Category: Housing

Policing The SPG: New Scotland Yard

Pour encourager les autres or an early demonstration of zero tolerance? 

The Mayor of London’s direction of refusal on 4 September 2017 in relation to a section 73 application to amend a 2016 planning permission for redevelopment of the former Metropolitan Police’s headquarters, so soon after publication of the final version of his affordable housing and viability SPG (see my 20 August 2017 blog post, 20 Changes In The Final Version Of The London Mayor’s Housing & Viability SPG) has certainly focused minds. 

The sale of New Scotland Yard was reported in the Guardian in December 2014 under the headline “Daylight robbery? New Scotland Yard is bought for £370m by developer: Abu Dhabi investor buys famous police headquarters for £370m and says he will replace the block with luxury apartments”. The piece reports that the then Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime “put New Scotland Yard on the market in September [2014] and said it would have cost over £50m to bring the building back up to standard. It bought the freehold for £123.5m in 2008. The sale forms part of a major revamp of the Met estate, which has raised £215m so far through the sale of 52 buildings (with plans to sell up to 200 buildings by 2016/17). The overhaul is estimated to save over £60m in annual running costs by 2016.” The then Metropolitan Police Commissioner was reported as saying that the sale was “absolutely vital“. The move was going to save more than £6m a year in running costs. The sale proceeds “would be used to kit out bobbies on the beat with tablets, smartphones and body cameras.”

The piece reports the sale agent as saying that the sale showed “continuing international confidence in the London market”. “What was clear was that all the bidders could appreciate just what a special opportunity it was”. 
The article goes on: “The new luxury apartments are expected to generate up to £100m in stamp duty when they are sold, as they will be priced over the £925,000 level that attracts a 10% rate.”
The police vacated the building in November 2016 once the purchaser, BL Development Limited (registered in Jersey but reported in the press as “an investment vehicle controlled by UAE-based Abu Dhabi Financial Group”) obtained planning permission from Westminster City Council in April 2016 for a redevelopment comprising 268 apartments. The section 106 agreement dated 27 April 2016 provides for ten affordable homes together with a £10m payment in lieu – and no review mechanism, so a once and for all deal. 
The previous Mayor, Boris Johnson, did not intervene in the planning process. Indeed, the timing rather suggests that the application was referred to him in the run up to the 5 May 2016 Mayoral election and conveniently planning permission was issued before Sadiq Khan’s success in that election.  
I do not know how rigorous or otherwise the viability assessment was at that stage, but it does seem that the benchmark land value used was £277m, some way below the amount that the developer had to pay in reality to secure the site. The sale of this public sector land generated £370m, a figure which would otherwise have come from the tax payer to subsidise police operations. The developer was going into the viability negotiation only able to assume a value for the site that was almost £100m below what it had paid, so it could hardly be said that the whole of the problem lies at the door of the developer for having overpaid for the site in a highly competitive disposal process. 
The Mayor could of course have required as a condition of the sale process that the purchaser provide a minimum of affordable housing and thereby depressed everyone’s bids, and ultimately the sale price, accordingly. He didn’t – a political choice. 
The same month as the police leave the building, November 2016, BL Development Limited make a section 73 application to optimise the scheme – a further 27 apartments, reduced basement space, fewer car parking spaces, other design changes. Its viability assessment seeks to justify (a position accepted by Westminster City Council’s viability consultants) that no further affordable housing can be secured without the scheme being unviable, meaning a reduction in the percentage of affordable housing that would be delivered (net of the in lieu contribution) from 4% to 3%.
Westminster City Council resolves on 16 May 2017 to approve the application, despite strong concerns expressed by the Mayor at stage 1 referral on 20 March 2017. There is then a very long delay before the final stage of the process, namely stage 2 referral to the Mayor where he has a fixed 14 days’ period within which to decide whether to wave it through, call it in or direct refusal. I have no direct knowledge but I assume that discussions were continuing with the Mayor’s viability team to seek to neutralise their position and in any event to make process with the necessary variation to the section 106 agreement – perhaps also to await sight of the final version of the Mayor’s affordable housing and viability SPG. The Mayor’s SPG is published on 16 August and the application is finally referred on 24 August. On the day before the application was referred to the Mayor the applicant increases its affordable housing offer by one unit, on a “without prejudice” basis, on the condition that no viability review mechanism would be required.  
Big stakes for the developer. Is the Mayor going to intervene on such a high profile site which has generated a massive return for his authority? But, on the other hand, how would he maintain credibility in his SPG without intervening on a scheme with, at face value and without descending in detail into the viability position, such a low level of affordable housing, both as originally granted (just before he could do anything about it) and (particularly) as amended?
The application was a natural one to choose from the Mayor’s perspective as it gives rise to a number of the issues addressed in the SPG, for instance:
– approach to section 73 applications

– current affordable housing commitment well below 35% threshold

– issues in relation to assessment of assumed land value, projected sales rates and profit

– land formerly in public ownership

The Mayor’s direction states that the “level of affordable housing provision proposed is wholly unacceptable” for two reasons:

“Affordable housing provision: The proposed affordable housing contribution of 10 intermediate units (3.3% by unit, 2.9% by habitable room) and £10 million off-site payment in lieu has not been adequately justified. The methodology undertaken by the applicant to assess the viability of the scheme is not in compliance with the Mayor’s Affordable Housing and Viability SPG and leads the GLA to conclude that more affordable housing could be supported within the scheme. On the basis of the evidence presented, the applicant has not demonstrated that the scheme will deliver the maximum reasonable amount of affordable housing, and the proposals are therefore contrary to London Plan Policy 3.12 and the Mayor’s Affordable Housing and Viability SPG. 

Viability review mechanism: No provision has been made in the draft s.106 agreement for viability review mechanisms. Given the low level of affordable housing proposed and the significant length of the development programme, the use of review mechanisms is essential in order to reassess the viability of the scheme and determine whether additional affordable housing could be supported. The absence of viability review mechanisms does not therefore support the delivery of the maximum reasonable amount of affordable housing on the site, and is contrary to London Plan Policy 3.12 and the Mayor’s Affordable Housing and Viability SPG.”

The stage 2 report sets out GLA officers’ “significant concerns with the applicant’s approach to the assessment of the viability of the scheme…These include the applicant’s approach to land value, sales rates and profit”. 

So what were the problems identified?
1. The applicant’s viability consultants argued that the 2016 permission had been implemented and that it should should form the basis of comparison with the amended scheme to determine whether it is viable. The 2016 permission viability assessment had previously concluded that the 2016 permission scheme was not viable even with no affordable housing. The applicant had since reviewed its assessment of that scheme and asserted that it was now in fact viable due to assumptions as to lower build costs, lower finance costs and a lower profit target, leading to a higher benchmark land value (£159.34m). When the extant scheme is being used as the baseline for the section 73 scheme, obviously improvements in the viability of the extant scheme raise the bar in terms of how profitable the section 73 scheme would need to be. The report found that this approach was inappropriate “and leads GLA officers to conclude that more affordable housing could have been achieved within the extant scheme, or otherwise that the extant scheme does not provide a reasonable basis for determining the viability of this s. 73 scheme”.
2. The Council’s viability consultants do not escape criticism. They had adopted a market value approach to arrive at a benchmark land value of £200m but, in the view of GLA officers, the consultants had “not demonstrated that their approach to site value properly reflects planning requirements for affordable housing or has been adjusted to ensure that it is compatible with the current day basis of the applicant’s assessment, as required by the Mayor’s SPG”. 

3. The applicant’s appraisal apparently did not factor in a £19.5m reduction in build costs due to a reduction in the size of the basement. 

4. An IRR (internal rate of return) approach was taken to determining a target profit. The SPG states that an IRR approach “is sensitive to the timings of costs and income, and in such cases these value inputs must be robustly justified“. The report finds that the development programme assumed for the project of 8.4 years was long for a scheme of this size and inconsistent with the construction plan submitted with the ES. Slower assumed delivery would depress the profitability of the scheme. A cross-check of profit as a factor of gross development value and of gross development costs (now required by the SPG where IRR is used) showed higher than typical rates of profit. An additional contingency on construction costs was included which was not agreed. 

5. The absence of early and late stage review mechanisms was deprecated. The developer unsuccessfully argued that to include them would be a disincentive to proceed with the section 73 scheme, as opposed to the extant scheme, which does not have them.

6. There is then this political point which I feel uneasy about given the extent to which the previous Mayor had extracted value from the site via the disposal process: “This is a site that has recently been transferred from public ownership, and is in one of the highest value areas in the country. The applicant’s affordable housing offer of 3-4% must be considered in this context.”

So what next? BL Development will need to decide whether to (1) appeal against the directed refusal (which would be a fascinating test of the status to be given to the SPG and indeed the robustness or otherwise of the various viability approaches) (2) sharpen its pencil with a view to a further application or (3) simply build out the extant scheme, fewer units, the agreed affordable housing provision, no review mechanism. 
More widely there are some public policy issues arising as to public land disposals. Maximum value can be extracted at the disposal stage or the disposal opportunity can be used to require, as a bid condition, higher levels of affordable housing than would be possible if the site were sold on an unconstrained basis. But (pace Boris Johnson) you shouldn’t be able to have your cake and eat it. 
Simon Ricketts, 9.9.17
Personal views, et cetera

NIMBY v YIMBY

“Good Grief… anything but address the elephant… the illogical Nimbys” (comment on my last blog post, received via twitter)
I’ve been struggling with “not in my back yard” for a while, almost as bad as the “elephant in the room”.
The Times reported this week a speech by Shelter’s Polly Neate: “Ugly new homes breed nimbys, builders told“.
Canada’s Globe and Mail tells us “Margaret Atwood is a NIMBY – and so are most of us“.

It got me wondering when we all started this absurd Americanised name calling. Wikipedia identifies its first use as in 1980, corroborating a google ngram viewer search which traced its published use back to 1980…

These searches are addictive by the way…


The next morning I was sitting on the train to work, reading John Grindrod’s Outskirts book (buy it) and turned the page to find this passage…


So the derogatory phrase was created by the PR department of a chemical company responsible for the Love Canal pollution scandal that practically singlehandedly led to modern US environmental law in relation to land contamination. Smell a rat?

When someone is objecting to or protesting about something happening in their area, how tempting is it to disregard the objection by labelling it as “nimby” but it’s an ugly blunderbuss of an expression. What if the objection or protest is justified? Who is going to stand up for an area if it isn’t those who live there? Was Jane Jacobs a nimby then? Why does the European Convention on Human Rights protect rights to property (paragraph 1 of the 1st protocol) and to private and family life (article 8)?
The answer is in the respective qualifications to those rights:
– nothing in the right to property “shall impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest”

– the right to private and family life is subject to such interference “as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Of course we know where the finger is being legitimately pointed when people are called out as nimbys – at those who are motivated by overly selfish motives – tranquility and wealth for the few, regardless of the wider public interest. However, are attitudes in fact changing when it comes to housing? A February 2017 report by the National Housing Federation, Demise of the NIMBY: changing attitudes to building new homes, would appear to suggest so.
Predictably, ministers have been on the bandwagon:

Sajid Javid in his speech to Conservative party conference in 2016:

“Everyone agrees we need to build more homes.  

But too many of us object to them being built next to us.  

We’ve got to change that attitude.  

So my message today is very clear: it’s time to get building.”

