Heffalump Traps: The Ashdown Forest Cases

The Ashdown Forest in East Sussex is unique. Lindblom LJ recently described it as follows:
“Ashdown Forest contains one of the largest continuous blocks of lowland heath in south-east England. The [Special Area of Conservation] which extends to about 2,700 hectares, comprises both Northern Atlantic wet heaths with Erica tetralix and European dry heaths. It is a “European site” under regulation 8 of the Habitats regulations. The [Special Protection Area] was designated mainly for the protection of two species of bird: the Nightjar and the Dartford Warbler, both included in Annex 1 of EU Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds, as amended. Ashdown Forest is also designated a Site of Special Scientific Interest (“SSSI”), for its heaths, birds, invertebrates, reptiles and amphibians, including the Great Crested Newt.”

The Ashdown Forest was of course also the inspiration for A.A. Milne’s Winnie the Pooh:

“Anyone who has read the stories knows the forest and doesn’t need me to describe it. Pooh’s Forest and Ashdown Forest are identical.” (Christopher Milne)


This honeypot is particularly vulnerable to the indirect effects arising from development in two respects:

– nitrogen deposition caused by motor vehicles

– impacts from recreational use of the forest
It can be particularly difficult to model the levels at which those effects are likely to arise. Any standardised thresholds are bound to be simplistic and to err either on the side of unnecessary restriction of development or on the side of risking significant harm to the forest. But we can’t embark on a huge multi-disciplinary research project every time any change is proposed – and, even then, will the results be accurate?

Whether we are in or out of the EU, I assume that we all accept that there are some particularly special places such as Ashdown Forest that require longterm protection due their nature conservation value and which can be harmed in a number of ways by the incremental effects (direct and indirect) of development? Equally, I’m sure we all recognise that a balance has to be struck in the level of survey work and assessment that local planning authorities and developers should do to determine whether development will acceptable?

It would never be easy to construct a legal regime that provides a fair and efficient process for determining what survey work and assessment is required and where the dividing line is between what is acceptable and unacceptable. As both a Special Area of Conservation and Special Protection Area, the Ashdown Forest is protected under the EU’s Habitats and Birds Directive, transposed in England and Wales by the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010.
In basic summary, if it cannot be proven, beyond reasonable scientific doubt, that there will be no significant effect on the site either alone or in combination with other plans or projects, “appropriate assessment” is required, namely consideration of the impacts on the integrity of the European site, either alone on in combination with other plans and projects, with regard to the site’s structure and function and its conservation objectives. If the assessment determines that there will be adverse impacts which cannot be mitigated or avoided by alternative solutions, the plan or project can only proceed in extremely limited circumstances. Appropriate assessment can be a significant undertaking. Relevant for what follows, policy makers have come up with a pragmatic mechanism of requiring contributions by developers to Suitable Alternative Natural Greenspace (“SANGs”) to provide for areas to come forward that will take recreational pressure away from protected sites as a standardised form of mitigation, often thereby avoiding the need for individual, development by development, appropriate assessment. 
Additional levels of protection, not just relevant to European designated sites, are provided by the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (in relation to the formulation of plans or programmes whose policies may give rise to significant environmental effects) and by the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (in relation to certain categories of development projects which may give rise to significant environmental effects). Each has a screening stage, by which the need for detailed assessment work can be avoided if it can be shown that significant environmental effects are unlikely to arise. 
The Great Repeal Bill will operate post Brexit so as to continue to give legal effect in the UK to all of these regimes until such time as Parliament reviews each of them. The Government published on 30 March its White Paper, Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the United Kingdom. It contains this details-free passage on environmental protection:
“The Government is committed to ensuring that we become the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than we found it. 

The UK’s current legislative framework at national, EU and international level has delivered tangible environmental benefits, such as cleaner rivers and reductions in emissions of sulphur dioxide and ozone depleting substances emissions. Many existing environmental laws also enshrine standards that affect the trade in products and substances across different markets, within the EU as well as internationally. 

The Great Repeal Bill will ensure that the whole body of existing EU environmental
 law continues to have effect in UK law. This will provide businesses and stakeholders with maximum certainty as we leave the EU. We will then have the opportunity,
over time, to ensure our legislative framework is outcome driven and delivers on our overall commitment to improve the environment within a generation. The Government recognises the need to consult on future changes to the regulatory frameworks, including through parliamentary scrutiny. ”
That may sound benign, but let’s keep an eye on that reference to ensuring “our legislative framework is outcome driven”. “Too much red tape’ appears to be the knee jerk reaction of many politicians to EU environmental legislation, viz recent jabs at protected species such as the great crested newt and at SANGs.
So have we got the balance right in our current legislation? Ashdown Forest has in the last two years given us four court rulings (three at Court of Appeal level) which in different ways identify the difficulties and complexities that inevitably arise in practice. If the sensitivity of a site such as the Ashdown Forest is a given, how would any other system better regulate the competing interests at play and provide an effective regime for determining forensically what are often complex and difficult environmental and ecological scientific issues?
Chronologically (if we ignore famous proceedings that ran from 1876 to 1882 as to the extent of commoners’ rights over the forest versus the rights of a landowner, the 7th Earl De La Warr), the cases have been as follows:

Ashdown Forest Economic Development LLP v Wealden District Council and South Downs National Park Authority (Court of Appeal, 9 July 2015)

This was a challenge by local landowners, including in fact the 11th Earl De La Warr, to policies in the Wealden Local Plan, including a requirement for SANGs provision in relation to housing developments within 7 kilometres of the forest. The Court of Appeal quashed the requirement, holding “with a degree of reluctance” that the council and the national park authority had failed to consider reasonable alternatives to the 7 kilometres cordon, in breach of the requirements of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive, overturning Sales J’s first instance ruling.  
Sales J had also rejected the landowners’ challenge to a cap on housing numbers in the plan, which had been justified on the basis of seeking to ensure that traffic movements did not increase beyond 1,000 AADT (annual average daily traffic flows on any road in the forest, equivalent to a 1% increase), treated by the authorities and Natural England as a threshold beyond which appropriate assessment would be required under the Habitats Regulations. The landowners were not given permission to appeal that ground and so that housing numbers policy stands. 
Secretary of State v Wealdon District Council (Court of Appeal, 31 January 2017)
This was a challenge by Wealden District Council to an inspector’s decision to allow an appeal against the refusal of planning permission for the construction of 103 dwellings, 42 of them to be provided as affordable housing, and the provision of 10 hectares of SANGs and public open space, on land at Steel Cross, a small settlement to the north of Crowborough. The site is about 2.4 km from the edge of the forest. The inspector had found that there would have been a need for appropriate assessment despite the 1,000 AADT threshold not having been reached, but for proposed mitigation in the form of financial contributions towards heathland management. The challenge had succeeded at first instance before Lang J and the Court of Appeal had to address a number of submissions from the opposing parties based on SAC and SPA issues:
– did the inspector adopt too strict an approach in concluding that there was no need for an appropriate assessment? 
– was he wrong to assume that heathland management to mitigate the effects of nitrogen deposition would be carried out under a strategic access management and monitoring strategy (“SAMMS”)? 

– did he fail to take into account evidence given for the council on the efficacy of heathland management?

