local authorities to effectively police the limit on the number of nights.
I wrote a blog post Time To Review The “C” Use Classes? back on 1 July 2016. It is obvious that a more comprehensive review is needed than what is currently proposed.
Once a building is included within a conservation area, the permitted development right to demolish it, by virtue of Schedule 2, Part 11, Class B of the General Permitted Development Order, no longer applies.
What a coincidence it would be if, after redevelopment of a building was proposed (in the face of local opposition), a local authority were to extend an existing conservation area so as to include the building, so as to prevent its demolition without the need for planning permission….
The claimant owns the former Debenhams store in Staines. Its application for planning permission for demolition and redevelopment was submitted on 10 November 2021 and elicited 268 objection letters, including objections on the basis that this would represent the “loss of an iconic building” and that there would be “heritage impacts on nearby conservation areas and listed building”. The application was subsequently refused on 6 June 2022, the reasons for refusal including “harm to the significance of designated heritage assets (including the [adjoining Staines Conservation Area]) and non-designated heritage assets” and “overdevelopment causing harm to the character and appearance of the area”.
Prior to the refusal, presumably to narrow the points in contention in relation to the planning application, on 25 February 2022 the claimant made an application to determine whether prior approval was required for the demolition of the building under the GPDO. On 24 March 2022 the council confirmed that prior approval was required (not in itself a big issue in that the prior approval process cannot engage with the principle of demolition as opposed to how it is carried out). But it then extended the Staines Conservation Area to include the building, before refusing prior approval on the basis that the building was now in a conservation area and therefore the GPDO permitted development right to demolish was no longer available.
Before deciding to extend the conservation area, the council had carried out a consultation process and it was reported internally within the council that there were no material objections to the proposal. Somehow, the council had overlooked detailed representations submitted by a heritage specialist (Pegasus’ excellent Gail Stoten) on behalf of the claimant.
When the claimant issued a pre-action protocol letter threatening to judicially review the decision to extend the conservation area, the council then prepared a supplementary report that purported to consider the overlooked set of representations, before concluding that the points made did not change the council’s decision.
The claimant relied on four grounds in its subsequent claim for judicial review:
Ground 1 – The council acted unlawfully in making the decision to extend the conservation area in that its true purpose was to prevent its demolition and redevelopment – an improper purpose and therefore contrary to law.
Ground 2 – The council failed to take into account the claimant’s representations.
Ground 3 – The officers’ reports were seriously misleading in not referring to the fact that Historic England had declined to list the building “on the basis that the Building did not possess the quality of design, decoration and craftsmanship to merit being of special architectural interest”.
Ground 4 – The purported reconsideration of the decision by way of the supplementary report was unlawful.
The claimant was represented at the hearing by Paul Tucker KC leading Jonathan Easton (now KC but not earlier in the week when judgment was handed down!).
On the first ground the judge stated:
“Since the purpose of designating or extending conservation areas is to preserve or enhance areas of “special architectural or historic interest”, the designation or extension of a conservation area which is motivated principally by a desire to protect a specific building and prevent its demolition will be unlawful.”
The judge considered that on the basis of the case law the question was whether the desire to protect the building from demolition was one impetus for the designation (which would be lawful) or the only impetus (unlawful). This is obviously a high bar for a claimant to clear. On the facts he concluded that it was the former and so ground 1 failed.
However the claim succeeded on the other grounds.
In relation to grounds 2 and 4:
“(i) the defendant failed to take account of the claimant’s representations in response to the consultation at the proper time; (ii) it did not do so in a legally adequate manner in the SR (if that was what the defendant purported to do in the SR); and (iii) having regard to (ii), it cannot be said that it is inevitable or even highly likely the outcome would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred.”
In relation to ground 3:
“…there was a clear need to provide Members with a fair and balanced analysis of the architectural worth of the Building. This included informing them of the outcome of the approach made to Historic England regarding possible statutory listing.” It was also obviously material that “in both 2004 and 2016, the Building had not been regarded as sufficiently important to merit even local listing.” Nor could members have been expected to know about these matters. “It has not been shown that their local knowledge extends to being aware of negative decisions on potential listing on the part of Historic England. Likewise, Members may not have been aware (or may have forgotten about), the previous local list review exercises.”
Given a local planning authority’s breadth of discretion in deciding whether to designate or extend conservation areas, this was quite a win for the claimant, basically down to the council’s administrative own goals (full credit to PT KC and JE KC of course…).
Let’s not forget the wider issues swirling around on the question of demolition of buildings, in the context of embodied carbon (we still await the Secretary of State’s M&S Oxford Street decision). See for example this campaigning piece Could a Grade III listing for buildings halt the UK’s tide of demolition? (22 November 2022) by Will Arnold, head of climate action at The Institution of Structural Engineers or this contrary view Why grade III listings should be avoided at all costs (Edward Clarke in The Times, 12 March 2023 (behind a paywall). But it surely brings the heritage system into disrepute when conservation designations are relied upon as a convenient means of controlling demolition for other purposes, whether those may be a reaction to the spectre of redevelopment or arising from laudable concerns about climate change.
I mentioned in last week’s blog post that the Government has of course now published its consultation on the environmental outcomes reports system (17 March 2023) which is proposed to replace environmental impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment, as per the enabling provisions in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill. Consultation responses are due by 9 June 2023.
This is going to be a fundamental change to our plan-making and decision-making process.
We are going to dive into the detail in a Clubhouse session arranged for 4 pm on 30 March, led by my Town Legal partner Duncan Field, with other panellists including Riki Therivel (Levett-Therivel), Juliette Callaghan and Venessa Thorpe (Trium) and Elin Fradgley (Quod). So that we have an idea of likely numbers and so you receive a reminder when the event starts, do RSVP here.
By way of reminder, Part 6 of the LURB (clauses 138 to 152) sets out the legislative framework for environmental outcomes reports.
The “non-regression” duty set out in clause 142(1) is an important protection:
“The Secretary of State may make EOR regulations only if satisfied that making the regulations will not result in environmental law providing an overall level of environmental protection that is less than that provided by environmental law at the time this Act is passed.”
The consultation paper sets out a number of the issues arising from the present system, all of which I’m sure we can all recognise:
• inefficiency
• duplication
• risk aversion
• loss of focus
• issues with data
Under “risk aversion”, Sullivan LJ is quoted from his 2004 Court of Appeal judgment in Blewett:
“It would be no advantage to anyone concerned […] if Environmental Statements were drafted on a purely “defensive basis” mentioning every possible scrap of information […] Such documents would be a hindrance, not an aid, to sound decision-making by the local planning authority since they would obscure the principal issues with a welter of detail”.
(Personally I would expand the comment: this is the direction that the whole planning system has gone, not just in relation to environmental statements, but the whole gamut of application documents, (particularly design and access statements), planning committee reports and planning permissions themselves often with 50 or more conditions imposed where the permission relates to development of any scale or complexity).
