Development management – Page 3

Dennis

There was an interesting Hillside after-tremor this week by way of R (Dennis) v London Borough of Southwark (Holgate J, 17 January 2024) which may prove useful in giving more practical guidance as to the approach to drop-in applications in the context of modern multi-phase masterplan-style permissions.

(For a quick refresher on the Hillside judgment itself, see my 2 November 2022 blog post Running Down That Hillside)

In Dennis an objector challenged the decision by Southwark Council to grant a section 96A (non-material amendments) approval the effect of which was intended to make an outline planning permission for the phased redevelopment and regeneration of the Aylesbury Estate in south east London “severable” (within the meaning of the Hillside judgment) by the insertion of that word into the description of development authorised by the outline planning permission. The claimant contended that the amendment was “material” and therefore outside the scope of section 96A. Southwark Council and the developer, Notting Hill Genesis, submitted that the outline planning permission should be interpreted as “severable” in any event and that the amendment sought was just by way of caution. The amendment was made so as to pave the way for implementation of a drop-in permission for development within one of the phases, which would be inconsistent with what the outline planning permission had authorised. The drop-in application had been resolved to be approved subject to grant of the section 96A application.

There are already a few particular aspects as to the facts which need to be borne in mind before applying the judgment more broadly:

The approach to seeking to make a particular phase “severable”, in Hillside terms, from the rest of the permission was simply by way of introducing the word “severable” into the description of development!

The parties disagreed as to whether the permission was already to be construed as severable but agreed for the purposes of the litigation that if it was not already severable the amendment would be material and therefore fell outside of section 96A. The judge did not reach a ruling that changes to accommodate drop-in applications are necessarily material and of course that will be a matter for the planning judgment of the decision-maker in every case.

The amendment was by way of securing “severability” rather than adjusting the permission so that building it out would not be materially incompatible with what was to come forward by way of a drop-in application.

This is to be contrasted by many Hillside strategies that we see, where alongside submission of the drop-in application care is taken to amend the existing permission to the extent necessary to achieve material physical compatibility – often by way of section 96A because the local planning authority in its planning judgment determines those amendments not to be material. This after all makes sense and, whilst I might have some sympathy for objectors where the strategy is taken that was taken in Dennis, where there would be no control over what might come forward on the severed part of the permission, I don’t have any sympathy where it is perfectly clear what the changes are, by virtue of the drop-in application having been made, accompanied by full assessments of the acceptability of the proposal in the context of the wider consented development and where this is all reported to committee so that everyone is clear and has a full opportunity to make representations to the same extent as if the whole development had been the subject of a fresh application (the Supreme Court’s impractical suggestion in Hillside).

So what did we learn from Dennis, aside from the extent to which Hillside issues remain a menace for all concerned, and aside from being reminded, again, that the Government really should have grasped the nettle and legislated to address the problem in the way that many of us urged (we even provided draft clauses!) rather than sticking with introducing via LURA the very weak section 73B procedural option into the 1990 Act?

Hillside applies as much to outline planning permissions as to full permissions.

Care is needed as to the word “severable” used by the Supreme Court in Hillside. Simply inserting the bare term “severable” into a permission does not make it severable.

Phasing alone does not connote severability. Indeed, “if the inclusion of phasing provisions were to be sufficient to sever a planning permission, whether detailed or outline, that could have consequences which nobody involved in seeking or granting that permission would have envisaged, such as the application of the statutory time limits for the implementation of each separate permission. For example, if the outline permission in Percy Bilton had been treated by the court as severed, the statutory time limits for submitting reserved matters for approval would have applied to each of the resulting discrete permissions and so some of those consents would have become time-expired. That was the issue in the case. Practitioners will therefore need to consider carefully the possible consequences of seeking to argue that a single planning permission should be treated as severed.”

A final point to note is that this case arose not from a challenge to the approval of the drop-in application (quite right, see my 15 December 2023 blog post Permission Incompatibility Not Relevant For The Decision Maker – Court of Appeal In Fiske). The case arose from the attempt of the developer to ensure, by way of the section 96A application, that implementation of that drop-in permission would not lead to a risk that the existing planning permission could no longer be relied on. I would comment that it is of course open to the developer to seek again to amend the permission such that the proposals can proceed.

I noted the statement in Planning Resource from the Public Interest Law Centre, which represented Dennis:

“This is an important judgement for housing campaigners across the country, as large estate redevelopments often unfold from outline planning permissions over time – or ‘phased’ like this. This case scrutinises the method in which developers use ‘drop in’ applications to deviate from what was promised to residents.”

My response would be: What really has been achieved by the challenge? What further assessments will be needed and further opportunity for views to be expressed, as a result of this outcome, that could not have been made in the context of the drop-in application? I’m sceptical.

On a separate note, I was really pleased at the beginning of the week to participate in a joint Landmark Chambers and Town Legal event, looking at the implications of the revised NPPF, chaired by Hashi Mohamed and with other panellists Rupert Warren KC, Anjoli Foster, Meeta Kaur and Sam Stafford. If you missed it (we were hugely oversubscribed), Sam has now put it out online as a 50 Shades of Planning podcast. Listen via this link or on Apple. Spotify etc.

Simon Ricketts, 20 January 2024

Personal views, et cetera

Image courtesy of Wikipedia

Street Votes!

I know we are all trying to wind down, or maybe are slumped there fully unwound already, I do know that, I do see you. However, I couldn’t let a DLUHC consultation paper just slip out unnoticed on 22 December…

The Government’s consultation paper on street votes development orders landed this afternoon. The consultation period closes on 2 February 2024

You will recall that this new potential consenting route for domestic development was teed up by section 106 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which shoehorns new sections 61QA to 61QM into the 1990 Act.

The consultation paper summarises as follows how SVDOs will work in practice:

“11. A group of residents which meets certain requirements will be able to come together with a proposal for permission to be granted for development on their street, for example the addition of an extra storey to properties. The proposal can be put forward by the group of residents directly or with the assistance of an individual such as an architect.

12. The proposal will be examined by the Planning Inspectorate on behalf of the Secretary of State to check that the proposed development is in scope and that requirements prescribed in secondary legislation are met. These requirements will help ensure that development meets high design standards and that local impacts are taken into account.

13. If the proposal passes the examination, it is then put to a referendum. Where the required threshold of votes is met, subject to any final checks, the Planning Inspectorate will make the street vote development order on behalf of the Secretary of State. Once the street vote development order is made, granting planning permission, a person with control of the land can then decide whether they want to take forward development.

14. Where street vote development takes place, local authorities will be able to capture value from the new development via the Community Infrastructure Levy and, when it is introduced, the new Infrastructure Levy, and use it to fund infrastructure that will support the local area.”