The Court of Appeal held that the inspector’s approach to the potential relevance of even relatively small additional traffic numbers had not been wrong but he had failed to justify why, in the face of contrary evidence from the council, he considered that heathland management would amount to adequate mitigation. Furthermore:
“As Mr Price Lewis submitted, the inspector did not explain how he thought the financial contributions in the section 106 obligation were in fact going to be translated into practical measures to prevent or overcome the possible effects of nitrogen deposition to which he had referred, as well as funding the SAMMS projects which would tackle the potential effects of recreational use. He did not say what he thought was actually going to be done, by whom, and when, in implementing the “habitat management” upon which his conclusion on the need for “appropriate assessment” was predicated. That conclusion depended on his judgment that, with mitigation, including heathland management to mitigate the effects of nitrogen deposition, the proposed development, together with other proposals, was not likely to have significant effects on the European site. Such mitigation, as he made clear, was essential to his “precautionary approach”. So if there was any real doubt about the requisite heathland management coming forward, his conclusion that an “appropriate assessment” was not required would, to that extent, be undermined. It was necessary for him to establish with reasonable certainty that the relevant mitigation, including heathland management, would actually be delivered. But he did not do that. He did not identify a solid proposal for heathland management, relevant to this proposed development, to which there was a firm commitment on the part of those who were going to carry it out. His conclusions in paragraphs 68 and 71 of his decision letter, and in paragraph 105, clearly depended on the concept that the “contributions to SAMMS” in the section 106 obligation “would” – as he put it – actually be used, in part, to fund “projects” of “habitat management”. These projects would involve measures, such as cutting and grazing to reduce, “offset” or “outweigh” the effects of nitrogen deposition attributable to this development in combination with other proposals, including “additional eutrophication”. But which “projects” he had in mind is obscure.”
The planning permission was quashed. 
R (DLA Delivery Ltd) v Lewes District Council (Court of Appeal, 10 February 2017)  
This case raises a number of issues in relation to neighbourhood planning (see my 19.2.17 blog post, Five Problems With Neighbourhood Plans ) but for the purposes of this blog post the relevant question before the Court of Appeal was whether the neighbourhood plan for Newick, approximately 7 km from the forest, contravened the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive in that the need for strategic environmental assessment had been screened out, relying on on the emerging sustainability appraisal work carried out by Lewes District Council and the national park authority. The claim had been brought by a promoter of a scheme which had not been allocated for development in the plan. If SEA had been found to be required, this would have given it the opportunity to promote its site as a reasonable alternative for those allocated, given that it was outside the magic 7 km radius of the forest. Whilst the court found errors in the council’s reasoning for arriving at a negative screening opinion, they were not such as to vitiate the decision and the plan was not quashed. 
Wealden District Council v Secretary of State, Lewes District Council and South Downs National Park Authority  (Jay J, 20 March 2017)
The forest lies within Wealden’s and the national park authority’s respective administrative areas. Lewes District Council’s boundary is around 5-6km from the forest. This was a challenge by Wealden District Council of a joint core strategy prepared by Lewes and the national park authority. Wealden claimed that Lewes and the national park authority had acted unlawfully in concluding, on advice from Natural England, that the joint core strategy would not be likely to have a significant effect on the SAC in combination with the Wealden core strategy. 
Natural England had advised that if the expected increase in AADT flows on any route within 200m of a protected site was less than 1,000 cars per day or 200 HGVs per day, equivalent to less than a 1% increase in traffic, then appropriate assessment was not necessary. The expected increase turned out to be 190 AADT, but the expected increase of 950 generated by proposals in the Wealden core strategy was ignored. The defendants tried to argue before the court that the 1,000 AADT threshold was “sufficiently robust and precautionary to cover any likely scenario of in-combination effects. The amounts of nitrogen dioxide in play are so small that they are effectively de minimis and of neutral effect”. 
The judge held that Natural England’s approach was “plainly erroneous”. There was “no sensible or logical basis” for excluding the Wealden core strategy from account” and a “clear breach” of the Habitats Directive. 
A couple of additional points to note:
– The challenge was to policies in the joint core strategy, but (unlike the national park authority) Lewes had adopted it more than six weeks before the challenge had been brought. Accordingly only the policies relating to the provision of new housing in the national park authority’s area were quashed. 
– In an extreme case of nominative determinism, Natural England’s expert advisor, as in a number of these cases, was one Marion Ashdown. 

Controversy relating to Ashdown Forest is likely to continue if a recent Daily Mirror piece  on the Mid-Sussex local plan inspector’s 20 February 2017 preliminary conclusions on housing requirements is anything to go by…
So what do we conclude from all of this?
Even once we agree that complex eco-systems such as Ashdown Forest need protection, the dividing line between an appropriate precautionary approach to house-building in the vicinity and inappropriate over-protection is really hard to draw, and it is equally difficult to apply triage so as to reduce the amount of detailed assessment work required. 
The necessary predictions draw upon scientific disciplines such as chemistry, statistics, ecology and psychology as much as they are about planning or law. 
Perhaps there is room for greater clarity. After all, it is concerning when even the Government’s statutory advisory body can be “plainly erroneous” in its approach. And it is concerning that so many complex cases are reaching the courts – and leading to the quashing of decisions and policies. This hardly gives a certain basis for house building. 
But don’t think that this is ever going to be easy or that the problems mainly lie with the nature of the EU directives from which the legal principles flow. We will reinvent the wheel at our peril. 

After all that, perhaps there is one thing on which we can all agree?

It is more fun to talk with someone who doesn’t use long, difficult words but rather short, easy words like “What about lunch?” (A.A. Milne)

Simon Ricketts 8.4.17
Personal views, et cetera

Great Expectations: Pip & The Brownfield Land Registers

“We changed again, and yet again, and it was now too late and too far to go back, and I went on“. (Charles Dickens, Great Expectations)
Permissions in principle will change our planning system significantly, mark my words. In my 11.6.16 blog post  I posed a series of questions arising from the legislative skeleton that is sections 150 and 151 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. 
Victorian part-work style, we now have had the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (Permission in Principle etc) (Miscellaneous Amendments) (England) Regulations 2017  (made 6 March 2017, in force 27 March 2017), the Town and Country Planning (Brownfield Land Register) Regulations 2017  (made 20 March 2017, in force 16 April 2017) and the Town and Country Planning (Permission in Principle) Order 2017 (made 20 March 2017, 15 April 2017). The statutory instruments don’t yet give effect to all of what sections 150 and 151 enable, but we now have some answers. 
This blog post is not a full summary of how the regime will operate. There are various good summaries but I particularly recommend the Lichfields 27 March 2017 ‘essential guide‘.
A few headlines from the new regime:
1. Local planning authorities will be under a statutory duty to publish their brownfield land registers by 31 December 2017 and then maintain them, reviewing the entries at least annually. 
2. The registers will be in two parts:
– Part 1: previously developed land with an area of at least 0.25 hectares that is suitable and available for residential development and where residential development is achievable (all defined terms)
– Part 2: land in Part 1 where the local planning authority has exercised its discretion to enter the land in Part 2 and has decided to allocate the land for residential development having followed defined publicity, notification and consultation procedures. 

3. The information that must be recorded for each entry is specified and includes

– “the minimum and maximum net number of dwellings, given as a range, which in the authority’s opinion, the land is capable of supporting”

– “where the development includes non-housing development, the scale of any such development and the use to which it is to be put“. 

4. Part 2 will not include sites where the development would require environmental impact assessment. So, if the proposed development falls within Schedule 2 column 1 of the 2011 EIA regulations (for most purposes, more than 150 dwellings or on more than 5 hectares), a negative screening opinion or direction must first be obtained (but remember, indicative screening thresholds as to when significant environmental effects are likely to arise allow for the possibility of projects much larger than 150 dwellings). 

5. There are no statutory rights of appeal if the local planning authority refuses to include land on the register (ECHR article 6 compliant?). Judicial review would, as always with any decision of a public body, be available but the decision to include land on Part 2 is at the local planning authority’s discretion so that would not be easy.  

6. Once land is on Part 2 it has automatic “permission in principle” for five years. In order to be able to carry out the development, application for technical details consent is required, particularising “all matters necessary to enable planning permission to be granted”. The statutory determination period for technical details consent is ten weeks for major development and otherwise five weeks, so deliberately shorter than the equivalent periods in relation to “traditional” non-EIA planning applications (thirteen and eight weeks respectively). A section 106 agreement may be required if the usual tests are met. 

7. There is no defined limit on the extent of non-housing development that can benefit from the procedure, alongside residential development. 

8. The procedure applies to conversion and extension of existing buildings as well as development. 

For a wider overview of where this mechanism is heading, there are also useful references in DCLG Planning Update Newsletter March 2017, from which it is clear that further regulations will follow to (1) allow applications for permission in principle to be made for minor development (ie basically less than ten homes) for sites on part 1 of a brownfield land register and to (2) allow automatic permission in principle to stem from allocation in defined categories of statutory development plans rather than just from designation on a brownfield land register. Guidance is also in the offing (dovetailed with the revised NPPF? We can but hope). 
We also await the Government’s response to its February 2016 technical consultation on implementation of planning changes  chapter 2 (permission in principle) and chapter 3 (brownfield register). It was originally promised to be published alongside the regulations. In the meantime, a number of passages in the consultation document are useful in putting flesh on the bones:

“The result of a grant of permission in principle is that the acceptability of the ‘prescribed particulars’ cannot be re-opened when an application for technical details consent is considered by the local planning authority. Local planning authorities will not have the opportunity to impose any conditions when they grant permission in principle. It will therefore be important for the development granted in principle to be described in sufficient detail, to ensure that the parameters within which subsequent application for technical details consent must come forward is absolutely clear.”

