Month: October 2025

Commons Select Committee: Land Value Capture

Today’s Commons Housing Communities and Local Government Committee’s report Delivering 1.5 million new homes: Land Value Capture (28 October 2025) contains recommendations which are more wide-ranging than the report’s title would suggest: some practical and, one would hope, uncontroversial; others touching on some raw political nerves at MHCLG no doubt.

Starting with the latter, do turn to the “epilogue” which comments directly on what were at that stage just media reports as to the “package of support for housebuilding in the capital” announcement which the government and the Mayor of London issued on 23 October 2025. The Committee expresses itself to be “seriously concerned by media reports that London’s affordable housing target could be cut” and “the Secretary of State may be considering suspending local authorities’ powers to charge the Community Infrastructure Levy to address concerns about development viability. None of the evidence to our inquiry—including from representatives of developers—advocated abolishing CIL entirely as a means of addressing viability concerns. On the contrary, we heard that the Government should reform CIL to extend its coverage where it is viable.”

“The Ministry must continue its work with the Greater London Authority to deliver an acceleration package, so that London boroughs are delivering housing in line with their local housing need targets. In response to this Report, the Ministry must provide its assessment of how changes to London’s affordable housing target may deliver more affordable housing units, by increasing the number of new homes built overall. Any reduction to London’s affordable housing target must be accompanied by a clawback mechanism to ensure developers return a portion of their profits to the local authority, ringfenced for affordable housing delivery, if a development surpasses an agreed benchmark profit. If London’s affordable housing target is reduced and the number of affordable housing units delivered declines, the Ministry and the Greater London Authority must commit to reinstating the 35% target.”

Perhaps this epilogue is slightly premature, given the actual announcement proved only to be a prologue to a consultation process that will run “from November” (late November is my guess). Perhaps the Committee should hear further evidence on that back of the consultation material to be published – it is slightly odd to be responding just to a newspaper report, particularly given that the actual announcement has been made.

But that epilogue does point to the fundamental policy tension in the current economic environment: what matters most – affordable housing delivery by percentage, or by absolute numbers? See for instance its recommendation that the government’s “forthcoming reforms to its guidance on viability assessments must ensure developers reliably deliver on their agreed affordable housing commitments, with viability assessments only used to alter these commitments retrospectively in the most exceptional circumstances. To support this, we recommend that all local authorities in England must be encouraged to set a minimum percentage target for affordable housing in their local plan [NB what don’t?], with a ‘fast-track’ route planning route for developments which meet this local target.”

“Too often, site-specific viability assessments are used by developers to negotiate down affordable housing requirements in circumstances where this is completely unjustifiable. Affordable housing contributions are frequently the first provision to be cut following a viability assessment, even where a developer may be making other significant contributions through Section 106 agreements and CIL. In areas with high land values, viability assessments should only be used in this way in very exceptional circumstances. Currently, not all local authorities have their affordable housing requirements clearly set out in local policy. Greater clarity from local authorities would provide developers with the right incentives to avoid lengthy viability negotiations, and ensure more applications are meeting local affordable housing requirements from the outset.

As part of its ongoing review of the viability planning practice guidance, the Government must consider how different types of developer contribution could be re-negotiated following a viability assessment, to protect affordable housing contributions. The Government must also update national policy to encourage all local authorities to set a minimum percentage target for affordable housing in their Local Plan for all major developments that include housing. This figure should be based on a local need assessment for affordable housing in each local authority, with particular regard for the local need for Social Rent homes. Local authorities should be encouraged to offer a ‘fast-track route’ for developments which meet the local affordable housing target, by making those developments exempt from detailed viability assessments and re-assessments later in the development process. This would encourage developments with a high percentage of affordable housing and speed up the delivery of housing of all tenures.

The Government must continue to develop its proposal to publish indicative benchmark land values to inform viability assessments on Green Belt land across England. The Government must publish different benchmark land values for each region of England, to reflect variation in land values. The Government must also ensure that the viability planning practice guidance contains clear advice on the “local material considerations” that would warrant local adjustments. The Government should continually review the effectiveness of the policy and consider how it may be extended to development on land that is not in the Green Belt.”

On land value capture itself:

“There is scope to reform the current system of developer contributions in England to capture a greater proportion of land value uplifts from development to deliver affordable housing and public infrastructure. There is a compelling case for such reforms—especially in the context of a deepening housing crisis and with public finances currently under strain. However, a radical departure from the Section 106/Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) regime, which currently constitute the existing mechanisms of land value capture in England, would risk a detrimental impact on the supply of land in the short-term. We recognise that this would be disruptive to the Government’s housebuilding agenda.