The Government proposes that for the procedure to be available there will need to be at least ten residential properties in the street, with rules as to the minimum size of the qualifying group of voters and percentage of votes required as follows:

It is proposed that any proposal must include:

“a signed and witnessed letter from members of the qualifying group declaring that they support the proposal, where a proposal has been submitted on their behalf
a map which identifies the street area and the land in that street area to which the proposal relates
a draft order which includes a description of the development to which the order relates and any proposed planning conditions
any necessary supporting information such as impact assessments or statements. Further information is set out in the “Managing local impacts” section of this consultation
details of any consultation with statutory bodies
a declaration that the qualifying group has engaged with the local community”

“21. In addition, we propose that qualifying groups (or those acting on their behalf) must submit a street design code that sets out illustrated design parameters for physical development within the street area such as number of floors, plot use and the facade treatment of buildings.

22. We also propose qualifying groups (or those acting on their behalf) will have the option to submit a detailed specification of the elevations visible from public spaces for new or extended buildings that are permitted in the street area. If these are submitted, they must include at least one detailed elevation drawing for facades facing public spaces. Specifications of elevations not facing public spaces are optional. Qualifying groups may provide various façade options if a varied streetscape is desired.

23. If plot widths in the street area vary, the specification must include requirements on how the elevations can be adapted to deal with such variation. If they wish, qualifying groups may also choose to include permitted elevations for wider buildings that can be created by merging plots e.g. an elevation for a small mansion block created by merging three existing plots.”

A ”street area” is to be defined as “the properties on each stretch of road starting or ending at a crossroads or as a minor road at a T-junction or where there is a gap between buildings of more than 50 metres. A street is treated as terminated if the continuous stretch of buildings is broken by a bridge wider than 3 metres. This applies to both the street running beneath and over the bridge. A residential property is counted as being in a street area if any part of its boundary runs along the highway. The street area must have at least 10 residential properties within its boundary. We also propose that adjoining streets could be joined together to form one street area, for example, joining together two streets that have fewer than 10 residential properties.”

Detailed design requirements are set out in a table at paragraph 35 of the consultation document, informed by six design principles:

Supporting a gradual evolution in the character of neighbourhoods
Limiting impacts on neighbours
Preserving green space and increasing outdoor space (including balconies)
Celebrating heritage
Promoting active travel
Creating sociable neighbourhoods

If you look at the paragraph 35 table you will see that there is much detail as to for instance, the maximum number of extra storeys (dependent on the density of the area); setbacks; basements; angled light planes; ceiling heights and corner properties.

It is proposed that “street vote development orders should be permitted to go beyond that which might be permitted under the local development plan where the impacts are broadly acceptable in the view of the Secretary of State according to national policy, and it will not cause problems with the implementation of the local plan.”

If the proposal survives examination and the necessary referendum, the Government hasn’t yet decided how long property owners will have to commence development:

“Option A: Development must be commenced within 10 years of the order being made. This is longer than is typically allowed for planning permission granted through existing consent routes because the permission will potentially apply to properties under many different owners, some of which may not be able to commence development within a shorter period (e.g. 3 years). The qualifying group would also have the option to propose an increase to this period as part of its proposal if it takes the view more time is needed to commence development;
Option B: Development must be commenced within a specified period (e.g.10, 20 or 30) years of the order being made. The qualifying group would also have the option to apply to the local planning authority after the order has been made to extend the commencement period; and
Option C: No time period. Permission granted through a street vote development order would be permanent.”

In summary, there’s a lot here for local planning authorities, planning professionals and (above all) home owners to get their heads around. The concept has been widely lobbied for by eg Policy Exchange, Create Streets and YIMBY. I’ll be interested to see the extent to which ultimately there is take-up and, aside from the inevitable definitional problems with any rules-based process such as this, of course there are some open questions as to the extent to which this process, alongside continuing extensions of permitted development rights and the prospect of national development management policies, further marginalises the role of the local planning authority. And does anyone remember neighbourhood development orders and all of that malarkey…?

But something to be picked up again on the other side, as they say.

In the meantime, peace to all in 24 – even to those I may be seeing across a planning inquiry or court room!

Simon Ricketts, 22 December 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Image from YIMBY Street Votes website

There’s No Other Way

To what extent is a decision-maker required to consider, before granting planning permission, whether there are alternative, more acceptable, development proposals compared to that which has been applied for?

The question arises again and again and the answer can be a bit of a blur.

Now that Marks and Spencer’s challenge to the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse planning permission for the demolition and redevelopment of its Oxford Street building has been ruled by Lang J to be arguable and will proceed to a full hearing, we shall see what the court makes of the reliance that the Secretary of State placed upon his conclusion that:

“32. Overall, the Secretary of State concludes that the evidence before him is not sufficient to allow a conclusion as to whether there is or is not a viable and deliverable alternative, as there is not sufficient evidence to judge which is more likely. The Secretary of State also does not consider that there has been an appropriately thorough exploration of alternatives to demolition. He does not consider that the applicant has demonstrated that refurbishment would not be deliverable or viable and nor has the applicant satisfied the Secretary of State that options for retaining the buildings have been fully explored, or that there is compelling justification for demolition and rebuilding.

33. The Secretary of State notes that M&S has stated that it will not continue to occupy and trade from the store for very much longer if permission is refused (IR13.46). Whether or not M&S leave the store following the Secretary of State’s decision is a commercial decision for the company. However, taking into account the locational advantages of the site, the Secretary of State does not agree with the Inspector at IR13.75 that redevelopment is the only realistic option to avoid a vacant and/or underused site.”

My 18 November 2023 blog post, Two Apples: Bramley and Worcestershire, referred in passing to alleged inadequate consideration of alternatives being one of the unsuccessful grounds of challenge in R (Bramley Solar Farm Residents Group) v Secretary of State (Lang J, 15 November 2023). Lang J referred to Holgate J’s review of the case law on alternative sites in R (Save Stonehenge World Heritage Site Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport (Holgate J, 30 July 2021 – see also my 30 July 2021 blog post Stonehenge Road Tunnel Consent Quashed) – see his paras 268 to 272, in particular:

“269 The analysis by Simon Brown J (as he then was) in Trusthouse Forte Hotels Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1986) 53 P & CR 293,299–300 has subsequently been endorsed in several authorities. First, land may be developed in any way which is acceptable for planning purposes. The fact that other land exists upon which the development proposed would be yet more acceptable for such purposes would not justify the refusal of planning permission for that proposal. But, secondly, where there are clear planning objections to development upon a particular site then “it may well be relevant and indeed necessary” to consider whether there is a more appropriate site elsewhere. “This is particularly so where the development is bound to have significant adverse effects and where the major argument advanced in support of the application is that the need for the development outweighs the planning disadvantages inherent in it.” Examples of this second situation may include infrastructure projects of national importance. The judge added that, even in some cases which have these characteristics, it may not be necessary to consider alternatives if the environmental impact is relatively slight and the objections not especially strong.