“We expect that the parameters of the technical details that need to be agreed, such as essential infrastructure provision, will have been described at the permission in principle stage and will vary from site to site”

“We are proposing that local planning authorities should use existing evidence within an up to date Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment as the starting point for identifying suitable sites for local brownfield registers. To support this, we will encourage authorities to consider whether their Assessments are up to date and, if not, to undertake prompt reviews. 


While sites contained within the Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment are a useful starting point, we will encourage local authorities to ensure they have considered any other relevant sources if these are not included in their Assessments. This could include sites with extant planning permission and sites known to the authority that have not previously been considered (for example public sector land). 


We will also expect authorities to use the existing call for sites process to ask members of the public and other interested parties to volunteer potentially suitable sites for inclusion in their registers. We propose that this would be a short targeted exercise aimed at as wide an audience as is practicable. That will enable windfall sites to be put forward by developers and others for consideration by the authority. 

Authorities that have recently undertaken a full Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment may not consider this to be necessary when initially compiling a register. However, in areas without up to date evidence and for all authorities completing subsequent annual reviews of their register, the process of volunteering potentially suitable sites will play an important role in refreshing the evidence base and help ensure all suitable sites, including windfall sites, are included.”

“We intend to introduce measures that will apply where additional action is needed to ensure that sufficient progress is being made. These measures could include a policy based incentive which would mean that local planning authorities that had failed to make sufficient progress against the brownfield objective would be unable to claim the existence of an up-to-date five year housing land supply when considering applications for brownfield development, and therefore the presumption in favour of sustainable development would apply.

“We propose that the measures we adopt would take effect fully from 2020, and would apply to any local planning authority that had not met the 90% commitment by that date. However, in light of the need for local planning authorities to make continuous progress towards the 90% commitment, we are also interested in views on any intermediate objectives and actions that might apply. “

Be in no doubt, eventually we will have a mechanism that:

– imposes hard statutory deadlines on authorities to publish and regularly update their registers
– whilst light on statutory recourses for developers whose land is not included, will be focused on by Government – woe betide authorities that do not play ball

– will in many cases provide a quicker route to development than the familiar allocation, outline permission, reserved matters approach

– will be potentially relevant for establishing the development credentials of a site even if in due course a traditional planning application is intended

If you have residential development or conversion in mind, the first step is to seek to ensure that your property is on Part 1 of the first round of brownfield land registers, to be published by 31 December 2017. Within the 73 authority pilot areas  this process is well underway. Although care is needed to secure reference to an appropriate scale of development, that’s a pretty immediate way to secure acceptance that your site is suitable for residential development!

Simon Ricketts 1.4.17
Personal views, et cetera

CIL: Kill Or Cure?

If anyone doesn’t think that the Community Infrastructure Levy urgently needs reform, do read this 1 March 2017 VOA ruling on one of many thorny issues that arise constantly in practice: how to calculate indexation (as well as how to calculate chargeable floorspace) in relation to section 73 permissions that amend pre-CIL permissions. The copy of the ruling in the link to the gov.uk website is redacted but I can tell you that around £3m turned on the decision relating to a development of 527 dwellings. The authority in question (I will preserve anonymity) has been interpreting the Regulations in a way which it asserts to be literal and correct, but which leads to unfairly onerous liability arising (which for some people arises completely out of the blue by way of revised liability notices being served). 
The VOA member considered that the authority’s approach “is wrong and undermines the purpose of regulation 128A” (the regulation that seeks to avoid double charging in the case of development pursuant to section 73 permissions). I understand that the issue may now reach the High Court by way of judicial review. As with any tax legislation, the dilemma is as to what room is there for a purposive interpretation, however unfair the consequences of a literal reading. After all, see R (Orbital Shopping Park Swindon) Limited v Swindon Borough Council (Patterson J, 3 March 2016):
“…not only would the defendant’s approach be contrary to the whole approach to the interpretation of planning permissions it would be contrary to constitutional principles. As was said in Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1980] AC 1148 by Lord Wilberforce:


”Taxes are imposed upon subjects by Parliament. A citizen cannot be taxed unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a taxpayer and the amount of his liability is clearly defined. 
A proposition that whether a subject is to be taxed or not, or, if he is, the amount of his liability, is to be decided (even though within a limit) by an administrative body represents a radical departure from constitutional principle. It may be that the revenue could persuade Parliament to enact such a proposition in such terms that the courts would have to give effect to it: but, unless it has done so, the courts, acting on constitutional principles not only should not, but cannot, validate it.”
In that case a literal interpretation was to the benefit of the payer rather than the authority. Patterson J underlined “the importance of a close and clear analysis of what the statute actually requires“. 

The problem is that the 2010 Regulations are a hopeless mess; anything but clear to payer or authority alike – the antithesis of good tax legislation or indeed good planning legislation. The successive sets of amendments in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 have resolved some problems, ignored others and created new ones. Due to ambiguities in the Regulations, CIL liability arising from a development is in many cases dependent on the approach being taken by individual collecting authorities, which is plainly contrary to the rule of law as well as wasteful of the time and money of all concerned. Planning consultants are having to act as tax accountants, with very large amounts of money at stake, dependent not just on an accurate reading of the legislation that accords with the collecting authority’s approach (unless there is to be an appeal to the VOA) but on service of the correct notices at the correct time – the process does not allow for any mercy on the part of the authority. 

Of course the planning system has from its outset wrestled with two core unresolved issues:
– The extent to which the system should have any land value capture role

– Apportionment of responsibilities between the state and developers/land owners for infrastructure delivery/funding. 

CIL is the latest attempt to square the circle but has proved hopelessly inefficient. 
For an excellent, detailed, analysis of the underlying issues, still nothing beats Tom Dobson’s 2012 paper to the Oxford Joint Planning Law Conference. 
Tom of course subsequently was one of the team, led by Liz Peace, appointed by the Government in November 2015 to:
“Assess the extent to which CIL does or can provide an effective mechanism for funding infrastructure, and to recommend changes that would improve its operation in support of the Government’s wider housing and growth objectives.” 

Whilst the political reverberations of Brexit have been an unwarranted distraction from things that might actually help to improve lives and provide homes, it is so disappointing that the review team’s report was only published in February 2017, alongside the Housing White Paper. (Why was it held up till then? There is no read-across to the white paper proposals). The report is dated October 2016 but its contents were an open secret as long ago as June last year (see my CIL BILL? 3.6.16 blog post). Not only that but the Government has indicated that it will not be responding to the report’s recommendations until this Autumn’s budget. This presumably means no substantial changes until April or October 2018 at the earliest. 

The review team considered four options:
– do nothing

– abolition

– minor reform

– more extensive reform

The report is a solid piece of work, well argued and rooted in experience. It identifies CIL’s failings (raising less money than anticipated, over-complicated, opaque) and firmly recommends extensive reform, particularly the replacement of the current system with a more standardised approach of Local Infrastructure Tariffs (LITs) and, in combined authority areas, Strategic Infrastructure Tariffs (SITs). LITs would supposedly be set at a low level calculated by reference to a proportion of the market value per square metre of an average three bedroom property in the local authority area, although the “example rates” in appendix 5 of the report are not particularly low given that there would be far fewer exemptions and reliefs and less opportunity to net off existing floorspace:
* £20 – £90 per m2 for Authorities in the North of England

* £30 – £90 per m2 for Authorities in the Midlands

* £30 – £220 per m2 for Authorities in the South and East of England

* £50 – £440 per m2 for London Boroughs

For developments of ten dwellings or more, there would be a return to the flexibility of section 106 for provision of site-specific infrastructure (netting off LIT liability) and of course abolition of the pooling restriction (come on government, if you do nothing else, remove the pooling restriction – even Donald Trump would be able to achieve that!). 