He doesn’t use the “n” word but the reporting of the speech picks up the signalling, because the word is so populist – we all know (or think we know) what it means:
– Sajid Javid declares war on ‘Nimbys’ who stand in the way of badly-needed new homes (The Independent)

– Sajid Javid attacks ‘nimbyism’ as he calls for 1m new homes (BBC website)

Gavin Barwell was more direct in his speech to the CPRE on 20 February 2017:
“…there are some people who claim the CPRE is merely a respectable front for nimbyism – that behind your public objectives is a private and unrelenting refusal to accept any kind of new development in rural areas.

Of course I know that’s nonsense.

You recognise that well-designed new settlements in sustainable locations can take the pressure off the green belt and you have an unparalleled legacy in influencing the planning system, particularly in the years after the war.

Your vision for garden cities, towns and villages has been adopted by the government. So has your preference for community-design, with extra power and resources for local areas to make this happen.

So now you have got the government behind your ideas I would challenge you to go a step further and prove your detractors wrong.

Support local communities in their quest for good design and actively seek out and champion the best-designed developments – so no one can say your words are not backed up by deeds.”

Is the CPRE a nimby organisation? Well it is certainly depressing to see that members have at their disposal on the CPRE website a copy-and-paste draft letter of objection.
Note the passage in the draft letter that suggests that the objector should draw where relevant on any relevant neighbourhood plan. The Government is of course anxious to distance neighbourhood plans from neighbourhood protectionism. For instance, this is John Howell MP speaking in a debate on neighbourhood planning on 3 July 2017 about those who promote neighbourhood plans:
“I should say at this point that in the main we are not talking about communities who are anti-development; we are talking of communities who want to embrace new housing for the long-term sake of their communities and to ensure that facilities such as pubs and sports clubs do not fall into disuse. They also want new housing above all to cater for younger people and families. There is nothing for the Government to fear here about being in the world of the nimby; neighbourhood plans have allocated some 10% more housing than it was originally suggested they should provide by their district or borough councils. From that point of view, they have been a great success.”

This is an assertion which is difficult to square with experience. Time and again development is being delayed or thwarted by neighbourhood plans that have been made following the most light touch of examination procedures. 

Yimbyism is of course the self-referential counter-balance to anti-housing development interests. 

London YIMBY’s report “Yes In My Back Yard: How To End The Housing Crisis, Boost The Economy And Win More Votes was published by the Adam Smith Institute in August 2017. It is disappointing that their proposed solutions would entail further disruptive legislative change (not going to happen) and don’t to me at least (disclosure, I’m presumably part of the problem as one of the “armies of planning lawyers and consultants” on which “billions of pounds” are apparently spent, referred to in the report) seem to be practical in the sense of delivering a simpler, more effective, fairer system:
“We propose three policies that would hand power back to residents; ways of solving the housing crisis that will also win political parties votes. Each would make a huge difference alone; together they could have a transformative effect on the housing situation in Britain: 

    1. Allowing individual streets to vote on giving themselves permitted development rights, to build upwards to a maximum of six storeys and take up more of their plots. 


    2. Allowing local parishes to ‘green’ their green belts, by developing ugly or low amenity sections of green belt, and getting other benefits for the community in turn. 

3. Devolving some planning laws to the new city-region mayors including the Mayor of London. Cities could then decide for themselves if they want to expand and grow and permit extra housing, or maintain their current size and character.”

It’s a new movement, originating a couple of years ago in San Francisco but gaining real traction. The New York Times reported in July on its second annual conference: California Today: A Spreading ‘Yimby’ Movement.
Yimbyism is good to see, as long it remains positive and is genuinely springing from communities rather than political activists. But we really need to avoid getting entrenched in “brexiteer”/”remoaner” style tribalism. As with Brexit, the underlying public policy issues are complex and often down to difficult political choices to be made against an impossibly complex economic, environmental and legal background. In a climate where simple messages, right or wrong, have greater potency to influence democracy than ever via social media and elements of the traditional media (and certainly greater potency than what the scorned “experts” may say) the message as to the need for housing and for essential infrastructure must be as clear and non-partisan as possible but at the same time we must treat those with opposing views with respect, winning the intellectual argument with the evidence. How to go about winning hearts and minds? There’s a lot of good sense in Shelter’s March 2015 report Addressing Our Housing Shortage: Engaging the Silent Majority. Labelling people as selfish and insular isn’t going to win any argument. QRED*

*quod referendum erat demonstratum

Simon Ricketts, 2 September 2017
Personal views, et cetera

Another Review

“You’re joking, not another one?” (Brenda, April 2017)
This was my reaction too. But let’s try to suspend our cynicism. 
The Raynsford review of planning has been instigated by the Town and Country Planning Association “to identify how the Government can reform the English planning system to make it fairer, better resourced and capable of producing quality outcomes, while still encouraging the production of new homes.” Evidence will be gathered over 18 months with a report to be formally presented at all major party conferences in autumn 2018.
Background papers have been published by the TCPA:
* Background Paper 1: Creating a blueprint for a new planning system in England 
* Background Paper 2: The rise and fall of town planning 

* Provocation Paper 1: Do we have a plan-led system? 

* Provocation Paper 2: People and planning 

The papers are good and if anyone is going to review the planning system then TCPA president and ex Labour housing and planning minister Nick Raynsford is the right person, backed by a heavyweight team (albeit one that is light on developer input). 
But…
Here we are in a becalmed area of policy making, away from the high winds and storms of Brexit, with so many unfinished changes to our current system (a July 2017 House of Commons Library research briefing on the Government’s Planning Reform Proposals counts 22 of them). There have been too many ideas but not enough sieving. There’s an implementation logjam. 
There is little governmental appetite or capacity I’m sure for further significant reform in this Parliament. Putting it charitably, Alok Sharma has hit the ground walking, with little other than disparate funding announcements (eg in August announcements of £6.2m funding for Didcot garden town and £65m funding for build to rent at Wembley Park) and trumpeting of at best inconclusive home start statistics as to new homes starts.
Furthermore, what role does a review have where it has not been called for or endorsed from government, and is one which is led by a former Labour politician, however experienced in the issues? The planning system is a machine, big cogs, little cogs, to deliver the government of the day’s social, economic and environmental objectives. Unless the review is just to be about process, what objectives are to be assumed in framing recommendations? Where is the machine to be pointed? Or is this about establishing a 2020 vision come the next election, but by which time we will be in another place, politically, economically? The past is a different country, but so is the future. 
Too cynical? Perhaps this vulnerable, overwhelmed government, focusing its attention on the impossibility of Brexit, will be only too keen to accept non-partisan thinking. Strike that. Of course it won’t. It pays lip service at best to the recommendations of the Commons CLG Select Committee. It stalls implementation of previously commissioned reports, for example in relation to CIL. I’m sure that the recommendations of the Raynsford report will be wise and wide-ranging. But it will land with a silent thud. 
Has there been any governmental activity that has been subject to quite so many reviews as has the planning system? Perhaps this is inevitable given that planning is a wholly artificial policy construct, a political intervention, but it’s quite a roll of honour:
– Barlow Commission report on the Distribution of the Industrial Population (1940) 
– Utthwatt report on Compensation and Betterment (1941)
– Scott report on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas. (1942)
– Beveridge report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942)
– Reith report on New Towns (1946)
– Planning Advisory Group report on the Future Of Development Plans (1965)
– Skeffington report on Public Participation in Planning’ (1969)
– Dobry review of the Development Control System (1975)
– Those influential white papers Lifting The Burden (1985) and Building Businesses Not Barriers (1986)

– Lord Rogers report Towards An Urban Renaissance (1999)
– The green paper Planning: Delivering A Fundamental Change (2001), together with four daughter papers published at the same time. 
– Barker reviews of Housing Supply (2004) and of Land Use Planning (2006)
– Eddington review of Transport (2006)
– Lyons Inquiry into Place Shaping (2007)
– White Paper, Planning For A Sustainable Future (2007)
– Killian Pretty Review: Planning applications: A faster and more responsive system (2008)

– Penfold review of non-planning consents
– The Conservative party’s Open Source Planning manifesto document (2010)
– Lord Heseltine report No Stone Unturned: In Pursuit Of Growth (2012)
– Local Plans Expert Group (2016)
– Liz Peace’s CIL review (2017)

Those are just some of the reviews that have been undertaken or sponsored by government, to which we can add work by think tanks and campaign organisations such as the TCPA. There are almost too many to catalogue but how about, for instance, the work of: 
– Policy Exchange eg A Right to Build: Local homes for local people (2016)

– CPRE eg Getting Houses Built: How to Accelerate the Delivery of New Housing (2016)

– the Labour party sponsored Lyons Housing Review Mobilising across the nation to build the homes our children need (2014, updated in 2016)

– Shelter eg Solutions for the housing shortage: How to build the 250,000 homes we need each year (2013)

– Institute of Economic Affairs eg Abundance of land, shortage of housing  ( 2012)

– IPPR eg We must fix it: Delivering reform of the building sector to meet the UK’s housing and economic challenges  (2011)

Lastly, we need to keep an eye on what we can learn from the changes currently underway in Scotland. An independent review of the Scottish planning system Empowering Planning To Create Great Places that concluded in May 2016 has led to the June 2017 Places, People and Planning consultation paper. 

Hats off as always to the TCPA for not giving up, sitting on the sidelines or focusing on the here and now. They deserve, and will need, our support because the review’s outcome will not be a soundbite-sized, easy-to-swallow happy pill but will look worryingly like the work of…

experts. 

Simon Ricketts, 28 August 2017
Personal view, et cetera

20 Changes In The Final Version Of The London Mayor’s Affordable Housing & Viability SPG

The final version of Sadiq Khan’s supplementary planning guidance on affordable housing and viability was published on 16 August 2017. I had previously blogged on the November 2016 draft. 

For internal purposes at Town we have prepared a tracked version, showing the differences. There are many, mostly tightening up the language, but also with some material additions and changes of emphasis.

This blog post focuses on 20 of what appear to me to be material changes from the position I summarised last year: 
1. 50% affordable threshold for public land

The threshold for the ‘fast track route’, where viability information is not required, nor review mechanisms as long as an agreed level of progress is made following the grant of permission, remains at 35% for schemes on private sector owned land. However a higher threshold of 50% has been introduced for land “in public ownership or public use” where grants are not available.

“2.33  It is widely recognised that land in public ownership should make a significant contribution towards the supply of new affordable housing. Land that is surplus to public sector requirements typically has a low value in its current use, allowing higher levels of affordable housing to be delivered. For these reasons the Mayor has an expectation that residential proposals on public land should deliver at least 50 per cent affordable housing to benefit from the Fast Track Route. 


2.34  Where a public landowner has an agreement in place with the Mayor to provide 50 per cent affordable homes across a portfolio of sites, individual sites which meet or exceed the 35 per cent affordable housing threshold and required tenure split may be considered under the Fast Track Route. Where such an agreement is not in place, schemes that do not provide 50 per cent affordable housing will be considered under the Viability Tested Route. 


2.35  Where 50 per cent affordable housing is delivered on public land, the tenure of additional affordable homes above the 35 per cent is flexible and should take in to account the need to maximise affordable housing provision. 


2.36  This will apply to land that is owned or in use by a public sector organisation, or a company or organisation in public ownership, or land that has been released from public ownership and on which housing development is proposed.”

Is the definition in paragraph 2.36 specific enough? What are companies or organisations in public ownership? What if the land was released from public ownership long ago?

2. Specific advice in relation to section 73 applications

“2.14  For schemes that were approved under the Fast Track Route, any subsequent applications to vary the consent will not be required to submit viability information, provided that the resulting development continues to meet the 35 per cent threshold and required tenure split, and does not otherwise result in a reduction in affordable housing or housing affordability. 