Reforms to land value capture should be iterative, starting with improvements to existing mechanisms. Therefore, the Government must immediately pursue the reforms to Section 106 and CIL outlined in the chapters below. These reforms must optimise the system’s capacity to capture land value uplifts and deliver infrastructure and affordable housing—particularly homes for Social Rent—in line with the Government’s wider policy ambitions. The Government must also trial additional mechanisms of land value capture in areas where there are significant uplifts in land value which current mechanisms may not capture effectively. Specifically, the New Towns programme discussed in Chapter 5 presents a vital opportunity to test new ways of financing infrastructure delivery on large developments and learn lessons for future reforms.

Any reforms to land value capture should also be considerate of the wider tax system, to balance public needs and equitable charges on development. To support this work, the Government should publish updated land value estimates, which were last published in August 2020. If the Government does not intend to do so, it must explain why it no longer publishes this data.”

In essence, the Committee sees any radical change as likely to be disruptive to the government’s current agenda. Instead, it is recommending a number of changes which in my view are “no brainers”, for instance better resources for local planning authorities and looking to simplify the approach to section 106 agreements and to CIL:

Reforms to section 106 agreements

“There is a strong case for the introduction of template clauses for aspects of Section 106 agreements across England, as was recommended by the National Audit Office and others. Templates would allow local authorities to focus negotiations on site-specific factors rather than legal wordings. Template clauses would also allow for greater standardisation and clarity of requirements across all local authorities, and in turn reduce the workload of local authorities and Small and Medium-sized Enterprise developers.

As part of the site thresholds consultation that will take place later this year, the Ministry must seek views on how standardised Section 106 templates could most effectively streamline the negotiation process across sites of all sizes. Based on the consultation responses, the Ministry must work with the Planning Advisory Service to develop a suite of Section 106 template clauses and publish these within six months of the consultation closing. Alongside their publication, the Ministry must also update its guidance to local authorities on Planning Obligations to encourage local authorities to adopt these template clauses.”

I covered the same ground in my 14 June 2025 blog post Why Does Negotiating Section 106 Agreements Have To Be Such A Drag? Not only that, but my firm has also been working on an actual template draft for small and medium sized schemes and a specific set of proposals for ironing out the pinch points that currently exist at every step of the sway from arriving at heads of terms through to agreement completion. This was there to be grasped – it is a national embarrassment. We held a workshop on 30 September 2025, attended by a selection of thirty or so lawyers and planners from the public and private sectors, developers and representatives of industry bodies with MHCLG present in an observer capacity. If you weren’t invited I apologise but we were limited by the size of our meeting room! The draft output from the workshop will be released next month. If there is an organisation out there which is willing to make a larger space available in late November for a launch event please let me know.

Section 106 dispute resolution scheme

This may be why I write blog posts…. The Committee picked up on a reference I made in the blog post mentioned above to section 158 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 which has never been switched on, allowing for a dispute resolution procedure to be able to be invoked where necessary during the course of negotiations.

“Local planning authorities across England have expressed concern that protracted Section 106 negotiations are causing delays to housing delivery. Drawn out negotiations do not benefit public outcomes and cause undue delays to development, which may impede the Government’s housebuilding ambitions. Whilst we recognise the Minister for Housing and Planning’s concerns that introducing a dispute resolution scheme may add complexity to the system, we believe the potential benefits to affordable housing delivery and unlocking stalled development outweigh this risk.

The Government should introduce a statutory Section 106 dispute resolution scheme, under the provisions of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. If the Government does not intend to pursue this, it should set out a detailed explanation as to why the Ministry has chosen not to implement the provision legislated for by Parliament in the 2016 Act. This should include setting out any specific technical or legal barriers to implementation which the Ministry has identified.”

Community Infrastructure Levy

Again, nothing earth-shattering. Rather, calls for more transparency as to which authorities are charging CIL and at what rates; widening opportunities for authorities to pool receipts (and recognising the opportunity that the reintroduction of strategic planning will bring) and greater focus on infrastructure funding statements.