There would be transitional arrangements, with the review team speculating that these could take us to the end of this Parliament in 2020. Alas, with subsequent slippages even that now looks optimistic. 
What do we think the Government will do with the report? It is worrying that Gavin Barwell was talking at MIPIM of somehow including affordable housing in any revised system (see for instance Inside Housing’s article 24 March 2017). Keep it simple!
My personal guess is that significant change may well be too much for this government at this time. If so, ministers need to face that reality and it really is urgent that we at least push for Plan B: a further set of amending Regulations (preferably in the form of a consolidated version of the 2010 Regulations), putting right what we can, including abolition of the pooling restriction, alongside a clearer approach to indexation, to section 73 permissions and to payments in kind. The report called for interim measures but without setting them out in detail. 
Many of you remain in the “kill CIL” camp. I recognise that the CIL review team’s recommendations are radical but to go one step further and lose any levy or tariff mechanism would in my view be impractical. For bigger schemes, section 106 agreements definitely have advantages (as long as the negotiation process can be as streamlined as possible and the authority’s requirements signposted in policies) but for smaller projects a standardised approach should in theory leave everyone knowing where they stand – and another major lurch to a new system would inevitably have unanticipated outcomes. 
That June 2016 blog post was my first. And this is my 50th, with no real progress on CIL in the meantime. Gavin Barwell has rightly won many plaudits as planning minister but for many of us his real test will be to clear up quickly this CIL mess created by his predecessors (the coalition government in 2010 should have ditched it in the way that the Conservatives’ Open Source Planning manifesto document had suggested). As politicians love to say about most things, but true in the case of CIL, it’s broken. 
Simon Ricketts 25.3.17
Personal views, et cetera

London Calling: Mayoral Interventions

Sadiq Khan is now 10 months into his role. How has he been using his Mayor of London Order 2008 powers to intervene in relation to strategic planning applications? The number one priority in his manifesto was, after all, to:
“tackle the housing crisis, building thousands more homes for Londoners each year, setting an ambitious target of 50 per cent of new homes being genuinely affordable, and getting a better deal for renters.”


The consultation draft of the new London Plan is expected in August 2017, although we already have his draft affordable housing and viability SPG with its 35% affordable housing threshold approach (below which viability appraisal justification is required), covered in my 1.12.16 blog post. Ahead of the anticipated adopted version, a couple of items in the 14 March 2017 report to the London Assembly’s Planning Committee are of background interest:

– from page 9 a transcript of a discussion held on 1 February 2017 with James Murray, Jamie Ratcliff and private sector representatives in relation to the draft SPG

– from page 51 the Committee’s proposed response to the draft SPG.

Given that the Mayor’s intervention powers under the 2008 Order (to direct refusal of an application or call it in for his own determination) are the most direct levers that he can pull in relation to specific development proposals, it is perhaps surprising that so far we have not seen them used as much as under the last days of the Johnson regime.
This is how it stands as at 18 March 2017:
Flamingo Park, Bromley
Khan’s first intervention was in fact to direct refusal on 15 June 2016 of the Flamingo Park scheme in Bromley of a Green Belt scheme for a new stadium for Cray Wanderers FC along with 28 flats. (One for pub quizzes: Cray Wanderers claim to be the oldest football club in London – and second oldest in the world!). 
The London Borough of Bromley was minded to grant planning permission, but the Mayor considered that the ‘very special circumstances’ test for inappropriate development in the Green Belt had not been met. He added:
“Whilst writing I would take this opportunity to express my concern as to the lack of affordable housing and the effect the excess parking provision will have on the highway network in the vicinity of the site.”
Unusually, the Secretary of State promptly intervened and called in the application before the refusal was issued. The Mayor was preparing to defend the refusal direction but the applicant Cray Wanderers announced yesterday (17 March 2017) that it has withdrawn the application following legal advice and discussions with the Mayor and Bromley Council. It will resubmit a new application “in the next four to six weeks”. 
It will be interesting to see the extent to which the new scheme sees any increased housing component and the approach taken to affordable housing. 

Plough Lane, Merton

Khan’s next intervention also related to a proposed football stadium – this time Galliard Homes proposal for a new 20,000 seat football stadium for AFC Wimbledon and 602 residential units, on the Wimbledon Greyhound Stadium site, next to the site, now redeveloped for housing, of the old Wimbledon FC stadium in Plough Lane (Wimbledon FC now having of course having emigrated to Milton Keynes as MK Dons). (I hope you’re following this – I rather wish I had included Wimbledon and Cray Wanderers in my 7.1.17 blog post Level Playing Fields: Football Stadia & Planning).
The proposals included 9.6% affordable housing (all intermediate, shared ownership) with a review mechanism. The application was called in by previous Mayor Boris Johnson on 26 March 2016 (against GLA officers’ advice), but in an unusual twist, Mayor Sadiq Khan released it back to Merton on 19 August 2016 for Merton to approve. I had previously doubted (and possibly still do) whether it is lawful for a Mayor to release back an application which has previously been called in – there is certainly no express power to do so – but the Mayor’s reports set out the legal justification that he relies on. 
Bishopsgate Goodsyard, Hackney

There is one further Johnson hangover, the application for the mixed use redevelopment of Bishopsgate Goodsyard (including 1,356 residential units) which was called in by him on 23 September 2016 at the request of the applicant. Despite having been called in presumably with the intention of approving it, or at least reaching a determination more speedily than if it had been left with the London Borough of Hackney as local planning authority, the application then hit the buffers when a GLA officers’ report was published on 8 April 2016, recommending that he refuse it at the representation hearing arranged for 18 April 2016. The applicant decided to defer the hearing to address the issues and there it rests. The next twist is anyone’s guess. Will Khan even have to reach any decision or will we see withdrawal and resubmission?

We now come to two much more recent decisions, both on 10 March 2017. The Mayor’s draft SPG was obviously referred to in both cases and affordable housing review mechanisms imposed in both cases, with a cap of 50% – which is the borough-wide requirement applicable in both cases (albeit Haringey’s emerging local plan appears to be proposing a lower 40% borough wide target). 
Hale Wharf, Haringey
Haringey members had resolved, against officers’ recommendations, to refuse planning permission for this 505 residential unit scheme, within the Upper Lee Valley Opportunity Area and the Tottenham Housing Zone, on no fewer than eleven grounds. The Mayor called it in on 4 January 2017 and approved it on 10 March 2017 as recommended in his officers’ stage 3 report.
The position secured on affordable housing was as follows:
“a minimum of 177 units (35% of overall units) to be affordable, with 20% affordable rent and 80% shared ownership by habitable room. 

Details of affordability will be secured. Review mechanisms as follows will secure the delivery of more affordable housing (up to 50% of the scheme or the level of grant funding) should it be viable: 
- 

Review mechanism (1): In the event that the development has not been substantially implemented within 2 years of the date of the decision, an updated viability assessment shall be submitted in order to establish if additional affordable housing can be provided and any such additional affordable housing shall be provided on site; 
- 

Review mechanism (2): A viability assessment shall be submitted prior to substantial completion of Phase 1 in order to establish if additional affordable housing can be provided and any such additional housing shall be provided on site; 
- 

Review mechanism (3): A viability assessment shall be submitted prior to substantial completion of Phase 3, to establish whether there is any surplus from the completed scheme which can be contributed towards off-site provision of affordable housing. 
- 

Review mechanism (4): Further review if development stalls for a period of more than 24 months.”
It’s worth noting that there was already significant GLA funding being given for infrastructure for the scheme before the application was called in but the Mayor’s involvement appears to have secured £7.75m worth of affordable housing funding to a registered provider, so the review mechanism will be aimed at recovery and recycling of that grant funding.
Palmerston Road, Harrow

Harrow members resolved, again against their officers’ recommendations, to refuse an application by Origin Housing for a mixed use development within the Harrow and Wealdstone Opportunity Area and the Heart of Harrow Housing Zone to provide 187 residential units, within 5 buildings of between 1 and 17 storeys. Again, on 10 March 2017 the Mayor accepted the recommendations in his officers’ stage 3 report.
The affordable housing position secured is as follows: 
– a minimum of 74 homes (40% of overall units) on the site to be provided as affordable homes, with 30% affordable rent and 70% shared ownership (40% was proposed in the original application but the tenure mix is different);

– a viability review mechanism will secure the delivery of more affordable housing (up to a level of 50% of the scheme) should it be viable. 

 The affordable housing is with grant based on the Mayor’s Affordable Housing Programme 2016-21, with an early review mechanism if enabling works are not substantially commenced within two years. 