2.15  For schemes where the original permission did not meet the 35 per cent threshold or required tenure split, or where a proposed amendment would cause it to no longer meet these criteria, viability information will be required where an application is submitted to vary the consent and this would alter the economic circumstances of the scheme (for example resulting in a higher development value or lower costs). Such schemes will be assessed under the Viability Tested Route to determine whether additional affordable housing can be provided.

2.16  Proposed amendments that result in a reduction in affordable housing, affordability or other obligations or requirements of the original permission should be rigorously assessed under the Viability Tested Route. In such instances a full viability review should be undertaken that reconsiders the value, costs, profit requirements and land value of the scheme. The Mayor should be consulted where a scheme amendment is proposed that changes the level of affordable housing from that which was secured through the original planning permission.”


There is a risk that the inevitable minor amendments that come forward after grant of planning permission, with less than a material effect on the economic circumstances of a scheme, will lead to the need for updated viability information if paragraph 2.15 is to be applied strictly. This could lead to delays, or to scheme amendments not being pursued if the borough is not prepared to accept that they are non material amendments that can be secured under section 96A.

3. Greater emphasis on viability transparency

The draft guidance already indicated that viability information “should be available for public scrutiny and comment like all other elements of a planning application“. The new guidance ratchets this up a further level:

– “boroughs should implement procedures which promote greater transparency where not already in place”. 

– in submitting viability information, applicants “should also provide a summary of the financial viability assessment which outlines key findings, inputs, and conclusions to assist review by the LPA, Mayor, and members of the public.”

Applicants will still have the opportunity to “argue that limited elements should be confidential, but the onus is on the applicant to make this case“.

4. Habitable floorspace cross-check
Whilst the percentage of affordable housing should be measured in habitable rooms, there is this additional advice:

“Habitable rooms in affordable and market elements of the scheme should be of comparable size when averaged across the whole development. If this is not the case, then it may be more appropriate to measure the provision of affordable housing using habitable floorspace. Applicants should present affordable housing figures as a percentage of total residential provision by habitable rooms, by units, and by floorspace to enable comparison.”

5. Sensible flexibility regarding fast track approach

The draft guidance indicated that in order to follow the fast track approach, even if a scheme offered the threshold level of affordable housing, it was required to “meet all of the other relevant policy requirements and obligations”. The relevant passage now refers to meeting “other obligations and requirements to the satisfaction of the LPA and the Mayor where relevant”.  

6. Greater emphasis on exploring the opportunity for public subsidies

“All schemes are expected to determine whether grant and other forms of subsidy are available and to make the most efficient use of this to increase the level of affordable housing delivered. All applicants are expected to work with the LPA, the Mayor, and Registered Providers (RPs) to ensure affordable housing from all sources is maximised.”

The guidance is intended to be “integrated with the approach to funding set out in the Mayor’s guidance to his Affordable Homes Programme 2016-2021 .”

Funding is said to be available on a fixed grant-per-unit basis:

“2.24  Where developer-led schemes can provide or exceed 40 per cent affordable housing (with grant) then the fixed grant per unit will be available on all affordable housing units in the scheme. 


2.25  Where developer-led schemes are delivering less than 40 per cent, grant will only be available for the additional affordable homes over and above
the baseline level of affordable housing shown as being viable on a nil-grant basis.”

“2.28  Where public subsidy is available to increase the level of affordable housing on a scheme the tenure of additional affordable homes above the 35 per cent is flexible but should take into account the need to maximise affordable housing provision through the available public subsidy.”


7. Build To Rent

The final version of the guidance retains the Mayor’s support for build to rent. Some additional elements have been spelt out in his “build to rent” definition. As well as being a development of at least 50 units, with a build to rent covenant of at least 15 years, with self-contained units, operated under unified ownership and management, the development must:

” • offer longer tenancies (three years or more) to all tenants, with break clauses that allow the tenant to end the tenancy with a month’s notice any time after the first six months; 


* offer rent certainty for the period of the tenancy, the basis of which should be made clear to the tenant before a tenancy agreement is signed, including any annual increases which should always be formula-linked; 


* include on-site management, which does not necessarily mean full-time dedicated on-site staff, but must offer systems for prompt resolution of issues and some daily on-site presence; 


* be operated by providers who have a complaints procedure in place and are a member of a recognised ombudsman scheme; and 


* not charge up-front fees of any kind to tenants or prospective tenants, other than deposits and rent-in-advance.”

There is more detailed guidance about the clawback arrangement if units in the scheme cease to be available as BTR:

“4.14  In line with the Mayor’s approach to affordable housing on Build to Rent schemes, and to ensure that there is no financial incentive to break a covenant, planning permission should only be granted where the scheme is subject to a clawback agreement. The appropriate clawback amount will be the difference between the total value of the market rent units based on the viability assessment at application stage, and those units valued on a ‘for sale’ basis at the point of sale. The LPA should be notified of the sale price of units that are sold and this should inform the market value of remaining units to determine the clawback. The clawback amount must demonstrate a sufficient difference in the value of units between rented and for sale tenures, consistent with the ‘distinct economics’ of build to rent, for the scheme to qualify for the Build to Rent pathway.

4.15  The clawback amount will be payable to the LPA for the provision of affordable housing in the event that market rented units are sold within
the covenant period, which would break the covenant. For larger phased schemes the LPA should consider whether the clawback amount should be disaggregated to the relevant block in which units are sold. The clawback amount should not reduce over time to ensure that the covenant remains effective for the full period. 


4.16  In the event that a share of rented units are sold, and the remaining units are retained within the rental market, an LPA may determine that the clawback 
is calculated based on the units sold. The other units will remain under covenant and the clawback will apply at the point of sale if disposed of within the covenant period. 


4.17  The clawback does not relate to any affordable units provided as part of the scheme. Affordable units are not subject to a minimum covenant period and must always be secured in perpetuity. Additionally, overall ownership of the building(s) in which the units are located may change during the covenanted period without triggering ‘clawback’ if the units remain in single ownership and management as Build to Rent.”

Encouragingly, the guidance indicates that, as the sector develops, “the Mayor will keep under review whether it may be possible to set out a Fast Track Route specifically for developments following a Build to Rent pathway through the planning system.”


8. The “early review”

This is the review that the draft guidance stated was to be carried out when an agreed level of progress on implementing the scheme has not been achieved within two years of the permission being granted. The early review is also in the final version of the guidance, although with a little more flexibility: “within two years of the permission being granted or as agreed with the LPA”. 

Plans in the section 106 agreement “should identify which homes would switch to affordable accommodation in the event of an improvement in viability at this early stage”. 

All review mechanisms should generally set a cap on the amount of additional provision to be sought, which should be 50% affordable housing. Suggested formulae are set out in the guidance. 

9. Mid-term review

For applications that do not meet the 35%/50% threshold, as well as the early stage review there is the late stage review at the point at which 75% of units are sold or let (the review generating payments in lieu rather than an additional requirement for affordable housing in the scheme, and with the surplus split 60/40 between the borough and the developer). However, the final version of the guidance introduces the possibility of mid-term reviews for some schemes:

“For longer-term phased schemes it may also be appropriate to secure mid-term reviews prior to implementation of later phases and an updated Early Stage Review in the event that a scheme stalls for a period of 12 or more months following an Early Stage Review.”

10. Targets for registered providers

“2.30  Generally the Mayor expects RP-led schemes to seek to deliver as much affordable housing as possible within the context of the requirements of London Plan policy 3.12. RPs with agreements with the Mayor have to deliver at least 50 per cent affordable housing across their programmes, and in the case of strategic partners 60 per cent. 


2.31  The approach to grant funding for approved provider-led schemes is set out in Mayor’s Homes for Londoners: Affordable Homes Programme 2016-21. 


2.32  RP-led schemes are likely to benefit from programme grant as set out in 2.30. Individual schemes which are led by RPs with an agreed programme with the Mayor can follow the Fast Track Route if they can commit to delivering a minimum of 35 per cent without grant. This should be set out in the Section 106 agreement along with the proportion of affordable housing which can be delivered with grant.”


11. Density opportunities

“2.37  Where a scheme meets the 35 per cent affordable housing threshold it may also be appropriate to explore the potential to increase densities on a case- by-case basis to enable the delivery of additional affordable homes where this meets exemplary design standards. It is for LPAs, and the Mayor where relevant, to consider the weight to be given to the benefit of additional affordable housing above the threshold, where this arises through increased densities or scale.”

12. Incentivising largely or entirely affordable housing schemes


“2.42  To incentivise schemes that are largely or entirely affordable, those that propose 75 per cent affordable housing or more as defined by the NPPF may be considered under the Fast Track Route whatever their tenure mix, as long as the tenure and other relevant standards are supported by the LPA.”

13. Affordable housing requirements for co-living and student accommodation

As did the draft, the final version of the guidance sets out that”new types of non-self contained accommodation [the final version adds: “such as purpose-built shared accommodation“] can play a role in meeting housing need where they are of high quality and well designed.” These should not be classed as affordable provision (and nor should hostels). The final version of the guidance states:

“2.51…Affordable housing contributions on these schemes will be assessed through the Viability Tested Route, and should be provided as separate or off-site self- contained provision, or cash in lieu payments. 


2.52  Student accommodation developments will also be assessed under the Viability Tested Route. Affordable student accommodation should be provided onsite in line with the Mayor’s Housing SPG.”


14. More detailed guidance on off-site affordable housing and cash-in lieu contributions

The guidance stresses that “[v]iability alone is insufficient justification for off-site affordable housing provision or a cash in lieu payment” and goes on to set out in more detail than previously how off-site provision and cash-in-lieu payments are to be calculated:

“2.61  Off-site affordable housing requirements will be calculated by reference to the total housing provision on the main development site and any linked sites providing off-site affordable housing. For the purposes of the initial assessment and viability reviews the policy target would equate to 50 per cent affordable housing provided across the main site and any linked sites providing affordable housing when considered as a whole. 


2.62  The starting point for determining in-lieu contributions should be the maximum reasonable amount of affordable housing that could be provided on-site as assessed through the Viability Tested Route. The value of the in- lieu contribution should be based on the difference in Gross Development Value arising when the affordable units are changed to market units within the appraisal. This is to ensure that where the on-site component of
market housing is increased as a result of the affordable contribution being provided as a cash in-lieu payment, this does not result in a higher assumed profit level for the market homes within the assessment which would have the effect of reducing the affordable housing contribution. 


2.63  The maximum value of any in-lieu contribution, for the purposes of the
initial assessment and viability reviews (the policy cap), will be based on
the equivalent of 50 per cent affordable housing provision. As with off-site affordable housing provision (see above), the target will be a percentage of the on-site market housing taken together with additional affordable housing provided off-site. 


2.64  Where an LPA has established a locally based approach for determining in-lieu contributions, such as a tariff based approach, this may be applied where this would result in a higher level of affordable housing provision (or higher policy cap).”

15. More detailed advice on estate regeneration schemes

Existing affordable housing that would be lost in an estate regeneration scheme should be replaced on a like-for-like basis. The guidance clarifies that this means “that, for example, homes at social rent levels should be replaced with homes at the same or similar rent levels, or that specialist types of affordable housing should be replaced with the same type of housing. The Fast Track Route does not apply in these circumstances, and all estate regeneration schemes should follow the Viability Tested Route to deliver the re-provision of the existing affordable floorspace on a like-for-like basis and maximise additional affordable housing.”


