Resignation of Rishi Sunak as chancellor – 5 July 2022
Resignation of Boris Johnson as prime minister – 7 July 2022
Replacement of Boris Johnson by Liz Truss as prime minister – 6 September 2022
Death of Her Majesty – 8 September 2022
Mini-budget and publication of growth plan – 23 September 2022
Resignation of Liz Truss as prime minister – 20 October 2022
Replacement of Liz Truss by Rishi Sunak, Boris Johnson or AN Other as prime minister – October 2022
A lot has happened. Or perhaps, in our planning world, nothing has happened.
We briefly had a prime minister who talked of abolishing “top-down, Whitehall-inspired Stalinist housing targets” and indeed the Levelling Up Secretary of State Simon Clarke (who incidentally came out publicly today as a backer of Boris Johnson) spoke about those targets as if they had already been abolished. But of course, as we wait for the mythical NPPF changes prospectus (delayed to November even before the Truss resignation which could lead to further delay), formal policy remains as is. The only effect of the loose talk was to give cover to local authorities anxious for an excuse to pause their local plan making. Thanks Liz – it wasn’t just the markets that you spooked.
No doubt the change is on its way regardless but, honestly, how idiotic it would be to give up on having a methodology that identifies each local planning authority’s local housing needs, for which they should usually plan. The likely consequences of removing the targets are clear:
longer plan-making processes, particularly the examination stage
fewer homes delivered
more planning by appeal
plan-making increasingly largely driven by promises of funding to be provided and threats of funding to be removed. We can try to forget about that “pork markets” Truss quote but I suggest you retain at hand a much older phrase: “pork barrel politics”.
And what is wrong with top down targets anyway? Our health and education systems for instance are full of the things.
Away from housing, the announcements in the growth plan in relation to, for instance, fracking (pro – despite the planning minister Lee Rowley being strongly against) and solar energy (anti) have not get found their way into any formal policy changes.
I have scrolled through the amended Bill and aside from the detailed changes to schedule 11 (which relates to the infrastructure levy) mentioned by Nicola, and other minor tweaks, I would only draw attention to the following new provisions:
clause 111 – power to shorten the deadline for examination of DCO applications
clause 112 – additional powers in relation to non-material changes to DCOs
clause 152 – prospects of planning permission for alternative development [in the context of CPO compensation]
Next up will be Report stage and a debate on the Third Reading of the Bill and we shall see if any further amendments are tabled by the Secretary of State, whoever he or she may be at that stage.
“If passed, REULRR will effectively sweep away any and all EU laws that the Government hasn’t actively decided to keep.
It does this by:
Repealing EU derived laws by the end of 2023. The government will be able to extend that deadline to 23 June 2026 (the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum) but can’t further extend it.
Repealing the principle of supremacy of EU law by the end of 2023. Currently, any EU decision reached before 1 January 2021 is binding on UK courts unless the government departs from it. However, this bill will subjugate all EU law in favour of UK law by default.
Repealing directly effective EU law rights and obligations in UK law by the end of 2023; and
Establishing a new priority rule requiring retained direct EU legislation to be interpreted and applied consistently with domestic legislation.”
She discussed this further at our clubhouse Planning Law Unplanned session last week on the Growth Plan, which Sam Stafford has now trimmed neatly into a 50 Shades of Planning podcast:
You will remember that the European Union Withdrawal Act 2018 had the effect of retaining, post Brexit, EU-derived domestic legislation such as the regulations in relation to environmental impact assessment, strategic environmental impact and conservation of habitats, leaving it to Parliament in due course to determine the extent to which the legislation should subsequently be repealed or amended.
”The REUL [retained EU-derived law] framework established by EUWA, however, was not intended to be maintained indefinitely on the UK statute book and now the Government is in the position to ensure REUL can be revoked, replaced, restated, updated and removed or amended to reduce burdens.”
The Bill now places a firm deadline on that process:
“The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill facilitates the amendment, repeal and replacement of REUL by the end of 2023, and assimilates REUL remaining in force after that date by removing the special EU law features attached to it.”
The end of 2023 deadline can only be extended, to 23 June 2026 “should a lack of parliamentary time, or external factors, hinder progress towards reform of retained EU law prior to the 2023 sunset date.”
Is this of concern?
In short, yes of course. It may be said that the Government is committed to a principle of non-regression from current environmental standards, but given the current political pinball and the lack of relevant ministers with any real experience of the sheer complexity and nuances of what they are dealing with, frankly anything is possible. Campaign groups are certainly on edge: Brexit freedoms bill’ could abolish all pesticide protections, campaigners say (Guardian, 29 September 2022).
To an extent, at a high level, the principle of non-regression is built into the trade and co-operation agreement between the UK and EU which was signed on 30 December 2020 and came into force on 1 May 2021. The UK gave various, at least theoretically, binding commitments in the agreement as to non-regression from environmental levels of protection, which I describe in my 27 December 2020 blog post Brexit & Planning: An Update.
There are also generalised commitments within the Environment Act 2021 (which of course Parliament is always of course at liberty to amend or repeal as it chooses). The Government consulted in May 2022 in relation to its draft environmental principles statement. The statement has not yet been finalised and there is not yet any duty upon ministers to take it into account in their policy making. This may not be until summer 2023 at the earliest! The Office for Environmental Protection (a body established pursuant to the 2021 Act) has criticised the statement for “a relatively limited degree of ambition”. The OEP has similarly criticised as unambitious the Government’s draft environmental targets, also consulted upon pursuant to the 2021 Act.
As against these inchoate commitments to environmental standards, what is going to give in the face of a Government which, according to its Growth Plan, will be “disapplying legacy EU red tape where appropriate” in the investment zones it is proposing, and which proposes a Planning and Infrastructure Bill which will be:
“reducing the burden of environmental assessments
reducing bureaucracy in the consultation process
reforming habitats and species regulations”?
Genuine improvements to the processes are certainly possible. But do we trust the Government to strike an appropriate balance, hurtling towards a self-imposed December 2023 deadline and (at the latest) 2024 general election? In the coming year, most of our environmental legislation, and planning legislation to the extent that it is intertwined, will need to be reviewed, line by line, and, given that most of it is in the form of secondary legislation (and the sheer lack of time – after all the REULRR Bill covers all EU derived legislation!), there will be relatively limited Parliamentary scrutiny of that process. Even with the best of intentions, how is this timescale even going to be possible if we are to avoid a complete bodge-up? We have been treading (often polluted) water for so long and we still have no sense whatsoever of what the long trumpeted “outcomes focused” approach will look like in practice – eg see my 2 April 2022 blog post Is the Nature Recovery Green Paper The Answer? (& If So What Was The Question?)