Conclusions

Of course the Mayor has to be selective as to how to use his powers. After all, the legal limits are clear from R (Spitalfields Historic Trust) v Mayor of London (Gilbart J, 10 May 2016), where Mayor Johnson’s use of the Mayoral call in power was tested and just about survived. However, so far, perhaps true to the man – and maybe no bad thing – we have seen a more cautious approach from Sadiq Khan:

– one direction of refusal where, who knows, a compromise may be on the cards

– one previously called in application returned to the borough to determine

– two applications called in and approved, but both schemes offering more than 35% affordable housing, with a review mechanism potentially to get to 50% – both schemes in opportunity areas and London housing zones where officers’ recommendations to approve had been overturned.

Administrations usually become more interventionist over time. I headed this piece London Calling, but with Mayor Khan we certainly haven’t yet seen The Clash. 
Simon Ricketts 18.3.17
Personal views, et cetera

 

 

 

Aarhus: Caps In The Air Again

 The Aarhus Convention requires that access to justice in environmental matters should be “be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”. 
Dear patient reader, you will recall that in 2013 the Government introduced a relatively simple mutual costs capping system. It is described in my 19 November 2016 blog post Mending Aarhus, along with a summary of the Government’s response to consultation in 2015 as to proposed changes to the regime to address a number of practical flaws or unfairnesses.
Rule 8(5) of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2017  came into force on 28 February 2017, largely implementing the Government’s November 2016 proposals.
The new rules will change the nature of planning litigation in a number of important ways:
1. The procedure was available for judicial review litigation concerning “environmental matters”. The reference to “environmental matters” has been replaced by more specific references to claims within the scope of Articles of the Aarhus Convention that relate to access to environmental information and environmental assessment. Claimants challenging decisions in relation to non-EIA development may now find that they can no longer secure costs protection, even though their claim concerns environmental issues. 
2. The procedure is widened from judicial review litigation to include challenges to enforcement notice appeal decisions but, contrary to what the Government has previously indicated, not section 288 planning appeal decision challenges (nor indeed other statutory appeals, for instance in relation to plan making or compulsory purchase orders). 
3. The procedure is now only open to “members of the public” as defined in the Aarhus Convention (the Convention defines “the public” as “one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations, organisations or groups”). The interpretation will ultimately be for the courts to determine (more unnecessary cost and uncertainty) but in my view this is likely to exclude local authorities and other emanations of the state, including parish councils. The idea of a district or borough council seeking to rely on Aarhus costs capping in a claim against another council has sometimes been bizarre but query whether poor as church mice parish councils should be similarly shut out. 
4. Any claimant seeking to have its costs exposure capped will have to file and serve with the claim form a “schedule of the claimant’s financial resources which takes into account any financial support which any person has provided or is likely to provide to the claimant and which is verified by a statement of truth”. It will be crucial, in the short period of time available before the claim is filed and served, to make sure that what is said is both accurate and is not likely to lead the court, on application by the defendant or of its own accord, to increase or remove the caps, having regard to the following principles:
Varying the limit on costs recoverable from a party in an Aarhus Convention claim 45.44.—(1) The court may vary the amounts in rule 45.43 or may remove altogether the limits on the maximum costs liability of any party in an Aarhus Convention claim.
(2) The court may vary such an amount or remove such a limit only if satisfied that— 
* (a)  to do so would not make the costs of the proceedings prohibitively expensive for the claimant; and 


* (b)  in the case of a variation which would reduce a claimant’s maximum costs liability or increase that of a defendant, without the variation the costs of the proceedings would be prohibitively expensive for the claimant. 


(3) Proceedings are to be considered prohibitively expensive for the purpose of this rule if their likely costs (including any court fees which are payable by the claimant) either— 

(a) exceed the financial resources of the claimant; or 

(b) are objectively unreasonable having regard to— 

(i) the situation of the parties;
(ii) whether the claimant has a reasonable prospect of success; 

(iii) the importance of what is at stake for the claimant; 

(iv) the importance of what is at stake for the environment; 

(v) the complexity of the relevant law and procedure;and 

(vi) whether the claim is frivolous. 

There are some big uncertainties in these criteria. For example, what are the “financial resources” of the claimant? Is the claimant expected to sell illiquid capital assets (such as his or her home, or cash in his or her pension) to meet a costs award that has a short deadline for compliance? If what is at stake is of great importance to the claimant, for example the loss of his home, should he be prepared to accept a higher cap? Does the claimant have to own up to what he is paying his own lawyer? How detailed must the information be as to financial support received from, for instance, contributors to a litigation fighting fund? Will potential contributors be discouraged from reaching in their pockets?
Is this the end of wealthy litigants, whether corporates or individuals, relying on costs capping? Few surely would have any problem with that (if you embark on litigation, be prepared to meet to the other side’s costs if you lose – someone has to) but will this also kick out the JAMs? Will the big NGOs face difficulties explaining that a cap of more than £10,000 would be prohibitively expensive? Will the uncertainties prevent potential litigants from embarking on proceedings in case they lose protection when it is too late in practical terms to back out?
5. Defendants who unsuccessfully challenge costs caps will no longer face an award of costs on an indemnity basis in relation to their challenge. Surely challenges will be much more frequent – and the threat, in responses to pre-action letters, of challenges to costs caps so as to discourage potential claimants. 
6. Any hearing on costs capping issues may be held “in private if it involves confidential information (including information relating to personal financial matters) and publicity would damage that confidentiality”. If hearings are required, which judges seek to avoid on costs cap issues so as not add to the costs burden of the parties, what personal financial information wouldn’t fall into that category?
7. The rules now make clear, in line with case law, that where there are multiple claimants, the £5,000 (for an individual) and £10,000 (for a group) caps apply to each claimant rather than being apportioned between them. 
8. The costs capping regime has now been extended to the Court of Appeal but only in the most sketchy way, not materially changing current practice. The Court of Appeal is simply directed to “consider whether the costs of the proceedings will be prohibitively expensive for a party who was a claimant” and “if they will be, make an order limiting the recoverable costs to the extent necessary to prevent this”.
The House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has strongly criticised the amended rules: “The MoJ has not provided a convincing case for changing from the previous standardised system of cost capping, which was well understood, to this more complex system which appears to have significant potential to increase both the costs for public administration and the uncapped litigation costs of the claimant”. 

Furthermore, in bad timing for the Government, the UN Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee published a report on 24 February 2017, only four days before the amended rules came into force, continuing to express concerns about the operation in England and Wales of costs capping in environmental cases and the changes that were consulted upon in 2015: “with the exception of the proposal to broaden the scope of “Aarhus claims” to include statutory appeals falling within article 9, paragraph 2, of the Convention” [ironically now not fully included as it transpires!] “all proposed amendments would increase rather than decrease uncertainty and risk of prohibitive costs for claimants”. 

The compliance of the amended rules with the Convention is heading for the courts, following a judicial review brought by ClientEarth, Friends of the Earth and RSPB. 
As both poacher and gamekeeper, what do I think? The 2013 rules have not been working badly but it has been absurd on occasion to see wealthy individuals and substantial companies and groups take advantage of extremely low costs caps in litigation against local authorities that have increasingly tight budgets. What would be wrong in that situation in having a mechanism for doubling or trebling the default £5,000/£10,000 cap, as long as the mechanism can be kept as fast and simple as possible? Balancing simplicity against fairness to all is as always the challenge – and for the developer sitting on the sidelines as an interested party the real devil, as always, is delay. 
Simon Ricketts 11.3.17
Personal views, et cetera

NB Invaluable to this piece was first a call from Nicola Gooch at Irwin Mitchell on 28 February, then this good Will Upton blog post and then finally a thought-provoking Francis Taylor Building event presented by Robert McCracken QC, Ned Westaway and Charles Streeten.

Definitely Maybe: Defining Affordable Housing

Affordable housing is defined in the NPPF as follows:
The Government carried out a consultation  in December 2015, proposing that the definition be expanded so as to include

– low cost ownership models, which “would include products that are analogous to low cost market housing or intermediate rent, such as discount market sales or innovative rent to buy housing”
– starter homes (of which more later). 

Two further changes were proposed in the February 2017 response to consultation:  
* introduction of a household income eligibility cap of £80,000 (£90,000 for London) on starter homes. 