270 The Court of Appeal approved a similar set of principles in R (Mount Cook Land Ltd) v Westminster City Council [2017] PTSR 1166, at para 30. Thus, in the absence of conflict with planning policy and/or other planning harm, the relative advantages of alternative uses on the application site or of the same use on alternative sites are normally irrelevant. In those “exceptional circumstances” where alternatives might be relevant, vague or inchoate schemes, or which have no real possibility of coming about, are either irrelevant or, where relevant, should be given little or no weight.”

And now it has arisen yet again, in R (Peak District and South Yorkshire Branch of the CPRE) v Secretary of State for Transport (Thornton J, 17 November 2023. The CPRE argued that the Secretary of State should not have given development consent for the A57 Link Roads Scheme, on the basis that:

“Ground 1: The Secretary of State unlawfully failed to comply with the requirement in Regulation 21(1)(b) of the Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 to provide a reasoned conclusion on the significant effects of the Scheme because he erroneously treated National Highways’ Environmental Statement as providing a cumulative assessment of the carbon emissions from the Scheme in conjunction with other developments when it did not and he failed to assess the significance of those cumulative impacts.

Ground 2: when concluding that the benefits of the Scheme clearly outweighed the harm to the Green Belt such that there were ‘Very Special Circumstances’ justifying inappropriate development in the Green Belt, the Secretary of State unlawfully failed personally to assess whether credible alternatives proposed might deliver substantially similar benefits with less harm to the Green Belt.”

Both grounds of challenge were rejected but I am going to focus on the second.

“Twenty-two hectares of the Scheme will be located on Green Belt land. The Panel reached the view that the Scheme will cause harm to the openness of the Green Belt. It will cross the Green Belt, introduce permanent embankments, bunds, and barriers alien to the Green Belt; give prominence to vehicles and introduce new street lighting. The Panel gave the harm significant weight in its decision making but concluded that the need for, and considerable public benefits of, the Scheme clearly outweighed the adverse effects of the Scheme, including its harm to the Green Belt. The public benefits weighing significantly in favour of granting consent were said to include the reduced congestion and improved journey time through Mottram, Hollingworth and Tintwistle, as well as between Manchester and Sheffield, together with the significant economic benefits brought about by the improvements proposed. The Secretary of State agreed with the Panel’s conclusion.”

CPRE argued that “in the circumstances of this case, the existence or absence of alternatives that might deliver the same or similar benefits, with no or substantially less harm to the Green Belt, was a mandatory material consideration which the Secretary of State unlawfully failed to take into account. The following reasons were advanced for this assessment. First, the Scheme will involve large scale civil engineering works that will be permanent and irreversible. Second, the Scheme was considered to be inappropriate development and the harm caused to the openness of the Green Belt by the Scheme was given “substantial weight” by the Secretary of State. Third, National Highways had expressly relied on its options appraisal, and “the lack of alternatives” to demonstrate very special circumstances justifying inappropriate development. Fourth, interested parties had specifically identified credible alternatives in the course of the Examination that they claimed would deliver the same or similar benefits with no or substantially less harm to the Green Belt. Fifth, the alternatives proposed were concrete and capable of genuine assessment. They had scored well in early options appraisals, and their promoters were present and engaged in the Examination. Those credible alternatives had received considerable attention in the Examination. Sixth, this was not an “alternative sites” case. Rather, as in Langley Park School for Girls v Bromley London Borough Council ([2010] 1 P & CR 10) and R (Save Stonehenge World Heritage Site Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport ([2021] EWHC 2161 (Admin)) it was an “alternative schemes” case where the alternative schemes advanced by interested parties fell within the red line boundary of the application site. Seventh, the initial options appraisal was more than seven years old and did not reflect substantial changes in policy and technology since then and had not assessed alternatives with regard to their impacts on Green Belt purposes and openness, as in Langley Park.“

The judge referred to Holgate J’s summary of the case law.

“The category of legal error relied on in the present case is said to be that the Secretary of State erred by failing to take account of the alternatives advanced by CPRE and Mr Bagshaw. An error of law cannot arise in this regard unless, on the facts, the alternatives advanced by CPRE and Mr Bagshaw were so obviously material, that it was irrational for the Secretary of State to fail to consider them.”

The judge rejected the arguments as follows:

“In conclusion; I do not accept the underlying factual basis of CPRE’s primary case that the Secretary of State treated alternatives as a material consideration but failed to assess them for himself. Permission to apply for judicial review on CPRE’s primary case is refused.

Nor am I persuaded that the alternatives advanced by CPRE and Mr Bagshaw were mandatory material considerations such that it was unlawful for the Secretary of State to rely on their assessment by National Highways in its options appraisal of the Scheme. The present case is not analogous with the wholly exceptional set of circumstances in R (Save Stonehenge World Heritage Site) v Secretary of State for Transport [2021] EWHC 2161 (Admin). There is no general principle of law that the existence of alternative sites inevitably becomes a mandatory material consideration in any case where a proposed development would cause adverse effects but these are held to be outweighed by its beneficial effects (Lang J in R (Substation Action Save East Suffolk Ltd) v Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [2022] PTSR 74 at §211). Neither the applicant for development consent or the decision maker relied on the absence of alternatives to justify the Scheme. The credibility of the alternatives advanced was in dispute. The present case is distinguishable from Langley Park School for Girls v Bromley London Borough Council [2010] 1P & CR 10). The criticism advanced about the age of the options appraisal by National Highways was addressed by the Panel in its Report.

The Panel approached the alternatives proposed as a matter of planning judgement, giving them brief consideration but focussing its consideration on whether a proportionate options appraisal had been carried out by the applicant for development consent, in accordance with paragraph 4.27 of the Policy Statement on National Networks. The Secretary of State agreed with the Panel’s approach and conclusion. In my judgment the approach taken demonstrates no error of law.”

I have emboldened above the passages which are of most interest.

It is also worth remembering that environmental impact assessment does not require consideration of alternatives, simply a description of the “reasonable alternatives” which have in fact been “studied by the developer”.

In summary, whilst there are exceptions, decision making in relation to planning applications and appeals is not generally about casting around for better alternatives to the proposal under consideration, but about assessing its adequacy, judged against the development plan and other material considerations.

Simon Ricketts, 26 November 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Quids No Pros

If you pay planning application fees, or are a planner whether private or public sector, you may feel somewhat cheated by the Government’s 25 July 2023 response to its February 2023 technical consultation Stronger performance of local planning authorities supported through an increase in planning fees.

The development sector has made it clear for a long time that it is generally willing to pay more to planning departments by way of increased planning application fees if the money enables those departments to be better resourced. Accordingly there was widespread support for most of the proposals within the consultation paper. The whole thrust of the consultation paper was that the government accepted that “local planning authorities need more resource in order to perform their critical social, economic and environmental functions on planning effectively”. Also that the government was “only prepared to introduce fee increases if planning performance also improves. We want to ensure that all applicants experience a high-quality and timely service. This consultation therefore also proposes a new approach to how the performance of local planning authorities is measured across a broader set of quantitative and qualitative measures. This will provide greater transparency of service delivery and earlier and more targeted support to local planning authorities where needed.”