On a slightly different, although possibly related, note….
At 6 pm on Wednesday 5 October 2022 we will be having a discussion on Clubhouse with barrister Hashi Mohamed, around the themes of his FT article The housing crisis sits at the centre of Britain’s ills (1 October 2022, behind paywall) and his recent book A home of one’s own, a trenchant and personal look at the politics of planning and housing.
Join via this link. If you use the link to RSVP in advance (you don’t have to) you’ll get a reminder when we start – and we can get a feel for likely numbers.
What is needed to calm the nerves all round – on planning, on housing, on environmental protection – is detail. When are we going to get it? HM Treasury announced on 26 September 2022:
“Cabinet Ministers will announce further supply side growth measures in October and early November, including changes to the planning system, business regulations, childcare, immigration, agricultural productivity, and digital infrastructure.”
Always just another month or so to wait, every time.
Ahead of a late but welcome announcement by the Government, there was a silly headline in The Times this week: Homes crisis ‘worsened by environmental red tape’ (18 July 2022). Yes, we are back to the topic of my 16 July 2022 blog post: nutrient/water neutrality.
It’s good that this huge issue is attracting media attention – and I’ll come on to the Government announcement in a moment – but it is disappointing to see the usual “red tape” sneer.
The problem isn’t the rules or bureaucracy: we have specific areas designated of particular ecological importance and sensitivity, the integrity of some of which is under threat because of the existing levels of nutrients draining into them, from farming (eg fertilisers, animal waste) and from homes (human waste), and the integrity of others which is under threat due to the consequences of over-abstraction of water. These situations haven’t been adequately dealt with by the water companies or government agencies, meaning that even one more home being built in these catchment areas is considered by Natural England to be unacceptable without adequate mitigation in place (which can be difficult, particularly for smaller schemes). The problem isn’t the housebuilding, it’s the pre-existing precarious state of these areas.
It is a big problem, and it has been with us for a long time now (see my previous blog posts).
The Government has been waking up to the issue. Back in March 2022, DEFRA announced some support for affected local planning authorities, Nutrient pollution: reducing the impact on protected sites (16 March 2022). But this was little comfort to those stuck in the system.
But this week we saw more wide ranging measures announced by DEFRA and DLUHC. Of course they won’t provide an immediate solution, but they are certainly welcome.
These are the main measures announced by the Secretary of State:
“In order to drive down pollution from all development in the relevant catchments, we will be tabling an amendment to the Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill. This will place a new statutory duty on water and sewerage companies in England to upgrade wastewater treatment works to the highest technically achievable limits by 2030 in nutrient neutrality areas. Water companies will be required to undertake these upgrades in a way that tackles the dominant nutrient(s) causing pollution at a protected site. We are also using feedback from the recent ‘call for evidence’ to water companies to identify where these upgrades could be accelerated and delivered sooner.”
Natural England is directed to establish a nutrient mitigation scheme. “Defra and DLUHC will provide funding to pump prime the scheme: this is intended to frontload investment in mitigation projects, including wetland and woodland creation. This will then be recouped through a simple payment mechanism where developers can purchase ‘nutrient credits’ which will discharge the requirements to provide mitigation. Natural England will accredit mitigation delivered through the Nutrient Mitigation Scheme, enabling LPAs to grant planning permission for developments which have secured the necessary nutrient credits…We will announce further details in the autumn when the scheme will launch, and in the meantime, Natural England will be in touch with local authorities and developers.”
“Longer term, we continue to progress proposals to reform the Habitats Regulations so that impacts on protected sites are tackled up front, focusing on what is best for bringing sites back into favourable status.”
“We will make clear in planning guidance that judgements on deliverability of sites should take account of strategic mitigation schemes and the accelerated timescale for the Natural England’s mitigation schemes and immediate benefits on mitigation burdens once legislation requiring water treatment upgrades comes into force. DLUHC will revise planning guidance over the summer to reflect that sites affected by nutrient pollution forming part of housing land supply calculations are capable of being considered deliverable for the purposes of housing land supply calculations, subject to relevant evidence to demonstrate deliverability. It will be for decision takers to make judgements about impacts on delivery timescales for individual schemes in line with the National Planning Policy Framework.”
Joanna Averley’s letter goes into more detail as to how the proposed new statutory duty on water companies will help:
“The majority of nutrient pollution from residential properties enters waterbodies via treated discharges from wastewater treatment works (WWTW). The performance of WWTW varies based on the limits in environmental permits issued by the Environment Agency, which in turn reflect the environmental requirements of the waterbodies to which the effluent is discharged. The performance of WWTW is therefore the central factor in the level of nutrient pollution associated with existing homes and new development. It is therefore logical that effort on reducing nutrient pollution associated with housing focusses on upgrading WWTW. The statutory obligation for upgrading WWTW, which will be introduced into the LURB, will ensure that WWTW in nutrient neutrality catchments are operating at the highest level of performance, rectifying nutrient pollution at source. This will reduce the pollution from not only new development coming forward, but also from the majority of existing dwellings in affected catchments, representing a significant decrease in overall pollution from housing.
The specific performance levels of the connected WWTW is a major variable when determining the amount of mitigation new development has to secure to achieve nutrient neutrality. Suitable mitigation measures might include constructed wetlands or land use change, which can be land intensive. Under Natural England’s Nutrient Neutrality methodology, the permit limit is used, or where there is no permit limit on nutrient discharges from WWTW, a standard precautionary figure is used (8mg/l for phosphates (P) and 27mg/l for nitrates (N)). The statutory obligation from 2030 will require WWTW to operate at the technically achievable limit (TAL); for phosphates this is 0.25mg/l and nitrates 10mg/l. This action will ameliorate nutrient pollution and significantly reduce the mitigation burden for developments.
The habitat regulations require that mitigation be secured for the lifetime of the development which Natural England consider to be 80-120 years. The obligated upgrades to WWTW required from 2030; will provide clarity from the point of the LURB measures coming into force. For developments this means that the current high level of mitigation will only be required up to the end of 2030. After 2030, the pollution levels via WWTW will be much reduced and so a lower level of mitigation will be required. This reduces the overall mitigation burden on housing developments coming forward in nutrient neutrality catchments.”