* introduction of affordable private rented housing

The Government is accordingly consulting until 2 May 2017 on the following replacement definition for the NPPF (long isn’t it?):


Starter homes

There were howls of anguish at the starter homes initiative as first unveiled by the Government, the key elements of which were (as set out in chapter 1 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 and March 2016 technical consultation):
– a legal requirement that 20% of new homes in developments should be starter homes, ie
– to be sold at a discount of at least 20% to open market value to first time buyers aged under 40. 

– Price cap of £250,000 (£450,000 in London)

– The restriction should last for a defined number of years, the first suggestion being five years, replaced with the concept of a tapered restriction to potentially eight years

– Commuted sums in lieu of on site provision for specified categories of development, eg build to rent

The obvious consequence would have been a significant reduction in the potential for schemes to include a meaningful proportion of traditional forms of affordable housing. 
After all of last year’s battles over the Bill, it is now plain from the Government’s response to the technical consultation, that the starter home concept is now much watered down:
– There will be no statutory requirement on local planning authorities to secure starter homes, just a policy requirement in the NPPF, which is to be amended accordingly. 

– Rather than requiring that 20% of new homes be starter homes, the requirement will be that 10% of new homes will be “affordable housing home ownership products” so could include shared equity or indeed low cost home ownership. 

– maximum eligible household income of £80,000 a year or less (or £90,000 a year or less in Greater London 

– 15 year restriction

– No cash buyers, evidence of mortgage of at least 25% loan to value

– It will only be applicable to schemes of ten units or more (or on sites of more than 0.5h). 

There will be a transitional period of 18 months (to August 2018) rather than the initially intended 6 to 12 months. 
Whilst we now have a more workable arrangement, plainly all that Parliamentary work was a complete waste of time. There was no need for chapter 1 of the 2016 Act – the current proposals can be delivered without any need for legislation. 
We will need to see the degree to which LPAs embrace the starter homes concept in reviewing their local plans. We will also need to be wary that we may lose the only benefit of a national standardised approach, ie the hope that there might be a standard set of section 106 clauses defining the operation of the mechanism (which will not be straightforward – see my 21.6.16 blog post Valuing Starter Homes). 
Affordable Private Rent
One of the documents accompanying the Housing White Paper was a consultation paper: Planning and affordable housing for build to rent.
The term Affordable Private Rent is now used for what we have all previously been calling Discounted Market Rent. Changes to the NPPF are proposed (subject to consultation) advising LPAs to consider asking for Affordable Private Rent in place of other forms of affordable housing in Build to Rent schemes, comprising a minimum of 20% of the homes in the development, at a minimum of 20% discount to local market rent (excluding use of comparables within the scheme itself), provided in perpetuity. The Affordable Private Rent housing would be tenure blind and representative of the development in terms of numbers of bedrooms. Eligible income bands are to be negotiated between developer and LPA. Developers will be able to offer alternative approaches where appropriate (eg greater discount, fewer discounted homes – or different tenures). “Build to Rent” will be defined and it is acknowledged that developers should be able to cease to operate the property as Build To Rent subject to payment of a commuted sum reflecting the affordable housing requirement that would otherwise have been applicable. 
There is also recognition in the consultation paper that factors in London may be different, allowing for an amended response and recognition of Mayor of London’s November 2016 affordable housing and viability draft SPG.
There will be a transitional period of 6 months from the time that the NPPF changes are made. The possibility is held out of model section 106 clauses, which would help minimise unnecessary delays. 

The recognition that Build to Rent is a model that doesn’t sit well with ‘ownership’ forms of affordable housing is what that industry (largely self-defining through scale of scheme and extent of professional management) has been lobbying for. Nor is there any more any reference to off-site starter home provision.
Wider implications
The extensions to the meaning of ‘affordable housing’ are all in the direction of private sector provision. The definition is now very wide indeed. Battles lie ahead once LPAs consider the implications of the changes for their local plan affordable housing requirements against a backdrop of, for example:
– reduced levels of socially rented housing over the last six years or so following the introduction of affordable rent (minimum discount of at least 20% to market rent), vividly demonstrated in the Government’s affordable housing statistics published on 2 March 2017:

– restrictions on housing benefit, for instance ineligibility of 18-21 year olds from 1 April 2017 under the Universal Credit (Housing Costs Element for claimants aged 18 to 21) (Amendment) Regulations 2017  made on 2 March 2017. 
– the continuing, onerous, requirement on registered providers since 2015 to reduce rents by 1% a year for four years resulting in a 12% reduction in average rents by 2020-21. 
– Loss of stock via the Housing and Planning Act 2016’s voluntary right to buy scheme in relation to registered providers and the Act’s provisions requiring local authorities to sell vacant higher value housing (the Government’s most recent statistics on sales date from October 2016 but already show significant numbers). 
A debate took place in the House of Lords this week, on 2 March 2017, on the Economic Affairs Committee’s July 2016 report, Building More Homes  in the context of the Housing White Paper. Lord Young closed for the Government saying many of the right things but, after such a background of continuing changes (I believe it was Adam Challis at JLL who recently counted 180 housing initiatives since 2010), with further uncertainty for at least 18 months, surely we now just need to get on with the matter in hand – ensuring that there are enough homes to meet all social needs, whilst not killing the golden goose without which this will simply not happen under any foreseeable system, ie profitable development by the private sector.
Simon Ricketts 4.3.17
Personal views, et cetera

Completion Notices: More Pointy, Still Pointless?

Completion notices have always been a blunt tool, little used by local planning authorities. The Housing White Paper proposes sharpening them, but to what end?
If we blow the dust off a bit we can remind ourselves that the current completion notice procedure in sections 94 and 95 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is as follows:
– Development must have been begun within the time limit on the planning permission and that time limit must have now expired. 

– If the LPA considers that the development “will not be completed within a reasonable period” they can serve a completion notice stating that the planning permission will cease to have effect after a period specified in the notice which must be at least 12 months. 

– Any notice is only effective if confirmed by the Secretary of State, who may extend the 12 months’ period. Any person served with a completion notice who objects within a time limit set out on the notice (must be at least 28 days) has a right to a hearing before the Secretary of State before he reaches his decision.

– If the notice takes effect, the planning permission becomes invalid at the end of the specified period, but this does not affect any development carried out under the permission before the end of the period. 

The procedure is very seldom used, for various reasons:
– It doesn’t do what it says on the tin. It does not secure completion of the development. If development has stalled, the developer is already having pretty fundamental problems. The threat of a completion notice is not going to lead to a developer finding significant amount of money to overcome those problems – indeed it could jeopardise a solution being found if funders are spooked.  

– Instead, use of the procedure is likely to lead to an uncompleted development – it should perhaps be called an uncompletion notice. Furthermore, the courts have resisted to date any notion that if, by the end of the specified completion deadline, only part of a building has been built, the part built is in any way no longer unauthorised (Cardiff County Council v National Assembly for Wales, Davis J, 22 June 2006 – in that case, an unsightly part-built garage, which the Council sought unsuccessfully to enforce against after the deadline in the completion notice). 

– The test as to whether the development “will be completed within a reasonable period” is too vague, particularly in relation to major projects. What is it to be judged against?

– The need for approval by the Secretary of State adds to the potential for delay and uncertainty. 

So what is the Government now proposing? As part of its collection of “Holding Developers And Local Authorities To Account” measures, the white paper contains the following:
“2.42 We want to ensure local planning authorities have more effective tools to deal with circumstances where planning permission has been granted but no substantive progress has been made. We propose to simplify and speed up the completion notice process, whereby if development on a site has stopped and there is no prospect of completion, the local authorities can withdraw planning permission for the remainder of the site. This would make it easier for local authorities to serve a completion notice, helping to stimulate building or clear unused permissions from their planned supply of land. “

Views are sought by 2 May on two proposals:

“A.107 The Government proposes to amend legislation to remove the requirement for the Secretary of State to confirm a completion notice before it can take effect. Local authorities know their circumstances best, and removing central government involvement will help shorten the process, and give authorities greater control and certainty. The opportunity for a hearing will be retained where there are objections. 

A.108 We also intend to amend legislation, subject to consultation, to allow a local authority to serve a completion notice on a site before the commencement deadline has elapsed, but only where works have begun. This change could dissuade developers from making a token start on site purely to keep the permission alive. However, it is important that this would not impact on the willingness of lenders to invest.”