Obviously significant increases in planning application fees would not be likely to lead to improvements in the operation of the system, and indeed would simply place a more onerous financial burden on applicants, if the additional income were not ringfenced to be spent on maintaining or improving planning services. Whilst improved performance may not all be about money, when it comes to significant hikes in planning application fees, more money, better services, that’s the quid pro quo.

The consultation document addressed the issue directly:

“The purpose of planning application fees is to enable a local planning authority to perform the statutory function of processing planning applications. However, we recognise that planning budgets are not ringfenced which means that planning fees often can be diverted as part of a wider corporate budget priorities to support other council services. This can limit the benefit of any increase in planning fees.

To ensure that the proposed additional fee income directly supports increased resourcing of local authority planning departments, it is sometimes suggested that planning fees should be ringfenced to planning services only. This would enable direct improvements in service delivery but does undermine the general flexibility afforded to local authorities on their wider financial management. We are seeking views on whether the additional income arising from the proposed fee increase (35% for major applications, 25% for all other applications) should be ringfenced for spending within the local authority planning department. Past increases have required a written commitment from all local planning authorities in advance of implementation.”

The question was asked:

“Question 7. Do you consider that the additional income arising from the proposed fee increase should be ringfenced for spending within the local authority planning department?

Yes/no/don’t know. Please give your reasons.”

The response document sets out the significant increases that are to be introduced by way of draft Regulations laid before Parliament on 20 July 2023 – basically:

Application fees for major development (broadly speaking 10 dwellings or more or if non-residential 1,000 sq m or more) to be increased by 35% and for other forms of development by 25%.
Annual inflation indexation from 1 April 2025.
Removal of the “free go” (for repeat application within 12 months).

The response document records that the responses to the consultation document were “generally very supportive of the measures to increase planning fees, recognising the importance of securing additional income for local planning authorities”. But hang on! Look at the response to question 7, as to whether the additional income should be ringfenced for spending within the local authority planning department:

“A total of 457 respondents answered this question. There was strong support for this proposal to ringfence the additional income generated by the increase in fees. 88% agreed with the proposal, 8% did not and 4% didn’t know.

Respondents considered that ringfencing was needed to justify the increase in fees and to ensure the additional resources directly lead to improvements in performance. The extra income could be used to expand planning teams (by providing higher salaries to attract planners from private sector, training and development of planners) and improve IT systems. Many suggested that all fee income should be ringfenced for planning. On the implementation of ringfencing, others commented that resources were needed across other areas of the local authority which provided input into planning decisions, including highways, environmental health, ecology, design, drainage and heritage, so any ringfencing conditions needed to be flexible enough to allow these to be funded too.

Those who did not agree were concerned that ringfencing removed flexibility over spending decisions from local authorities. Some were concerned that ringfencing could be difficult to implement and monitor. Some considered that local planning authorities may not end up with more resources if the projected additional fee increase was netted off the baseline budget.”

88% per cent in favour. A no brainer in the circumstances one would think.

The Government’s response?

“We welcome the strong support for this proposal. We want to ensure that the fee increase results in additional funds being available to local authority planning departments, but we will not take ringfencing forward through legislation as this would impose a restriction on local authorities when they are best placed to make decisions about funding local services, including planning departments. However, we would expect local planning authorities to protect at least the income from the planning fee increase for direct investment in planning services.”

No ring-fencing. It will be left to local authorities to make that decision..

This is hugely unfair. It is unfair on local authorities with severe financial constraints such that they will need to consider whether they can afford to ringfence these monies on a voluntary basis or to use them to maintain other statutory services. No doubt heads of planning will have a limited say in that particular tug of war. It is also unfair on applicants because this significant hike in fees was to secure stronger performance from local planning authorities (see the very name of the consultation document!) – that is the only reason why it was supported.

The other important element of the proposals consulted upon was the proposed introduction of a series of new detailed metrics against which local planning authority performance can be measured. Whilst I recognise that the information gathering in itself would have been onerous, we know that what’s measured does get valued and the statistics would be useful both internally within authorities (so as to make the case for better resourcing) and externally to drive better performance. The government’s response again is in my view rather a cop-out:

“In relation to planning performance, we are grateful for the wide range of comments that have been received, relating to how we can better assess the speed of decision-making through both amending existing metrics and introducing new ones, and in response to proposed new quantitative metrics which could allow performance to be measured more widely across a range of important planning functions. We are also grateful to hear a range of feedback on our proposals to introduce qualitative metrics, including customer experience, which could capture a more holistic picture of the quality of service delivery within planning departments. This feedback is highly valued and will be drawn upon as we develop our proposals for a new planning performance framework.

We are clear that an increase in planning fee income and resourcing to local planning authorities must lead to improved performance. It is our intention to introduce a new planning performance framework once we have increased planning fees and invested in supporting the capacity and capability of planning departments. However, we recognise that local planning authorities need a period of adjustment to any new planning performance framework, and we would reiterate our commitment to consult further on detailed proposals, including thresholds, assessment periods and transitional arrangements from the current performance regime.”

There is no reason why performance measurement should not start now – let’s get to the bottom of how bad the problems currently are. It’s almost as if the Government doesn’t want to find out…

I know the Government will point to different funding streams it is making available to support capacity and capability in planning departments, for instance to the statement in Michael Gove’s long-term plan for housing 24 July 2023 announcement that the government is taking other steps to “unblock the bottlenecks in the planning system that are choking and slowing down development, and stopping growth and investment by:

Launching a new £24 million Planning Skills Delivery Fund to clear planning backlogs and get the right skills in place.
Establishing a new “super-squad” team of leading planners and other experts charged with working across the planning system to unblock major housing developments, underpinned by £13.5 million in funding. The team will first be deployed in Cambridge to boost our plans in the city, before also looking at sites across our eight Investment Zones in England, to provide high-quality homes to go alongside the high-quality jobs being created there.”

That is cautiously welcomed. But it does not change my three conclusions:

Personally I think that the “no ringfencing” decision should be re-considered.
Surely we need better performance metrics now, not some time in the indeterminate future
There really does appear to be little point in responding to Government consultation processes when a 88% response one way or the other ultimately counts for nothing (and when perhaps a substantial proportion of the 88% would have responded differently to the questions about application fee increases if the assumption had been that the increases would not be ringfenced).

Plenty of quids, no pros.

Final thought – the Government has previously floated, in Planning for the Future, the idea of introducing planning appeal fees. Personally, my view is that if the fees genuinely increased resources and sped up the system, why ever not? Nothing else comes free.