On new towns:

The Committee calls on the government to set out where the funding is to come from (“The Government’s New Towns programme is likely to require billions of pounds of public and private investment over several decades, including millions from HM Treasury to establish development corporations during this Parliament”); greater use should be enabled of tax increment funding to fund infrastructure in cities and new towns. Specifically on the role that land value capture might play:

“There is significant potential to use land value capture as part of funding the proposed New Towns, especially on green field sites. However, we are concerned that the Government has announced substantial detail of the 12 potential sites without a planning policy to protect land value, contrary to the recommendation of the New Towns Taskforce. It appears that the Government has not yet established any delivery body to purchase land or enter agreements with landowners, which risks allowing developers considerable time to acquire sites for speculative development and immediately push up land values. The Taskforce said that, in the worst-case scenario, this could “jeopardise New Town plans”.

The Government must immediately conduct an analysis of Existing Use Values (EUV) on each of the 12 sites to maximise the capture of future land value uplifts, and develop plans for using appropriate mechanisms for land value capture on each site. This must include the option of development corporations using Compulsory Purchase Orders to assemble land where ownership is fragmented or negotiations stall. The Government must ensure arrangements for the purchase of land on New Towns sites are in place before it announces its final decision on locations by spring 2026.”

“The Ministry is right to prioritise New Towns which have the greatest potential to boost housing supply in the short-term, but its plan to “get spades in the ground on at least three new towns in this Parliament” does not match the scale of the Government’s housebuilding ambition. The New Towns programme can and must make a contribution towards increasing housing supply during this Parliament.

The Government must immediately clarify how housing delivery in New Towns will interact with local authority housing need targets. In its final response in spring 2026, the Government must include a roadmap for the New Towns programme, to show when each development corporation will be established, when development will commence on each site, and the estimated development timeline for each New Town.”

So will the government meet its 1.5m homes target?

“The housing sector is eagerly awaiting the Government’s Long-Term Housing Strategy, which it first announced in July 2024. Originally, this was to be published alongside the Spending Review in spring 2025. The continuing lack of a cohesive plan to deliver 1.5 million new homes has left the sector in the dark. We are also deeply disappointed that the Government has been unwilling to engage with us on the development of the Strategy, or provide any updates on its delayed publication, other than to tell us that it will be published “later this year”.”

“The Government can only begin to make significant progress towards its 1.5 million target once the sum of local housing need targets in Local Plans add up to that figure. Whilst the Government’s reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework seek to plan for approximately 370,000 new homes per year, local authorities will take several years to transition to this national annual target, as the currently Local Plans take seven years to produce and adopt on average. The Government has stated its ambition to introduce a 30-month plan-making timeline, but the relevant provisions in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 to speed up plan-making have still not been implemented.

The Government must immediately bring forward its Long-Term Housing Strategy without further delay. It must set out an ambitious, comprehensive, and achievable set of policies that will deliver 1.5 million new homes by July 2029. The Strategy must prioritise implementing reforms to the plan-making system to move towards a 30-month timeline. The Strategy document must include an annex to provide the Ministry’s assessment of how many net additional dwellings each policy change will contribute towards annual housing supply, adding up to 1.5 million new homes over the five-year Parliament. If the Ministry is unable to supply this, the Government must make an oral statement to the House to confirm how many new homes it will deliver by the end this Parliament.”

There we have it. If nothing else, that will all spur us on with the work on the template section 106 agreements work and, related to that, I’m very keen to discuss how section 158 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 might provide an effective, light touch, procedure.

Simon Ricketts, 28 October 2025

Personal views, et cetera

Some Week, Some Thoughts

This post will mostly be about judicial review but if instead you have come here for a summary of the implications arising from the joint government/Mayor of London package of support for housebuilding in London (23 October 2025) why not listen to my interview with Concilio’s Nick Dines and we’ll see you back here in 35 minutes?

Judicial review…

Depends which side you’re on doesn’t it.

There have been at least two interesting judgments in the last couple of weeks, interesting for different reasons which nothing to do with the substantive issues involved. I’m not going to summarise the actual cases because they are both covered well (by my Town Legal colleagues Archie Hunter and Adam Choudhury respectively) in Town Legal’s latest weekly planning judgments update (you can subscribe gratis via the button at the foot of the update):

All I wanted to say about CG Fry, given all the excellent summaries that are already out there (including Archie’s), was:

  • Fortune favours the brave. This is a case which was lost by CG Fry at first instance and in the Court of Appeal (all this of course following an unsuccessful planning appeal at which the same arguments were run). Who might have given up rather than carry on, with the exposure to costs arising? Great credit is due to Lord Charlie Banner KC. Would you in that position be resilient enough to hold to your initial opinion and to retain the trust of those relying on it? I’m thinking back to Richard Harwood KC in Dill v Secretary of State (Supreme Court, 20 May 2020) – where the stats were the same: LLW. I’m thinking back also to Estelle Dehon KC in R (Finch) v Surrey County Council (Supreme Court , 20 June 2024) – ruled unarguable on the papers, unarguable at renewal hearing, arguable by the Court of Appeal on two grounds, dismissed then by the High Court and then by the Court of Appeal before success in the Supreme Court: LLWLLW. Within boundaries (some cases are sure-fire losers), litigation is inherently uncertain. Judgments of lower courts may be overturned on appeal. It isn’t over till it’s over. I’ll come back to that theme in my comments on HyNot.
  • Isn’t it interesting that the outcome of the case turned upon the decision of a previous government that the “easy” way to give Ramsar sites the same protection as habitat sites that are protected under the Conservation of Habitats Regulations (special areas of protection and special protection areas) was simply to set that out in national policy rather than by way of amending the relevant legislation? That is now being rectified, belatedly, by way of a government amendment to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. But isn’t there a lesson when it comes to the NPPF itself or rather the proposed National Development Management Policies, envisaged by mechanisms set out in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 as being statutory documents with equivalence to statutory local development plans. Parliament clearly considered that it would not be enough for NDMPs to be given weight through policy-expression but we are all waiting to see in what form these NDMPs are finally going to emerge.
  • Lastly, it’s nice to read a Supreme Court judgment that is so straightforward and clear in its expression – and descriptive of the planning system in a way that any of us would recognise. It’s not always the case (mentioning no names, *coughs* Hillside).

Now to HyNot, again some excellent summaries out there (including Adam’s) so I just wanted to focus on the judge’s comments about “promptness” in bringing judicial review proceedings and on whether the “arguability” threshold should be higher in some cases:

  • This was a permission hearing, where the claimant simply needed to persuade the judge that the claim was arguable.
  • What was under challenge was the grant of consent by Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero of the “HyNet Carbon Dioxide Transportation and Storage Project – Offshore” The project “comprises 3 geological gas storage sites in the Liverpool Bay Area beneath the East Irish Sea. The proposal is designed to store 109 million tonnes of carbon dioxide and is a core part of the Government’s legal commitment to Net Zero. It is expected to create 2,000 construction jobs. The Development (called the Liverpool Bay CCS project) is part of a nationally significant infrastructure development in the North West which will have a very significant regional and national economic impact.”
  • The second paragraph of the judgment describes the claimant as follows: “The Claimant company and the group of individuals behind it do not like CCS in relation to power generation. They oppose it because they believe that CCS in relation to power generation and ‘blue’ hydrogen production is a costly and time-consuming distraction that will lock society into continued fossil fuel use and prevent investment in other more proven climate solutions. The Claimant is a Company Limited by Guarantee which was incorporated the day before this claim was filed. The name chosen by the incorporators of their company, “HyNot”, reveals the nature of its opposition to what, as appears below, is loosely known as the “HyNet Cluster”. The Claimant represents a campaign group which its director, Nicky Crosby, describes as being a loose group of campaigners from different environmental and climate campaign backgrounds, such as Frack Free Dee, Friends of the Earth, Extinction Rebellion, Chester Sustainability Forum, and CAFOD.”
  • Unlike more usual planning cases where there is now a six weeks’ deadline for bringing judicial review proceedings, this was a claim where the traditional judicial review deadline applied that the claim must be brought “promptly … and in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose”. The claim was brought on the last day within the three months’ deadline.
  • After finding the claim to be unarguable, the judge found that he would also have refused permission on the basis that the claimant failed to act “promptly”: “challenges to major infrastructure call for particular urgency. Whilst the volume of documentation was substantial, that did not in my judgment justify the delay, especially in circumstances where the Claimant ultimately filed only on a protective basis, without a pleaded case. I consider that the Claimant was aware of all of the information it required to enable it to bring proceedings on the grounds pleaded approximately 8 weeks before it filed its ‘protective’ claim. Certainly, by the end of April 2025 it was aware of the essential substance of the grounds that would have been available to it, and that is all that was required (see British Gas at paras. [141]-[145]). Detailed disclosure normally follows the grant of permission for judicial review, which is the trigger for the duty of candour and cooperation with the court and is not necessary before a claim can be brought (see British Gas at [145]). There is no reason why the Claimant could not have filed (whether ‘protectively’ or with proper pleadings, to be amended if required) much sooner. It is apparent, however, that the Claimant took the position that it could simply wait until the last day of the three-month period to file. The courts have stated emphatically that that is not the case.”
  • Whilst Saini J found the claim to be unarguable, there is an interesting concluding passage in the judgment recording that counsel for the government had urged the judge in submissions “to apply a more demanding test of the Claimant at the hearing than the traditional arguability test familiar at the permission stage”, relying on case law starting with the 1994 Mass Energy case. Counsel (Charles Streeten) “argued that the Claimant must satisfy a heightened test described as a “reasonably good prospect of succeeding” at a substantive hearing. The following facts were said to justify this more onerous hurdle: (1) the urgency (illustrated both by the categorisation of this claim as Significant under CPR 54D paras. 3.1 and 3.2 and by the measure of expedition ordered by Mould J); (2) the fact that a decision on permission has been adjourned to a hearing listed for half a day; (3) that the Court will have the benefit of extensive written and oral submissions from all three active parties; and (4) that the claim substantially affects the interests of a third party (the Developer).”  Whilst this proved unnecessary for his reasoning, Saini J went on to consider this argument “obiter” as lawyers like to say, i.e. even though it was not determinative and therefore less binding in terms of creating any legal precedent, although in my view still interesting. He considered “that there was substantial force in Mr Streeten’s submissions. A court does retain the discretion to require more of a claimant in establishing the merits of its case at a hearing of the type convened before me concerning an urgent matter of national importance, where there has been substantial pre-reading, detailed skeletons and oral submissions over half a day from all relevant parties. The grant of permission in a planning case on the type of facts before me is in itself highly likely to cast a long shadow over a development of national interest, with substantial financing and construction arrangements involving many third parties. I can see the force of an argument that much more than mere arguability of a claim (such as establishing that the claim is more likely than not to succeed) should be required in circumstances where such prejudice will be caused. Uncertainty as to the legal position is itself highly prejudicial in commercial arrangements.”

