This post will mostly be about judicial review but if instead you have come here for a summary of the implications arising from the joint government/Mayor of London package of support for housebuilding in London (23 October 2025) why not listen to my interview with Concilio’s Nick Dines and we’ll see you back here in 35 minutes?
Judicial review…
Depends which side you’re on doesn’t it.
There have been at least two interesting judgments in the last couple of weeks, interesting for different reasons which nothing to do with the substantive issues involved. I’m not going to summarise the actual cases because they are both covered well (by my Town Legal colleagues Archie Hunter and Adam Choudhury respectively) in Town Legal’s latest weekly planning judgments update (you can subscribe gratis via the button at the foot of the update):
- C G Fry & Son Limited v Secretary of State (Supreme Court, 22 October 2025)
- R (HyNot Limited) v Secretary of State (Saini J, 15 October 2025)
All I wanted to say about CG Fry, given all the excellent summaries that are already out there (including Archie’s), was:
- Fortune favours the brave. This is a case which was lost by CG Fry at first instance and in the Court of Appeal (all this of course following an unsuccessful planning appeal at which the same arguments were run). Who might have given up rather than carry on, with the exposure to costs arising? Great credit is due to Lord Charlie Banner KC. Would you in that position be resilient enough to hold to your initial opinion and to retain the trust of those relying on it? I’m thinking back to Richard Harwood KC in Dill v Secretary of State (Supreme Court, 20 May 2020) – where the stats were the same: LLW. I’m thinking back also to Estelle Dehon KC in R (Finch) v Surrey County Council (Supreme Court , 20 June 2024) – ruled unarguable on the papers, unarguable at renewal hearing, arguable by the Court of Appeal on two grounds, dismissed then by the High Court and then by the Court of Appeal before success in the Supreme Court: LLWLLW. Within boundaries (some cases are sure-fire losers), litigation is inherently uncertain. Judgments of lower courts may be overturned on appeal. It isn’t over till it’s over. I’ll come back to that theme in my comments on HyNot.
- Isn’t it interesting that the outcome of the case turned upon the decision of a previous government that the “easy” way to give Ramsar sites the same protection as habitat sites that are protected under the Conservation of Habitats Regulations (special areas of protection and special protection areas) was simply to set that out in national policy rather than by way of amending the relevant legislation? That is now being rectified, belatedly, by way of a government amendment to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. But isn’t there a lesson when it comes to the NPPF itself or rather the proposed National Development Management Policies, envisaged by mechanisms set out in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 as being statutory documents with equivalence to statutory local development plans. Parliament clearly considered that it would not be enough for NDMPs to be given weight through policy-expression but we are all waiting to see in what form these NDMPs are finally going to emerge.
- Lastly, it’s nice to read a Supreme Court judgment that is so straightforward and clear in its expression – and descriptive of the planning system in a way that any of us would recognise. It’s not always the case (mentioning no names, *coughs* Hillside).
Now to HyNot, again some excellent summaries out there (including Adam’s) so I just wanted to focus on the judge’s comments about “promptness” in bringing judicial review proceedings and on whether the “arguability” threshold should be higher in some cases:
- This was a permission hearing, where the claimant simply needed to persuade the judge that the claim was arguable.
- What was under challenge was the grant of consent by Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero of the “HyNet Carbon Dioxide Transportation and Storage Project – Offshore” The project “comprises 3 geological gas storage sites in the Liverpool Bay Area beneath the East Irish Sea. The proposal is designed to store 109 million tonnes of carbon dioxide and is a core part of the Government’s legal commitment to Net Zero. It is expected to create 2,000 construction jobs. The Development (called the Liverpool Bay CCS project) is part of a nationally significant infrastructure development in the North West which will have a very significant regional and national economic impact.”
- The second paragraph of the judgment describes the claimant as follows: “The Claimant company and the group of individuals behind it do not like CCS in relation to power generation. They oppose it because they believe that CCS in relation to power generation and ‘blue’ hydrogen production is a costly and time-consuming distraction that will lock society into continued fossil fuel use and prevent investment in other more proven climate solutions. The Claimant is a Company Limited by Guarantee which was incorporated the day before this claim was filed. The name chosen by the incorporators of their company, “HyNot”, reveals the nature of its opposition to what, as appears below, is loosely known as the “HyNet Cluster”. The Claimant represents a campaign group which its director, Nicky Crosby, describes as being a loose group of campaigners from different environmental and climate campaign backgrounds, such as Frack Free Dee, Friends of the Earth, Extinction Rebellion, Chester Sustainability Forum, and CAFOD.”
- Unlike more usual planning cases where there is now a six weeks’ deadline for bringing judicial review proceedings, this was a claim where the traditional judicial review deadline applied that the claim must be brought “promptly … and in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose”. The claim was brought on the last day within the three months’ deadline.
- After finding the claim to be unarguable, the judge found that he would also have refused permission on the basis that the claimant failed to act “promptly”: “challenges to major infrastructure call for particular urgency. Whilst the volume of documentation was substantial, that did not in my judgment justify the delay, especially in circumstances where the Claimant ultimately filed only on a protective basis, without a pleaded case. I consider that the Claimant was aware of all of the information it required to enable it to bring proceedings on the grounds pleaded approximately 8 weeks before it filed its ‘protective’ claim. Certainly, by the end of April 2025 it was aware of the essential substance of the grounds that would have been available to it, and that is all that was required (see British Gas at paras. [141]-[145]). Detailed disclosure normally follows the grant of permission for judicial review, which is the trigger for the duty of candour and cooperation with the court and is not necessary before a claim can be brought (see British Gas at [145]). There is no reason why the Claimant could not have filed (whether ‘protectively’ or with proper pleadings, to be amended if required) much sooner. It is apparent, however, that the Claimant took the position that it could simply wait until the last day of the three-month period to file. The courts have stated emphatically that that is not the case.”