Simon Ricketts, 1 September 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Image courtesy of Christopher Bill via Unsplash

Everybody Needs Good Neighbours

I’m not sure that the architects of the 1947 town and country planning system could have foreseen the extent to which it so frequently ends up being tested to its limits by the need to protect the specific, often legitimate, interests of neighbours and the extent to which the process has become weaponised in neighbour disputes.

I have dealt before with the inevitable mission creep over time, eg in my 4 April 2023 blog post Tate Modern Viewing Platform Supreme Court Ruling: What Is There For Planners To See?

To what extent can and should local planning authorities supplement adjoining owners’ private rights with policies and decision-making that protect those adjoining owners’ interests over matters such as the impact of noise and vibration on a particularly sensitive neighbour – and, if so, how do they make sure that they have the right engineering basis for their interventions? Particularly in London of course these issues arises again and again – see eg my 5 December 2016 blog post First World Problems: Basements and planning officers can get drawn into a neighbour versus neighbour quasi-mediation.

I was reminded by all this again by a case this week, Strongroom Limited v London Borough of Hackney (Deputy High Court Judge Tim Corner KC, 8 March 2023). I only recite the facts by way of illustration of the way these things escalate – the legal issues were settled on the day of the hearing.

The claimant operates a recording studio. The council granted planning permission for redevelopment of an adjoining property, with which the claimant shares a party wall. The claimant had objected to the planning application, submitting a report by consultant Jim Griffiths of the music acoustic consultancy, Vanguardia [pause here for quiet shout out to the excellent Jim] setting out his advice that “unless noise and vibration levels were strictly controlled during construction, the use of the Studios would be subject to harm, impossible to use and might be compelled to close as a result”. He set out the maximum noise and vibration levels that could be tolerated during the construction phase. The developer responded with their own commissioned report. The council in turn commissioned their own report and in consequence planning permission was granted with a detailed condition requiring submission of a “demolition and construction method statement covering all phases of the development to include details of noise control measures” with specific limits on noise and vibration levels set out in the condition.

Once the developer applied to discharge the condition the claimant argued strongly that the developer’s technical work was flawed and commenced proceedings for an injunction to stop construction works from being carried out. That resulted in a settlement agreement allowing, amongst other things, for on-site noise testing and disclosure of testing results. The claimant continued to take issue with the technical work and with some undisclosed testing which had been made available to the council. The council discharged the condition on the basis of the information submitted by the developer and the claimant challenged this by way of judicial review.

In the meantime, the, presumably despairing, developer sought and obtained a separate planning permission simply for change of use of its building, without any condition prescribing numerical noise and vibration limits during construction but requiring a construction management plan to be submitted including details of noise control measures. Again, the council discharged the condition on the basis of information submitted by the developer and again the claimant challenged this by way of judicial review.

So the Deputy High Court Judge had two complicated judicial reviews to determine, both revolving around whether the the council had acted properly in discharging the respective conditions. Unusually, on the very day of the hearing the parties reached a further settlement agreement resolving all of the issues. Even more unusually the one matter the parties had not managed to agree upon was the question of who should bear the costs of the proceedings and so the judge had to proceed with a relatively full analysis of the relative strength of the parties’ arguments before finally determining that (you may have seen this coming) each party should bear its own costs.

What an expenditure of time and money all round, at every stage of the process. Surely there must be a better way?

One of the problems is that outside the planning system, potential private law remedies in relation to matters such as noise, vibration and potential effects on the structural stability of adjoining buildings do not provide protection in a particularly straightforward and light-touch way. Yes, actions in private nuisance are available but the Tate Modern case is a high profile example of the inherent uncertainties of that expensive process. Yes, there is also the Party Wall Acts process in relation to certain matters but that only covers a narrow range of the issues arising from development and is in itself a rather antiquated system which could do with a thorough statutory review (for a topical description of the system, see another case last week: Power & Kyson v Shah (Court of Appeal, 7 March 2023)).

What’s the solution? I quite like the Australian approach:

Neighbours need to get to know each other. Next door is only a footstep away.

Finally, can I recommend the latest episode of the Planning Law (With Chickens) podcast by my colleagues Victoria McKeegan and Nikita Sellers. They chat through some of the most interesting things in planning law which have happened in the last few months and also have a good interview with James Wickham of Gerald Eve.

Simon Ricketts, 11 March 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Resources Resources Resources

As is the English way, it’s rather more nuanced than Money Money Money. And it’s hardly an Abba singalong, but speak to someone with practical experience of the operation of the planning system about what is needed to improve its operation: these three words constantly ring out – way above any chatter about the changes proposed in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill or by way of the Government’s wider policy reforms.

So it was good to see this week’s DLUHC consultation document Stronger performance of local planning authorities supported through an increase in planning fees (28 February 2023).

This consultation seeks views on improving the performance of English local planning authorities by increasing planning fees, “building capacity and capability” and “introducing a more robust performance regime”

Now you have responded to the last consultation process, you can start on this one! The deadline is 25 April 2023.

The document sets out the Government’s threefold strategy:

Financial support

“this consultation proposes an increase in planning application fees for major applications by 35% and for all other applications by 25%, together with an indexation proposal for fees to be adjusted annually in-line with inflation.”

Additional resource

“This consultation outlines how we are working with representatives across the planning and development sector to design and deliver a programme of support for building planning capacity and capability within local planning authorities and to seek views on how we can increase capacity and capability in the planning system as quickly as possible.”

Improved performance

“This consultation therefore also proposes a new approach to how the performance of local planning authorities is measured across a broader set of quantitative and qualitative measures”

Some examples of proposed fee increases:

Subject to the outcome of the consultation process, the increases will be introduced this summer and will be reviewed within three years.

The consultation raises various specific questions, such as:

Whether there are examples of bespoke or ‘fast track’ services which have worked well or could be introduced for an additional fee – and of any schemes that have been particularly effective
whether there should be a commitment on the part of authorities to ringfence the fees for spending within their planning departments (surely a no-brainer – and one to be firmly policed).
whether the ability for a “free go” repeat application be limited or removed
whether the fee for retrospective applications should be doubled.

In terms of increasing resources in the planning system, the consultation document says this:

“43. We want to support and work with local planning authorities to make sure that planners and the planning system are valued, and that there is a culture of proactive delivery, pride in performance and a clear understanding of high-quality customer service; as well as being ready to adapt to the new measures and ways of working methods proposed in the Levelling Up and Regeneration Bill.

44. We must also promote a broader understanding of the value of planning in supporting the country in its Levelling Up ambitions as a positive driver of sustainable economic growth and the development and building of homes and places that communities can be proud of.

45. We have created a cross-sector working group with representatives from local government, the private sector and professional bodies to design and deliver a programme of support to build capacity and capability strategy across local planning authorities. This programme will seek to provide the direct support that is needed now, deliver upskilling opportunities and further develop the future pipeline into the profession in order to continually improve the quality of service delivered and resilience of local planning authorities.