This should be welcomed (even if it is so belated and does raise questions as to whether water companies will actually be able to deliver – and at whose cost) but of course there is still the period to 2030 before these new permit limits apply and so it is important that the promised nutrient mitigation scheme is up and running as soon as possible. Housing Today have raised significant concerns on that score in their piece, Government’s nutrient mitigation scheme ‘years away’ (22 July 2022)
Finally, the ministerial statement sets out unambiguously the Government’s position as to whether the Regulations bite on reserved matters applications and applications to discharge pre-commencement conditions: “The Habitats Regulations Assessment provisions apply to any consent, permission, or other authorisation, this may include post-permission approvals; reserved matters or discharges of conditions.” Joanna Averley’s letter promises further planning practice guidance on this issue.
In the meantime, there is no Planning Law Unplanned clubhouse event this week but I am speaking at a clubhouse event arranged by Iain Thomson of Bellona Advisors for 6pm on Monday 25 July 2022 on the subject of Strategic Rail Freight Interchanges, alongside writer Gareth Dennis and Intermodality’s Nick Gallop – join here. And for a taster of what we may cover, here’s Iain’s recent SRFIs blog post.
I was left feeling that the nuances of how our wretchedly complicated, but still, at some level, functional system are lost in the political chatter. Of course, these sessions aren’t “debates” as such but in large measure a long succession of disjointed interventions and special pleading. Has anyone yet coined the term NIMC? There was certainly a lot of “not in my constituency” and very little discernible appreciation of the utter reliance of this country on private sector risk-taking and funding for most new homes (regardless of tenure) and employment-generating development. How can the development of 300,000 homes a year (confirmed by Michael Gove in Select Committee on 13 June 2022 still to be the target) be remotely possible in this political and fiscal climate? So many MPs assert the case for a lower target for their particular constituency: we know what underlies the clamour against centralisation of power (a theme we’ll come back to shortly). Development is held again and again to be the culprit for failing public services, lack of infrastructure, waiting lists at GPs’ surgeries and so on – ahem, it’s new development that ends up paying for much of this – existing residents should look rather at the ways in which the Government chooses to manage and fund the provision of health care and other services. And if the complaint is not that new residents are overwhelming local services (not true) it’s that developers are securing permissions and then choosing not to building them out (not true, although there are certainly unnecessary delays largely caused by the clunkiness of the planning system itself: you want to amend your development proposals to reflect the inevitable market changes or regulatory requirements since you first applied for planning permission years ago? Well that’s not going to be a simple process at all my friend). (Beauty as a way to securing greater acceptance of development? Despite the Government having alighted upon that particular agenda, driving the proposals around local design codes for instance, that issue seemed to receive little airtime).
Rant over.
The Bill entered Committee stage on 21 June 2022. The Public Bill Committee first heard evidence from various witnesses and then started line by line consideration of the Bill on 28 June 2022. They have not yet reached the planning provisions but the transcript of the discussion so far is here.
The Levelling-up, Housing and Communities Select Committee, chaired by Clive Betts MP, is holding a mini inquiry into the Bill. Michael Gove MP, Stuart Andrew MP and Simon Gallagher all gave evidence on 13 June 2022, which was slightly more illuminating. For instance, an exchange in relation to design codes from the session:
“Chair: Are we going to have the same level of consultation on the supplementary plans and design codes [as on the local plan]?
Simon Gallagher: Yes. One of the objectives of design codes is that they are locally popular, which is going to require a degree of engagement. Supplementary plans are created as one of the vehicles by which there would be opportunity for proper engagement, or legal force design codes. One of the problems with design codes at the moment is that they are often produced as supplementary planning guidance, which has no legal force.
One thing we have done in the Bill, subject to Parliament’s views, is to create something that is a legal device, a supplementary plan, which must be consulted on. Design codes must be provably popular and we are using the Office for Place to champion the best means of that community engagement.”
One of the themes that has dominated discussion of the Bill has been a concern that it could lead to a centralising of power, for instance by way of the requirement that decisions should be made in accordance with national development management policies (as well as local plans), unless material considerations “strongly” indicate otherwise – thereby putting this potentially amorphous concept of national development management policies (the extent of which is for the Government to determine and which can be added to or amended by the Government with as little prior consultation as it chooses) on the same level as statutory local plans.
“a) The Bill represents a significant change to the existing planning system. It undermines an important planning principle, the primacy of the development plan, by elevating national development management policies to the top of the planning hierarchy.
b) Unlike development plans, which are produced locally via a statutory process that involves considerable public participation, the Bill contains no obligation to allow the public to participate in the development of national development management policies.
c) The Bill also introduces two new development plan documents, spatial development strategies and supplementary plans. The Bill provides for very limited opportunities for public participation in the production of these documents.
d) The Bill introduces a new mechanism to allow the Secretary of State to grant planning permission for controversial developments, bypassing the planning system entirely. There is no right for the public to be consulted as part of this process.
e) Overall, in our view the Bill radically centralises planning decision-making and substantially erodes public participation in the planning system.”
Clive Betts pursued this theme with the witnesses on 13 June 2022:
“Chair: I am told that this is new in the way it is written into legislation. We have had very interesting legal advice from Paul Brown QC and Alex Shattock from Landmark Chambers, and it might be helpful if the Committee wrote to you with some of the questions that they have raised, which are pretty serious accusations of a centralisation that these measures are bringing about.
Michael Gove: Of course, I would be more than happy to explain the position and, indeed, any distance that these proposals place between themselves and the existing practice. I do not believe that they do significantly, but I am very happy to engage with the advice that the Committee has sought, and with others as well.
Simon Gallagher: Just to add to that, the Secretary of State referred a few minutes ago to the national planning policy framework prospectus that we were going to publish in July. We intend to set out in that how we can use these powers most effectively. That will give us the basis for proper engagement. I accept that, on the face of the Bill, it is a bit hard to read our intentions, so we need a little bit more detail and explanation out there, which will help.”
There was a further session on 20 June 2022, with evidence given by Victoria Hills RTPI), Hugh Ellis ((TCPA)and Chris Young QC.
Clive Betts’ has subsequently written to Michael Gove asking for his response by 4 July 2022 to a number of points in the “opinion” by Paul Brown QC and Alex Shattock (NB for what it’s worth, it’s not an opinion – barristers are careful in their use of language, it’s just a briefing note).
This month we can also expect to see the Government’s prospectus as to its intended approach to revising the NPPF as well as how it intends to draw up its national development management policies.
We are going to be running our own discussion on Clubhouse on the “who will have the power?” question, at 6 pm on 19 July. More details soon but do join here. Indeed, if you would like to speak do let me know – we would like a diverse range of voices and views.