There is also this new passage

“2.67  Where a borough is redeveloping an estate as part of a wider programme then it may be possible to re-provide a different mix of affordable housing
on the estate, taking account of the wishes of people who want to return to the estate, if the affordable housing is re-provided like-for-like or increased across the programme as a whole. This must also take account of the affordable housing requirements on the linked sites (i.e. it must be in addition to what the linked site would have delivered on its own). Further information on Estate Regeneration can be found in the Mayor’s Good Practice Guide.”

16. Scheme delivery


There are these new passages:

“3.10  Applicants should demonstrate that their proposal is deliverable and that their approach to viability is realistic. As such appraisals would normally be expected to indicate that the scheme does not generate a deficit, and that the target profit and benchmark land value can be achieved with the level of planning obligations provided. If an appraisal shows a deficit position the applicant should demonstrate how the scheme is deliverable. 


3.11  Where an applicant is seeking to rely on assumptions of growth in values these should be provided. For shorter-term non-phased schemes which are based on current day values and costs, growth assumptions should be included as a scenario test. 


3.12  For phased or longer-term schemes, it may be appropriate to include growth assumptions within the appraisal to ensure that this is realistic and that affordable housing is maximised. These should be informed by recognised market sources for the relevant area. Where this is the case viability review mechanisms will be required as set out in this guidance given the uncertainty in determining viability at the application stage. Higher profit targets should not be assumed which offset the benefits of this approach.”

17. Greater examination of costs information

Appraisals should set out the gross to net floorspace ratio of the proposed development. 

There are these additional passages as well:

“3.23… Applicants should submit elemental cost plans that are consistent with the level of detail provided in the drawings in support of planning applications (i.e. RIBA Plan of Works Stage C). Wherever possible such assessments should be benchmarked against other similar projects. Where an appraisal is based on current day values, costs should not include build cost inflation. 

3.24  LPAs are strongly encouraged to use cost consultants to rigorously assess scheme proposals and verify whether costs are appropriate taking into account pricing, quantities, specification, and assumed development values. Consideration should also be given to scheme design and whether development costs could be reduced as part of a cost/ value assessment.”

“3.26  Professional and marketing fees should be justified taking account of the complexity of the development and development values. Costs applied on a percentage basis should be realistic when considering the monetary value of the assumed cost.”
17. Additional passages in relation to developer profit

“3.32 In line with PPG a rigid approach to assumed profit levels should be avoided and applicants cannot rely on typically quoted levels. 


3.33  Factors that may be relevant when assessing scheme-specific target profit levels include the scheme’s development programme, and whether it is speculative or provides pre-sold/ pre-let accommodation. Market forecasts and stock market trends may also provide an indication of perceived market-wide risk”. 

18. Greater flexibility as to the use of internal rate of return

The draft guidance set out an expectation that the IRR measure of return would not be used for schemes providing fewer than 1,000 units. This is gone, although where IRR is used, profit must also now be considered as a factor of gross development costs or gross development value.

19. Defining EUV and any premium 

The guidance clarifies that where “a proposed EUV is based on a refurbishment scenario, or a redevelopment of the current use, this is an alternative development scenario and the guidance relating to Alternative Use Value (AUV) will apply.”


There is this additional passage in relation to the quantification of any premium:

“The level of premium can be informed by benchmark land values that have been accepted for planning purposes on other comparable sites where determined on a basis that is consistent with this guidance.”
20. Advice on the use of market value

In the limited circumstances where a non EUV+ approach is acceptable, there is more detailed guidance on the use of transactional evidence to establish market value:

“3.49  In the very limited circumstances where this approach may be justified,
an applicant must demonstrate that the site value fully reflects policy requirements, planning obligations, and CIL charges, and takes account of site-specific circumstances. Market land transactions used must be fully evidenced and justified as being genuinely comparable and consistent with the methodology applied in the viability assessment. These should also be used to determine whether the residual value of the scheme and cost and value inputs are realistic. The applicant should also consider the: 


- EUV; 

– the Residual Land Value assuming a policy compliant affordable housing offer; 

– the Residual Land Value based on an assumption of no affordable housing; and

– the Residual Land Value based on evidence from recent comparable market transactions. 


3.50  Land is valued on a current day basis; changes in circumstances since a site has been purchased are a factor of development risk. Land transactions may also be based on unrealistic assumptions regarding development density, changes of use, or planning obligations. Where site value does not take full account of the Development Plan or CIL charges, where market land transactions are not fully evidenced and genuinely comparable, or where transactions are based on a different methodology and have not been appropriately adjusted, reliance on market transactions will not be supported. 


3.51  If an applicant seeks to use an ‘alternative use value’ (AUV) approach it must fully reflect policy requirements. Generally the Mayor will only accept the use of AUV where there is an existing implementable permission for that use. Where there is no existing implementable permission, the approach should only be used if the alternative use would fully comply with development 
plan polices, and if it can be demonstrated that the alternative use could be implemented on the site in question and there is market demand for that use. 


3.52  In order to demonstrate the value of a policy compliant alternative that does not benefit from an implementable permission but does have a realistic prospect of achieving planning permission, the applicant should provide a detailed alternative proposal, incorporating current day costs and values. The applicant should also explain why the alternative use has not been pursued.”


In short, there’s a lot for us all to get our heads around. If I have missed anything, no doubt you will let me know…

Simon Ricketts, 20 August 2017

Personal views, et cetera

[Thank you, Rebecca Craig at Town Legal for rising to my initial “spot the difference” challenge].

New Cases, Old Law: Verdin, Cumberlege

There have been two interesting judgments already this August, both by well-respected members of the planning bar sitting as deputies. Not everyone is away. Both cases illustrate the political and unpredictable nature of decision-making where neighbourhood plan issues arise. Between them they include a range of traditional, but still interesting and difficult, planning principles:
– When is the decision maker taken to have a closed mind or for his or her decision to be improperly infected by lobbying?
– How should the decision maker determine whether proposed planning conditions may or may not be relevant to the decision?
– The test to be applied when determining when a decision may be invalid when a consideration, that is capable of being material, is not taken into account.
– the extent of the requirement for consistency in decision making. 
– the effect on a decision of a material error of fact in its reasoning
The first two issues are addressed (as well as others) in Verdin and the last three issues are addressed in Cumberlege.
Verdin (t/a the Darnhall Estate) v Secretary of State & Cheshire West and Chester Borough Council  (Robin Purchas QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge, 10 August 2017). 
This proposal for 184 dwellings on the edge of Winsford, Cheshire, had been recovered on appeal for the Secretary of State’s own decision, rather than being left for an inspector to determine, due to the then emerging Winsford neighbourhood plan. (It will be remembered that the Secretary of State’s policy, most recently stated on 12 December 2016, for a further period of six months which ended on 12 June 2017, has been to recover for his own decision making all appeals in relation to “proposals for residential development over 25 dwellings in areas where a qualifying body has submitted a neighbourhood plan proposal to the local planning authority but the relevant plan has not been made“. This has slowed down and added uncertainty in relation to many appeals that frankly should have been left for capable inspectors to determine.)

After a very slow application and appeal process (application July 2013, refusal November 2013, inquiry June 2014, reopened inquiry following representations that material considerations had changed September 2015, decision letter July 2016), the Secretary of State had dismissed the appeal, against his inspector’s recommendations. In so doing he partly relied on a finding that the scheme was in conflict with the Winsford neighbourhood plan. Unlike his inspector, who found that there were “very substantial social benefits from the proposal“, the Secretary of State found that any benefits of the proposal not outweighing a combination of that conflict and “moderate harm to the environmental dimension of sustainable development from the adverse impact of the loss of open fields”. As part of his downgrading of the benefits that the inspector saw as arising from the scheme, the Secretary of State took the view that four proposed conditions put forward by the appellant (requiring self-build housing as part of the development; requiring training and employment measures; requiring local building firms to be used, and requiring local procurement) did not meet the six tests in the NPPF (necessary; relevant to planning and to the development to be permitted; enforceable; precise; reasonable in all other respects) and therefore he did not take them into account.

The deputy judge’s judgment is interesting for the factual references in passing to the lobbying and internal deliberation that is going on behind the scenes. See for instance paragraph 129, referring to lobbying from the local MP seeking to delay the decision until after an inspector had reported on the local plan (presumably with the hope that the report would assist objectors’ case on the five year housing land position) and referring to civil servants’ internal email correspondence which was said by the appellant to demonstrate that the decision was being delayed to give time for the neighbourhood plan to be made. Paragraph 144 also refers to “the existence of a draft submission from one officer in the planning casework division which proposed a recommendation that the appeal be allowed but which was subsequently changed in the submission that was made to ministers”. 

A number of the appellant’s grounds of challenge were rejected, including that the then planning minister Brandon Lewis had a closed mind in deciding not to permit residential schemes on sites not allocated in the neighbourhood plan by virtue of the letter that he had sent in 2016 to the Planning Inspectorate in relation to appeals involving neighbourhood plan issues (“wholly unarguable”); that the Secretary of State had unlawfully delayed his decision (which the deputy judge did not infer into the internal email correspondence) and that he acted unlawfully in allowing himself to be lobbied by local members of Parliament (no basis for that because the letters were made available allowing representations to be made).
However, the deputy judge went on to quash the decision on the basis that the Secretary of State had no basis for rejecting the proposed conditions requiring training and employment measures; requiring local building firms to be used, and requiring local procurement. Whilst the Secretary of State was justified in rejecting the self-build housing as going beyond the advice in the NPPF because it sought to control the values at the plots would be made available, there was no basis for his criticisms of the other conditions. The judgment includes a useful analysis of the legal tests and an examination of the conditions against those tests. 
Whilst no doubt the appellant will be pleased to have another shot at persuading the Secretary of State to arrive at a different conclusion this time round, it is disappointing to be left with the sense that timing is all and the Secretary of State and his civil servants, as well as of course objectors, know it. Who hasn’t sensed from time to time that decisions have been subject to delay whilst at the same time, conveniently for objectors, the housing land supply position has changed or an emerging neighbourhood or local plan has gained traction? And who doesn’t sense that appeals such as this are as much about the politics as the about the evidence?
Baroness Cumberlege of Newick v Secretary of State & DLA Delivery Limited (John Howell QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge, 4 August 2017). 
This related to an appeal against refusal of planning permission for an even smaller scheme, for up to 50 dwellings in Newick, Sussex. Here the appeal had been allowed by the Secretary of State who had recovered it due to the then emerging Newick neighbourhood plan. However the decision was challenged by Baroness Cumberlege and her husband, both local residents and members of the Newick Village Society. The baroness, aside from being a Conservative peer, has, according the judgment “been a parish, district and county councillor representing the village“. She argued that:
– the Secretary of State had wrongly determined that a key policy of the local plan was out of date, without explaining the inconsistency of that conclusion with the reverse conclusion reached by him in another recovered appeal decision. 

– the Secretary of State had made a material error of fact in treating the appeal site as falling outside an area of 7km designated for the purpose of protecting the Ashford Forest SPA and SAC (yes, this is a case to add to those covered in my 8.4.17 blog post, Heffalump Traps: The Ashdown Forest Cases).

Having allowed the appeal, when faced with the challenge the Secretary of State submitted to judgment on the first ground of challenge and did not participate in the hearing in front of John Howell QC – never a good moment for the developer to be left to justify as lawful that which the decision maker himself is now prepared to disown. 
For what would seem to be a limited series of issues, the judgment is a long one at over 50 pages. Helpfully, the deputy judge’s conclusions are summarised from paragraph 148 onwards. To summarise the summary (rarely a good idea):
– Where a matter is not required by legislation to be taken into account, “a decision may be invalid when no reasonable decision maker in the circumstances would have failed to take that matter into account”. 