I read the consultation document with a view to summarising the main changes from the current system but can’t improve on this pithy summary by Duncan:
“EORs are expected to act as a translator of technical assessment work and only address performance against outcomes in a concise and publicly accessible way; in doing so EORs will need to identify necessary mitigation and/or compensation.
– The range of possible topics (outcomes) to be covered by EORs is likely to be slimmed down to avoid duplication with other assessments required in the planning process.
– Although Government will maintain a distinction between projects where EORs are always required and projects where they may be required, there should be fewer discretionary decisions around screening due to the inclusion of more directive screening criteria.
– On changes to scoping there seems likely to be less of a focus on scoping outcomes in or out and more of a focus on assessing scoped in outcomes in a proportionate way (so some outcomes may be included but assessed in less detail).
– Outcomes will be measured by reference to data-based indicators, and these will be developed at a national level to ensure consistency.
– The Government acknowledges that there needs to be better alignment between assessments at a strategic (plan) level and those at a project level so that they speak to each other; it is hoped that the focus of EORs on the same outcomes and the application of nationally determined indicators will help with this.
– Guidance on alternatives will be developed to focus assessment on realistic/credible options. However, this will need to include an analysis of the alternatives by reference to the mitigation hierarchy (avoidance-mitigation-compensation).
– There will be a greater emphasis on adaptive management of mitigation and monitoring/enforcement of measures after decisions have been taken.
– There is recognition that there needs to be better access to and collection of environmental data to assist with EORs.”
The Government envisages that an EOR at the project stage under the Town and Country Planning Act would be structured as follows:
• a short introduction (which references the project details in the accompanying Planning Statement)
• a short, high level, summary of how reasonable alternatives and the mitigation hierarchy were considered early in the development of the project
• an assessment of contribution towards achieving an outcome supported by the indicators set out in guidance – this will include
• the residual effects on the environment identified through the underlying technical work, with relevant conclusions in the technical work clearly pinpointed
• the current baseline and relevant trend data, similarly identified
• commentary on levels of uncertainty for that data or indicator set
• proposed mitigation, and
• monitoring proposals
• a summary of the contribution of the cumulative effects of the project as a whole on outcomes and how this relates to the conclusions of any strategic or plan level assessment.
Outcomes (to be consulted upon in coming months), measured by reference to a national data set, will need to be set out for at least the following:
• biodiversity
• air quality
• landscape and seascape
• geodiversity, soil and sediment
• noise and vibration
• water
• waste
• cultural heritage and archaeology
The idea is promising. The real challenge, not referred to in the consultation paper? How to discourage the sorts of legal challenges which have caused our current processes to be so bloated, whilst ensuring that unjustified assessment short cuts cannot be taken.
The LURB is currently making slow progress through its Lords Committee stage, due to the hundreds of amendments tabled, some of them by the Government, such as (see amendment 412D) the proposed change to the compulsory purchase system that would allow acquiring authorities in some circumstances to seek a direction, when making a compulsory purchase order, disapplying any entitlement to hope value on the part of the land owner. This could have huge implications on the the land promotion and development market – in that the risk of compulsory purchase at an under-value may well prove a significant potential disincentive to development promoters and those funding them. As usual it was a bit chaotic to begin with but we had a good and sparky discussion on the issue on Clubhouse last week, with the basic concept being defended by Shelter’s Venus Galarza, against an array of compulsory purchase surveyors and lawyers (none of whom were objecting to the objective of enabling greater delivery of housing, including affordable housing – rather the way it being done!). Shelter have their own slightly different amendment, amendment 414, narrow than that of the Government. You can hear it all here.
Looking further ahead, we now have a Clubhouse session on the dreaded Infrastructure Levy arranged for 2pm on 19 April, to be led by another of my Town Legal partners, Clare Fielding. If you would like to join the panel for that one do let me know.
You may be returning from that escapist world that is MIPIM and grimacing at the prospect of a week’s worth of emails, or you may be finishing a week of grimacing at all the LinkedIn pics of your colleagues in Ray-Bans. In any event, we now have three developments in relation to the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill, currently at Committee stage in the House of Lords, sent to test the old saying that a change is a good as a rest…
I’m very grateful for three of my partners, not part of the MIPIM contingent, who have particularly had their eyes on the following:
Government amendment relating to removal of “hope” value in relation to particular categories of CPO
The Government tabled amendments on 13 March 2023 to the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill that would have significant impacts on landowners. Raj Gupta has written a Compulsory Reading blog post LURB in the Lords – no hope (16 March 2023) on the potentially far-reaching implications. We have arranged a Clubhouse Planning Law Unplanned session at 5 pm on Thursday 23 March to discuss the proposal, led by Raj, Jon Stott, Greg Dickson and other leading specialists. Please RSVP here if you would like to tune in and/or take part in the discussion.
Government consultation on environmental outcomes reports – a new approach to environmental assessment
The Government published its consultation today, 17 March 2023, on the design on its proposed new system of environmental assessment. See the press statement, and consultation document. Duncan Field has set out some initial comments in a LinkedIn post. Again, we are going to arrange a Clubhouse Planning Law Unplanned event, probably for Thursday 30 March but further details will appear shortly.
Government consultation on the proposed infrastructure levy
The Government published its consultation today, 17 March 2023, on the design of the proposed infrastructure levy. See the press statement, technical consultation and a February 2023 research paper published alongside it. Clare Fielding will shortly be publishing a Levy-Headed blog post as to the likely implications.
Now to unpack. And let my picture be a warning for you to keep your parents away from the Be Real app.
I’m not sure that the architects of the 1947 town and country planning system could have foreseen the extent to which it so frequently ends up being tested to its limits by the need to protect the specific, often legitimate, interests of neighbours and the extent to which the process has become weaponised in neighbour disputes.
To what extent can and should local planning authorities supplement adjoining owners’ private rights with policies and decision-making that protect those adjoining owners’ interests over matters such as the impact of noise and vibration on a particularly sensitive neighbour – and, if so, how do they make sure that they have the right engineering basis for their interventions? Particularly in London of course these issues arises again and again – see eg my 5 December 2016 blog post First World Problems: Basements and planning officers can get drawn into a neighbour versus neighbour quasi-mediation.
I was reminded by all this again by a case this week, Strongroom Limited v London Borough of Hackney (Deputy High Court Judge Tim Corner KC, 8 March 2023). I only recite the facts by way of illustration of the way these things escalate – the legal issues were settled on the day of the hearing.