I will also be speaking at the National Planning Forum event “The good, the bad and the beautiful – the Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill – a planning panacea?” on 5 July and hope to explore the issues a little further alongside an excellent panel of fellow speakers.
My Town Legal colleagues have put together a fantastic (I think) 17 page summary of the main planning and compulsory purchase provisions of the Bill. Thanks Safiyah Islam and the following contributors:
• Part 3, Chapter 1 – Planning Data – Aline Hyde
• Part 3, Chapter 2 – Development Plans – Emma McDonald
• Part 3, Chapter 3 – Heritage – Cobi Bonani
• Part 3, Chapter 4 – Grant and Implementation of Planning Permission – Lucy Morton
• Part 3, Chapter 5 – Enforcement of Planning Controls – Stephanie Bruce-Smith
• Part 3, Chapter 6 – Other Provision – Stephanie Bruce-Smith
• Part 4 – Infrastructure Levy – Clare Fielding
• Part 5 – Environmental Outcomes Reports – Safiyah Islam
• Part 6 – Development Corporations – Amy Carter
• Part 7 – Compulsory Purchase – Raj Gupta
* Relevant clauses in Part 2 (Local Democracy and Devolution), Part 8 (Letting by Local Authorities of Vacant High-Street Premises), Part 9 (Information About Interests and Dealings in Land) and Part 10 (Miscellaneous) – Victoria McKeegan
If you would like to receive further detailed updates from time to time please email town.centre@townlegal.com.
I held a Clubhouse session on 12 May 2022 where I discussed the changes and their possible implications alongside Catriona Riddell, Phil Briscoe, Nick Walkley and Meeta Kaur. It is available to listen to here.
For a deeper dive into the compulsory purchase elements, do join our next Clubhouse session at 6 pm on Tuesday 17 May 2022, where my colleagues Raj Gupta and Paul Arnett will be leading a discussion with special guests Charles Clarke (DLUHC, previous chair of the Compulsory Purchase Association), Henry Church (CBRE, and current chair of the Compulsory Purchase Association), Caroline Daly (Francis Taylor Building), Virginia Blackman (Avison Young) and Liz Neate (Deloitte). Some line up! Join here.
Raj and Paul have also started a blog, Compulsory Reading, focused on CPO issues. The first post is here and, guess what, this will be compulsory reading if your work touches at all on the intricate and changing world of compulsory purchase law.
Phew! So what was I getting at in the heading to this post? Surely any fule kno that there was once a government white paper in August 2020 that, amongst other things, proposed a more zonal approach to planning – with local plans throwing all areas into three hoppers: protected, restricted and growth – but that the political lesson learned was that this would be a vote loser and so the zonal approach was abandoned by incoming Secretary of State Michael Gove in the wake of the Chesham and Amersham by-election?
The idea of growth areas (where allocation would amount to automatic development consent) has certainly been abandoned, but the consequence of a number of the proposals in the Bill in my view leads us more towards a system where there is much less decision making flexibility in relation to individual planning applications and appeals. Instead, planning decisions will need to be made in accordance with the development plan and national development management policies “unless material considerations strongly indicate otherwise”.
So developers will need to make sure that:
⁃ development plans (local plans, neighbourhood plans) etc allocate the necessary land.
– the associated mandatory local design codes are workable
⁃ they can work within the constraints of whatever national development management policies the Government arrives at.
If development accords with these requirements, planning permission should be a doddle. If not, you plainly need to overcome a heavy presumption against. Our current flexible system (sometimes good, sometimes bad) will take a big lurch towards being rule-based or, dare I say it, zonal.
This may be a Good Thing or it may be a Bad Thing. Much depends on whether development plans, local design codes and national development management policies are properly tested for their realism. There will be even more focus on testing the soundness of local plans.
However, when it comes to local plan making, there are some major unresolved uncertainties:
⁃ First, what housing numbers do local authorities need to plan for? The Government still aspires to a 30 month local plan preparation to adoption timescale but that is only going to work if you have a largely “plug in and play” approach to the numbers, as was envisaged in the White Paper. What will happen to the standard methodology? We don’t get know. The Government’s policy paper says this:
“The changes in the Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill will require a new National Planning Policy Framework for England. The Government continues to listen to the representations of MPs, councillors and others on the effectiveness not only of the formula but the surrounding policies. Alongside Committee stage of the Bill, it intends to publish an NPPF prospectus setting out further thinking on the direction of such policies.”
What numbers are we planning for as a country? Are we still targeting 300,000 homes a year? The Government’s response to the Select Committee report on the planning white paper says this:
“The Government is determined to create a market that builds the homes this country needs. Our ambition is to deliver 300,000 homes per year on average and create a market that will sustain delivery at this level. There is compelling evidence that increasing the responsiveness of housing supply will help to achieve better outcomes. There seems to be consensus that 250,000 to 300,000 homes per annum should be supplied to deliver price and demand stability. For example, a 2014 joint KPMG and Shelter report highlighted that 250,000 homes per annum were needed to address price and demand pressures.”
⁃ Secondly, what will replace the duty to co-operate, which will be abolished? What will the new duty to assist really amount to? Can authorities adjoining urban areas with high unmet housing needs simply turn away from meeting those needs?
⁃ Thirdly, what if the allocations in the plan prove to be undeliverable or do not come forward? The safety net/potential stick of the five year housing land supply requirement (and presumably the tilted balance) in the case of up to date plans is to be abolished according to the policy paper:
“To incentivise plan production further and ensure that newly produced plans are not undermined, our intention is to remove the requirement for authorities to maintain a rolling five-year supply of deliverable land for housing, where their plan is up to date, i.e., adopted within the past five years. This will curb perceived ‘speculative development’ and ‘planning by appeal’, so long as plans are kept up to date. We will consult on changes to be made to the National Planning Policy Framework.”
Much is to be resolved here before we can begin to work out whether the proposals in the Bill will be an improvement on the present position.
Of course, the Government recognises that more work is needed. The following forthcoming consultation processes are identified:
“Technical consultations on the detail of the Infrastructure Levy and changes to compulsory purchase compensation.
• A consultation on the new system of Environmental Outcomes Reports which will ensure we take a user-centred approach to the development of the core elements of the new system, such as the framing of environmental outcomes as well as the detailed operation of the new system.
• A technical consultation on the quality standards that Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects will be required to meet to be considered for fast-track consenting and associated regulatory and guidance changes to improve the performance of the NSIP regime.
• Proposals for changes to planning fees.
• Our vision for the new National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), detailing what a new Framework could look like, and indicating, in broad terms, the types of National Development Management Policy that could accompany it. We will also use this document to set out our position on planning for housing, and seek views on this, as well as consulting on delivering the planning commitments set out in the British Energy Security Strategy.”