– “There is a public interest in securing reasonable consistency in the exercise of administrative discretions, which may mean that it is unreasonable for a decision maker not to take into account other decisions that may bear in some respect on the decision to be made”

– “Given that one reason why the Secretary of State may “recover” planning appeals in order to determine them himself is to introduce coherence and consistency in development control, however, avoiding apparent and unexplained inconsistencies in the Secretary of State’s own decisions on matters that may have ramifications for decision making in other cases is an important consideration in determining what may be required of him if he is not to act unreasonably”. 

– No reasonable decision maker would have failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that he had not issued any decisions relating to the question as to whether the relevant local plan policy was out of date. “It can only undermine public confidence in the operation of the development control system for there to be two decisions of the Secretary of State himself, issued from the same unit of his department on the same floor of the same building within 10 weeks of each other, reaching an apparently different conclusion on whether a development plan policy is up to date without any reference to, or sufficient explanation in the later one for, the difference”. 

– The Secretary of State made a material error of fact in relation to whether any part of the site was within the Ashdown Forest 7km radius, which led to no consideration as to whether a condition should be imposed to prevent any dwellings from being constructed in that part of the site in breach of the Habitats Regulations. 

The planning permission was quashed, although the deputy judge granted permission to appeal on both grounds.
It is indeed concerning that the DCLG would appear to have no adequate system to prevent the Secretary of State from issuing obviously inconsistent decisions – and indeed concerning that the conflicting conclusions could be reached in the first place, calling into question the extent to which objective determinations, shorn of context and politics, can be reached. Perhaps if the Secretary of State had not recovered so many appeals the problem wouldn’t have arisen. (It is even more difficult for the rest of us to keep track without a public-access searchable database). 
The political obsession with seeking to give neighbourhood plan making a strong role in decision making is coming at great cost: delay, expense, a reduction in the objectivity of decision making (in my personal view) and, most worryingly, is continuing to be a drag on the delivery of new homes. 
Simon Ricketts, 12 August 2017
Personal views, et cetera

First World Problems 2: Amalgamations And Deconversions

Securing planning permission for your proposed super-basement is definitely a first world problem (see my previous 5 December 2016 blog post). 
As is seeking to knock two or more flats or houses into one.
There’s that scene in Help! where John, Paul, George and Ringo each open their separate front doors in a terraced street, which all open into one enormous Beatle mansion. (Illusions shattered: in reality Ailsa Road, St Margarets followed by a set at Twickenham Film Studios.).

Until 2000, the general view was that amalgamations like this, as well as deconversions of flats back into single dwellinghouses, probably didn’t amount to development requiring planning permission. The statutory definition of development specifically includes sub-division of dwellings (“the use as two or more separate dwellinghouses of any building previously used as a single dwellinghouse involves a material change in the use of the building and of each part of it which is so used“, section 55(3)(a), Town and Country Planning Act 1990) but is silent as to amalgamation. 
The way in which that position has changed, without any change in legislation is an interesting example of the way in which the scope of planning law and of relevant planning considerations can change over time to reflect social priorities and concerns.
The judgment of Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge in London Borough of Richmond v Secretary of State (28 March 2000) was a significant turning point. “It is undoubtedly the law that material considerations are not confined to strict questions of amenity or environmental impact and that the need for housing in a particular area is a material consideration…” The case involved a conversion from seven flats to one dwelling. 
It was then thought that this case could often be distinguished in terms of the number of units that were to be lost in that case and that LPAs would face an uphill struggle where they did not have policies in place restricting amalgamations resulting in the loss of dwellings. 
For instance, Kensington and Chelsea’s consolidated local plan currently states that the council will “resist development which results in the net loss of five or more residential units”. Until August 2014, the council took the view that this constrained its ability to argue that amalgamations leading to the loss of less than five units did not amount to development requiring planning permission. In R (Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea) v Secretary of State (Holgate J, 15 June 2016), Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC was representing the owners of two flats in Stanhope Gardens SW7 seeking to defend a certificate of lawfulness of proposed use which they had won on appeal. The inspector had considered that without a formal change in policy, the loss of a unit by way of amalgamation could not be relevant, even though the inspector accepted that “the scale of amalgamation in the Borough may be having a material effect on the number of dwellings in the Borough“. Holgate J held that this approach was wrong – whilst the nature of the policy would be relevant to whether planning permission should be granted, this did not mean that the housing need concerns raised by the council were not significant “for the threshold purpose of deciding whether planning permission even applied“. All was not however lost for the owners – the inspector had also granted planning permission for the amalgamation and the council’s challenge to that decision was rejected. 
RBKC’s local plan partial review, which is currently under examination, proposes a more restrictive policy that would only allow any amalgamation where the resulting dwelling is less than 170 sq m. Westminster City Council takes a different approach. Policy S14 of its city plan indicates that:
“Proposals that would result in a reduction in the number of residential units will not be acceptable, except where: 

* the council considers that reconfiguration or redevelopment of affordable housing would better meet affordable housing need; 


* a converted house is being returned to a family-sized dwelling or dwellings; or 


* 2 flats are being joined to create a family-sized dwelling.”

Amalgamations are a drag on net housing supply in both boroughs. Housing in London 2015: The evidence base for the Mayor’s Housing Strategy (Mayor of London, September 2015) reports:

“Between 2011/12 and 2013/14 a net 5,010 homes were created through conversions and a net 1,160 homes were lost through de-conversions.

Conversions were most common in accessible Inner London locations, and de-conversions in high price areas. The ward with the most conversions in this period was St. Leonard’s in Lambeth with 74 followed by Childs Hill in Barnet with 65. The three wards with the highest numbers of de- conversions were all in Westminster – Hyde Park (with 42), Knightsbridge and Belgravia (27) and Bayswater (26).”


Planning Resource briefly reported (subscriber only content) a ruling by Lang J on 27 July 2017 in Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Secretary of State, where she apparently quashed the decision of a planning inspector, who had allowed an appeal against refusal of planning permission partly on the basis of a certificate of lawfulness of proposed use or development for a proposed amalgamation that had been issued before the council’s August 2014 change in stance. Presumably she considered that circumstances had materially changed such that the certificate could no longer be relied upon. 

The battle has moved now to whether planning permission should be granted, rather than whether it is necessary. On 13 July 2017, in Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Secretary of State and Noell and Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea v Secretary of State and Lahham Deputy High Court Judge Neil Cameron QC quashed two decisions where separate inspectors had granted permission on appeal. The inspector had made a mistake of fact in both decisions when calculating housing land supply as he deducted vacant units returning to use from the requirement whilst including those units in the supply and by stating that the housing land supply would be boosted further by recent deliverable planning permissions when those planning permissions were already accounted for in the calculated supply. The Secretary of State did not defend either claim. Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC acted for the owners (if there’s a golden thread that runs through the case-law on amalgamation, it’s Christopher). 
Pending a tighter policy being in place, Inspectors have indeed still been allowing appeals in Kensington and Chelsea. For instance:
– Warwick Gardens, Kensington, 17 May 2017:
“In regards to the development plan, whilst I find conflict with Local Plan Policy CH3 and London Plan Policy 3.14 in that a unit of residential accommodation would be lost, and saved UDP Policy H17, the appeal proposal would not prejudice the Council’s ability to meet its housing supply targets or give rise to unacceptable harm in regards to housing choice. Indeed, it would assist to address the imbalance in the housing stock in regards to 3 bedroom dwellings. Consequently, I do not consider that the appeal proposal conflicts with the development plan when taken as a whole.”

– 15 Cheyne Place, Kensington, 10 April 2017:

“The proposal would conflict with Policy CH3 of the CLP and 3.14 of the LP, which seek to ensure that that there is a sufficient supply and choice of housing. Notwithstanding this conflict, I do not find that, in this instance, the proposal would undermine the Council’s ability to achieve its housing targets. In addition, it would also make a contribution towards an identified need for three bedroomed units. Moreover, the emerging Local Plan Partial Review indicates that the Council intend to accept amalgamation development of this scale. Therefore, in culmination, I attribute significant weight to these matters which outweighs the moderate conflict the proposal has with the CLP and LP.”
– 28 Victoria Road, Kensington, 11 January 2017:
“I saw at the site visit that the garden arrangement as existing is not ideal. There are presently no separate areas that 2 individual units could use and, if shared, residents of the upper floors would be able to gain views into the bedroom window of the ground floor flat whilst using the garden. To restrict the use of the garden to the ground floor occupants would leave the larger unit with no outdoor amenity space apart from a small terrace at first floor level.”

– 77 Drayton Gardens, Kensington, 4 November 2016:

“As part of its Local Plan Partial Review, the Council is about to consult on a policy which would permit the amalgamation of two residential units to one, if the gross floorspace of the resulting unit would not exceed 170 sqm. Mr Burroughs’ unchallenged evidence is that the resulting unit in this case is 99 sqm. ”

“The amalgamation of two residential units (second and third floor flats) into a single residential unit conflicts with CLP Policy CH3, saved UDP Policy H17 and LP Policy 3.14B, which aim to ensure an adequate supply and choice of housing to meet identified needs. The Framework also requires Council to boost significantly the supply of housing. However, on the evidence before me, the amalgamation will not, on the balance of probability, affect the Council’s ability to meet its housing targets. Furthermore, it will contribute to meeting a current identified need for larger dwellings in the borough, whilst improving the quality of accommodation, in accordance with LP 3.14A. Furthermore, in the light of the terms of a policy now being proposed as part of the Local Plan Partial Review, the Council appears to consider that amalgamations of this kind could be acceptable. On balance, these are material considerations which indicate that I should allow the appeal on ground (a) and grant planning permission, notwithstanding the conflict with the development plan.”

Simon Ricketts, 6 August 2017
Personal views, et cetera

Not In My Neighbourhood

To my mind, the problems with neighbourhood plans that I listed in my 19.2.17 blog post haven’t gone away. 

In fact, two changes to the neighbourhood plan process that were switched on from 19 July 2017 by the Neighbourhood Planning Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1) Regulations 2017 will just bring the issues to the boil at an earlier stage:

– section 1 of the 2017 Act gives decision makers a duty to have regard to neighbourhood plans as a material consideration once they have been examined, prior to their having been approved in a neighbourhood referendum or finally made (ie ‘adopted’ in local plan language). 

– section 3 of the 2017 Act requires decision makers to treat a neighbourhood plan as part of the statutory development plan once they have been approved by a referendum (unless the local authority then decides not to make it). 

In the meantime, the last few weeks have seen various rulings from the High Court and decision letters from the Secretary of State that demonstrate the complexities, uncertainties and tensions that are arising. 

Farnham Neighbourhood Plan
Bewley Homes Limited v Waverley District Council (Lang J, 18 July 2017) 

The claimants, Bewley, Wates and Catesby, were three development companies unhappy that their respective development sites were not allocated for development in the draft Farnham neighbourhood development plan. 
The case illustrates the real difficulties that arise both with grappling with detailed issues during the examination process and seeking to assert, when the report has been published, that the examiner’s reasoning is deficient. 
The claimants’ first line of attack was that the examiner was wrong to conclude that the draft plan complied with the basic condition of being in conformity with the strategic policies of the 2002 local plan. 
Lang J sets the bar very low in terms of the extent of the examiner’s duty to give reasons for the conclusions in his report: “I consider that an Examiner examining a neighbourhood plan is undertaking a function which is narrowly prescribed by statute and he is subject to a limited statutory duty to give reasons. It is distinguishable from the function of an Inspector determining a planning appeal, where the duty to give reasons is expressed in general terms.”
Secondly, she makes clear that the requirement that the neighbourhood plan must be in general conformity with strategic policies in the relevant local plan is pretty loose in practice: “The authorities establish that the phrase “in general conformity” is a flexible test which allows for some differences. The plans do not have to match precisely. It was a matter of planning judgment for the Examiner to decide whether the degree of the differences was such that he could not properly find that “the making of the [plan] was in general conformity with the strategic policies in the development plan”, as required by paragraph 8(2)(e) of Schedule 4B. For that purpose, he was required to consider the plan as a whole.”