The claimant operates a recording studio. The council granted planning permission for redevelopment of an adjoining property, with which the claimant shares a party wall. The claimant had objected to the planning application, submitting a report by consultant Jim Griffiths of the music acoustic consultancy, Vanguardia [pause here for quiet shout out to the excellent Jim] setting out his advice that “unless noise and vibration levels were strictly controlled during construction, the use of the Studios would be subject to harm, impossible to use and might be compelled to close as a result”. He set out the maximum noise and vibration levels that could be tolerated during the construction phase. The developer responded with their own commissioned report. The council in turn commissioned their own report and in consequence planning permission was granted with a detailed condition requiring submission of a “demolition and construction method statement covering all phases of the development to include details of noise control measures” with specific limits on noise and vibration levels set out in the condition.
Once the developer applied to discharge the condition the claimant argued strongly that the developer’s technical work was flawed and commenced proceedings for an injunction to stop construction works from being carried out. That resulted in a settlement agreement allowing, amongst other things, for on-site noise testing and disclosure of testing results. The claimant continued to take issue with the technical work and with some undisclosed testing which had been made available to the council. The council discharged the condition on the basis of the information submitted by the developer and the claimant challenged this by way of judicial review.
In the meantime, the, presumably despairing, developer sought and obtained a separate planning permission simply for change of use of its building, without any condition prescribing numerical noise and vibration limits during construction but requiring a construction management plan to be submitted including details of noise control measures. Again, the council discharged the condition on the basis of information submitted by the developer and again the claimant challenged this by way of judicial review.
So the Deputy High Court Judge had two complicated judicial reviews to determine, both revolving around whether the the council had acted properly in discharging the respective conditions. Unusually, on the very day of the hearing the parties reached a further settlement agreement resolving all of the issues. Even more unusually the one matter the parties had not managed to agree upon was the question of who should bear the costs of the proceedings and so the judge had to proceed with a relatively full analysis of the relative strength of the parties’ arguments before finally determining that (you may have seen this coming) each party should bear its own costs.
What an expenditure of time and money all round, at every stage of the process. Surely there must be a better way?
One of the problems is that outside the planning system, potential private law remedies in relation to matters such as noise, vibration and potential effects on the structural stability of adjoining buildings do not provide protection in a particularly straightforward and light-touch way. Yes, actions in private nuisance are available but the Tate Modern case is a high profile example of the inherent uncertainties of that expensive process. Yes, there is also the Party Wall Acts process in relation to certain matters but that only covers a narrow range of the issues arising from development and is in itself a rather antiquated system which could do with a thorough statutory review (for a topical description of the system, see another case last week: Power & Kyson v Shah (Court of Appeal, 7 March 2023)).
What’s the solution? I quite like the Australian approach:
Neighbours need to get to know each other. Next door is only a footstep away.
Finally, can I recommend the latest episode of the Planning Law (With Chickens) podcast by my colleagues Victoria McKeegan and Nikita Sellers. They chat through some of the most interesting things in planning law which have happened in the last few months and also have a good interview with James Wickham of Gerald Eve.
As is the English way, it’s rather more nuanced than Money Money Money. And it’s hardly an Abba singalong, but speak to someone with practical experience of the operation of the planning system about what is needed to improve its operation: these three words constantly ring out – way above any chatter about the changes proposed in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill or by way of the Government’s wider policy reforms.
This consultation seeks views on improving the performance of English local planning authorities by increasing planning fees, “building capacity and capability” and “introducing a more robust performance regime”
Now you have responded to the last consultation process, you can start on this one! The deadline is 25 April 2023.
The document sets out the Government’s threefold strategy:
Financial support
“this consultation proposes an increase in planning application fees for major applications by 35% and for all other applications by 25%, together with an indexation proposal for fees to be adjusted annually in-line with inflation.”
Additional resource
“This consultation outlines how we are working with representatives across the planning and development sector to design and deliver a programme of support for building planning capacity and capability within local planning authorities and to seek views on how we can increase capacity and capability in the planning system as quickly as possible.”
Improved performance
“This consultation therefore also proposes a new approach to how the performance of local planning authorities is measured across a broader set of quantitative and qualitative measures”
Some examples of proposed fee increases:
Subject to the outcome of the consultation process, the increases will be introduced this summer and will be reviewed within three years.
The consultation raises various specific questions, such as:
Whether there are examples of bespoke or ‘fast track’ services which have worked well or could be introduced for an additional fee – and of any schemes that have been particularly effective
whether there should be a commitment on the part of authorities to ringfence the fees for spending within their planning departments (surely a no-brainer – and one to be firmly policed).
whether the ability for a “free go” repeat application be limited or removed
whether the fee for retrospective applications should be doubled.
In terms of increasing resources in the planning system, the consultation document says this:
“43. We want to support and work with local planning authorities to make sure that planners and the planning system are valued, and that there is a culture of proactive delivery, pride in performance and a clear understanding of high-quality customer service; as well as being ready to adapt to the new measures and ways of working methods proposed in the Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill.
44. We must also promote a broader understanding of the value of planning in supporting the country in its Levelling Up ambitions as a positive driver of sustainable economic growth and the development and building of homes and places that communities can be proud of.
45. We have created a cross-sector working group with representatives from local government, the private sector and professional bodies to design and deliver a programme of support to build capacity and capability strategy across local planning authorities. This programme will seek to provide the direct support that is needed now, deliver upskilling opportunities and further develop the future pipeline into the profession in order to continually improve the quality of service delivered and resilience of local planning authorities.
46. To support the development of our planning capacity and capability strategy and programme we would like to hear your views and experience of the specific challenges in recruiting and retaining planning professionals with the right skills and experience and the best ways in which government, working with professional bodies, can boost the capacity and capability of local planning authorities. It is our intention to carry out numerical research in the coming months to support this important strand of work, but in the meantime we would welcome any data and insight that you would like to provide.”
In terms of increasing the performance of local planning authorities:
“48. As we propose to introduce measures to increase fee income relating to planning services specifically, we want to amend the existing metrics that measure performance of local planning authorities for speed of decision-making so that local planning authorities are primarily held to account for the number of applications that are determined within the statutory determination periods rather than through an extension of time agreement. We also propose to tighten the Planning Guarantee period for non-major applications.”
“we propose that where the statutory determination period is 8 weeks the Planning Guarantee should be set at 16 weeks and where the statutory determination period is 13 weeks (or 16 weeks for Environmental Impact Assessment developments) the Planning Guarantee should be retained at 26 weeks.”
[What are your experiences of the Planning Guarantee? The only time I’ve seen someone apply for their money back (with every justification), the local planning authority refused to progress the section 106 agreement until the applicant had agreed in writing to waive his rights to rely on it!]