All this is relevant in the light of continuing thinking by the government as to ways of closing down unmeritorious judicial review cases. I referred in my 25 January 2025 blog post to the government’s announcement as to changes to be made to procedures governing legal changes of development consent order decisions in relation to nationally significant infrastructure projects (now the subject of provisions within the Planning and Infrastructure Bill), following first the report by Lord Banner KC and subsequent consultation that I summarised in my 28 October 2024 blog post Banner Review Into Legal Challenges of NSIPs (NB there really are other barristers out there I feel sure, I’m not being sponsored or anything). Lord Banner had recommended that there may be a case for raising the permission threshold for judicial review claims challenging DCOs (“There is much to be said for raising the threshold for permission to apply for judicial review of DCOs, to the heightened Mass Energy threshold, so that only those claims likely to succeed are allowed to proceed to a substantive hearing. There is no right, either under UK constitutional principles or international law, for an arguable but weak or mediocre claim to proceed to a full hearing rather than being weeded out beforehand)”, but the government was not inclined to accept this; perhaps the courts are beginning to get there of their own volition in relation to challenges of nationally significant projects? (Although what is the risk that a claim such as that in Finch is prematurely ruled out?). The big question is of course: if these measures are appropriate for challenges to nationally strategic infrastructure projects, why should they not be introduced in relation to planning-related challenges more generally?

To my mind, it is good to see the tough line taken by Saini J on promptness. Given the six weeks’ deadline for planning-related judicial review cases, why is there even still the traditional “prompt but in any event within three months” test, which can be so uncertain in its practical application? I’m currently dealing with a case, in relation to a proposed commercial development, where the claimant (a public authority) filed a day out of time, the challenge delaying significantly a development project, resulting in, according to my client’s evidence, several million pounds of lost rental income. The court has taken over three months before finally allowing the claim to be filed out of time. What sort of signal does this send? Is there some sort of institutional bias towards large infrastructure developments?

And on the question of court delays, is anyone else experiencing unusually long delays before securing decisions at the permission stage on the papers? I have one case where we filed on 6 May. Still… nothing.

Getting the balance right in relation to sieving out unmeritorious judicial review cases is so important given the implications not just for the project under challenge but in terms of giving reassurance to all those operating in the planning system that every document does not need to be “gold plated” as an insurance against even unmeritorious challenge. The fear of a claim for judicial review (successful or otherwise) is skewing every stage of the system!