These proposals are hardly radical. The Government published a report on completion notices back in July 2001, that it had commissioned from Cardiff University and Buchanan Partnership, no longer on the web as far as I know, which back then made these recommendations (to which it appears the Government never responded):
* Greater thought should be given to tailoring the time period in the standard condition relating to the commencement of development to fit the situation. In particular, the period could be reduced to two years for minor development.
* The Government’s advice, then in Circular 11/95, against including a condition requiring that the whole of an approved development be completed should be reviewed.

* No justification for referral to the Secretary of State, and this should be replaced by a right of appeal.

* Better publicity for the system could lead to its greater use.

The first recommendation in the white paper echoes the 2001 report and is hardly controversial. There should be no reason to require confirmation by the Secretary of State if objections to the notice haven’t been received. 
The second recommendation is more worrying, when looked at in conjunction with the separate proposals in the white paper, that:
– the applicant should “provide information about their estimated ‘start date’ (month/year when a substantive start would take place) and ‘build out rate’ (the number of homes built per financial year) for all proposals for or including housing development”
– developers should “provide local authorities with basic information (in terms of actual and projected build out) on progress in delivering the permitted number of homes, after planning permission has been granted”

– large housebuilders should be required to publish “aggregate information on build out rates”

Owners and developers are normally vigilant to keep planning permissions alive by carrying out a material operation prior to the implementation deadline on the permission, reflecting the frequent reality that detailed architectural and engineering work post-permission, as well as the funding structure to underpin a development, often including necessary pre-lets in the case of commercial floorspace, take longer than the deadline for implementation (in relation to which the default period is now proposed to be reduced to two years). Missing the deadline means going down a very long snake to submit a fresh application for planning permission. 
The white paper proposal envisages that an LPA could serve a completion notice at any time after the developer has carried out a material operation, even before the implementation deadline has expired. What would there be to prevent an LPA serving completion notices as a matter of routine where development appears to be slower than was previously indicated, or than housebuilder averages? The white paper itself questions whether this would “impact on the willingness of lenders to invest”. The answer is that it surely would as there would be no certainty for a lender that if the borrower developer defaults on its loan the lender will have time to step in and secure the completion of the development under the same permission – or work through another solution with the borrower. The underpinning certainty of the permission is lost. Two years to implement a permission is no period at all and if relatively minor works within that period may not suffice to keep the permission alive, banks will undoubtedly want to consider the risk profile vis a vis particular authorities very carefully. 
Why not look at more constructive opportunities with the information to be provided about actual or projected build out rates? For example:
– Remember the section 106BC procedure? Revised section 106 arrangements alleviating affordable housing requirements ceased to apply to those parts of the development that had not been completed within three years. That sort of structure could be considered by LPAs in section 106 agreements where justified.

– Any viability review mechanism could be expressed as only operable if specified amounts of development had not been achieved by defined milestones.

– Encourage LPAs to tie any funding they control, eg use of CIL monies for the benefit of the scheme, to timely build out progress.

So much can be achieved by planning obligations and conditions, instead of spending time working out how to hack at the problem with what is hardly the sharpest tool in the box.


Simon Ricketts 25.2.17

Personal views, et cetera

Five Problems With Neighbourhood Plans

The real effects of neighbourhood plan making on housing delivery and on the efficient, democratic operation of the planning system are hard to pin down and yet the Government continues to champion its role. Are we really heading in the right direction? After all, despite the positivity of government sponsored initiatives such as mycommunity.org.uk  it isn’t all sweetness and light. Here is my personal worry list:
1. Neighbourhood Plans are usurping the role of local plans, whilst being subject to a lighter-touch examination process. 
The Court of Appeal, in R (DLA Delivery Ltd) v Lewes District Council  (10 February 2017), has now confirmed that a neighbourhood plan may be made without there being an up to date local plan. Until such time as the local plan comes forward, as the only up to date development plan, the neighbourhood plan’s policies will benefit from the statutory presumption in section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 and from paragraph 198 of the NPPF: “[where] a planning application conflicts with a neighbourhood plan that has been brought into force, planning permission should not normally be granted”.
This gives neighbourhood plans a role which was surely not foreseen by Parliament. Neighbourhood plans are intended to be in general conformity with the local plan’s strategic policies. But instead any policy vacuum can be filled by the neighbourhood plan’s own strategic policies. Whilst the Planning Practice Guidance urges collaborative working between neighbourhoods and local planning authorities, this does not prevent problems from arising which are exacerbated by two further factors:
–  in order to survive the ‘relatively limited‘ (Court of Appeal in DLA Delivery, para 5) examination process, neighbourhood plans only have to satisfy the ‘basic conditions’ set out in the paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 4B to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as applied to neighbourhood plans by section 38A of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, rather than the wider and more rigorous soundness test applicable to local plans. 
–  the Neighbourhood Planning Bill proposes to accelerate the process, by deeming post-examination pre-referendum neighbourhood plans to be a material consideration in the determination of planning applications (clause 1) and by deeming post-referendum neighbourhood plans to be treated as part of the statutory development plan ahead of formally being made by the district or borough council (clause 2). It will be easier for the Secretary of State to dismiss appeals on the basis of inconsistency with emerging neighbourhood plans (a sensitive subject for DCLG given for example Holgate J’s quashing in Woodcock Holdings Limited v Secretary of State, 1 May 2015 and a series of examples of the Secretary of State having consented to judgment in similar circumstances). 
2. The Neighbourhood Plan process is “complex and burdensome”
Not my words but a description given by participants, according to recent research by the University of Reading: Neighbourhood Planning Users Research Revisited.  
Any community embarking on a neighbourhood plan has to be ready for the long haul. Because policies within the plan can have real consequences for communities and developers alike, it is no surprise that the process can be litigious. 
R (Crownhall Estates Limited) v Chichester District Council  (Holgate J, 21 January 2016) was the third (third!) judicial review in relation to the Loxwood Neighbourhood Plan, with the claimant developer seeking unsuccessfully to challenge the plan’s provision for only 60 homes against a background of a failure of the district council to meet its obejectively assessed housing needs. 

I do not believe that there is a transcript of Dove J’s rejection in Swan Quay LLP v Swale Borough Council on 31 January 2017 of a challenge to the Faversham Creek Neighbourhood Plan which contained a policy preventing redevelopment of the claimant’s property on the basis that it would lead to ‘gentrification’. The ruling is summarised by the Faversham Creek Trust in a press release.  
Challenges commonly focus on whether there has been compliance with the requirements of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive, another unsuccessful ground of challenge in DLA Delivery. R (Stonegate Homes Limited) v Horsham District Council (the late, missed, Patterson J, 13 October 2016) was an example of a successful challenge on this basis. The Haddenham Neighbourhood Plan is another, where Aylesbury Vale District Council consented to judgment.
3. Neighbourhood Plans dissipate the local planning authority’s resources

Parish councils such as Haddenham are unlikely to have the resources to resist a legal challenge, leaving the responsibility to the local planning authority which, under the legislation, formally “makes” the plan. How much say will they have over the way in which the defence case is brought and, as importantly, why should the local planning authority’s resources be stretched in this way?

We also have of course dissipation of CIL proceeds, with 15% of CIL proceeds available to be spent by parish councils, increased to 25% where a neighbourhood plan is in place – proceeds that would otherwise have applied towards infrastructure projects required to deliver development. 
4. Neighbourhood Plans are unnecessary and marginalise the role of the local planning authority

District and borough councils are designed to operate down to ward level. We elect ward councillors to represent our local interests – that is to say, the things we care about in relation to our home environment, our neighbourhood. Local plans can and do include policies at neighbourhood level. Additionally, there is scope for area action plans to provide more detailed site-specific policies where justified. 

We should all engage more with local plan making. Does the distraction of neighbourhood planning fuel the inaccurate sense that what happens at district or borough level is remote and not to do with us? What if the energy that one sometimes sees expended on neighbourhood planning were to be properly harnessed at local planning authority level, with proper access to officers and with consistency of plan making over a strategically sensible area?
5. Neighbourhood Plans are not fit for the further roles that Government continues to give them
Neighbourhood planning is of course voluntary. It is more prevalent in affluent areas and its heartland is in the south east (Turley research, 2014). In unparished areas it is the preserve of unelected groups. And yet the Government intends it to play a grown up role alongside local plans. Indeed, given that they have statutory force, unlike the NPPF, have neighbourhood plans in fact become more important than the Government’s own planning policies?
Gavin Barwell’s 12 December 2016 written ministerial statement (see my blog post That Ministerial Statement) set out that relevant policies for the supply of housing in a neighbourhood plan that is part of the development plan should not be deemed to be ‘out-of-date’ under paragraph 49 of the National Planning Policy Framework where the following circumstances arise at the time a planning decision is made: 
* the written ministerial statement making the policy change on 12 December 2016 is less than 2 years old, or the neighbourhood plan has been part of the development plan for 2 years or less;

* the neighbourhood plan allocates sites for housing; and

* the local planning authority can demonstrate a three-year supply of deliverable housing sites. 