“We propose that the performance of a local planning authority for speed of decision making should be primarily assessed on the percentage of applications that are determined within the statutory determination period, not an agreed extended period of time. We also believe that the performance of local planning authorities for speed of decision-making should be assessed separately for the following application types:
Major applications (10 or more new dwellings, or site area of 0.5 hectares or more and the number of dwellings is unknown; provision of a non-residential building or buildings where the floor space created by the development is 1000sqm or more; development on a site with an area of 1 hectare or more)
Non-Major applications (excluding householder applications) (anything smaller than the criteria for major development, including residential development of between 1 and 9 new dwellings on a site with an area less than 1 hectare, or site area is less than 0.5 hectares and the number of dwellings is unknown; non-residential development where the floor space created is less than 1000sqm or where the site area is less than 1 hectare; or other types of non-major development such as change of use)
Householder applications (development within the curtilage of a dwelling house which requires an application for planning permission and is not a change of use)
Discharge of conditions
County matters (minerals and waste) applications”
The document seeks views on the suitability of these individual metrics:
It suggests that there could be a standardised “customer satisfaction survey” (sigh, is “customers” really the right word?).
What do you think? I was quite encouraged by the various proposals although do they really go far enough? I suspect that the fee increases are pitched about right but how much extra money will the Government be committing to this essential service?
The document asks whether there any other application types or planning services which are not currently charged for but should require a fee or for which the current fee level or structure is inadequate. There are no fees at present for listed building consent applications – not mentioned in the consultation document. Is that right? The fee for section 73 applications is very light – currently £234 – when in reality the work involved can be extensive. The consultation does ask as to the appropriate fee for the LURB’s proposed section 73B procedure but not about our familiar friend section 73. Should the fee be higher for EIA development – I would have thought so? (and, by the way, whilst outside the remit of this consultation, there is still no visible progress on introducing fees in relation to planning appeals).
Separately, should there be greater control over non-statutory fees for planning performance agreements and for pre-application advice? I increasingly hear tales of woe from applicants as to large fees paid only for advice to be provided very late – and then sometimes reversed once the application has been submitted.
I know that the information gathering in relation to the metrics will entail further work on the part of already busy staff but it will give a much clearer picture than anyone has at the moment – huge delays are masked by routinely agreed time extensions. And the requirement, for instance, for data to be supplied on the “percentage of committee decisions to refuse against officer recommendation that are subsequently allowed at appeal” should certainly focus minds….
Sam Stafford has done wonders via his 50 Shades of Planning podcast series to shine a life on what “life on the frontline” for planning department staff can be like – I recommend his 25 February 2023 Life on the frontline II episode. In the light of these proposals, Life on the frontline III next year will make for even more interesting listening.
This week I wasn’t sure whether to write about the Government’s 21 February 2023 response to its consultation on the proposed biodiversity gain regulations or about the Government’s 23 February 2023 action plan for reforms to the nationally significant infrastructure projects process.
But both of these documents, important as they are, are largely self-explanatory – and have been covered in various summaries which are out there. So I ditched those ideas.
Instead I will focus on another interesting recent case, involving one of my favourite buildings (a “megastructure” according to the judge): the Brunswick Centre, Camden.
Lazari Properties 2 Limited v Secretary of State (Lane J, 21 February 2023) is nothing to do with the architecture of the building, but rather the architecture of the planning system itself. Whilst only a preliminary ruling by Lane J as to whether there were arguable grounds of challenge, some interesting practical issues arise as to:
⁃ the need for precision in framing lawful development certificate applications
⁃ the proper interpretation of conditions restricting uses by reference to superseded Use Classes Order descriptions.
The centre “contains 2 linked blocks of 560 flats above a shopping centre with rows of shops at raised ground level. The shops (which include a supermarket) are situated over a basement, which contains car parking, a service area and a cinema. Ramps and steps provide access to the central boulevard from several surrounding streets.”
Uses in the building are controlled in part by condition 3 of a planning permission in 2003 for the centre’s refurbishment:
“”Up to a maximum of 40 percent of the retail floorspace, equating to 3386m2 (excluding the supermarket and eye-catcher), is permitted to be used within Use Classes A2 and A3 of the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order.”
Old use classes A2 and A3 are now of course subsumed within the new use class E. So, given that retail uses also fall within class E, does that mean that this condition no longer has any effect such that the whole of the retail floorspace can now be used for any purposes falling within class E?
The owner submitted an application to the local planning application for a certificate of lawfulness of existing use or development (“CLEUD”), with a red line around the whole of the centre and with the proposal described as follows:
“Application to certify that the existing use of the Brunswick Shopping Centre within Class E and without compliance with Condition 3 of Planning Permission: PSX0104561 is lawful”.
Uh oh. I wrote about the perils and constraints of CLEUDs and CLOPUDs (certificates of lawfulness of proposed use or development) in my 12 June 2021 blog post I’m Sorry I Haven’t A CLEUD.
Quite aside from the legal question arising as to whether the references to classes A2 and A3 in the condition should now be read as references to class E, was the description of the existing use sufficiently precise?
The London Borough of Camden didn’t determine the application within the statutory period and the owner appealed. The inspector dismissed the appeal in a decision letter dated 27 July 2022:
⁃ the reference to use class E was not a sufficiently precise description of the existing uses of the units within the centre. Whilst the owner’s objective was clearly to establish that class E use of any of the units would not be in breach of the condition, that was not the role of lawful development certificates: “It is a long established principle that LDCs enable owners and others to ascertain whether specific uses, operations or other activities are or would be lawful. They do not enable anyone to ask the general question, “what is or would be lawful?“
⁃ the reference simply to the whole of the centre, which encompassed various uses plainly not falling within class E, was not sufficiently precise, and was not remedied by a plan excluding defined areas.
⁃ In accordance with case law, condition 3 was to be interpreted having regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, viewed in their particular context (statutory or otherwise) and in the light of common sense. The inspector considered that the purpose of Condition 3 is “clear from its stated reason. It is to safeguard the retail function and character of the Brunswick Centre. It does this by stating a maximum amount of floorspace that is permitted to be used for A2 and A3 purposes.
“Condition 3 only makes sense if there is an implied exclusion of the Use Classes Order or else it has no purpose. The purpose of Condition 3 is clear and it remains enforceable since the uses that are restricted are known, those being the uses set out as falling within Class A2 and A3 when planning permission was granted.”
Both parties made costs applications against the other. The inspector rejected the owner’s costs application and made a partial award of costs in favour of the council.
So what did Lane J make of all this? Without giving any reasoning, he considered that it was arguable that condition 3 was not to be interpreted in the way arrived at by the inspector. However, he found that the inspector’s conclusions as to the inadequacy of simply describing the existing use by reference to class E, as to the inadequacy of the submitted plans and as to costs were all unarguably correct.
An interesting procedural question as to why it was still appropriate for the interpretation question (referred to as grounds 1 and 2) to go to a full hearing, given the fundamental flaws in the formulation of the CLEUD application and appeal:
“I must accordingly explain why I have concluded that, on the facts of the present case, permission should be granted for grounds 1 and 2 to be determined at a substantive hearing. I accept Mr Taylor’s submission that grounds 1 and 2 are, in effect, severable and that there is a real purpose in permitting the claimant to argue them substantively, so that the High Court can reach a decision on the correct interpretation of condition 3. Given that a fresh application by the claimant under section 191 is highly likely, if not inevitable, and that condition 3 is likely to be relevant to the determination of any such application, it plainly makes sense that the issue of interpretation is settled before such a fresh application is made.