Finally,  as a result of an amendment to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill tabled by a conservative peer, also a working planning KC (*checks notes* him again!!), the government is put forward its own amendment which will build on the current provisions in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 which allow for an extension of the time for implementing a planning permission which has been challenged by way of judicial review. At present, under section 91 (3), if proceedings are brought to challenge the validity of a planning permission, the deadline for implementation is extended by one year.  The amendment will extend the deadline by a further year if the proceedings have permission to go to the Court of Appeal and by two years if they have permission to go to the Supreme Court. In the case of outline planning permissions, reserved matters submissions will be extended by equivalent periods.

All good and necessary but any steps to speed up judicial proceedings, and to sieve out doomed claims as at early as stage as possible, would of course be more likely to address the root problem.

Simon Ricketts, 24 October 2025

Personal views, et cetera

London Stalling

This one is about the current position with London (non) development and some thoughts about what procedural steps may be open to you if you are a London (non) developer with a planning permission for a scheme that is no longer viable to build out.

On 14 October 2025, Molior published figures for Q3 2025 construction starts and sales in relation to schemes in London with 25+ homes for private sale or rent. Apologies for the extensive quoting but their summary is clearer than anything I can write:

“Between 2015 and 2020, there were 60-65,000 homes for private sale or rent under construction in London at any given time.

Today, that number has fallen to 40,000 … and 5,300 of those are halted part-built.

With a surge of completions expected in 2026, Molior forecasts that just 15-20,000 new homes will be actively under construction on 1st January 2027.”

“London had just 5,933 new home sales in Q1-Q3 2025.

Sales rates are weak across all local markets and at every price point.

At prices up to £600 psf – the level at which most London owner-occupiers can buy – sales to individuals are virtually non-existent.”

“Build-to-rent completions are about to plunge.

Interest rates rose during 2022, then the Liz Truss budget pushed them higher.

This stopped new money from funding London multifamily development.

Completions are set to disappear after 2027 because construction starts fell in 2023 / 2024.”

“There were 3,248 private starts in Q1-Q3 2025.

London is now on track for fewer than 5,000 private construction starts in 2025.”

“Starts have been falling for a decade because sales rates and profitability have been falling for a decade.

Building Safety Regulator delays have made things worse in 2025.”

“Development is unviable across half of London.

Development costs are high, so it is unviable to build profitably in half of London – areas under £650 psf.

This is even if the land is provided free and there are no planning obligations like CIL and affordable housing.”

“London has 281,000 unbuilt permissions.

These numbers are private + affordable C3 permissions.

The numbers include outline consents, detailed consents and unbuilt phases of schemes partly under way.

Also included are projects successful at committee but still waiting S106 sign-off.”

Set all that alongside the homelessness and rough sleeping crises in London. The BBC reported yesterday that more than 132,000 households were living in temporary accommodation on 30 June 2025, up 7.6% from the same time last year. Aside from the human cost, this is of course at a huge financial cost for London boroughs: £740m ‘black hole’: London’s temporary accommodation crisis draining local resources (London Councils, 13 October 2025). And at the sharpest end: Number of people “living on the streets” of London increases by 26% (Crisis, 31 July 2025).

Whilst I try not to wear out my two typing-fingers commenting on press speculation about forthcoming announcements, I think we can assume that the government and the Mayor of London will soon be announcing various measures to try to turn this around or at least provide some sort of jump-start (note to government press team, I suggest that we are in “jump-start” rather than “turbo-charge” territory). See for example the Guardian’s 17 October 2025 piece London developers to be allowed to reduce percentage of affordable homes.

The spectre in the press pieces of some temporary reduction in developers’ threshold for qualifying for the Mayor’s fast-track (i.e. basically avoiding the need for formal viability appraisal and a late stage viability review mechanism if they can commit to a level of affordable housing which is usually 35%, with a policy-compliant split of affordable housing tenure types within that – see policy H5 of the London Plan for more detail) down to perhaps 20% is being seen by some as amounting to an actual reduction in the amount of affordable (and particularly socially rented) housing that will be developed.  But this analysis is unfortunately wrong: very few schemes are currently proceeding with 35% or more affordable housing.  Viability appraisals either agreed or accepted after scrutiny on appeal (this is not developers cooking the books) are already coming out at way less than 20%, let alone 35% (which is why simply reducing the threshold alone wouldn’t be enough). See for instance the inspector’s decision in relation to the Stag Brewery appeal (summarised in my 4 May 2025 blog post (7.5% affordable housing) and the 29 May 2025 decision letter in relation to a proposed tower block in Cuba Street (16.6% affordable housing). Nor is this a purely London phenomenon, if you recall last month’s Brighton Gasworks decision (summarised in my 27 September 2025 blog post) (zero affordable housing).

