The inquiry’s recommendations are within volume 7, part 14, chapter 113, pages 231 to 249 of its phase 2 report published on 4 September 2024, following publication of its phase 1 report in 2019. After 1,500 or so pages, the recommendations are expressed concisely, with precision and urgency.
The question for this phase of the inquiry to answer was specific:
“In Phase 2 we have set out to answer the question that has been at the forefront of many people’s minds: how was it possible in 21st century London for a reinforced concrete building, itself structurally impervious to fire, to be turned into a death trap that would enable fire to sweep through it in an uncontrollable way in a matter of a few hours despite what were thought to be effective regulations designed to prevent just such an event?”
The conclusions of the report lay bare the tangle of causes:
There is no simple answer to that question, but in this report we identify the many failings of a wide range of institutions, entities and individuals over many years that together brought about that situation.”
These pieces in Inside Housing, ‘Complacent’ government ‘well aware’ of cladding risks before Grenfell fire but ‘failed to act’ and What the Grenfell Tower Inquiry report said about the key players in the disaster draw together those conclusions.
With some humility given the seriousness of the topic and its breadth, I thought that I should at least try to identify some potential consequences for the planning system. This follows two earlier blog posts, Tall Buildings & Fire Safety (7 January 2023) and Safety & Planning (3 July 2021). Themes of those posts included the extent to which human safety, and the safe construction of buildings, are a matter for the planning system rather than Building Regulations and the problems arising where policies are continually in a state of flux, when there is uncertainty as to where the controls lie – via the planning system or via separate legislation – and when there is the possibility of inconsistency as between the differing regimes.
Partly as a response to phase 1 of the inquiry’s work, the previous Government made the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure and Section 62A Applications) (England) (Amendment) Order 2021, which introduced a requirement for a fire statement to be submitted with applications for planning permission for development involving a building (1) contains two or more dwellings or educational accommodation and (2) contains 7 or more storeys or is 18 metres or more in height. This “Planning Gateway One” fire statement is published on the planning register and the Health and Safety Executive must consulted before the grant of planning permission involving a high-rise residential building in certain circumstances.
The Planning Practice Guidance explains:
“The changes are intended to help ensure that applicants and decision-makers consider planning issues relevant to fire safety, bringing forward thinking on fire safety matters as they relate to land use planning to the earliest possible stage in the development process and result in better schemes which fully integrate thinking on fire safety.”
Against that context, let’s look at some of the phase 2 report recommendations most relevant to the Town and Country Planning Act system. On a narrow reading, the recommendations focus on the need for improvements to the separate Building Regulations/”building control” system, rather than the planning system (although note my comments later):
- The Building Regulations system as at the time of the disaster was “seriously deficient” – poorly worded, lack of active monitoring of their performance by Government.
- The arrangements under which the construction industry are regulated have become too complex and fragmented, as between different government departments, but also: “Building control was partly in the hands of local authorities and partly in the hands of approved inspectors operating as commercial organisations, enforcement of the law relating to the sale of construction products was carried out by Trading Standards and commercial organisations provided testing and certification services to manufacturers of products. UKAS accredited organisations operating as conformity assessment bodies. In our view, this degree of fragmentation was a recipe for inefficiency and an obstacle to effective regulation.”
“In our view all the functions to which we have referred, as well as some others to which we refer below, should be exercised by a single independent body headed by a person whom, for the sake of convenience, we shall call a construction regulator, reporting to a single Secretary of State.”
“We are aware that in the period since the Grenfell Tower fire Parliament has passed the Building Safety Act 2022 to regulate work on higher-risk buildings, to impose particular duties on those involved in the construction and refurbishment of such buildings and to establish a Building Safety Regulator responsible for building control and for overseeing standards of competence. However, responsibility for the range of functions identified above remains dispersed. We therefore recommend that the government draw together under a single regulator all the functions relating to the construction industry to which we have referred.”
- “For the purpose of this and our other recommendations we have used the expression “higher-risk building” in the sense in which it is used in the Building Safety Act, that is, a building that is at least 18 metres in height (or has at least seven storeys) and contains at least two residential units. However, we do not think that to define a building as “higher-risk” by reference only to its height is satisfactory, being essentially arbitrary in nature. More relevant is the nature of its use and, in particular, the likely presence of vulnerable people, for whom evacuation in the event of a fire or other emergency would be likely to present difficulty. We therefore recommend that the definition of a higher-risk building for the purposes of the Building Safety Act be reviewed urgently.” [my emboldening]
- “We think that a fresh approach needs to be taken to reviewing and revising the Building Regulations and statutory guidance that is driven primarily by considerations of safety. Fresh minds are needed. We therefore recommend that, as far as possible, membership of bodies advising on changes to the statutory guidance should include representatives of the academic community as well as those with practical experience of the industry (including fire engineers) chosen for their experience and skill and should extend beyond those who have served on similar bodies in the past.”