The judge found that it was sufficient that the examiner referred to his consideration of Farnham Parish Council’s Basic Conditions Statement, from which it could be taken that he accepted Farnham’s Basic Conditions Statement as the basis for identifying the strategic policies in the Local Plan 2002.
Lang J noted that even if the reasoning had been flawed, in the light of the Court of Appeal’s ruling in DLA Delivery, “the Examiner could lawfully have adopted a different route, holding that the strategic policies restricting housing development had become time-expired in 2006 and were now redundant, and could be disregarded.”
The claimants’ other grounds of challenge arose from detailed evidence and submissions that they had made on issues relating to SANGS land and relating to a landscape study on which a key policy in the draft plan was based. It is clear that the developers had approached both issues in some forensic detail. However, the judge was satisfied with the light-touch way in which the matters had been addressed in the report:

“It was sufficient that the Examiner recorded at paragraphs 2.4, 2.7 and 2.8 that he had considered all the written material submitted to him, together with the discussions at the public hearing, all of which provided him with sufficient information to enable him to reach his conclusions. The main points raised by the Claimants were adequately addressed in the report and the Examiner’s conclusions were made sufficiently clear.”

“The Claimants invited me to infer that the Examiner did not consider the Wates’ material because he did not refer to it. However, given the limited scope of his examination, he was not required to refer specifically to the evidence and representations presented by the Claimants, and the points raised therein. There was a large volume of evidence and these were not principal documents. It was sufficient that the Examiner recorded that he had considered the representations. He also stated at paragraphs 2.4, 2.7 and 2.8 that he had considered all the written material submitted to him, together with the discussions at the public hearing, all of which provided him with sufficient information to enable him to reach his conclusions.”

Faringdon Neighbourhood plan
Hoare v Vale of White Horse District Council (Deputy High Court Judge John Howell QC, 7 July 2017)
Here policy 4.5B in the draft plan sought to safeguard Wicklesham Quarry for employment uses following completion of quarrying and restoration activities on the site and to support such development on it provided that there is a demonstrable need for it, no other suitable site closer to the town centre is available and certain other conditions are met.
The claimant was a local resident objecting to the allocation. 
The court took a similar approach as in Bewley to complaints as to the lack of general conformity with strategic policies in the local plan:


“The phrase “strategic policies” is, like “general conformity”, inherently imprecise, and it is not one in my judgment to which the court should seek to give a spurious degree of precision. Which policies in a development plan warrant that classification will inevitably involve a question of planning judgment that will be framed (but not necessarily exhausted) by the objectives of the particular plan and the policy’s significance in relation to their achievement and to the character, use or development of land in the area to which the plan relates which it seeks to promote or inhibit. The more central or important the policy is in relation to such matters the more likely it will be that it may be a “strategic policy” in that plan. Its identification as “strategic” or as part of the “strategic policies” in that plan may well provide a good indication of its significance. But the fact that it is not so identified does not necessarily mean that it is not a strategic policy and its identification as such does not necessarily mean that it is.”



The claimant also submitted that Policy 4.5B is about a “county matter”, which is a category of “excluded development” that cannot lawfully form part of a neighbourhood plan; and that the District Council erred in treating the quarry as “previously developed land” for the purpose of the NPPF. 
The deputy judge held that the policy was not about a county matter, given that it sought to safeguard the Quarry for employment uses following the completion of quarrying and restoration activities on the site: “The provision which is excluded from a neighbourhood plan is not any provision about any development in respect of land which is the subject of a restoration condition or an aftercare condition. It is any provision about development which “would conflict with or prejudice compliance with” such a condition. There may be operations or uses that can be carried on on such land without doing so. Moreover there is nothing to preclude a neighbourhood development plan making provision about a development that may be carried out on land subject to such conditions but only after they have been complied with. That may in fact be desirable in order to provide guidance about the future use of the land. Thus in my judgment the mere existence of such conditions applicable to an area of land does not mean that no provision about that land may be made in a neighbourhood plan.”



The deputy judge agreed that the council had indeed been wrong to categorise the site as previously developed land, given the restoration condition. However, he did not consider that the error was material to the outcome of the plan and declined to quash the plan on that basis.

 
Not easy to challenge a neighbourhood plan, is it?

Central Milton Keynes Business Neighbourhood Plan

The Secretary of State issued his decision letter on 19 July 2017, granting planning permission to Intu Milton Keynes Limited for extension of the Intu Milton Keynes shopping centre. The application was supported by Milton Keynes Council but had been called in by the previous Secretary of State Greg Clark in November 2015, who indicated that for the purposes of determining the application he wished to be informed as to “the consistency of the application with the development plan for the area including the Central Milton Keynes Business Neighbourhood Plan”.

The Central Milton Keynes Business Neighbourhood Plan was England’s first business neighbourhood plan. Central Milton Keynes Town Council objected to the application. As part of its objections it sought to portray the proposals as contrary to policies of the Neighbourhood Plan seeking to protect semi-public open space in Midsummer Place and seeking to retain Central Milton Keynes’ classic grid pattern.

However, the Secretary of State agreed with his inspector’s conclusion that the application was “in accordance with development plan policies, including those in the Neighbourhood Plan, and is in accordance with the development plan overall”.

The inspector indicated that her finding was “based on a balanced interpretation of Policy CMKAP G3. Had I taken an absolute approach to the policy, the reduction in the quantity of semi-public open space, would have resulted in a breach of the policy. Nevertheless, the proposed development would have been consistent with the development plan as a whole. In the final instance the considerable benefits of the proposal would have been material considerations sufficient to indicate that it should be determined other than in accordance with the development plan”. 



Buckingham Neighbourhood Plan
The Secretary of State declined to follow his inspector’s recommendation and, by his decision letter dated 17 July 2017, refused planning permission to Bellway Homes for a development of 130 dwellings in Buckingham. The inspector concluded that the neighbourhood plan was silent as to the proposed development of the application site. The Secretary of State disagreed:

“the larger housing sites, representing both the acceptable location and level of housing, are specifically identified and allocated in the BNDP. Both larger sites and the smaller windfall sites being confined to within the settlement boundary (HP7). The application site, being both unallocated and outside the settlement boundary, falls within neither category above and, as a consequence, the Secretary of State considers the proposals are not policy compliant. This is a policy conflict to which the Secretary of State attaches very substantial negative weight in view of the Framework policy (paragraphs 183-185) that neighbourhood plans are able to shape and direct sustainable development in their area and that where an application conflicts with a neighbourhood plan, planning permission should not normally be granted (paragraph 198).”

Barnham and Eastergate Neighbourhood Plan & the Walberton Neighbourhood Development Plan
 Yet another application called in so that the Secretary of State could consider whether development proposals (for 400 dwellings as well as commercial development in Fontwell, West Sussex) were consistent with (here two) neighbourhood plans. The Secretary of State granted planning permission, by his decision letter dated 13 July 2017, finding that the proposals were indeed consistent, “subject to careful consideration at the reserved matters stage”. 
In relation to each of these applications, call in by the Secretary of State on neighbourhood plan grounds has been directly responsible for significant delays, of at least 18 months. In each of the applications there has been significant debate, argument and uncertainty as to the meaning of neighbourhood plan policies – perhaps no surprise given the light touch, difficult to challenge, nature of the neighbourhood plans examination process.
Isn’t it time for a proper review of the costs and benefits of the neighbourhood plans system as it is currently operating?
Simon Ricketts, 22 July 2017

Personal views, et cetera

Courts Interpret NPPF Paras 14, 133/134, 141 (But Couldn’t It Be Clearer In The First Place?)

The Government’s chief planner Steve Quartermain has confirmed this week that the revised NPPF will be published before the end of the year. To what extent will it reflect the proposed changes set out in the previous Government’s ‘response to consultation’ document that was published alongside the February 2017 housing white paper and to what extent will it take on board any changed political priorities since the June 2017 election or indeed various inherent uncertainties and ambiguities which have continued to occupy the courts?
Paragraph 14
I have previously blogged as to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Suffolk Coastal, which resolved (by way of a judgment of Solomon in which all parties, by operation of unexpected judicial reasoning, both won and lost) the question as to how the paragraph 14 presumption applies where there is no five year supply of housing land. 
The Court of Appeal in Barwood Strategic Land II LLP v East Staffordshire Borough Council (30 June 2017) has now resolved the question as to the presumption in favour of sustainable development applies in the mirror image position, where there is a five year supply and where the plan is not in other respects out of date. 
As in other matters, the NPPF is unclear on the meaning and application of the presumption in favour of sustainable development. Perhaps the presumption is oversold in the ministerial foreword: “Development that is sustainable should go ahead, without delay – a presumption in favour of sustainable development that is the basis for every plan, and every decision.”
Paragraph 14 expresses the presumption as a “golden thread running through both plan-making and decision-taking“, before going on to set out what this means for plan making and decision making. For decision making it means:
” ◦ approving development proposals that accord with the development plan without delay; and

    * where the development plan is absent, silent or relevant policies are out-of-date, granting permission unless: 
– any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework taken as a whole; or

– specific policies in this Framework indicate development should be restricted.”

The question that has exercised the courts in a series of cases is whether the presumption applies outside these specific instances, for example even where a scheme is contrary to an up to date plan. 

Lindblom LJ first sets out how judges should approach questions of policy interpretation, referring back to his first instance judgment in Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (19 March 2014): 
“Planning policies are not statutory or contractual provisions and should not be construed as if they were. The proper interpretation of planning policy is ultimately a matter of law for the court. The application of relevant policy is for the decision-maker. But statements of policy are to be interpreted objectively by the court in accordance with the language used and in its proper context.”
He refers to his statement having been “underscored” by the Supreme Court in Suffolk Coastal where they set out that “the interpretation of policy will be suitable, in principle, for legal analysis – though only to a degree that depends on the context and content of the policy in question.”
Lindblom LJ followed the approach taken by Holgate J in Trustees of the Barker Mill Estates v Test Valley Borough Council (25 November 2016) in finding that is no freestanding presumption in favour of sustainable development outside para 14. 
Of course that is not to say that, as long as paragraph 14 is correctly interpreted, applicants cannot pray in aid other matters (factors where the development would accord with other policies in the NPPF) as material considerations, to overcome the presumption. It was a shame that (because in this case the judge was found to have misinterpreted paragraph 14) Lindblom LJ did not find it necessary expressly to put right some curious reasoning of the first instance judge, Green J, as to the operation of the statutory presumption in favour of the development plan set out in section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. In his judgment Green J tries to box in the exercise of a decision maker’s discretion with odd passages such as this:
“Insofar therefore as paragraph [14] permits of a residual discretion it must be recognised that the outcome arrived at by the operation of paragraph [14] should carry considerable gravitational pull. It should yield only as an exception to the norm where there exists objective and substantial reasons which can be readily demonstrated to a high degree of probative value and which takes into account the particular reasons why a development has been found to collide with the Local Plan. I should add however (see paragraph [54] below) that I express no concluded view on exactly how exceptional “exceptional” actually is; this being an issue better explored in a case where that issue truly arises.”