20%, plus the other measures being whispered about such as increasing subsidies for socially rented housing and/or allowing councils not to charge CIL, may tip the balance so as to turn some non-developers back into being developers again and thereby deliver more affordable housing (including socially rented housing) in absolute numbers (which is what counts after all) than is currently the case.

But what about the many schemes consented on the basis of 35% or more, that simply aren’t proceeding, at least beyond basic operations to keep the permission alive (see my 7 September 2025 blog post The Stressful & Sadly Often Necessary Task Of Keeping Planning Permissions Alive)?

If we look to amend existing, unviable, section 106 agreements, no longer do we have the benefit of section 106BA, a provision introduced in April 2013 via the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013, to allow developers to apply to modify or discharge affordable housing obligations in Section 106 agreements where those obligations made a development economically unviable, and then repealed three years later in April 2016. That provision unlocked various stalled permissions at the time. Is it too late, or too unpalatable, for an amendment to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill simply to reintroduce it?

Instead, the main routes are:

  • If the section 106 planning obligation is at least five years’ old, a formal application to the local planning authority can be made under section 106 A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 on the basis that the relevant obligation, unless modified, “no longer serves a useful purpose”.  The test is expressed very generally which is unhelpful but the case would be that if the obligation is causing development, otherwise beneficial, not to proceed, it cannot be serving a “useful purpose”. There is the right of appeal to the Planning Inspectorate.
  • Seeking variation of section 106 planning obligations in the slip-stream of an application made under section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (an application, of course, for planning permission for the development of land without complying with conditions subject to which a previous planning permission was granted – and which is to be assessed against the current development plan and other material considerations). This was the route taken in the Cuba Street appeal I mentioned above. Full planning permission had been granted in December 2022. A section 73 application was made to amend the approved floor plans set out in the schedule referenced in condition 2 of that permission, to “provide an increase in the residential units from 421 to 434, and a reduction in the affordable housing (AH) provision from 100 (71/29 affordable rented to intermediate split as a ratio) to 58 (66/44 affordable rented to intermediate split as a ratio). In percentage terms the change in AH would be from 30.15 % to 16.6%. A consequence of these changes would be amendments to conditions 24 and 29, with respect to wheelchair accessible homes and cycle storage, given that they relate to the quantum of development subject to the original permission.”
  • Negotiating a deed of variation to the section 106 planning obligation, outside these formal procedures, without any recourse to appeal if the authority is resistant.
  • A fresh application for planning permission – utterly the nuclear option in times of cost, time and risk.

If there is indeed some form of announcement from MHCLG and the Mayor of London, I will be interested to see:

  • What is said about existing stalled permissions and any advice that is to be given to boroughs as to the approach they should take when approached by way of any of these procedural routes.
  • More generally, how will any announced (presumably temporary) relaxations with regard to the London Plan policy H5 threshold approach  or any other policy requirements sit as regards section 38 (6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (“If regard is to be had to the development plan for the purpose of any determination to be made under the planning Acts the determination must be made in accordance with the plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise”)? Where there’s a will there’s a way but this is all another reminder, as if we needed it, that the process for reviewing and updating the London is so slow as not to be fit for purpose.

Oh and we still await MHCLG’s updated planning practice guidance on viability.

“London calling, at the top of the dial.

And after all this, won’t you give me a smile?”

Simon Ricketts, 18 October 2025

Personal views, et cetera

Hillside: Every Journey Starts With The First Step

Various people have asked me what I made of the amendment to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill that Lord Charlie Banner KC sought to introduce last month, seeking to lance the large boil that is Hillside (and if that word means nothing (1) lucky you, read no further, or (2) please read my 2 November 2022 blog post Running Down That Hillside).

The truth is that for a long time I couldn’t really face getting back into the subject, having failed to get traction for expansion of what became section 73B when the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act Bill was passing through its Parliamentary stages, and, before that, having sat behind Charlie at the Hillside Supreme Court hearing. The problem is real, but arriving at a workable solution is hard.

