Category: Green belt

The Valentine Brothers original version obviously, rather than Simply Red.

In fact, pardon me if this post feels a little like the extended 12” remix, but I wanted to work out for myself some of the long-running arguments that are out there as to the role of financial viability testing in planning.

The subject has been made topical by the “viability in relation to green belt release” annex to the consultation draft revised National Planning Policy Framework, as well as Labour’s proposals in relation to “no hope value” CPOs (mentioned in my 21 July 2024 blog post Hope/No Hope). But the discussion is vital anyway in present circumstances where, in order to deliver and/or fund necessary housing development (and indeed many other forms of development), the state largely relies on the private sector, which is inevitably motivated by profit.

It’s difficult to have a sensible discussion without trying to establish some basic principles. So here goes…

We want an acceptable environment around us: sufficient social housing for those who need it, health and education facilities, biodiversity and open space, good public transport, footpaths and cycleways.

We no longer seem prepared to pay for this fully through direct taxation or indeed charitable benevolence.

Instead, over the last 25 years or so of my career, Government policy has increasingly supported the indirect taxation of development activity (primarily by way of section 106 agreement planning obligations and the community infrastructure levy) to help pay for all these good things, even where it is not the development itself that is leading to the need for the particular infrastructure or facilities (and before you raise it, regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations only provides cover against the most egregious of LPA “asks”).

Affordable housing is the classic example of what I mean by indirect taxation. As I set out in my 28 May 2017 blog post Affordable Housing Tax:

“In requiring the developers of private housing schemes to contribute to the provision of affordable housing, the planning system has become a tax collection system, and an inefficient, opaque one at that.

[…]

“The provision of market housing does not in any way increase the need for affordable housing, indeed over time by increasing supply if anything it should decrease it. It may be said that mixed use communities can only be achieved by requiring the inclusion of affordable housing within market residential schemes, but that in itself does not justify the state putting the cost of the affordable housing at the door of the developer.”

[Think how odd it would be for car makers to be required to sell a large proportion of their product at below market rate, in fact at a loss – or indeed for supermarket chains to be so required – nice as that thought might be. Why is housing so different?]

Add to this the much-reduced availability of grant funding.

You see the same indirect taxation in the case, for instance, of schools: whether or not a particular housing scheme is built, children need schooling somewhere in the country. And yet the cost of delivery of new schools is regularly met in large part by way of contributions and obligations extracted via the planning system.

Most recently, the 10% biodiversity net gain requirement. Laudable – but another indirect tax on development via the planning system.

All of this appears to be implicitly accepted as in the public interest, presumably on the basis that:

• It’s a victimless crime – assumed to be paid for out of (a) the receipts the land-owner receives for sale of the land, as long as the requirements are flagged sufficiently far in advance that they can be built into the contractual arrangements between the land owner and developer and can generally manage the land-owner’s expectations; and/or (2) the developer’s profit (for whom the return needs to outweigh the risk).

• It sugars the pill for local communities, which is important given the general antipathy towards development (or maybe that’s just my village’s Facebook group….).

• It would be politically impractical to meet these costs via the national public purse.

This is all fine if the numbers work out – if the contributions required by policy can be paid for, whilst leaving enough money in the project to ensure that it will still proceed i.e. that between them:

• The land-owner receives enough money to persuade them to sell the land, rather than hold onto it or sell it for other purposes

• The developer concludes that there is a sufficient slice of profit left to make it worthwhile as a business proposition to proceed to carry out the development, having regard to the availability, and likely cost over time, of development finance and/or of funding partners, and the range of development risks such as the costs of construction, other regulatory costs and uncertainties over time, unforeseen problems along the way and as to the financial return likely to be achieved at the end of it all

• The purchaser or renter of the home is protected by operation of market forces against the cost simply being passed onto them.

What happens when the contributions requested in return for planning permission don’t work out? That is where the viability appraisal process comes in.

The Planning Practice Guidance https://www.gov.uk/guidance/viability advises that local plans “should set out the contributions expected from development. This should include setting out the levels and types of affordable housing provision required, along with other infrastructure (such as that needed for education, health, transport, flood and water management, green and digital infrastructure).

These policy requirements should be informed by evidence of infrastructure and affordable housing need, and a proportionate assessment of viability that takes into account all relevant policies, and local and national standards, including the cost implications of the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) and section 106. Policy requirements should be clear so that they can be accurately accounted for in the price paid for land.”