- Whilst Saini J found the claim to be unarguable, there is an interesting concluding passage in the judgment recording that counsel for the government had urged the judge in submissions “to apply a more demanding test of the Claimant at the hearing than the traditional arguability test familiar at the permission stage”, relying on case law starting with the 1994 Mass Energy case. Counsel (Charles Streeten) “argued that the Claimant must satisfy a heightened test described as a “reasonably good prospect of succeeding” at a substantive hearing. The following facts were said to justify this more onerous hurdle: (1) the urgency (illustrated both by the categorisation of this claim as Significant under CPR 54D paras. 3.1 and 3.2 and by the measure of expedition ordered by Mould J); (2) the fact that a decision on permission has been adjourned to a hearing listed for half a day; (3) that the Court will have the benefit of extensive written and oral submissions from all three active parties; and (4) that the claim substantially affects the interests of a third party (the Developer).” Whilst this proved unnecessary for his reasoning, Saini J went on to consider this argument “obiter” as lawyers like to say, i.e. even though it was not determinative and therefore less binding in terms of creating any legal precedent, although in my view still interesting. He considered “that there was substantial force in Mr Streeten’s submissions. A court does retain the discretion to require more of a claimant in establishing the merits of its case at a hearing of the type convened before me concerning an urgent matter of national importance, where there has been substantial pre-reading, detailed skeletons and oral submissions over half a day from all relevant parties. The grant of permission in a planning case on the type of facts before me is in itself highly likely to cast a long shadow over a development of national interest, with substantial financing and construction arrangements involving many third parties. I can see the force of an argument that much more than mere arguability of a claim (such as establishing that the claim is more likely than not to succeed) should be required in circumstances where such prejudice will be caused. Uncertainty as to the legal position is itself highly prejudicial in commercial arrangements.”
All this is relevant in the light of continuing thinking by the government as to ways of closing down unmeritorious judicial review cases. I referred in my 25 January 2025 blog post to the government’s announcement as to changes to be made to procedures governing legal changes of development consent order decisions in relation to nationally significant infrastructure projects (now the subject of provisions within the Planning and Infrastructure Bill), following first the report by Lord Banner KC and subsequent consultation that I summarised in my 28 October 2024 blog post Banner Review Into Legal Challenges of NSIPs (NB there really are other barristers out there I feel sure, I’m not being sponsored or anything). Lord Banner had recommended that there may be a case for raising the permission threshold for judicial review claims challenging DCOs (“There is much to be said for raising the threshold for permission to apply for judicial review of DCOs, to the heightened Mass Energy threshold, so that only those claims likely to succeed are allowed to proceed to a substantive hearing. There is no right, either under UK constitutional principles or international law, for an arguable but weak or mediocre claim to proceed to a full hearing rather than being weeded out beforehand)”, but the government was not inclined to accept this; perhaps the courts are beginning to get there of their own volition in relation to challenges of nationally significant projects? (Although what is the risk that a claim such as that in Finch is prematurely ruled out?). The big question is of course: if these measures are appropriate for challenges to nationally strategic infrastructure projects, why should they not be introduced in relation to planning-related challenges more generally?
To my mind, it is good to see the tough line taken by Saini J on promptness. Given the six weeks’ deadline for planning-related judicial review cases, why is there even still the traditional “prompt but in any event within three months” test, which can be so uncertain in its practical application? I’m currently dealing with a case, in relation to a proposed commercial development, where the claimant (a public authority) filed a day out of time, the challenge delaying significantly a development project, resulting in, according to my client’s evidence, several million pounds of lost rental income. The court has taken over three months before finally allowing the claim to be filed out of time. What sort of signal does this send? Is there some sort of institutional bias towards large infrastructure developments?
And on the question of court delays, is anyone else experiencing unusually long delays before securing decisions at the permission stage on the papers? I have one case where we filed on 6 May. Still… nothing.
Getting the balance right in relation to sieving out unmeritorious judicial review cases is so important given the implications not just for the project under challenge but in terms of giving reassurance to all those operating in the planning system that every document does not need to be “gold plated” as an insurance against even unmeritorious challenge. The fear of a claim for judicial review (successful or otherwise) is skewing every stage of the system!
Finally, as a result of an amendment to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill tabled by a conservative peer, also a working planning KC (*checks notes* him again!!), the government is put forward its own amendment which will build on the current provisions in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 which allow for an extension of the time for implementing a planning permission which has been challenged by way of judicial review. At present, under section 91 (3), if proceedings are brought to challenge the validity of a planning permission, the deadline for implementation is extended by one year. The amendment will extend the deadline by a further year if the proceedings have permission to go to the Court of Appeal and by two years if they have permission to go to the Supreme Court. In the case of outline planning permissions, reserved matters submissions will be extended by equivalent periods.
All good and necessary but any steps to speed up judicial proceedings, and to sieve out doomed claims as at early as stage as possible, would of course be more likely to address the root problem.
Simon Ricketts, 24 October 2025
Personal views, et cetera