The amendment was as follows:

Huge credit to Charlie because, if nothing else, his amendment has put the issue back on the table with MHCLG. Baroness Taylor’s response in the debate on 11 September 2025 (see columns 1736 to 1741), contained the following passages:

“The Government recognise that the Hillside judgment and subsequent court decisions have caused concerns across the development sector, and the noble Lord was kind enough to send me some of the articles that have been written since, setting out which problems they are causing. It has made it more challenging to use the practice of drop-in permissions to deal with changes in development proposals for plots on large-scale residential and commercial development in response to changing circumstances.”

“We want to ensure that large-scale developments, where they need to change, can secure the necessary consents to deal with these changes effectively and proportionately. Unfortunately, we are not persuaded that Amendment 169 is the solution to Hillside for overlapping planning permissions. It is too broad in scope, and we must be absolutely sure that it would not undermine the integrity of the planning system. The long-standing principle that Hillside endorsed—that it is unlawful to carry out a development when another permission makes it physically impossible to carry it out—is a sound one. Decisions are made on the merits of the entire development proposal, and this amendment would allow developers to pick and choose what parts of an approved development they wanted to implement when they had a choice.

Similarly, we need to consider carefully the implications of legislating to deal with overlapping planning permissions and development consent orders in general terms. […]

“We want to ensure that there is sufficient flexibility to deal with change to large-scale developments. Clause 11 already provides a framework for a more streamlined and proportionate process to change development consent orders, but we also want to look at how the framework can be improved for planning permissions. We would welcome further discussions with your Lordships and the wider sector on this matter.”

All this stuff about considering carefully and further discussions is all well and good but perhaps the next step now should be to keep a number of planners and planning lawyers in a locked room until they have arrived at a refined version of the proposal which is watertight, legally and in public policy terms? What situations are people actually worried may arise? How can those outcomes be designed out?

I don’t want to be locked in the room but to start the discussion…

I think we need a bit of clarity as to how an authority actually states in the later permission or in a section 106 agreement that the lawfulness of past and future development carried out pursuant to one of those planning permissions shall be affected. This wouldn’t really appropriately be done by way of a planning condition. Nor would it be part of the operative part of the permission. A statement of the legal effect of implementation of the permission on another permission or permissions sounds more like a role for an informative (although to have such a declaration with legal effect within an informative would be unprecedented and something for subsequent purchasers’ solicitors to root around for in acquisition due diligence processes) but what are the guardrails, for instance:

(1) Surely the local planning authority shouldn’t by this route be able to affect the lawfulness of past development (the Supreme Court in Hillside ruled out any potential effect on the lawfulness of development which has already happened)?

(2) Surely a statement as to the lawfulness of future development to be carried out under an existing permission should only be possible where otherwise Hillside could cause a problem ie where there would potentially be materially inconsistent development? Otherwise this could end up being potentially more constraining, dependent on the attitude of the relevant local planning authority.

(3) How can the rights of a landowner with the benefit of at least part of the existing planning permission be protected rather than find out after the event that another party has secured a permission with a statement that (potentially without justification) affects that landowner’s ability to continue to rely on that earlier permission?

(4) What is to prevent the outcome being a planning permission which allows plainly inconsistent planning permissions to be built out free even of the traditional Pilkington constraints?

These are the sorts of real-world issues the final version of any legislative provision would need to cover off. The drafting will be gnarly…

Secondly, we need to think about what procedural mechanisms would need to be put in place. For instance:

  • Should the planning application form include a question asking if within the planning application red line area there are any planning permissions on which the applicant still wishes to rely alongside implementation of any planning permission granted pursuant to this application, warning that if this question is not answered correctly, the consequence of implementing the planning permission sought may be that previously granted planning permissions may no longer be able to relied upon?
  • Should Planning Practice Guidance direct a local planning authority, in determining an application for planning permission, specifically to consider in a section of its relevant officer’s report whether there are any existing planning permissions, which relate to some or all of the land the subject of this planning application, and if so whether or not it would be appropriate in planning terms for further development to be carried out under each of those permissions should this application be approved and implemented? And might digital planning, possibly even the Extract tool, make this less of a paperchase than traditionally it certainly would be?

It’s good that people are thinking about all this again. But it is darned hard! Mountain not hill.

Simon Ricketts, 3 October 2025

Personal views, et cetera