I hope this serves as some sort of introduction to the Bill and a taster as to some of the issues which will be occupying so many of us as the Bill passes through its Parliamentary stages. I don’t expect it to be on the statute book before early 2023, with a fair wind, and most of its provisions will not be in force until 2024 at the earliest. Final health warning: Bills change – we can expect plenty of amendments, omissions and additions over coming months.
Aside from my earlier plugs for our newsletters and the Planning Law Unplanned clubhouse sessions, I would also recommend two other blog posts: those of Nicola Gooch and Zack Simons . None of us has come up with a satisfactory LURB pun yet but I’m sure we all have our teams working on it.
In the 21st century, London has increasingly been a safety deposit box for the wealthy of the world – so many people with incomprehensible amounts of wealth, including (but not exclusively) the so-called Russian “oligarchs” (“one of a small group of powerful people who control a country or an industry”).
Obviously, if you come by your wealth legitimately so be it, but the sums these people apparently own would suggest at best that something is wrong with the very structure of capitalism, and at worst…well draw your own conclusions. And to what extent is this all assisting the evils of the Putin regime – and its equivalents briefly eclipsed in the news cycle?
The UK financial sanctions list (4 March 2022) currently identifies 196 Russian individuals, with the reason for each person being on the list.
“Prior to 10 February 2022, the Regulations allowed the UK Government to ‘designate’ (that is, to impose sanctions on) a person who is or has been involved in ‘destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine’. Individuals and entities that are so ‘designated’ are listed on the UK Consolidated Sanctions List (“the UK Sanctions List”) along with confirmation of the reasons for designation.”
“Asset freeze” sanctions “seek to impose prohibitions or requirements for the purposes of:
1. freezing the funds or economic resources owned, held or controlled by certain individuals and entities;
2. preventing financial services being provided to or for the benefit of certain individuals or entities;
3. preventing funds or economic resources from being made available to or for the benefit of certain entities or individuals; or
4. preventing funds or economic resources from being received from certain individuals or entities.”
“On 10 February 2022, the UK Government expanded its power to designate entities and individuals from a wide variety of sectors as it gave itself the power to designate persons ‘involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia’, including:
1. Carrying on business as a Government of Russia affiliated entity
This will include any entity which is owned directly or indirectly by the Russian Government or in which the Government of Russia holds directly or indirectly a minority interest or which has received some form of financial or other material benefit from the Government of Russia.
2. Carrying on business of economic significance or in a sector of strategic significance to the Government of Russia
This includes the Russian, chemicals, construction, defence, electronics, energy, extractives, financial services, information and communications and transport sectors.
3. Owning or controlling directly or indirectly or working as a director or trustee of a Government of Russia affiliated entity or an entity falling within any of the other above categories.”
As described in Commons Library briefing Countering Russian influence in the UK (25 February 2022), the so-called “golden visa” scheme has now been scrapped:
“On 17 February, the Government announced the immediate closure of the Tier 1 (Investor) visa to new applicants. The visa offered up to five years’ permission to stay in the UK and a route to permanent residence, in return for a minimum £2m investment. A review of all investor visas granted between 2008 and April 2015 was announced in 2018. The Government has said results will be published “in due course”.
Russians are the second most common nationality granted investor visas since 2008, although they accounted for a much smaller proportion of applicants since 2015. Just over 2,500 investor visas have been issued to Russians since 2008 (roughly one fifth of all such visas issued). People granted investment visas before 2015 may have now completed the residence requirement for permanent residence (and possibly British citizenship).”
“Prevent and combat the use of land in the UK for money laundering purposes by increasing the transparency of beneficial ownership information relating to overseas entities that own land in the UK. The Bill therefore creates a register of the beneficial owners of such entities. The register will be held by Companies House and made public.
Reform the UK’s Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO) regime to enable law enforcement to investigate the origin of property and recover the proceeds of crime. The measures in the Bill aim to strengthen the UK’s fight against serious economic crime; to clarify the scope of UWO powers; and to increase and reinforce operational confidence in relation to UWO powers.
Amend financial sanctions legislation, including the monetary penalty legal test and information sharing powers to help deter and prevent breaches of financial sanctions.”
However, is this going far enough? There have been pieces in the media reporting that the French government had “seized” a Russian oligarch’s yacht. There is no detail as to what the precise legal status of that action was – there would need of course to be a solid legal basis for confiscation (presumably without compensation) but it is interesting that Boris Johnson and Michael Gove have been reported to be looking at the potential to bolster the Economic Crime Bill so as to facilitate the confiscation of UK property owned by Russian oligarchs (see for instance Michael Gove calling for UK to seize London homes of Russian oligarchs CityAM 27 February 2022 and Michael Gove considers options for seizing oligarchs’ property The Times 3 March 2022). Is this just tough talk and no action? I know you may not want to hear this but… any legislation, and individual decisions made under it, would need to be tightly framed to be consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights (and in a rule of law based, democratic, society that is surely right):
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” (Article 8).
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” (Article 1 of the First Protocol)
Of course, confiscation without compensation may be properly framed as necessary in the public interest but this will need care.
The London Mayor issued a press statement on 26 February 2022, Mayor demands seizure of property connected to oligarchs, supporting the confiscation of assets but going further in terms of measures to seek to minimise the number of empty homes in the capital (surely these measures are essential to ensure that we can look in the eye those who say that there is no need for additional new homes?) and to penalise foreign buyers more generally (jury out as far as I’m concerned – baby, bathwater etc):
“The Mayor has previously criticised the Government’s failure to deliver on the promise of a register of overseas property ownership and has now set out further measures to charge those who buy property in the UK with no intention of living here and leave them empty while London faces a housing crisis.
As well as the register of overseas ownership, the Mayor is calling for:
• Seizure of property assets held by allies of President Putin
• Raising the amount overseas owners have to pay for leaving their home empty by increasing the council tax ‘empty homes premium’
• Raising capital gains tax on overseas buyers from 28 per cent to 40 per cent
• Increasing the taxes paid by overseas companies investing in property by increasing the Annual Tax on Enveloped Dwellings”
For further reading, there is this article in yesterday’s edition of the Economist: The rise and fall of Londongrad (behind pay wall, 5 March 2022).
This week’s Clubhouse event will be at a slightly earlier time, at 5pm on Tuesday 8 March. Its theme is “BREAK THE BIAS – women in planning/law”, to mark this year’s International Women’s Day theme. We have various speakers including Meeta Kaur, Nikita Sellers, Caroline Daly, Nicola Gooch and Zenab Hearn. Link here.