Obviously, it is sensible for local plans to give as much certainty as possible as to what contributions will be sought from developers and thereby to serve to dampen the expectations of land-owners. But the reality is that viability assessments at the local plan making stage are inevitably broad-brush, often based on typical development typologies. They become out of date. There is often insufficient push-back from developers – either because they do not yet have a relevant project in mind at the time the plan is being consulted upon and examined, or because they are nervous about losing the potential allocation of their site for development. And so policy aspirations are set high.

When an application for planning permission comes forward for development which is in accordance with the local plan or otherwise in the public interest, save that the full range of policy requirements cannot be met without rendering the project unachievable, what happens then?

To quote paragraph 58 of the current NPPF (which paragraph is not proposed to be amended in the consultation draft):

“Where up-to-date policies have set out the contributions expected from development, planning applications that comply with them should be assumed to be viable. It is up to the applicant to demonstrate whether particular circumstances justify the need for a viability assessment at the application stage. The weight to be given to a viability assessment is a matter for the decision maker, having regard to all the circumstances in the case, including whether the plan and the viability evidence underpinning it is up to date, and any change in site circumstances since the plan was brought into force. All viability assessments, including any undertaken at the plan-making stage, should reflect the recommended approach in national planning guidance, including standardised inputs, and should be made publicly available.”

A decision-maker can decide to grant planning permission without commitments on the part of the developer to all of the contributions normally required by policy, if the developer has justified that the development would otherwise be unviable  demonstrating that by way of a viability assessment carried out in accordance with the methodology set out in the Government’s Planning Practice Guidance.

The guidance these days is tighter than it was, although there is still much room for debate and disagreement as between the developer’s surveyor and the surveyor engaged by the local planning authority (invariably at the developer’s cost). There is much public discussion about “benchmark land value” in this exercise, i.e. in estimating the costs of carrying out the development, what cost should be assumed for the land itself? But that is by no means the only factor when it comes to viability. In many situations, development may be unviable even assuming little or no land value, simply because of, for instance, the large infrastructure costs which would need to be met by the developer, financing costs and/or low value of the completed development – and this is all made more complicated in relation to longer-term projects, where an internal rate of return model may be more appropriate. But for I’m going to focus here on the land value issue.

It’s been clear for many years that the benchmark land value to be plugged into the viability appraisal is not the price that the developer has actually paid for the land – see for example Parkhurst Road Limited v Secretary of State (Holgate J, 27 April 2018). Instead, the usual approach, according to the Planning Practice Guidance, should be EUV+, i.e. to take the existing use value (ignoring, for example, any development potential) and then to apply a premium. Oh dear, one of the big questions is how big should that premium be? The guidance says this:

“The premium should provide a reasonable incentive for a land owner to bring forward land for development while allowing a sufficient contribution to fully comply with policy requirements.

Plan makers should establish a reasonable premium to the landowner for the purpose of assessing the viability of their plan. This will be an iterative process informed by professional judgement and must be based upon the best available evidence informed by cross sector collaboration. Market evidence can include benchmark land values from other viability assessments. Land transactions can be used but only as a cross check to the other evidence. Any data used should reasonably identify any adjustments necessary to reflect the cost of policy compliance (including for affordable housing), or differences in the quality of land, site scale, market performance of different building use types and reasonable expectations of local landowners. Policy compliance means that the development complies fully with up to date plan policies including any policy requirements for contributions towards affordable housing requirements at the relevant levels set out in the plan. A decision maker can give appropriate weight to emerging policies. Local authorities can request data on the price paid for land (or the price expected to be paid through an option or promotion agreement).”

There are some examples of where a premium of many times the EUV has been found to be appropriate. For example:

• Long Marston, Pebworth (APP/H1840/S/16/3158916, 16 May 2017): In the particular circumstances there, the inspector found that a premium of around 15 times the EUV was appropriate. (The appeal pre-dated the PPG but turned on a similar earlier concept of EUV+).

• Parkhurst Road, Islington (APP/V5570/W/16/3151698, 19 June 2017): The appeal site was a former Territorial Army barracks in north London. The inspector found that the EUV was £2.4m but EUV+ was £6.75m (still less than the developer had paid for the site) . In the subsequent High Court challenge I refer to above, Holgate J the judge said this about EUV+: “Some adherents appear to be promoting a formulaic application of ‘EUV plus.’ But as the RICS advised its members in its 2012 Guidance Note, an uplift of between 10 and 40% on existing use value is an arbitrary number and the method does not reflect the workings of the market…”.

• Old Oak and Park Royal local plan examination in public, Inspector’s Interim Finding on Viability (10 September 2019) : In relation to the Car Giant site forming most of the plan area, a very large brownfield site in north London, the inspector found the EUV to be £5.3m. The Old Oak and Park Royal Development Corporation’s surveyors suggested a premium of 20% would be appropriate. The inspector found that the characteristics of the site, including in particular Car Giant’s significant relocation costs, would justify a far larger premium, concluding that EUV+ was “clearly in excess of £240m”.