Whilst not specifically tackling this approach, Lindblom LJ pointedly follows the Supreme Court in Suffolk Coastal and Holgate J in Barker Mill with a warning against excessive legalism in matters of policy interpretation:

“I would, however, stress the need for the court to adopt, if it can, a simple approach in cases such as this. Excessive legalism has no place in the planning system, or in proceedings before the Planning Court, or in subsequent appeals to this court. The court should always resist over-complication of concepts that are basically simple. Planning decision-making is far from being a mechanical, or quasi-mathematical activity. It is essentially a flexible process, not rigid or formulaic. It involves, largely, an exercise of planning judgment, in which the decision-maker must understand relevant national and local policy correctly and apply it lawfully to the particular facts and circumstances of the case in hand, in accordance with the requirements of the statutory scheme. The duties imposed by section 70(2) of the 1990 Act and section 38(6) of the 2004 Act leave with the decision-maker a wide discretion. The making of a planning decision is, therefore, quite different from the adjudication by a court on an issue of law (see paragraphs 8 to 14, 22 and 35 above). I would endorse, and emphasize, the observations to the same effect made by Holgate J. in paragraphs 140 to 143 of his judgment in Trustees of the Barker Mill Estates.”

Paragraphs 133/134

What is the extent of the setting of a listed building for the purposes of assessment of harm?

In Steer v Secretary of State (Lang J, 22 June 2017) the main issue was treatment by an appeal inspector of the impact that proposals in Allestree, Derbyshire, for residential development and associated development would have on the landscape character of the area and heritage assets, namely Kedleston Hall (a grade 1 listed building), Kedleston Park (a grade 1 listed park), Kedleston Conservation Area, Kedleston Hotel and Quarndon Conservation Area. The Council, Historic England, the National Trust and others had opposed the appeals on the basis that whilst the proposed development was at some distance from, and would not be visible from the assets, there were historic and social/economic connections between the areas which meant that the appeal site was properly to be regarded as within the setting of the listed hall and park. 
The definition of ‘setting’ in the glossary to the NPPF is unspecific: “The surroundings in which a heritage asset is experienced. Its extent is not fixed and may change as the asset and its surroundings evolve.”
Lang J concluded that the inspector adopted an unlawfully narrow approach when determining whether the appeal site was part of the setting of Kedleston Hall and misdirected himself that a visual connection was necessary or determinative, in addition to the evidence of a historical connection.
The judge found that the inspector’s “focus was upon identifying a visual connection, and assessing the proposal’s impact upon it. The historic social and economic connections were set to one side in this exercise.”
“The evidence was that the appeal site was part of the setting of the Hall because it had formed part of the estate, managed historically as an economic and social entity, and it remained in its historic agricultural use, with hedges and mature trees characterising the field boundaries. From the Hall and the Park, the surrounding rural context was important in preserving a sense of a parkland landscape at the centre of a managed rural estate, rather than in a suburban context. The site was on the primary visitor route to the Hall and Park and so visitors would experience the historical narrative, and the concentric influence of the Hall on its landscape, as they traversed the agricultural estate, then entered the enclosed, designed park and gardens, enjoying the drama of anticipation as a great English country house was revealed to them.”
In reaching her conclusion it is interesting to see the reliance that Lang J places on Historic England’s good practice guide on the setting of heritage assets. 

Paragraph 141

Hayes v City of York Council (Kerr J, 9 June 2017) concerned a planning permission granted by York Council for the construction of a visitor centre at the base of the motte at Clifford’s Tower in York and the installation of a new staircase and tower floor, with walkways, balustrading, a roof deck with a café and other restoration works. A car park next to the site is to be removed. The project includes archaeological works and disturbance to buried artefacts. 

The case concerned the meaning of paragraph 141 of the NPPF, which states that where heritage assets are lost or partly lost, local planning authorities and developers should make archaeological records publicly available, but “the ability to record evidence of our past should not be a factor in deciding whether such loss should be permitted”. 
The challenge was brought by a member of the council. One of his complaints was that the council had taken account of a legally irrelevant factor, namely the ability to record evidence of the past.
Kerr J reviewed the more detailed national heritage policies that preceded the NPPF and the way in which the precise wording changed and finally was summarised in, and replaced by, the NPPF:

“The codification exercise which created the NPPF delivered commendable brevity, at the price (well worth paying) of replacing detailed exposition with general policy statements that can be Delphic, as in this instance.”

He turned to paragraph 141:
“The difficulty arises from the wording in the last sentence: “the ability to record evidence shall not be a factor in deciding …”. Those words do express, as a matter of language, what appears in conventional public law parlance to be the exclusion of a material consideration. Read literally, those words say not only that the ability to record evidence cannot be the sole justification for the harm; it cannot even contribute to the justification for the harm.”
Kerr J had real difficulty with this literal reading:
“Why should the preservation of information about an asset not be weighed in the balance along with other factors in favour of a development that harms a heritage asset? The harm is attenuated by the preservation of information and making it publicly available, which enhances and better reveals the significance of the harmed asset and hence its positive contribution to the locality and to our heritage.”

“This difficulty can only be overcome, in my judgment, once it is recognised that a non sequitur crept in when PPS 5 replaced PPS 16, and then found its way into the language of NPPF paragraph 141. In my judgment, the last sentence of that paragraph only makes good sense if interpreted so that the words “should not be a factor” are taken to bear the meaning “should not be a decisive factor”, in deciding whether the harm to the asset should be permitted.

I appreciate that, even allowing for the fact that the NPPF is a policy document and not a statutory provision, this interpretation stands uneasily with the actual words of the last sentence of the paragraph. But unless the paragraph is interpreted in that way, it would be very difficult to apply in a coherent manner.”

Kerr J rejected paragraph 141’s “literal interpretation in favour of a sensible and liberal construction of the paragraph in its proper historical context“.
Wider thoughts

So, three recent examples of the way in which the courts embark upon interpreting policy (whether national or local) and its application, consistent of course with the Supreme Court’s approach in Tesco Stores Limited v Dundee City Council (21 March 2012) that “policy statements should be interpreted objectively in accordance with the language used, read as always in its proper context. 

That is not to say that such statements should be construed as if they were statutory or contractual provisions. Although a development plan has a legal status and legal effects, it is not analogous in its nature or purpose to a statute or a contract. As has often been observed, development plans are full of broad statements of policy, many of which may be mutually irreconcilable, so that in a particular case one must give way to another. In addition, many of the provisions of development plans are framed in language whose application to a given set of facts requires the exercise of judgment. Such matters fall within the jurisdiction of planning authorities, and their exercise of their judgment can only be challenged on the ground that it is irrational or perverse (Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759, 780 per Lord Hoffmann). Nevertheless, planning authorities do not live in the world of Humpty Dumpty: they cannot make the development plan mean whatever they would like it to mean.”
Despite the reference to interpreting policies “objectively”, it will be seen that the courts will draw upon context, previous gestations of guidance and extraneous guidance documents to assist them. Sometimes, as in Hayes, the strict meaning of words will be stretched in a way that potentially leads to uncertainty. 
A broader approach to the interpretation of development consents by reference to extraneous documents than has traditionally been the case was signalled by the Supreme Court in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Limited v the Scottish Ministers (16 December 2015):
“When the court is concerned with the interpretation of words in a condition in a public document such as a section 36 consent, it asks itself what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole. This is an objective exercise in which the court will have regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the relevant words, the overall purpose of the consent, any other conditions which cast light on the purpose of the relevant words, and common sense. Whether the court may also look at other documents that are connected with the application for the consent or are referred to in the consent will depend on the circumstances of the case, in particular the wording of the document that it is interpreting. Other documents may be relevant if they are incorporated into the consent by reference (as in condition 7 set out in para 38 below) or there is an ambiguity in the consent, which can be resolved, for example, by considering the application for consent.”
To my mind, this all takes us into dangerous territory. Isn’t the public, or a purchaser of a development site, entitled to take words as meaning what they say. The courts are having to step in and complete the gaps left by inadequate drafting. Whilst its focus is a long way away from planning law, Lord Sumption’s speech The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of Contracts given at Keble College Oxford on 8 May 2017 is a thought-provoking read. One of the concluding passages:
“It is I think time to reassert the primacy of language in the interpretation of contracts. It is true that language is a flexible instrument. But let us not overstate its flexibility. Language, properly used, should speak for itself and it usually does. The more precise the words used and the more elaborate the drafting, the less likely it is that the surrounding circumstances will add anything useful. I do not therefore accept that the flexibility of language is a proper basis for treating the surrounding circumstances as an independent source from which to discover the parties’ objective intentions.”
I agree! Let’s aspire to use words precisely, whether in the drafting of policies, permissions or indeed agreements, rather than relying on the courts as a slow, expensive and unpredictable backstop. And given their broad effect, surely policies ought to be written even more carefully than contracts?
Simon Ricketts, 8 July 2017
Personal views, et cetera
Image by Rob Cowan.

Crossrail 2, Where Are You?

We’ve got some work to do now. 
George Osborne’s March 2016 budget indicated that the then Government would be “investing in the infrastructure that will deliver economic growth for the next generation” by a number of measures, including “securing London’s future infrastructure by giving the green light for Crossrail 2 to proceed. The government will provide £80 million to develop the project with the aim of bringing forward a Hybrid Bill this Parliament”. 


There have been rumours that the Treasury or Department for Transport subsequently have not yet been convinced of the business case but, whatever the reason (the twin challenges of Brexit and the need to devote resources to Northern Ireland to prop up a new born minority government? Politics = events, dear boy, events), the project’s absence from the Conservatives’ 2017 manifesto and subsequently from the Queen’s Speech on 21 June has been hugely disappointing. 
Perhaps given Mr Osborne’s new job it is no surprise that on the day of the Commons debate on the Queen’s Speech, 29 June, the London Evening Standard set out its concern in a strongly written editorial, but the points are surely well made. 
Delay to the project would have a series of harmful consequences:
– Postponement of the commuting benefits and congestion relief that it will bring. Given the need to provide additional capacity at Euston ready for the opening of HS2 in 2033, it is time critical (see City am’s 28 June 2017 piece).
– Loss of the opportunities that it will open up for additional housing and employment development around stations on the route, including opportunities for Transport for London to explore the possibilities for land value capture mechanisms. The Crossrail 2 Growth Commission confirmed in its 2016 report that the project could unlock 200,000 additional homes and 200,000 additional jobs. Without Crossrail 2, how will further housing come forward at the scale that is needed? In this uncertain period, are key sites going to lie fallow or developed at less than the scale that could be achieved with better rail connectivity?

– The unnecessary cost of delay, estimated by Crossrail 2 managing director Michele Dix at £2bn a year.

– Extended blight that will be caused along its current route, safeguarded in 2015 and shown on this interactive map.

– The uncertainty that has now been created for the impending replacement London Plan, the first draft of which we will see in November. The implications of Crossrail 2 are so significant that might the Mayor have to publish “with and without Crossrail 2” draft policies? How can the likely effects of the plan be properly assessed with such a question mark over Crossrail 2? 

The Mayor commenced consultation on 26 June 2017 in relation to his Mayor of London Community Infrastructure Levy 2 Preliminary Draft Charging Schedule (MCIL2 PDCS). MCIL1, which was adopted on 1 April 2012, was directed towards funding Crossrail 1. MCIL2 is directed towards funding Crossrail 2 and the Mayor intends for it to be adopted in April 2019. 