The Government is seeking a general legislative power to shut down particular developers’ activities, with no rights of appeal, no rights to compensation and no published set of the criteria which it would apply.
Zack Simons’ concerns set out in his 17 February 2022 #Planoraks blog post are well justified.
My 21 January 2022 blog post “Planning Powers” A Pawn In Unsafe Cladding Negotiation explained the Government’s efforts to “persuade” developers to contribute a further £4bn towards remediating unsafe cladding, on top of the residential property developer tax which applies from 1 April 2022 – with the Secretary of State authorised by the Treasury to “use a high-level “threat” of tax or legal solutions in discussions with developers as a means of obtaining voluntary contributions from them” with one of the threats used being “restricting access to…the use of planning powers”.
“Tough new measures that will force industry to pay to remove cladding and protect leaseholders from exorbitant costs have been unveiled by Secretary of State for Levelling Up Michael Gove today (14 February 2022).
For those in industry not doing the right thing, the government will be able to block planning permission and building control sign-off on developments, effectively preventing them from building and selling new homes.”
“Reflecting the scale of the problem, the government will also be able to apply its new building safety levy to more developments, with scope for higher rates for those who do not participate in finding a workable solution.
The government hopes to not have to use these powers; it wants responsible developers and manufacturers to operate freely and with confidence, to help deliver the homes people need. If they do not act responsibly, they must face commercial and financial consequences.”
Obviously culpable developers need to pay up. But what is proposed is startling to say the least:
So the Secretary of State is seeking the power to prohibit in regulations “persons of a prescribed description from carrying out development” or specified types of development (whether or not they have the benefit of planning permission) as well as the power to “by regulations impose a building control prohibition, as regards buildings or proposed buildings, in relation to persons of a prescribed description” which would prevent them from being able to apply for or be granted building control approval. The Secretary of State would also be able to prescribe “certificates” (not sure what that description is meant to capture) which would not be able to be granted under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (and which if granted would be of no effect).
These prohibitions “may be imposed for any purpose connected with—
(a) securing the safety of people in or about buildings in relation to risks arising from buildings, or
(b) improving the standard of buildings.”
The provisions are drafted far too widely. What (unprecedented?) power it would give this Government (and any future Government). Of course, where prohibitions are plainly unjustified (for instance against developers who have done wrong other than not to accede to these demands for a “voluntary” payment or perhaps even if they have made a payment) the regulations could be challenged by way of judicial review (NB we need to keep an eye on ongoing judicial reform!). However, if the legislation were to give the wide discretion currently planned, this would not be easy – any grounds of challenge might need to rely on the limited protections provided by the Human Rights Act (NB we need to keep an eye on… yes, you’re there before me).
I’m concerned that these amendments have been introduced at this late stage in the passage of the Bill, with little advance notice so as to enable proper Parliamentary and more general public scrutiny.
Developers need to meet their liabilities. But this whole exercise seems to be much more of a blunderbuss – aimed at the easiest, biggest, targets and ignoring the significant role that poor regulation (and indeed de-regulation) has played in this whole scandal. Do we really want this legislation on the statute book which could well be misused in the future? Or is it all just a bluff to secure that £4bn?
If anyone would like to participate in a future Planning Law Unplanned clubhouse discussion on the topic, please let me know. 8 March 2022 is a possibility.
In the meantime:
⁃ Spencer Tewis-Allen is leading a discussion on build to rent at 6 pm on 22 February – link to clubhouse app and event here.
⁃ Hashi Mohamed is our special guest at 6 pm on 1 March, discussing his Radio 4 programme Planning, Housing and Politics – link to clubhouse app and event here.
There was a customarily short and clear judgment from Holgate J this week as to how decision makers should approach applications for prior approval for the upward extension of buildings under the General Permitted Development Order: CAB Housing Limited v Secretary of State (3 February 2022)
So I’m saying nothing, you will be pleased to hear, about the 2 February 2022 Levelling Up white paper There are plenty of summaries available – and you do need a summary! Or listen to the Planning Law Unplanned clubhouse event we held, featuring Catriona Riddell (linkedin piece here), Iain Thomson (linkedin piece here) and Victoria Hutton (linkedin piece here).
Nor anything about mythical Bob, the Government’s 31 January 2022 Benefits of Brexit paper, which seemed to have little new to say in terms of the subject matter of this blog.
Nor anything about the energy price cap – although that does give additional topicality to our our next Planning Law Unplanned clubhouse event plugged at the end of this post.
Nor anything about the continuing NIMBY vs YIMBY noise that I got drawn into on twitter this week – although there is at least some link between Holgate J’s judgment & all that: someone came out with the usual trope that a planning system with a large discretionary element to decision making is “good for the lawyers”. I didn’t respond, but thought to myself that a less discretionary system, whether based on zoning or permitted development rights, is of course even better for the lawyers – because it all becomes about where the legal boundary lines are.
When Parliament amended the General Permitted Development Order to allow upwards extensions, subject to defined criteria and limitations together with the need to seek prior approval for certain aspects of the proposals, the description of the matters in relation to which prior approval is required was far too vague. What do matters such as “impact on amenity” and “external appearance” actually mean? Do you take as a given the right to extend up to two storeys upwards and in that context consider external appearance, akin to considering reserved matters with the equivalent of outline planning permission already having been granted for the two storeys, or can issues of principle as to the acceptability of that upwards extension be considered, as long as they relate to amenity or external appearance,? Obviously this is a particularly critical question where the local planning authority may be resistant in principle to upwards extensions – these new rights trumpeted by the Government become rather less meaningful.
The Cab Housing case related to three appeal decisions where the relevant inspector had dismissed appeals in relation to proposals under Class AA of Part 1 of the GPDO (upwards extensions to detatched houses).
Over to Holgate J to explain:
“These challenges raise important issues regarding the true interpretation of Class AA of Part 1. First, are the claimants correct in saying that a planning authority’s control of impact on amenity limited to effects on properties contiguous with, or abutting, the subject property and are those effects limited to overlooking, privacy and loss of light? Alternatively, does that control embrace impact upon all aspects of the amenity of neighbouring premises, as the Secretary of State contends? Second, is the authority’s control of the external appearance of the subject dwelling limited to the “design and architectural features” of its principal elevation and any side elevation fronting a highway, and is it further limited to the effects of those matters upon the subject dwelling itself? The claimants contend for that interpretation and they say that the authority is not allowed to consider the effects of external appearance upon any property outside the subject dwelling. Alternatively, is the correct interpretation, as the Secretary of State contends, that the control covers (1) all aspects of the external appearance of the proposed development, and not simply the two elevations specifically referred to in AA.2(3)(a)(ii)) and (2) impact upon other premises, and not simply the subject dwelling itself?