On the one hand, this sort of exercise may be seen as sensible in that it is seeking to get to the number that can be taken to be the tipping point at which a land-owner might rationally choose to sell rather than stay put. But of course, on the other, the potential range is so wide that the outcome of the process can be very unpredictable and result in high numbers – true but what is the alternative that enables or persuades land-owners (who are often in fact reluctant to sell in any event – their heads only turned by a financial offer they can’t refuse) actually to make their land available, unless there is a market intervention such as compulsory purchase (but (1) that obviously needs careful justification and (2) a careful look is needed at how the compulsory purchase compensation principles work), some targeted form of tax credits or in fact (never thought I’d say this and I still only think this works in theory rather than reality) community land auctions?

I’ll throw in another complication here: the figures in a viability appraisal are in part theoretical. We know that the actual price paid for the land isn’t plugged into the equation. The actual price may have been far higher, meaning that the developer is always going to be struggling to get the project off the ground. It may have been lower – the land may have been held for generations, with a very low current book value, or be held by a body that is prepared to make the land available at an under-value. Similarly as to the efficiencies in construction or financing that a particular developer may be able to bring to the process (versus the greater challenges in this respect an SME may have than a national housebuilder), or preparedness to take a reduced profit, or even a loss with this development, given wider objectives. If we want an objective scrutiny of the financial position, not tied to a particular developer who may of course in any event sell on, this is probably right. But it does mean that there may be two processes underway: (1) what is the objective agreed assessment as to the viability of the project and (2) is this developer for some reason prepared to offer more than what is objectively viable on the basis of that agreed assessment?

Can we at least agree that this subject is not easy, either in macro policy terms or in its detailed application? And that whilst it may be tempting for some to say “get rid of viability testing, development must simply meet all policy requirements”, can we agree that this is unrealistic without (1) up to date realistic local plan policies (unlikely) or (2) an acknowledgement that effect would less development coming forward, particularly in the areas where it is most needed?

At which point I turn to the Government’s proposals.

A new annex is included in its draft revised NPPF, headed “viability in relation to green belt release”, but one of the only two new elements of the proposed approach set out in that annex is what I have put in bold in the following paragraph:

“To determine land value for a viability assessment, a benchmark land value should be established on the basis of the existing use value (EUV) of the land, plus a reasonable and proportionate premium for the landowner. For the purposes of plan-making and decision- taking, it is considered that a benchmark land value of [xxxx] allows an appropriate premium for landowners. Local planning authorities should set benchmark land values informed by this, and by local material considerations.“

These are the key associated paragraphs in the consultation document which explain the “[xxxx]“:

“29. Approaches that government could take to ensure the appropriate use of viability include the following options.

a. Government sets benchmark land values to be used in viability assessments. When assessing whether a scheme is viable, it is necessary to make an allowance for the amount of money to be paid to the landowner. This should currently be set by the local planning authority. Government could set indicative benchmark land values for land released from the Green Belt through national policy, to inform the policies developed on benchmark land value by local planning authorities. These should be set at a fair level, allowing for a premium above the existing use, but reflecting the need for policy delivery against the golden rules. Different approaches to benchmark land value are likely to be appropriate for agricultural land, and for previously developed land.

b. Government sets policy parameters so that where land transacts at a price above benchmark land value, policy requirements should be assumed to be viable. As part of this approach, Government sets out that if land has been sold (or optioned) at a price which exceeds the nationally set benchmark land value, viability negotiation should not be undertaken. Under this approach, the planning authority should not be seeking higher contributions (e.g. 60 per cent affordable housing), but equally the developer should not be seeking lower contributions (e.g. 40 per cent affordable housing), as this would represent a transfer of value from the public to private landholders. Therefore, planning permissions would not generally be granted for proposed developments where land transacts above benchmark land value, and cannot comply with policy.

c. Government sets out that where development proposals comply with benchmark land value requirements, and a viability negotiation to reduce policy delivery occurs, a late-stage review should be undertaken. This would build on the approach to be taken by the Greater London Authority, and tests actual costs and revenues against the assumptions made in the initial viability assessment. If, for example, the development is more viable than initially assumed, due to a rise in house prices, then additional contributions can be secured, to bring the development closer to or up to policy compliance.