The proposed per sq m rates are £80 for band 1, £60 for band 2 and £25 for band 3, save that in central London and the Isle of Dogs, the rates for office, retail and hotel uses will be £185 for offices, £165 for retail and £140 for hotel uses.
 
Central London. 


Isle of Dogs

The Mayor’s supporting information says this about the current funding position for Crossrail:
“Since the 2016 Budget, Transport for London, the Greater London Authority and the Government have been working to develop a funding package for the project as part of the development of a strategic outline business case. The London contribution to the costs of Crossrail consists of four funding sources: 

    * Crossrail 2 net operating surplus – i.e. the net impact of Crossrail 2 on TfL’s rail revenues 


    * over station development – proceeds from development of land and property initially required for construction (development related with Crossrail 2 will pay Mayoral CIL 2 on the same basis other developments) 


    * a Business Rate Supplement (BRS) (once the current BRS repays Crossrail 1 related debt) 


    * a Mayoral Community Infrastructure Levy (MCIL2).”


MCIL2 is intended to meet approximately 15% of the project’s costs. What if Crossrail 2 does not go ahead? The document states:

“Negotiations on the Crossrail 2 scheme are still underway and there is no agreed funding package at present. However, MCIL2 does need to be brought forward now to avoid a charging gap at the end of Crossrail 1 construction and to allow for early funding of the Crossrail 2 scheme. Should no funding deal be achievable, the Mayor will be able to apply the MCIL2 proceeds to fund other strategic transport projects for which there is a significant funding gap.”
Crossrail 2 is also a key strand of the Mayor’s draft transport strategy published on 21 June 2017: “It
 will enable London’s highly productive economy to continue to grow by helping 270,000 more people get into the centre in the morning peak. It will thereby support 200,000 new jobs, as well as unlocking 200,000 additional new homes – more than 30 per cent of them outside London”

So what is happening behind the scenes? Will Crossrail 2 emerge in a leaner form? A City am story on 26 June asserts (denied by Crossrail 2) that a revised business case provided to the Government in March had dropped the proposed station at Kings Road Chelsea (the subject of a vociferous celebrity-backed campaign) and that possible stations at Turnpike Lane and Balham have been replaced by Wood Green and Tooting Broadway options respectively. The continued speculation without any real information, isn’t helping anybody.

What political weight, if any, does the National Infrastructure Commission still have? George Osborne (him again) established the NIC in October 2015 to “determine Britain’s infrastructure priorities and hold governments to account for their delivery” and appointed Lord Andrew Adonis as its chairman. NIC’s support of Crossrail 2 was hugely influential in the lead up to that March 2016 announcement. It set out on 26 June 2017 its top 12 infrastructure priorities, with Crossrail 2 featuring strongly: “The Government should by the end of 2017 publish a plan, agreed with the Mayor of London, for the funding and phased construction of Crossrail 2, and for securing the necessary parliamentary consent, taking account of the recommendations in the NIC’s Transport for a World City report.”
If this stasis goes on much longer I may even start to get nostalgic about all of those photos of George Osborne in high vis and hard hat…
Simon Ricketts, 1 July 2017

Personal views, et cetera


Viability & Affordable Housing: Update

This is a supplement to my 28 May 2017 Affordable Housing Tax blog post, since when:
Politics, people
The avoidable tragedy on 14 June of Grenfell and its aftermath – with its residents needing to be rehoused and concerns as to the fire safety of many other council housing blocks – has surely focused attention on the challenge of providing adequate housing.
Except that by cruel irony this has come precisely when the Government is of course having to face other challenges as a result of the 8 June election. Despite the Conservatives’ manifesto promises in relation to “social housing” (later confirmed to be in fact not social housing) and changes to compulsory purchase processes, the background notes to the Queen’s Speech on 21 June simply said this on housing:

“HOUSING


“Proposals will be brought forward to […] help ensure more homes are built.” 

We have not built enough homes in this country for generations. In order to fix the dysfunctional housing market, we need to build more of the right homes, in the right places, and ensure the housing market works for all parts of our community. 


This will help to tackle the increasing lack of affordability by bringing more properties onto the market. It will slow the rise in housing costs relative to the rise in wages, and help ordinary working people gain better access to this most basic of necessities. It will help more ordinary working families buy an affordable home and will bring the cost of renting down. 


In February we published a Housing White Paper, which proposes end-to-end action across the whole housing system, with measures to: 

    * release more land for homes where people want to live; 


    * build the homes we need faster; 


    * get more people building homes; 


    * support people who need help now.

We will deliver the reforms proposed in the White Paper to increase transparency around the control of land, to “free up more land for new homes in the right places, speed up build-out by encouraging modern methods of construction and diversify who builds homes in the country” (p.70). 
We will consult and look to take action to promote transparency and fairness for leaseholders. We will look at the sale of leasehold houses and onerous ground rents, working with property developers, the Competition and Markets
 Authority and others as outlined in the Housing White Paper. 


Key facts 


Getting more homes built 

    * In 2016, the median house price in England was nearly eight times the median earnings – an all time record high. 


    * Home ownership among 25-34 year-olds in England has fallen from 56% in 2005/06 to 38% in 2015/16, whereas the percentage of 25-34 year-olds living in the private rented sector increased from 24% to 46% over the same time period. 


    * 189,650 net additional homes were delivered in 2015/16 in England, up 11% on 2014/15 and the highest level since 2007/08. We need to sustain that momentum to meet the affordability challenge. All credible sources agree we need between 225,000 and 275,000 new homes per year to tackle this problem. “

Are we moving into a period when local rather than national government will have to make the running, regardless of political complexion? Plus ça change, perhaps. Nickie Aiken, leader of Conservative-run Westminster City Council, gave a no-holds-barred speech to the London Real Estate Forum on 13 June 2017:
“There’s no time for on-going pleasant and cosy chats that might improve things for the better at some undefined point in the future.”

“My view is that too many times we have not always pushed back enough in requiring affordable homes onsite, have buckled on viability or surrendered to the idea that brutal market economics simply denies housing opportunities for most people and that is just a harsh fact of life.”

“If you are a developer who wants to invest in and be invested in the future of our city for the long haul you are very welcome.

However, if you are just a speculator who wants to make a fast buck by building properties that only oligarchs and absent overseas investors can afford, you are in the wrong borough.”
It’s good for a politician to make statements such as this but it’s not so popular (although equally true) to say that viability is still a challenge on many schemes. Many sites do attract a high market value regardless of any developer’s proposal (even when circular arguments are avoided) and why would the owner relinquish the site at a loss? Sales prices and costs budgets cannot be guaranteed. Development values are maximised by targeting the most profitable segments of the market and in the approach taken to density, yes to maximise return, but also to make the affordable housing numbers work on top of CIL and other non-negotiable requirements. Criticise from the side lines but would you speculate or lend your own money on any different or more altruistic basis, given the commercial and political uncertainties to which any significant longterm project will be exposed to? For a decision maker to make the right judgment call that maximises both the amount of housing that will actually be delivered and, within that, the amount and range of affordable housing (rather than ending up with nothing more than homes on paper, an unimplemented permission), is never going to be easy. What would make it easier would be:
– closer prescription as to the appropriate methodology to be followed – and for that methodology to follow economic reality as closely as possible so that, on the one hand, developers cannot avoid their proper obligations but, on the other, equally importantly, so that they still have every incentive to develop.  

– alongside that greater prescription, real penalties for those who game the system and bring it into disrepute. 

– due recognition for genuine altruism – how can we encourage good behaviour?

It is crucial to crack this because what the public perhaps doesn’t appreciate is the degree to which affordable housing subsidies are being left to be provided by the private sector – see for example the government’s latest statistics (April 2009 to March 2017) as to HCA/GLA funded affordable housing starts/completions by tenure type.
High Court
The current realities of viability negotiations have been exposed to the light in Minerva (Wandsworth) Limited v Greenland Ram (London) Limited (Rose J, 23 June 2017), a contractual dispute over an overage payment that Minerva, seller of the Ram Brewery site, successfully claimed from its purchaser, Chinese developer Greenland for securing a section 73 permission enabling a tower within the redevelopment scheme to be two storeys higher than initially approved. The factual account by Mrs Justice Rose is relentless in its detail.  
Appeal decisions
One theme of the Minerva case was the way in which the different parties’ viability consultants arrived at vastly differing figures, given the uncertainties as to the approach to be taken to, for instance the hypothetical land cost (benchmark land value) to be taken into account. Whilst the Mayor has set out his preferred approach in his draft affordable housing and viability SPG, the debate has continued and there have been two decision letters this month where inspectors have had to arbitrate between differing approaches taken by appellant and LPA. 
I referred in my 18 June 2017 blog post to a decision letter dated 12 June 2017 concerning a site at the junction of Notting Hill Gate and Kensington Church Street in which Inspector David Nicolson considered that the site value of £33m within the appellant’s viability appraisal (and indeed agreed by RBKC) was too high and he consequently did not accept the appellant’s position that affordable housing “could not be provided on site or, more importantly, that there needs to be a loss of all the existing 20 social housing bed spaces on the site or a net loss in the borough“. The inspector gave little weight to an alternative use value approach and was sceptical as to any figure that might be arrived at using an EUV approach. In his view, in the absence of any planning permission, there was “little sound evidence to show that the site is more of an asset than a liability”. 

The 19 June 2017 decision letter issued a week later in relation to the proposed redevelopment of the former Territorial Army Centre, Parkhurst Road, Islington was highly unusual as the central issue for the inspector, Michael Boniface, to determine was “whether the development would provide the maximum reasonable level of affordable housing in accordance with the development plan”. The proposal, by Parkhurst Road Limited, was for 96 homes and related works. The appellant had purchased the site for £13.25m in May 2013 from the Ministry of Defence. 
At the inquiry the appellant offered to provide 10% affordable housing (up from an initial position that 0% was justified given the viability position). Islington Council’s final position at the inquiry was that it would accept 34% (down from an initial requirement of 50%). The main issue between the parties was as to the appropriate land cost to be allowed for. The benchmark land value argued for by the appellant was £13.26m, a figure established at a previous inquiry, and sought to support the figure by reference to various comparables. The council argued for the EUV+ (existing use value plus premium) approach advocated for by the Mayor in his draft SPG and put forward a figure of £6.75m, which approach and figure was favoured by the inspector. The inspector was also not satisfied with the review mechanism that was proposed. 
Of note for other schemes in Islington, the inspector did not support the council’s proposed obligation, pursuant to its “Wasted Housing Supply” SPD, that would have required that none of the dwellings be left unoccupied or unused for a period of three months or more. The inspector did not consider on the evidence that the obligation was justified or that it could be properly and fairly enforced.
What next?
Obviously all eyes are on Alok Sharma, new housing and planning minister, for some hint of the approach that he will take. 
In the meantime, in London, the adoption of the Mayor’s affordable housing and viability SPG in July will provide more certainty, together with first sight of his draft Replacement London Plan later in the year. 
But ahead of that, an announcement is due on 26 June as to the Mayor’s proposed changes to his CIL charging schedule (to come into effect in 2019). Just remember that almost every penny of any extra charges levied on housing schemes will simply feed through into viability assessments and will reduce any surplus available for affordable housing. 
Time finally for a quick plug: LD Events’ annual Viability & Planning conference is taking place on 28 September 2017. 
Simon Ricketts 24.6.17
Personal views, et cetera

(Town Legal acted for the appellant in relation to the Parkhurst Road inquiry)