I accept that, as matters stand, the claimant has not sought a declaration, which will be needed on the above basis, given that the inspector’s decision should not be quashed. The claimant will need to do so. I do not, however, consider that the claimant’s failure, so far, to seek a declaration should be destructive of its case in respect of grounds 1 and 2.”
Like the judge, I’m not sure that the inspector’s conclusions in respect of condition 3 were necessarily correct and it will be useful to have a final ruling in due course on the issue, which may potentially assist with other interpretation questions arising from the introduction of class E in situations where conditions contain restrictions based on previous use classes. But I’m surprised that the case has gone so far on the basis of such a loose approach to the CLEUD process. Might a simpler approach have been to show all the retail units on a plan and to make a CLOPUD application proposing retail use in respect of each of them? That would have indirectly led to a ruling as to whether condition 3 was legally effective. But as it turns out, maybe the eventual outcome of these proceedings will end up getting to the same position for the owner, albeit at additional expense for all concerned.
Incidentally, if you would like much better summaries than this of planning law cases on a weekly basis, do subscribe to our free Town Library service if you haven’t done so already. Each week my Town Legal colleagues prepare summarise of any rulings handed down the previous week by the Planning Court, together with subsequent appeal rulings. Subscribe here.
It is frustrating to see public bodies, stymied by the lack of other funding sources, challenge the grant of planning permissions by way of judicial review in a bid for financial contributions from the developer. Frustrating because at root these are services which should properly be funded by the taxpayer; frustrating because the public body invariably loses, having spent public money in the litigation and exposed itself to the award of costs; frustrating because the challenge invariably slows down delivery of the development for which planning permission has been granted.
The issue as to the extent to which it is appropriate for financial contributions to be secured by way of section 106 agreement towards the delivery of health services has been rumbling on for years – see for instance the 20 August 2020 piece What the health? The planning system and healthcare service funding by Lichfields’ Myles Wild-Smith. Myles refers to recovered appeal decisions where the agreed section 106 provisions included a financial contribution towards the provision by the local Foundation Trust of acute and community health facilities and the encouragement that this has given NHS bodies over time to take this approach. The root of the issue for NHS Trusts is what can only be described as a flaw in the Government’s current funding mechanism which does not necessarily take into account the costs of provision of additional services to cater for an increase in population in the first year that population numbers are increased, leading to a “funding gap”.
The issue has now come before the Planning Court in the landmark case of R (University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust) v Harborough District Council (Holgate J, 13 February 2023) – “landmark” partly because four of the six barristers involved are from Landmark Chambers but more perhaps because Holgate J does not just dismiss the claim by the claimant NHS Trust on the facts but goes on to consider the wider principles engaged.
In basic summary, Harborough District Council granted planning permission for an urban extension to Lutterworth, comprising up to 2,750 dwellings and associated development. The University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust did not object to the development in principle but had been seeking that the council secure a contribution, via the section 106 agreement which was being negotiated, “of about £914,000 towards the delivery of health care by the Trust to mitigate what are said to be the harmful effects of additional demands upon its services from that proportion of the people moving to the site who would be new to the Trust’s area (referred to as “new residents”). The Trust estimates that the 2,750 houses on the site would accommodate 7,520 people, of whom 38.5%, or 2,896 people, would be new residents in the Trust’s area.”. The council considered the request and did not accept that it was justified (I don’t know but, aside from concerns as to whether such a contribution was legally appropriate and justified in planning terms, there may have been an underlying issue, frequently present: against the constraints of project viability, requiring such a contribution may have entailed less potential funding for affordable housing or other priority requirements of the council or county council).
Paragraphs 8 to 12 of the judgment describe the so-called “funding gap” (and this is the aspect of the judgment I am focusing on – the judgment also addresses, and rejects, some related grounds of challenge). The purpose of the contribution sought was to provide “funding for additional staff, drugs, materials and equipment” during the relevant part of the first financial year in which a “new resident” begins to occupy a dwelling.
Paragraphs 22 to 29 of the judgment set out the legal principles in relation to material considerations and section 106 agreement.
The council didn’t accept that the case for the “funding gap” had been made out. Holgate J agreed with the council that this was indeed a relevant consideration and that the council had reached a rational conclusion that the Trust had failed to provide any sufficient information to show that there was any “funding gap” and accordingly the contribution sought would have failed the “necessity” test in regulation 122 of the CIL Regulations.
After Holgate J gives what he describes as the “short answer”, he then goes on to consider “wider issues”.
“141 The question therefore arises how could an applicant for planning permission for a new development be required lawfully by a system of land use planning control to contribute to the funding of treatment within the NHS? It is well established that planning permission cannot be bought and sold, for example, by making a payment for community purposes unrelated to the development authorised. Furthermore, planning legislation does not confer any general power to raise revenue for public purposes (see e.g. Attorney General v Wilts United Dairies Limited (1921) 37 TLR 884; (1922) 38 TLR 781; McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Limited v Richmond London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 48).
142. Ordinarily a resident of the development at East Lutterworth who had moved to the Trust’s area would previously have been the responsibility of a CCG elsewhere in the country. So it has not been suggested that the development would increase the burden on the NHS in England as a whole. The attempt by the Trust to obtain a financial contribution under s.106 therefore depends upon their demonstrating a localised harm. The only harm they seek to rely upon concerns the provision by the Trust of services commissioned by the CCGs. On the Trust’s own case, that has to depend upon them showing a funding gap in relation to treatments for residents new to the area during their first year. The Trust accepts that there is no justification for any payment relating to other “first year” residents who are simply moving home within the Trust’s area, or to any resident after their first year at East Lutterworth. The extent to which funding is available to the Trust for the services it provides to the CCGs is the only possible justification for drawing these distinctions. Whether a funding gap genuinely exists was critical to the Trust’s request for a financial contribution under s.106.
143. Accordingly, HDC was fully entitled to ask questions and to seek information in order to see whether there is a real funding gap for treatment by the Trust of “new” residents in their first year of occupation. Indeed, if the local planning authority had agreed to require the developer to pay the contribution sought by the Trust before granting planning permission without being adequately satisfied that there was a relevant funding gap, it would have been open to criticism. In the event of the issue having to be determined in a planning appeal, HDC would have been at risk of being ordered to pay costs for unreasonable conduct.”
“147. But what if in a future case a NHS trust could demonstrate that it would suffer a funding gap in relation to its treatment of new residents of a development during the first year of occupation? On one level it would be a matter for the judgment of the local planning authority as to whether the three tests in reg.122(2) of the CIL Regulations 2010 are satisfied and whether it would be appropriate to require a financial contribution to be made, after taking into account other requirements and any impact on the viability of the scheme. But all that assumes that there is no legal (or other) objection to a contribution of the kind sought in the present case. The argument in this case does not enable the court to decide that issue as a legal question. This judgment should not be read as deciding that there would be no legal objection.