30. Benchmark land values are generally set as a multiple of agricultural use values, which are typically in the region of £20,000 – £25,000 per hectare, and as a percentage uplift on non-agricultural brownfield use values. We also note that views of appropriate premia above existing use values vary: for agricultural land, a recent academic paper[footnote 6 ] suggested BLVs of three times existing use value; the Letwin Review of Build Out [footnote 7] suggested ten times existing use value; Lichfields found that local planning authorities set BLVs of between 10- and 40-times existing use value [footnote 8 ]. These BLVs do not necessarily relate to Green Belt land, which is subject to severe restrictions on development, and Government is particularly interested in the impact of setting BLV at the lower end of this spectrum.

31. The Government considers that limited Green Belt release, prioritising grey belt, will provide an excellent opportunity for landowners to sell their land at a fair price, while supporting the development of affordable housing, infrastructure and access to nature. Where such land is not brought forward for development on a voluntary basis, the Government is considering how bodies such as local planning authorities, combined authorities, and Homes England could take a proactive role in the assembly of the land to help bring forward policy compliant schemes, supported where necessary by compulsory purchase powers, with compensation being assessed under the statutory no-scheme principle rules set out in Part 2 of the Land Compensation Act 1961.

32. In such cases, these rules would operate to exclude any increases or decreases in value of land caused by the compulsory purchase scheme, or by the prospect of it, and valuation of the prospect of planning permission (‘hope value’) for alternative development would reflect the golden rules outlined in the NPPF. Use of compulsory purchase powers may also include use of directions to secure ‘no hope value’ compensation where appropriate and justified in the public interest. A comprehensive justification for a no hope value direction (e.g., which includes a high proportion of vital affordable housing being delivered) will strengthen the argument that a direction is in the public interest. This would align with the Government’s aspiration for high levels of affordable housing to be delivered on these sites.”

That emboldening is in the document itself. So, we are looking at a potential approach where, for the purposes of viability appraisals on green belt sites (where there will be the policy requirement of “at least 50% affordable housing, with an appropriate proportion being Social Rent”) the Government caps the potential premium on existing use value more towards 3x than between 10 and 40x. That would provide some clarity, and would in the long term (beyond the gestation of current promotion agreements, option agreements and the like which will have baked in potentially higher figures) dampen land-owner expectations. However, the outcome may be that some potential sites are not released by land-owners because the resultant return is simply not worth it for them – they would prefer to hold the land for its current purposes, or make it available for non-residential development which may result in a higher premium, or wait for a more liberal policy climate to open up in future decades – and in the meantime battle against any threat of compulsory purchase. This is particularly the case at the moment where, as another risk to factor in, there is a dearth of registered providers even willing to build-out or take on the affordable housing element in some areas. The impacts of the approach will also particularly be felt in areas with weaker housing markets, where 50% affordable housing (including, importantly, an as yet unknown proportion of socially rented housing) will be a big drag on viability – and those areas are often the same areas where housing targets will be going up most steeply under the proposed revised standard method.

This proposal to set a blanket cap on existing use values really does need to be stress-tested during the current consultation period. I would particularly urge those with market knowledge to review those papers referred to in paragraph 30 quoted above – I have included the links. For instance, I couldn’t immediately see the workings for 3x EUV in that first paper.

The other change which that annex proposes is in its last line:

“Where a viability negotiation to reduce policy delivery has been undertaken, a late-stage review should be conducted to assess whether further contributions are required.”

Remember, this annex only relates to development in the green belt, but its effect is to advise that where policy compliant development (eg 50% affordable housing), cannot be delivered due to lack of viability, a provision should be included in the section 106 agreement, providing for a review at a later stage, or at later stages, of the development to see whether that is still the position or whether the project is now able to afford to meet those policy commitments, in full or at least in part. Obviously, in London, this has been relatively standard for some time (see eg the Mayor’s May 2023 draft development viability London Plan Guidance), and is often used in negotiations across the country. But the negotiation is never straight-forward, even in London where the provisions are so standardised. What should be the triggers; what is opened up on the review (and is it just a review of what has been developed so far or is it also an updated estimate of what has not yet been built); what proportion of the surplus should be retained by the developer so as to provide any incentive; what should be the cap on what can be secured on review (vital, as all of this is very sensitive to funders and lenders); what should any surplus be applied towards and what say does the developer has in this?

The threat of compulsory purchase in the case of recalcitrant landowners? That takes us back to the issues I covered in that Hope/No Hope blog post. In some cases, perhaps so, but of course as I have mentioned above, even acquisition of land at existing use value (which obviously would lead to protracted wrangling in many cases) does not always guarantee project viability.

Apologies for all that. Something got me started.

Simon Ricketts, 18 August 2024

Personal views, et cetera