- “We […] recommend that it be made a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer (see below) to be submitted with building control applications (at Gateway 2) for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion (Gateway 3). Such a strategy must take into account the needs of vulnerable people, including the additional time they may require to leave the building or reach a place of safety within it and any additional facilities necessary to ensure their safety.”
- “We […] recommend that the profession of fire engineer be recognised and protected by law and that an independent body be established to regulate the profession, define the standards required for membership, maintain a register of members and regulate their conduct. In order to speed up the creation of a body of professional fire engineers we also recommend that the government take urgent steps to increase the number of places on high-quality masters level courses in fire engineering accredited by the professional regulator.”
- “We recognise that both the Architects Registration Board and the Royal Institute of British Architects have taken steps since the Grenfell Tower fire to improve the education and training of architects. We recommend that they should review the changes already made to ensure they are sufficient in the light of our findings.
We also recommend that it be made a statutory requirement that an application for building control approval in relation to the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer under the Building Safety Act 2022 that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be as safe as is required by the Building Regulations.”
- “We […] recommend that a licensing scheme operated by the construction regulator be introduced for principal contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings and that it be a legal requirement that any application for building control approval for the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor to take all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is as safe as is required by the Building Regulations.”
- “One of the causes of the inappropriate relationship to which we have referred was the introduction into the system of commercial interests. Approved inspectors had a commercial interest in acquiring and retaining customers that conflicted with the performance of their role as guardians of the public interest. Competition for work between approved inspectors and local authority building control departments introduced a similar conflict of interest affecting them. As things stand that underlying conflict of interest will continue to exist and will continue to threaten the integrity of the system. We therefore recommend that the government appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process.
The shortcomings we have identified in local authority building control suggest that in the interests of professionalism and consistency of service all building control functions, including those currently performed by local authorities, should be exercised nationally. Accordingly, we recommend that the same panel consider whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority.”
The implications for the planning system of the conclusions and recommendations of the report should not be under-estimated:
- The Grenfell Tower tragedy had a specific factual background: the building had been constructed long ago – the issues arose through its refurbishment. Whilst building control should be the mechanism for ensuring the safety of the works carried out, the position is more complex in the case of the proposed construction in the first place of a higher-risk building. Building control is ultimately the detailed mechanism for ensuring that the development constructed can be safely occupied, but, as recognised by the Government in introducing the Planning Gateway One stage, fire safety needs to be considered at an early stage in the gestation of development proposals – it is too late for effective influence over issues such as emergency escape routes at the building control stage, there does need to be that early opportunity for safety to be built in from the outset. How are we likely to see that Planning Gateway One process change in the light of the recommendations? Clearly there will need to be some consideration as to whether 18 metres should still be the threshold. And what will the single regulator be, which responds at this stage? Will its decision-making be final or one consultation response of potentially many (albeit of significant weight)? How can we make sure that its decision-making is predictable and timely? This is also delicate to say given the potential consequences of a wrong decision, but: what if its decision-making is at times unreasonably prescriptive?
- How will this changed approach flow through into private sector appetite to embark on multi-storey residential projects, on which any achievement of the new Government’s targeted housing numbers is predicated?
- In circumstances where registered providers are generally reluctant to take on section 106 affordable housing (see eg The challenges for affordable housing delivery in London (Savills, 27 August 2024)), to what extent will the continuing focus on remedying existing unsafe buildings serve to increase that reluctance?
- Are there the resources? Anecdotally there is already a lack of fire engineers to advise appropriately on projects. How much will it cost to have a properly staffed and experienced national body for building control and how to move to such as system without creating further uncertainty?
When taken with other recent or current public inquiries, such as the Infected Blood Inquiry and the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry, aside from the frustratingly long time it takes for the wheels of justice to turn, the themes arising appear to be depressingly recurring: individual greed or complacency; business objectives that have become disconnected from the public interest; how difficult it is to stand up to “the establishment” in its varying forms; inadequate often confusing or ineffective regulatory or administrative systems; ineffective agencies, and inadequate checks and balances on ministers’ actions (and inactions).
My respect goes out not just to Sir Martin Moore-Bick, Ali Akbor OBE and Thouria Istephan for their important work in relation to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, but to all those affected by the tragedy, many of whose testimonies form such an important part of the reports. It will all unfortunately be forever part of this country’s history. It needs also to shape the future.
Simon Ricketts, 7 September 2024
Personal views, et cetera
SIMONICITY 