148. Where a housing development is carried out, some of the new residents may be entitled to social welfare benefits, which, like the need for secondary healthcare, arises irrespective of where that person lives. Of course, no one would suggest that the developer should make a contribution to funding those benefits.
149. The funding of treatment in NHS hospitals would appear to be different in two respects. First, in an area of net in-migration any increase in the need for treatment and staff will be experienced in the relevant local area, not nationally. Second, because the patients would receive treatment even if they had not moved home, a local funding gap would only arise if funding for the relevant NHS trust did not adequately reflect a projected increase in population and/or the national funding system did not adequately provide for a timely redistribution of resources. Population projections will involve some areas of out-migration as well as areas of net in-migration. It is therefore significant that CCG funding across the country takes into account ONS population projections. Accordingly, in the distribution of national funds there may be increases or decreases in funding for individual CCGs by reference to size of population.
150. It seems to me that two points follow. First, even if it could be shown in a particular area that there is a funding gap to deal with “new” residents, HDC was entitled to raise the possibility that this is a systemic problem in the way national funding is distributed. Although the Trust criticised HDC for taking it upon themselves to raise this point, it strikes me as being a perceptive contribution to a proper understanding of the issue. If there really is a systemic problem, this may raise the question in other cases whether it is appropriate to require individual development sites across the country to make s.106 contributions to address that problem. However, for the purposes of dealing with the present challenge, HDC’s decision rested on the Trust’s failure to show that there was a funding gap in this case, not any systemic issue.
151. Second, whether there is a lack of funding for a Trust to cope with the effects of a substantial new development is likely to depend not on those effects in isolation, but on wider issues raised by the population projections used as one of the inputs to determine funding for CCGs. The interesting arguments from counsel in this case suggest that these issues merit further consideration as a matter of policy outside the courts and even outside the planning appeal system.”
Some significant points to reflect on arising from the passages above:
Even if a “funding gap” by a provider of public services is demonstrated, not only does the decision maker still need to determine whether a contribution is justified “whether the three tests in reg.122(2) of the CIL Regulations 2010 are satisfied and whether it would be appropriate to require a financial contribution to be made, after taking into account other requirements and any impact on the viability of the scheme” but it should not be taken for granted that there will not be a legal objection to the making of the contribution.
If the underlying issue which led to the case is a “systemic problem in the way national funding is distributed… this may raise the question in other cases whether it is appropriate to require individual development sites across the country to make s.106 contributions to address that problem”.
There may well be problems with population projections used as one of the inputs to determine funding for clinical commissioning groups.
I would suggest that all three points require serious reflection both by the Department of Health and Social Care and by DLUHC
In the meantime, for the rest of us, the judgment is a reminder of the careful scrutiny that needs to be given to proposed planning obligations, so as to ensure that they meet the necessary legal tests. In a climate where there is often insufficient Government funding to pay for public services (and/or inadequate methodologies for determining the funding that is needed – as seems to be the case with health funding) , these issues are continually going to arise. Local residents have a right to expect that new development does not lead to unacceptable burdens on local services, but there are legitimate limits on the costs which can be borne by development. After all, the needs of new residents in a development were previously being met, and funded, elsewhere. Our planning system is increasingly an indirect tax collection system – and I fear that the impending Infrastructure Levy regime will only make matters even worse.
Defining what is the “project” for the purposes of ascertaining whether environmental impact assessment is required and, if it is, carrying it out appropriately, can be more difficult than one might think.
An application should not be considered in isolation if, in reality, it is an integral part of a more substantial development (Judgment in the case of R v Swale BC ex parte RSPB [1991] 1PLR 6). In such cases, the need for Environmental Impact Assessment must be considered in the context of the whole development. In other cases, it is appropriate to establish whether each of the proposed developments could proceed independently (R (Candlish) v Hastings Borough Council [2005] All ER (D) 178 (Jul); Baker v Bath & North East Somerset Council [2009] All ER (D) 169 (Jul)).
Paragraph: 025 Reference ID: 4-025-20170728“
I’m going to consider in this blog post the Court of Appeal’s ruling last week in R (Ashchurch Rural Parish Council) v Tewkesbury Borough Council (Court of Appeal, 7 February 2023), but the caselaw references in the guidance have been out of date for some time, in not referring to a number of recent cases, for instance the Court of Appeal’s ruling in R (Larkfleet Limited) v South Kesteven District Council (Court of Appeal, 6 August 2015), which concerned a proposal for a bypass on which significant residential development was dependent.
The court in Larkfleet referred to the relevant EU legislation and case law, in accordance with which the EIA Regulations were to be interpreted:
“What is in substance and reality a single project cannot be “salami-sliced” into a series of smaller projects, each of which falls below the relevant threshold criteria according to which EIA scrutiny is required”.
In that case, the court found that the construction of the bypass and the carrying out of the residential development were indeed to be treated as separate “projects”:
“Mr Kingston QC, for the Appellant, sought to rely on these passages in support of his submission that SKDC was obliged to assess the proposal for the link road and the proposal for the residential site as a single project. However, in my view the argument is unsustainable. It is clear from the terms of the EIA Directive that just because two sets of proposed works may have a cumulative effect on the environment, this does not make them a single “project” for the purposes of the Directive: the Directive contemplates that they might constitute two potential “projects” but with cumulative effects which need to be assessed. The passages from Ecologistas to which I have referred also contemplate that two sets of proposed works may constitute different projects for the purposes of the Directive. What these passages are directed towards is avoiding a situation in which no EIA scrutiny is undertaken at all. However, if the two proposed sets of words are properly to be assessed as two distinct “projects” which meet the threshold criteria in the Directive, there will be EIA scrutiny of the cumulative effects of the two projects.
It is true that the scrutiny of cumulative effects between two projects may involve less information than if the two sets of works are treated together as one project, and a planning authority should be astute to ensure that a developer has not sliced up what is in reality one project in order to try to make it easier to obtain planning permission for the first part of the project and thereby gain a foot in the door in relation to the remainder. But the EIA Directive and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice recognise that it is legitimate for different development proposals to be brought forward at different times, even though they may have a degree of interaction, if they are different “projects”, and in my view that is what has happened here as regards the application for permission to build the link road and the later application to develop the residential site.