46. To support the development of our planning capacity and capability strategy and programme we would like to hear your views and experience of the specific challenges in recruiting and retaining planning professionals with the right skills and experience and the best ways in which government, working with professional bodies, can boost the capacity and capability of local planning authorities. It is our intention to carry out numerical research in the coming months to support this important strand of work, but in the meantime we would welcome any data and insight that you would like to provide.”

In terms of increasing the performance of local planning authorities:

“48. As we propose to introduce measures to increase fee income relating to planning services specifically, we want to amend the existing metrics that measure performance of local planning authorities for speed of decision-making so that local planning authorities are primarily held to account for the number of applications that are determined within the statutory determination periods rather than through an extension of time agreement. We also propose to tighten the Planning Guarantee period for non-major applications.”

“we propose that where the statutory determination period is 8 weeks the Planning Guarantee should be set at 16 weeks and where the statutory determination period is 13 weeks (or 16 weeks for Environmental Impact Assessment developments) the Planning Guarantee should be retained at 26 weeks.”

[What are your experiences of the Planning Guarantee? The only time I’ve seen someone apply for their money back (with every justification), the local planning authority refused to progress the section 106 agreement until the applicant had agreed in writing to waive his rights to rely on it!]

“We propose that the performance of a local planning authority for speed of decision making should be primarily assessed on the percentage of applications that are determined within the statutory determination period, not an agreed extended period of time. We also believe that the performance of local planning authorities for speed of decision-making should be assessed separately for the following application types:

Major applications (10 or more new dwellings, or site area of 0.5 hectares or more and the number of dwellings is unknown; provision of a non-residential building or buildings where the floor space created by the development is 1000sqm or more; development on a site with an area of 1 hectare or more)
Non-Major applications (excluding householder applications) (anything smaller than the criteria for major development, including residential development of between 1 and 9 new dwellings on a site with an area less than 1 hectare, or site area is less than 0.5 hectares and the number of dwellings is unknown; non-residential development where the floor space created is less than 1000sqm or where the site area is less than 1 hectare; or other types of non-major development such as change of use)
Householder applications (development within the curtilage of a dwelling house which requires an application for planning permission and is not a change of use)
Discharge of conditions
County matters (minerals and waste) applications”

The document seeks views on the suitability of these individual metrics:

It suggests that there could be a standardised “customer satisfaction survey” (sigh, is “customers” really the right word?).

What do you think? I was quite encouraged by the various proposals although do they really go far enough? I suspect that the fee increases are pitched about right but how much extra money will the Government be committing to this essential service?

The document asks whether there any other application types or planning services which are not currently charged for but should require a fee or for which the current fee level or structure is inadequate. There are no fees at present for listed building consent applications – not mentioned in the consultation document. Is that right? The fee for section 73 applications is very light – currently £234 – when in reality the work involved can be extensive. The consultation does ask as to the appropriate fee for the LURB’s proposed section 73B procedure but not about our familiar friend section 73. Should the fee be higher for EIA development – I would have thought so? (and, by the way, whilst outside the remit of this consultation, there is still no visible progress on introducing fees in relation to planning appeals).

Separately, should there be greater control over non-statutory fees for planning performance agreements and for pre-application advice? I increasingly hear tales of woe from applicants as to large fees paid only for advice to be provided very late – and then sometimes reversed once the application has been submitted.

I know that the information gathering in relation to the metrics will entail further work on the part of already busy staff but it will give a much clearer picture than anyone has at the moment – huge delays are masked by routinely agreed time extensions. And the requirement, for instance, for data to be supplied on the “percentage of committee decisions to refuse against officer recommendation that are subsequently allowed at appeal” should certainly focus minds….

Sam Stafford has done wonders via his 50 Shades of Planning podcast series to shine a life on what “life on the frontline” for planning department staff can be like – I recommend his 25 February 2023 Life on the frontline II episode. In the light of these proposals, Life on the frontline III next year will make for even more interesting listening.

Simon Ricketts, 3 March 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Tate Modern Viewing Platform Supreme Court Ruling: What Is There For Planners To See?

By contrast with the timeline of this case to date, the planning system zips along.

This week the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Fearn & Others v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery (Supreme Court, 1 February 2023), the most important private nuisance case in many years. I’m not hoping to analyse the reasoning of the court in relation to the law of private nuisance, but if you are interested I suggest that you start with the Supreme Court’s own press summary and then enter the blizzard of property litigation lawyers’ updates and thought pieces on LinkedIn etc. I’m only interested in what it means for the town and country planning process – if anything.

I wrote about the first instance ruling of the High Court in my 2 March 2019 blog post, Trial By Instagram: Privacy & Planning. I used to be quite lyrical:

“Photo-sharing social media apps, weaponised by the smartphone camera, are changing our experience and expectations of place. Is the planning system, and the law of private nuisance, keeping up?

The London Evening Standard had a story for our times last night: Please stop ‘influencing’ on our doorsteps, Notting Hill residents tell ‘unapologetic’ Instagrammers.

At a personal level we have all become artists, influencers, curators, with our instant pics, filtered, composed, annotated. Fomo for you = dopamine for me. But zoom out and through endlessly snapping, sharing, liking and commenting, we are of course the product, the hive mind, the crowd source, working for the data mine, adding to the geo-cache, mapping ceaselessly where the sugar is in the city.

In this context, what sells a place? From outside in: a glimpse of the life style, the life, that could be yours. From inside out: unique views out onto a city. The two ugly i words: iconic, instagrammable.

Which all makes the parable of Fearn & others v The Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery (Mann J, 11 February 2019) so perfect.

On one side, the residents of Neo Bankside, housed from floor to ceiling in glass so as to achieve spectacular views out and having paid no doubt precisely to be able to enjoy that experience.

On the other side, at its closest point 34 metres to the north of Block C of Neo Bankside, the viewing gallery on the tenth floor of the Blavatnik Building extension to Tate Modern, from which visitors also have spectacular views, including, to the south, of those residents in their transparent homes.”

And so I went on, analysing Mann J’s judgment in detail, but that analysis is now completely redundant. The Supreme Court has overturned the ruling both of Mann J and subsequent ruling of the Court of Appeal and held, by a majority of three to two that the Tate was liable in nuisance for inviting the public to look out from a viewing platform from which they can, and many do, peer into the claimants’ flats – and (the saga is far from over yet) another court will now need to grapple with the issue of what remedies (injunction/damages) may be appropriate.

However, for planners, it is still worth reading paragraphs 29 to 53 of Mann J’s first instance judgment, where he sets out in detail the planning history of the properties.