In the decisions challenged in these proceedings, the Inspectors took the broader approach in relation to external appearance and, in two cases, to amenity. It is common ground that if the claimants’ construction of the GPDO 2015 is correct, then each of the decisions must be quashed as ultra vires. The decisions would have been taken outside the ambit of the powers exercisable by the Inspector. But, if the defendant’s interpretation is correct, then it is also common ground that each of the three Inspectors reached decisions which fell within their powers, their decisions are not otherwise open to legal challenge and the applications for statutory review must be dismissed.
The claimants point out that other Inspectors have taken a different view upon the scope of the controls exercisable in the determination of an application for prior approval under Class AA of Part 1. It has been said that the decision-maker is not allowed to assess the impact of the external appearance of a proposed addition of 1 or 2 storeys on any area outside the subject building, for example, the streetscape. It has also been said that the principle of an upwards extension of up to 2 storeys is “established” by the permitted development right itself, so that the decision on the application for prior approval should not frustrate, or resile from, that principle. Such statements have even been made in relation to other permitted development rights where the GPDO 2015 requires “external appearance” to be controlled, without going on to refer to specific elevations (see e.g. the decision letter dated 6 July 2021 on Kings Gate, 111, The Drive, Hove). If the Secretary of State’s interpretation of the GPDO 2015 is correct, then all these decisions were potentially liable to be quashed on an application under s.288 brought within time. Plainly there are differences of interpretation which need to be resolved. There is also the question: to what extent is it correct to say that the principle of development is established where a permitted development right is subject to prior approval?
The issues in this case also affect the proper construction and ambit of permitted development rights granted by GPDO 2015 under Classes ZA, A, AA, AB, AC and AD of Part 20. These provide for up to two storeys of multiple units of residential units to be erected on top of an existing purpose-built block of flats, or on top of detached or terraced buildings in commercial or mixed use or residential use.
The claimants’ narrower approach to the legal scope of prior approval in these Classes also has implications for non-residential permitted development rights. For example, the right to erect or extend an agricultural building under Class A of Part 6 of Schedule 2 to the GDPO 2015 is potentially subject to control by prior approval in respect of the “external appearance” of the building proposed. If, as some decision-makers have said, that control is limited to assessing the effects of that appearance on the building itself, then it would follow, for example, that the effects of that external appearance on the setting of a listed building nearby could not be controlled. Can this really be right?”
His conclusion was that this was not right:
“(i) Where an application is made for prior approval under Class AA of Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the GPDO 2015, the scale of the development proposed can be controlled within the ambit of paragraph AA.2(3)(a);
(ii) In paragraph AA.2(3)(a)(i) of Part 1, “impact on amenity” is not limited to overlooking, privacy or loss of light. It means what it says;
(iii) The phrase “adjoining premises” in that paragraph includes neighbouring premises and is not limited to premises contiguous with the subject property;
(iv) In paragraph AA.2(3)(a)(ii) of Part 1, the “external appearance” of the dwelling house is not limited to its principal elevation and any side elevation fronting a highway, or to the design and architectural features of those elevations;
(v) Instead, the prior approval controls for Class AA of Part 1 include the “external appearance” of the dwelling house;
(vi) The control of the external appearance of the dwelling house is not limited to impact on the subject property itself, but also includes impact on neighbouring premises and the locality.”
The judge seeks to downplay the significance of these conclusions:
“The decision of each Inspector was entirely lawful. That is as far as the Court’s function permits this judgment to go. Individual decision-makers will make their own planning judgments applying the prior approval controls, correctly interpreted, to the materials before them. This judgment does not mean that individual decision-makers would be bound to determine the appeals on the three properties the subject of these proceedings in the way that in fact occurred. That is always a matter of judgment for the person or authority taking the decision. I would also add that there is no evidence before the Court to show that the correct interpretation of Class AA of Part 1, along with the related Classes in Part 20, will in practice make it impossible or difficult for developers to rely upon these permitted development rights.”
As it is, given their inherent restrictions and limitations, these new GPDO rights have not yet delivered substantially more homes. Holgate J is of course right that his interpretation will not make it impossible for developers to rely on them – but surely it will make it more difficult in many cases. Despite the analysis in the judgment as to what was said in consultation documents in relation to the new rights, I’m left wondering whether the Government appreciated what confusion these changes would cause and, ultimately, their potentially limited advantages over an application for full planning permission?
As trailed earlier, this week’s Planning Law Unplanned clubhouse event will be all about reducing energy use and increasing renewables, with a sparky collection of guests I assure you… 6 pm, Tuesday 8 February 2022, link to app and event here.
It’s a scandal that leaseholders, through no fault of their own, have been exposed to potentially massive liabilities in relation to building defects for which obviously they were in no way responsible.
Isn’t it obvious that where buildings have been constructed unsafely, in breach of legal standards at the time, then those responsible for that work should be liable (with speedy resolution of that issue and gap funding for works in the interim), but that where the work was done to legal standards at the time we as taxpayers should pick up that burden?
In terms of arriving at a solution, has Michael Gove’s 10 January “developers must pay” announcement made things worse or will it prove to be a turning point?
We’re all guilty of swimming along in our separate lanes. I’m a planning lawyer, not a construction lawyer, property litigator or tax lawyer. But I wanted to understand the basics of what exactly is happening here, particularly since the Secretary of State was reported as threatening to use the planning system to make life more difficult for developers if they don’t agree a “fully funded plan of action”.
Since February 2021, we have known that the Residential Property Developer Tax will apply from 1 April 2022 in relation to residential property development recognised in accounting periods ending on or after that date. It will apply to companies or groups of companies undertaking UK residential property development with annual profits in excess of £25 million and is a new 4% tax on profits they make on UK residential property development. As set out in HMRC’s 27 October 2021 policy paper, “the tax forms part of the government’s Building Safety Package aiming to bring an end to unsafe cladding, provide reassurance to homeowners and support confidence in the housing market. Given the significant costs associated with the removal of unsafe cladding, the government believes it is right to seek a fair contribution from the largest developers in the residential property development sector to help fund it.” The Government’s aim is to raise £2bn of revenue over a ten year period.