The EIA Directive is intended to operate in a way which ensures that there is appropriate EIA scrutiny to protect the environment whilst avoiding undue delay in the operation of the planning control system which would be likely to follow if one were to say that all the environmental effects of every related set of works should be definitively examined before any of those sets of works could be allowed to proceed (and the disproportionate interference with the rights of landowners and developers and the public interest in allowing development to take place in appropriate cases which that would involve). Where two or more proposed linked sets of works are in contemplation, which are properly to be regarded as distinct “projects”, the objective of environmental protection is sufficiently secured under the scheme of the Directive by consideration of their cumulative effects, so far as that is reasonably possible, in the EIA scrutiny applicable when permission for the first project (here, the link road) is sought, combined with the requirement for subsequent EIA scrutiny under the Directive for the second and each subsequent project. The adequacy and appropriateness of environmental protection by these means under the EIA Directive are further underwritten by the fact that alternatives will have been assessed at the strategic level through scrutiny of relevant development plans (here, the Core Strategy and Masterplan) from an environmental perspective under the SEA Directive.”
“The most important feature of this case is that there is a strong planning imperative for the construction of the link road as part of the Grantham by-pass which has nothing to do with the development of the residential site. It is clear from the evidence that the residential site could not be granted planning permission unless the link road is constructed, but the converse is not true: there is a strong independent planning need for the construction of the link road (to complete the Grantham by-pass) whether or not the residential site is developed. In the context of this planning rationale, it makes obvious sense to regard the main function of the link road as being to form part of the Grantham by-pass and hence to regard the relevant project as the “construction of a road” (in the terminology in section 10 of Annex II to the EIA Directive). Since the main functional purpose of the link road, as part of the Grantham by-pass, is to provide a new passage for traffic to avoid Grantham this approach to identification of the project is supported by the references to roads and other transportation projects such as railways, tramways and so on in Annex I and Annex II to the EIA Directive as set out above.”
“As to the design connections, given that it is part of SKDC’s local plan that the residential site should be developed for housing (with some community and employment uses as well), it is simple planning good sense that an application should have been made for the link road (as part of the Grantham by-pass) to skirt the site, to avoid jeopardising those discrete planning objectives, and for the link road to include the roundabout and the stub, to avoid extra costs which are foreseeable if the residential site is developed in accordance with the local plan documents.”
“The fact that funding for the construction of the link road will depend to a significant degree on contributions in due course from the developer of the residential site does not lead to the conclusion that they must be regarded as part of a single “project”. The funding arrangements are contingent matters which do not bear on the planning merits of the proposal to construct the link road to complete the Grantham by-pass.”
“As regards the references in the local plan documents and other documentation to the connections between the link road and the residential site proposals, in my view they are just reflections of the points of linkage between the link road and the residential site referred to above. For example, it is unsurprising that in seeking planning permission for the link road LCC should have emphasised not just the desirability of constructing the Grantham by-pass but also how well that project fitted with other aspects of SKDC’s local plan and the other benefits for SKDC’s area which it would bring; and it is unsurprising that in seeking central government funding for the Grantham by-pass LCC should have emphasised both the need for the by-pass to ease traffic congestion in Grantham and also the other wider benefits which would be likely to be associated with its construction.”
“As further support for the identification of the link road as a distinct “project”, I think it is relevant that the applicant for planning permission is LCC, which is the highway authority with responsibility to promote the public interest in relation to the road network. LCC is not a private developer and has no commercial interest in the residential site. This tends to indicate that the two projects are distinct. I also think it is relevant that at the time of the link road application the detail of the proposals for the development of the residential site had not been worked up to the point at which an application for planning permission could be made by Buckminster, and it cannot be said that this was any part of some deliberate plan to “salami-slice” the applications so as to subvert the proper operation of planning controls.”
I set out all of the above from Larkfleet in some detail as context for, and in part a counter to, those who try to read to much into the implications of, the Court of Appeal’s ruling this week in R (Ashchurch Rural Parish Council) v Tewkesbury Borough Council (Court of Appeal, 7 February 2023).
The case is possibly an unwelcome and no doubt not unusual example of the perverse incentives on local authorities arising from time-limited government funding.
The case concerned a challenge to the grant of planning permission by the council for a road bridge over the Bristol to Birmingham mainline railway north of Ashchurch, Tewkesbury.In March 2019, Tewkesbury has been “awarded Garden Town status for a potential development of up to 10,195 new homes, around 100 ha of employment land, and related infrastructure. This was based on the Tewkesbury Area Draft Concept Masterplan Report (“the Masterplan”), which sets out potential largescale development over an area described as the “North Ashchurch Development Area””.
“The Masterplan expressly recognises that delivery of the northern development plots for Phase 1 development relies on “the provision of a northern link over the main rail line, overcoming severance and completing the link between existing local roads”. It identifies the bridge as one of the “short-term enabling interventions”. The bridge is therefore an essential prerequisite to the delivery of any housing development in the Phase 1 area. It is common ground that the sole purpose of its construction is to facilitate such development.”
“In the normal course of events, one might have expected any application for planning permission to be made only after [progress with the joint core strategy] and the adoption of a local plan, and for TBC to seek permission for the Phase 1 development of which the bridge would form an integral part, including the link road and any other vital transport infrastructure. Instead, the application was made, and granted, for the bridge alone.
[Paul Brown KC, acting for the claimant] told the Court that the bridge is known locally as “the bridge to nowhere,” because after it has been constructed, the temporary haul roads will be removed and there will be no connecting roads on either side, just a bridge in the middle of a field, which will be fenced off. Without a functioning highway unlocking the land within the Phase 1 area on the eastern side of the railway, the bridge will serve no useful purpose.
This unusual state of affairs has arisen because TBC wished to avail itself of funding from the Government which was only available for a limited period. In July 2017, the Government launched a £2.3 billion Housing Infrastructure Fund (“HIF”) in order to support housing delivery through the funding of vital physical infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, with the opportunity to facilitate the development of some 100,000 homes in England. The fund was split into two key areas, namely, forward funding (for larger schemes up to £250 million) and marginal funding (for schemes up to £10 million). The deadline for applications was September 2017.”
“It follows, therefore, that at the time when the application for planning permission for the bridge was considered, there was a clear expectation that the bridge would serve at least 826 houses, to be built within the Phase 1 area on the eastern side of the railway track, and the road infrastructure, including the link road over the bridge, would need to cater for at least that number.
Prior to making the application for planning permission, TBC commissioned an Environmental Impact Assessment Screening Report, for the purpose of determining whether an Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) was required. The Screening Report was produced in May 2020. The Judge quotes relevant extracts at paras 17 to 26 and para 33 of his judgment. The Screening Report noted that the bridge would not be used until future development came forward to make it operational. It recorded that the current proposals identified that the development area was anticipated to provide 826 new houses. Nevertheless it treated the bridge as a stand-alone “project”, to be considered independently from any environmental assessment of the highway and residential elements of the development that it was envisaged the bridge would facilitate. It noted that an assessment of those elements would be carried out in future, as and when it was envisaged that any development under Phase 1 of the Masterplan would be implemented.
The Screening Report recognised that the bridge was Schedule 2 development under the EIA Regulations, but concluded that, looked at in isolation, it was not likely to have significant effects on the environment. It was therefore unnecessary to carry out an EIA.”