Because, for all of us engaged in the town and country planning process, the big question is whether it should be the role of the planning system to seek to prevent juxtapositions of uses like this – or is that a matter for private law (and this case is now a demonstration of the remedies available for individuals who have their private law rights infringed)?

I agree with a post by Dentons’ Michele Vas this week, It’s official – it’s not the role of the planning system to police private rights – or is it? (2 February 2023):

“Whilst this case did concern a very particular set of circumstances as to the level of invasion of privacy the Claimants were subjected to (i.e. I suspect “overlooking” alone is unlikely to be sufficient to base a private nuisance claim on) it does stress how fundamental good design in new development is to avoid future private nuisance claims.

Placemaking, understanding and respecting the integrity of neighbourhoods should be a building block to good design. A further thought is that there is no useful “planning tool” to avoid or minimise future private nuisance claims; unlike property rights, it is not a right which can be lawfully interfered with or compulsorily acquired by relying on a local planning authority’s statutory powers.

Whilst the judgment is an incredibly welcome confirmation that the planning system is not there to police private rights, it is a reminder that design of development is at the heart to preventing these issues arising in the first place.”

I had noted down pretty much the same passages in the judgment as she identifies, namely paragraphs 109 and 110 from Lord Leggatt’s majority judgment:

“Reliance on planning law

109. The second matter of policy raised by the Court of Appeal was a suggestion that planning laws and regulations would be a better medium for controlling “inappropriate overlooking” than the common law of nuisance (para 83). This seems to me to overlook (if I may use the term) the fact that, while both may sometimes be relevant, planning laws and the common law of nuisance have different functions. Unlike the common law of nuisance, the planning system does not have as its object preventing or compensating violations of private rights in the use of land. Its purpose is to control the development of land in the public interest. The objectives which a planning authority may take into account in formulating policy and in deciding whether to grant permission for building on land or for a material change of use are open-ended and include a broad range of environmental, social and economic considerations. While a planning authority is likely to consider the potential effect of a new building or use of land on the amenity value of neighbouring properties, there is no obligation to give this factor any particular weight in the assessment. Quite apart from this, as Lord Neuberger observed in Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd [2014] UKSC 13; [2014] AC 822, para 95:

“when granting planning permission for a change of use, a planning authority would be entitled to assume that a neighbour whose private rights might be infringed by that use could enforce those rights in a nuisance action; it could not be expected to take on itself the role of deciding a neighbour’s common law rights.”

110. For such reasons, the Supreme Court made it clear in Lawrence that planning laws are not a substitute or alternative for the protection provided by the common law of nuisance. As Carnwath LJ said in Biffa Waste, para 46(ii), in a passage quoted with approval by Lord Neuberger in Lawrence, at para 92:

“Short of express or implied statutory authority to commit a nuisance … there is no basis, in principle or authority, for using such a statutory scheme to cut down private law rights.”

The practical as well as legal irrelevance of planning permission in this case is apparent from the judge’s finding that no consideration was given to overlooking in the planning process for the Tate extension: [2019] Ch 369, paras 58-63.”

It is also worth noting that Lord Sales’ minority judgment does not dissent in terms of the role of the planning system:

“148. The designs for the Blavatnik Building always included a viewing gallery in some form, although its precise extent varied through successive iterations of the design. Planning policy for the South Bank encourages the construction of viewing galleries in buildings of significant height. However, there is no planning document which indicates that overlooking by the viewing gallery in the direction of Block C was considered by the local planning authority at any stage. It is not likely that the planning authority considered the extent of overlooking. Further, while the Neo Bankside developer was aware of the plans for a viewing gallery, it did not foresee the level of intrusion which resulted. In broad terms, the design and construction of the Blavatnik Building with the viewing gallery in its final form took place in parallel with the design and construction of Neo Bankside, without the effects of the one on the other so far as visual intrusion was concerned being fully appreciated or addressed.”

201. At para 81 the Court of Appeal also pointed out that overlooking is frequently a ground of objection to planning applications and noted that “any recognition that the cause of action in nuisance includes overlooking raises the prospect of claims in nuisance when such a planning objection has been rejected”. However, other forms of activity which can give rise to claims in nuisance, such as the generation of noise, smoke or smells, are also matters which may be addressed in objections to planning applications, so this does not give rise to any point of distinction. More fundamentally, as this court pointed out in Lawrence, at paras 77-95 per Lord Neuberger, the planning regime is concerned with issues of the public interest, not with resolving questions of individual rights. So it is not surprising, and is not a matter of particular concern, that a cause of action in nuisance may be found to exist in a case where an objection to the grant of planning permission founded on similar matters has been rejected. A grant of planning permission pursuant to the administrative processes under the planning regime cannot remove private rights which neighbouring landowners may have. See also Hunter, p 710D, per Lord Hoffmann and Lawrence, paras 156 (Lord Sumption), 165 (Lord Mance) and 193 (Lord Carnwath).”

This must all surely be right. The right approach to the determination of any application for planning permission is whether the proposal is in accordance with the provisions of the local plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise. There may often be policies which seek to protect existing residential amenity (although when I look for instance at the current Southwark local plan, postdating these proposals, I see no specific references to protection of existing residents’ privacy or to avoiding overlooking). Even without local policy support, aspect of a development proposal which may adversely affect neighbours are certainly capable of being a material consideration in the determination of an application for planning permission, but as always it is for the decision-maker to decide how much weight to apply to those considerations.

I don’t believe that the judgment increases the onus on local planning authorities to consider privacy/overlooking considerations: planning decisions can only go so far and private law remedies are the ultimate safety net. And of course the circumstances of the Tate Modern case, by virtue of the unusual nature of the viewing platform and the extent of its use, should not be applied too widely. However, one would hope that the Government’s increased emphasis on design in the planning process may reduce the risks of these sorts of unanticipated juxtapositions in the future. It will be interesting to see the Government’s proposed National Development Management Policies in due course…

Simon Ricketts, 4 February 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Photograph by Jay Mullins courtesy of Unsplash

Thank You Mikael Armstrong: New Case On Scope Of Section 73

Thank you also to my Town Legal partner Patrick Robinson who spotted this hand-down yesterday from the Planning Court: Armstrong v Secretary of State (Deputy High Court Judge James Strachan KC, 27 January 2023).

Who is Mr Armstrong? Well Mr Armstrong had the benefit of a planning permission for the erection of a new dwelling in Cornwall with the wonderful address of The Beach House, Finnygook Lane, Portwrinkle. The planning permission dated back to 2007 but had been kept alive by way of minor implementation works.

A house had previously stood on the site. This photograph from the application documentation on Cornwall Council’s planning portal gives a sense of its dramatic location:

Mr Armstrong made an application under section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to vary the approved scheme, by way of amendment of a condition which listed the approved drawings (a condition which had been added by way of section 96A, to enable use of section 73 – the now familiar approach following Finney (if any non planners or planning lawyers are still reading, you must think we are all mad)).