The statement is of course the subject of a judicial review. In the meantime, the Government’s Housing White Paper has added the further qualification that neighbourhoods should be able to demonstrate that their site allocations and housing supply policies will meet their share of local housing need and that the local planning authority should be able to demonstrate through the White Paper’s housing delivery test that, from 2020, delivery has been over 65% (25% in 2018; 45% in 2019) for the wider authority area (to ensure that delivery rates across the area as a whole are at a satisfactory level). 
 The White Paper also proposes changes to the NPPF to “highlight the opportunities that neighbourhood plans present for identifying and allocating small sites that are suitable for housing, drawing on the knowledge of local communities”.

Finally, local planning authorities will now be “expected to provide neighbourhood planning groups with a housing requirement figure, where this is needed to allow progress with neighbourhood planning. As part of the consultation on a new standard methodology for assessing housing requirements, we will seek views on whether a standard methodology could be developed for calculating housing need in a neighbourhood plan area“.
Let us remember that these are voluntary plans, prepared by parish councils and community groups. Are we not seeing, yet again, a relentless move towards process and complexity, in an effort to make running repairs to a mechanism that was not designed for this function? 
Simon Ricketts 19.2.17
Personal views, et cetera

From The White Paper Mountain, What Do We See?

After so long we have reached the top of the mountain: the white paper and accompanying documents have all been published today, 7 February 2017. However, now we see a series of further peaks on the horizon. 
A good way into the white paper itself, Fixing Our Broken Housing Market, is to start at the back end. From page 72 you have the detailed proposals listed, including a series of proposed changes to the NPPF and other policies which are now the subject of a consultation process from today until 2 May 2017. The consultation focuses on a series of 38 questions but some of the questions are potentially very wide-ranging. Further consultation is proposed on various matters, including 
– housing requirements of older people and the disabled

– Increasing local authorities’ flexibility to dispose of land at less than best consideration and related powers

– Potentially increasing fees for planning appeals (up to a maximum of £2,000 for the largest schemes, recoverable if the appeal is allowed)

– Changes to section 106 processes (with further consideration being given to dispute resolution “in the context of longer term reform”)

– Requiring housebuilders to provide aggregate information on build-out rates and, for large-scale sites, as to the relevance of the applicant’s track record of delivering similar schemes

– Encouragement of use of CPO powers to support the build out of stalled sites. 

There is a supplementary consultation paper on planning and affordable housing for build to rent  containing a further 26 questions, with a consultation deadline of 1 May 2017.
There are responses to previous consultation papers and reports:
– Summary of responses to the technical consultation on implementation of planning changes, consultation on upward extensions and Rural Planning Review Call for Evidence  (including a u-turn on the previous idea of an upwards extensions permitted development right in London, now to be addressed by policy). 
– Government response to the Communities and Local Government Select Committee inquiry into the report of the Local Plans Expert Group 
There is plenty to get to grips with, for example:
– the housing delivery test and new methodology for assessing objectively assessed need

– an understandable focus on whether the applicant will proceed to build out any permission and at what rate, although with a worrying reduction of the default time limit for permissions from three to two years

– Homes and Communities Agency to become “Homes England”. 

It is also reassuring to see the Government applying real focus to build to rent, reducing its emphasis on starter homes – and also reducing its reliance on permitted development rights. 

However, it is surprising how much still remains unresolved. We will apparently have a revised NPPF “later this year” but for much else the start date looks to be April 2018, for example a widened affordable housing definition including watered-down starter homes proposals (no longer a statutory requirement and with reference to a policy target of a minimum of 10% “affordable housing ownership units” rather than the requirement of 20% starter homes previously proposed) and a new methodology for assessing five year housing land supply. 

Liz Peace’s CIL review team’s review of CIL: “A new approach to developer contributions”  (October 2016 but only now published) remains untackled. The Government’s response will be announced at the time of the Autumn Budget 2017. 

Decision-makers will need to grapple very quickly with the question as to the weight they should give to the white paper as a material consideration, given the Government’s clear policy direction now on a range of issues. 


Simon Ricketts, 7.2.17
Personal views, et cetera

Hillingdon JR: Lucky Strike Out?

In R (London Borough of Hillingdon & others) v Secretary of State  (Cranston J, 30 January 2017) the Government achieved an impressive strike out of the first challenge to the proposed third runway at Heathrow, following the Government’s 25 October 2016 announcements. My 15 October 2016 blog post Airports & Courts wins no prizes for predicting a series of such challenges.  
Following the strike out, the draft Airports NPS  was promptly published on 2 February for a 16 weeks’ consultation period. 
However, was this somewhat of a lucky win? The Government’s position, accepted by Cranston J, was that the effect of section 13(1) of the Planning Act 2008 was that there can be no legal challenge of a Government announcement of a decision to publish a draft NPS, but that any challenge instead has to be made within a six week window following final designation of the NPS.
Section 13(1) provides as follows: 
“A court may entertain proceedings for questioning a national policy statement or anything done, or omitted to be done, by the Secretary of State in the course of preparing such a statement only if –



(a) the proceedings are brought by a claim for judicial review, and

(b) the claim form is filed [before the end of] the period of 6 weeks beginning with [the day after] —

 
(i) the day on which the statement is designated as a national policy statement for the purposes of this Act, or



(ii) (if later) the day on which the statement is published.”

So was the 25 October 2016 announcement something done “in the course of preparing” an NPS? Hmm.
Was the operation of section 13(1) intended to be so different from sections 23 and 25 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, which provide for a six week deadline for challenging a compulsory purchase order from publication of notice of its confirmation and the exclusion that a CPO otherwise “shall not, either before or after it has been confirmed, made or given, be questioned in any legal proceedings whatsoever“? So, according to the 1981 Act, no challenges before the CPO has been made but the Supreme Court in R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Limited) v Wolverhampton City Council  (12 May 2010) has entertained a judicial review of a council’s resolution to make a compulsory purchase order. Is the drafting within the 2008 Act distinguishable from the 1981 Act? Even if it is, where is the logic? With CPOs the widely understood risk of JR of the resolution to make a CPO, before section 25 cuts in to prevent further challenges until the order has been finally confirmed or rejected, is the reason why acquiring authorities commonly seek to leave as little time as possible between that final resolution and making the order. There is no reference in Cranston J’s judgment to this (surely) analogous process

.

Whatever the rights and wrongs, the decision to go for a strike out – always high stakes, given the risk of adding to the time needed to dispose finally of the challenge or at least the risk of egg on face – has so far proved to be the right one, although I do not know whether the claimant local authorities plan to appeal. Even if cleared for take off, the proceedings would in any event face a bumpy ride give that judicial review is a remedy of last resort and it could be said that the claimant authorities should first be making representations to the draft NPS before resorting to litigation?
It was a good week all round for Heathrow. By a decision letter dated 2 February 2017  the Secretaries of State for Communities and Local Government and Transport allowed an appeal by the airport, permitting enabling works to allow it to implement “full runway alternation during easterly operations” (ie, basically, regular easterly departures from the northern runway), after a June 2015 (yes 2015) inquiry and initial refusal by Hillingdon Council in March 2014 (yes 2014) of the airport’s planning application.  
Finally, a post script on challenges to CPO decisions, and to my 22 September 2016 blog post Regeneration X: Failed CPOs. Local Government Lawyer reports that after an oral hearing Collins J has granted Southwark Council permission to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision not to confirm the Aylesbury Estate CPO, Dove J having previously refused permission on the papers. Collins J apparently also “proposed that a meeting should be held between the two parties before any litigation began, considered that it would be unlawful for Southwark to offer more than was allowed under the Compensation Code, and recognised that the decision had significant knock-on effects for other schemes“. It would be no surprise at all to me if the decision is eventually overturned. 
You may now unfasten your seat belts.

Simon Ricketts 4.2.17

Personal views, et cetera