There were basically two grounds of challenge to the grant of planning permission, both successful.
I’m not going to consider in detail the first ground (grounds 1 and 2 in the judgment), which was that the officer’s report had advised members to take into account the benefits of the bridge in terms of facilitating the housing development, but not any adverse effects arising from the housing development. Andrews LJ:
“In this particular case, I am satisfied on an appropriately benevolent reading of the [officer’s report] as a whole that the Planning Officer in substance directed the members of the Planning Committee that they could not or must not take account of the harms of the proposed development that the bridge would facilitate. That went beyond mere advice or the expression of a personal view about relevance. Those harms were at least potentially relevant: materiality was a matter for the Committee to determine, and they were being told that they must not consider something to be material which they might otherwise have regarded as material.”
The second ground (ground 3 in the judgment) was that the local planning authority had incorrectly characterised the “project” for EIA purposes as being simply the bridge. You will see the approach that the court took in relation to that matter from the following passages, which I suspect will be widely cited:
“The identity of the “project” for these purposes is not necessarily circumscribed by the ambit of the specific application for planning permission which is under consideration. The objectives of the Directive and the Regulations cannot be circumvented (deliberately or otherwise) by dividing what is in reality a single project into separate parts and treating each of them as a “project” – a process referred to in shorthand as “salami-slicing””.
“In Larkfleet, it was held that a proposed urban extension development and a link road were not a single project because despite the connections between them, there was a “strong planning imperative” for the construction of the link road as part of a town by-pass, which had nothing to do with the proposed development of the residential site. By contrast, in Burridge v Breckland District Council [2013] EWCA Civ 228, (“Burridge”) the Court of Appeal held that a planning application for a biomass renewable energy plant and a planning application for a combined heat and power plant linked to it by an underground gas pipe were a “single project,” on the basis that they were “functionally interdependent and [could] only be regarded as an “integral part” of the same development.”
It follows that the identification of the “project” is based on a fact-specific inquiry. That means other cases, decided on different facts, are only relevant to the limited extent that they indicate the type of factors which might assist in determining whether or not the proposed development is an integral part of a wider project.
Lang J, in her judgment in R(Wingfield) v Canterbury City Council and another [2019] EWHC 1975 (Admin), [2020] JPL 154, (“Wingfield”) stated at [63] that the question as to what constitutes the “project” is a matter of judgment for the competent planning authority, subject to challenge on grounds of Wednesbury rationality or other public law error. At [64] she set out a non-exhaustive list of potentially relevant criteria, which serves as a useful aide-memoire. These include whether the sites are owned or promoted by the same person, functional interdependence, and stand-alone projects. In relation to the last of these factors she said:
“where a development is justified on its own merits and would be pursued independently of another development, this may indicate that it constitutes a single individual project that is not an integral part of a more substantial scheme”.
The reverse may also be true, and that reflects the position in this case.”
“There is no reference in the Screening Report to Larkfleet or Burridge, nor to the factors identified in Wingfield. The author did not address the question whether the bridge and the highway that was envisaged to run across it were “functionally interdependent”; nor the question whether building a non-functioning bridge in the middle of a field was justified on its own merits, as a stand-alone project, without regard to the development it facilitated; nor the question whether the application for permission would have been pursued in the absence of the proposed development of Phase 1 of the Masterplan.”
“I reject the proposition that in a case in which the specific development for which permission has been sought clearly forms an integral part of an envisaged wider future development, without which the original development would never take place, there can only be a single “project” for the purposes of the Directive and the Regulations if the contemplated wider development has reached the stage where an application has been made or could be made for planning permission. That proposition appears to me to be antithetic to the approach taken in Rochdale and inherently illogical. The question “is this application part of a larger project?” can still be answered even if planning permission has not yet been sought for the larger project or the details of the larger project have not been finalised.”
“Insofar as the author of the Screening Opinion, and the Development Manager, decided that the “project” must be confined to the bridge because “any future contemplated development could not be [robustly] assessed at the time of the screening decision”, they fell into error by conflating two separate inquiries, namely, “what is the project?” and “what are the environmental impacts of that project?” The difficulty of carrying out any assessment of the impacts of a larger project which is lacking in detail, is a matter which is separate from and irrelevant to the question whether the application under consideration forms an integral part of that larger project.”
“The Phase 1 project may not be easy to define in detail because it is at a relatively early stage, which explains why the Screening Report refers to a “lack of definition”. That may affect the way in which the overall assessment of whether there is a significant impact on the environment is carried out – it would necessarily be based on less concrete information than an assessment at a later stage of the planning process would be. However, in my judgment it cannot affect the answer to the initial question at the screening stage, “is this application part of a larger project”? If and to the extent that TBC treated it as if it did, they fell into error.
The fact that the Planning Practice Guidance addresses the potential relevance of “other existing or approved developments” and tells local planning authorities that they should always have regard to the possible cumulative effects arising from any existing or approved development, should not be taken as restricting consideration of the impact of larger projects to “existing or approved” developments.
I accept that there was no evidence of any deliberate attempt by TBC to “salami-slice” in the present case. There were cogent justifications provided for hiving off and accelerating the application for the bridge, which had nothing to do with a wish to avoid the impacts of a full EIA assessment. But it does not follow from the fact that the application for the bridge was hived off in that way that its relationship to Phase 1 of the Masterplan, which provided the sole underlying justification for its existence, could be lawfully ignored when deciding on the identity of the “project””
“In conclusion on Ground 3, I am satisfied that TBC did not take a legally correct approach to the decision whether an EIA assessment was required. They never asked themselves the right questions. If and insofar as they justified treating the bridge as a stand-alone “project” by reference to (a) the difficulty of assessing the environmental impacts of the wider project (b) the fact that the Masterplan has no formal planning status or (c) the fact that EIA assessments will be carried out in future as and when Phase 1, or other aspects of it, become the subject of planning applications, they fell into error.”
What are the main implications of the Ashchurch case?
Care is needed in relation to the EIA scoping and screening process for a start, analysing the particular factual situation against this case law.
Clarity is needed as to whether there is any functional interdependence on other proposals – whether the proposals the subject of the planning application would be likely to proceed absent wider proposals – whether it forms an integral part of a larger project (to my mind that remains, as per Larkfleet, a high test, but it needs to be properly considered by the decision maker)
Caution should be exercised – in particular that those matters set out in the final passage I quote above are not relied upon as justification for arriving at a narrow project definition.
As always, this is not an “opening of the floodgates” moment. This was about a piece of infrastructure which only had one potential purpose. It was not, for instance, one parcel of development within a wider development allocation as in Wingfield. What matters is that decision makers should arrive at a reasoned, rational, conclusion as to the extent of the project for the purposes of the EIA Regulations, rather than simply take what is given to them on a plate by way of the planning application.
SIMONICITY 