We have also known that the Building Safety Bill is currently going through the House of Lords. Clause 57 of the Bill would enable the Secretary of State to impose a building safety levy “for the purpose of meeting any building safety expenditure”. As explained in a November 2021 DLUHC building safety levy factsheet:
“This is a new levy on developers. In addition to the new Residential Property Developer Tax (which will tax the profits of larger developers for at least 10 years), the levy will contribute towards fixing historical fire safety defects, including unsafe cladding.
We will establish three regulatory “Gateways” at key stages in design and construction, and introduce new requirements during construction, that will apply to higher-risk buildings:
· Planning Gateway one – at the planning application stage
· Gateway two – before building work starts
· Gateway three – when building work is completed
These are stop/go decision points that must be passed before a development can proceed to the next stage, strengthening regulatory oversight of design and construction. At Gateway two, construction cannot begin until the Building Safety Regulator approves the building control application.
There will be sanctions for failure to pay the levy which will be defined in regulations. This will result in the Gateway two application not being approved by the Building Safety Regulator.”
“The levy will apply to developments within scope of the Gateway 2 regulatory process, unless otherwise excluded. That means residential buildings or care homes over 18m or 7 storeys – but subject to exclusions, which we are consulting on.”
Consultation has been carried out as to the design of the levy but we have been waiting for the Government’s response and the quantum of the levy has not yet been determined.
The Secretary of State has been faced with the dilemma of how to relieve leaseholders from their unjustified burden at as little cost to the public purse as possible, presumably recognising that the building safety levy is not going to be able to achieve anything like what is needed .
It was revealed via a 7 January 2022 tweet from the BBC’s Lewis Goodall that Michael Gove had sought clearance from the Treasury “to make a statement resetting the Government’s approach to building safety ahead of Commons Report Stage of the Building Safety Bill”.
The tweet included a screenshot of the response from HM Treasury which authorises DLUHC to seek to secure £4bn funding from developers:
“You may use a high-level “threat” of tax or legal solutions in discussions with developers as a means of obtaining voluntary contributions from them.”
“…the taxpayer should not be on the hook for further costs of remediation”.
“DLUHC budgets are a backstop for funding these proposals (in full i.e. the £4bn if required) should sufficient funds not be raised from industry. You must prioritise building safety oversupply”.
“Lenders and insurers are not included in the “polluter pays” piece – and no contributions should be sought from them”.
Formal announcements were then made by the Secretary of State in the form of:
“Mr Gove has today written to industry giving them a deadline of early March to agree a fully funded plan of action including remediating unsafe cladding on 11-18 metre buildings, currently estimated to be £4 billion.
He warns he will take all steps necessary to make this happen, including restricting access to government funding and future procurements, the use of planning powers and the pursuit of companies through the courts. He adds that if industry fails to take responsibility, the government will if necessary impose a solution in law.”
• The “Dear Residential Property Developer Industry” letter referred to in the announcement:
“I am sure you are as committed as I am to fixing a broken system. I want to work with you to deliver the programme I have set out. But I must be clear, I am prepared to take all steps necessary to make this happen, including restricting access to government funding and future procurements, the use of planning powers, the pursuit of companies through the courts and – if the industry fails to take responsibility in the way that I have set out – the imposition of a solution in law if needs be.”
• A statement to the House of Commons “…we will press ahead with the building safety fund, adapting it so that it is consistent with our proportionate approach. We will now set a higher expectation that developers must fix their own buildings, and we will give leaseholders more information at every stage of the process.”
Note the references in the announcement and letter to “the use of planning powers”. Remember that reference in the Treasury letter to high-level threats?
“ Stuart Baseley, the executive chairman of the Home Builders Federation, said the industry lobby group had made its position clear at the meeting and would continue to engage constructively with the government. “We absolutely agree that leaseholders should not have to pay to remediate buildings. However we firmly believe that any further solutions must be proportionate.”
He said the bill should be shared with “other companies, sectors and organisations”, including “freeholders and the materials providers who designed, tested and sold materials that developers purchased in good faith”.
“As we made clear to the government, we do not believe it should fall to responsible UK housebuilders to fund the remediation of buildings built by foreign companies, developers no longer trading, or other parties.”
“We have made a start through the residential property developer tax and the building safety levy, both announced last February, but will now go further. I will today write to developers to convene a meeting in the next few weeks, and I will report back to the House before Easter. We will give them the chance to do the right thing. I hope that they will take it. I can confirm to the House today that if they do not, we will impose a solution on them, if necessary, in law.”
In the meantime, the House of Commons Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee announced an inquiry into building safety funding on 19 January 2022, with this statement from chair Clive Betts:
“The Secretary of State’s announcements on 10 January were a welcome step towards finally addressing the question of meeting the costs of making residential blocks safe rather than dumping the burden on flat-owners. Leaseholders should not be liable for the costs of removing hazardous cladding from their buildings nor the additional work necessary to make their flats safe.
“In our new inquiry, we want to examine the effectiveness and impact of the Government’s planned measures to make developers and industry pay. We also wish to scrutinise whether the Secretary of State’s approach goes far enough to finally fix this crisis and examine what the funding arrangement to be agreed with industry should look like. We will also want to examine the risk to the Department’s budget, particularly around social housing, if it is not able to secure sufficient funds from industry.”
The public evidence sessions for this inquiry are scheduled take place shortly and will conclude ahead of the Secretary of State’s planned report back to the House of Commons before Easter.”
How is all this going to play out? Who knows. If the development industry (a ridiculously loose term) doesn’t reach agreement with DLUHC, what really could we see in terms of the impacts on planning processes? Of course neither in law nor in practice could the Secretary of State discriminate in planning decision-making against any specific companies holding out from a deal but surely it will influence the priority or not that he gives to measures to increase housing supply by way of planning reform and/or his inclination or not to intervene with authorities where plan making has again stalled and surely it will influence the level at which the building safety levy is set, discriminating hugely against those bringing forward development proposals as against those companies which are responsible for past failings.
No-one should be under any illusion that these issues are easy. Is a “Dear Residential Property Developer Industry” letter accompanied by threats, in order to extract money from companies regardless of culpability, really the answer? We shall find out soon enough.
Meanwhile, this week’s clubhouse Planning Law Unplanned session is entitled “What do we mean by “digitising planning”? Possible futures”. We have five amazing guests: Euan Mills (digital planning lead, DLUHC), Graham Stallwood (director of planning, Planning Inspectorate), Mary Elkington, director, Figura Planning), Stefan Webb (place director, FutureGov) and Shelly Rouse, principal consultant, Planning Advisory Service). Join the app and event here.
SIMONICITY 