The application was refused by Cornwall Council, with one reason for refusal:

“The proposed development seeks to change the design of the dwelling approved via, E2/06/01798/FUL, from an irregularly-shaped boldly modernist dwelling to a dual-pitched alpine lodge style dwelling. The application site occupies a highly prominent and sensitive coastal plot. The proposed revised design completely alters the nature of the development and would result in a development that would differ materially from the approved permission. As a result this proposal goes beyond the scope of Section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and is contrary to guidance within the National Planning Practice Guidance, specifically paragraph 001 Reference ID: 17a- 001-20140306.”

There are these images of the approved and proposed schemes, courtesy of Cornwall Council’s planning portal:

(Whilst not relevant to the legal issues, I note that the proposed revisions to the scheme would cause it more closely to resemble the dwelling that had previously been on the site).

Mr Armstrong appealed. His appeal statement made these (entirely correct) points:

“a. although an application under section 73 of the 1990 Act is sometimes referred to as an application to make a “minor material amendment”, the terms of section 73 of the 1990 Act are not limited in that way and place no restriction on the magnitude of the changes that can be sought;

b. reference had been made by the Courts in the consideration of section 73 of the 1990 Act to not permitting amendments which amount to a fundamental alteration to the terms of a planning consent, but there was nothing of a fundamental nature such as scale, size, massing or footprint and positioning on the Site which would result in any significant change;

c. section 73 applications still receive the same amount of scrutiny as a full planning application and the process does not prejudice the ability for relevant parties to make representations”.

The appeal was determined by way of written representations. The inspector determined the main issue to be: “whether the proposal could be considered as a minor material amendment under section 73 of the TCPA 1990“.

(Alarm bells already…)

The inspector’s analysis includes the following passages:

“The original planning permission was for a bespoke dwelling in a contemporary architectural style, with the external materials being natural stone and cedar cladding. The approved plans show a multi-faceted building, with an organic form, including curved walls and sedum-covered roofs. By contrast, the proposed plans submitted with the section 73 application show a dwelling with a simple rectilinear form, rendered walls and a pitched slate roof. Consequently, although it is similarly sited, and has a comparable floorspace and volume, it is fundamentally different in its design, bearing virtually no resemblance to the approved building. The modifications are, therefore, substantial.

The appellant contends that the term “minor material amendment” infers that material changes are allowable under a section 73 application. However, the word “minor” qualifies the extent to which material changes should be considered via this route. In this case, the wholesale redesign of the house results in a development that would be of a substantially different nature than the one originally approved. In these circumstances, the PPG advises that a new planning application is necessary.”

He dismissed the appeal.

Thankfully, Mr Armstrong didn’t give up on the entire pettyfogging planning system at that point but, as a litigant in person, challenged the decision in the High Court.

And, as was only right in the face of this sort of reasoning from the inspector, he won! And in so doing, has provided further judicial authority for what planning lawyers end up saying again and again – the limits of section 73 are not confined by the question of whether there would be a minor material amendment to the approved scheme, but whether there would be a fundamental variation to the approved scheme (as that is the test previously set down in Arrowcroft and subsequent cases).

Deputy High Court Judge James Strachan KC’s gave no fewer than eight reasons why the inspector’s decision was unlawful:

“First, I consider the correct starting point must be the words of section 73 of the TCPA 1990 itself. As the Defendant accepts, there is nothing in section 73, or in the TCPA 1990, that limits its application to “minor material amendments”, or to amendments which do not involve a “substantial” or “fundamental” variation. On the face of the words used, s.73 applies to any application for planning permission for development of land “without complying with conditions subject to which a previous planning permission was granted” (see s.73(1)). It limits the local planning authority’s consideration to the “question of conditions subject to which planning permission should be granted (see s.73(2)). There are other limitations as to its scope such as those in ss73(4) and (5), but they are not engaged here. There is nothing in the language used that restricts an application to vary or remove a condition to “minor material amendments”, or to what a decision-maker considers to be a “non-fundamental variation”. I accept that the absence of such a limitation on the face of the statute does not automatically mean that such limitations cannot arise as a matter of statutory interpretation, in accordance with well-established principles requiring one to consider the meaning of a statute and its statutory purpose. However it is an important starting point that, on the face of the statute, provided the application is limited to non-compliance with a condition (rather than any other part of the permission) it falls within the stated scope of s.73 of the TCPA 1990.

Second, as now properly understood in light of Finney, the requirement that a s.73 application be confined to applications for non-compliance with a condition is significantly restrictive in and of itself. There is no obvious need, justification or statutory purpose for reading in additional restrictions which are not expressed on the face of the statute. Finney confirms that section 73 cannot be used to vary the operative part of a planning permission. It is a section concerned with non-compliance with condition, rather than the operative part of a permission. One therefore cannot use s.73 to vary or impose a condition where the resulting condition would be inherently inconsistent with the operative part of the planning permission; that would also involve effective variation of the operative part of the planning permission as well. That point was exposed clearly in Finney where the resulting varied condition caused the Inspector to omit the conflicting words in the description of development in her decision. The power under s.73 is therefore a limited one (as briefly observed in Hillside). But in such circumstances, it is difficult to see why it is necessary to introduce or read in further limits on its scope which are not otherwise expressed in the section itself. If, as accepted to be the case here, an application for non-compliance with a condition does not lead to any conflict or inconsistency with the operative part of the permission, it is difficult to see why it is objectionable in light of the statutory purpose of section 73 and the TCPA 1990 itself.

Third, section 73 is clearly intended to be a provision which enables a developer to make a section 73 application to remove or vary a condition, provided of course that the application does not conflict with the operative part of the planning permission. Any such variation application will be subject to the necessary procedural requirements for its consideration which, for example, enable representations to be received. If Parliament had intended the power to restrict its application further (for example to limit it to “minor material” amendments to a condition, or non-fundamental variations to a condition) one would have expected that to be expressed in the language used and it could readily have done so.

Fourth, and linked to the preceding point, the wording of section 96A of the 1990 Act is informative as part of the statutory context. Unlike section 73 which limits its application to conditions, section 96A was introduced as a power to amend a planning permission generally (including the operative part of the permission). But in introducing that power that is applicable to any part of a permission, Parliament expressly constrained its scope to “non-material amendments”. By contrast, no such limitation has been imposed on the scope of s.73 where it is applicable, but with the fundamental difference that s.73 is confined in scope to applications for non-compliance with conditions (rather than non-compliance with the operative part of a permission). From the perspective of statutory interpretation taking account of the statutory context, this is yet a further indication that if Parliament had wished to limit the power under s.73 to “minor material amendments” or so prevent “fundamental variations” to conditions, it would have done so expressly.

Fifth, the effect of giving the words used in s.73 their plain and ordinary meaning so as to allow an application to be made for non-compliance with any planning condition which is not in conflict with the operative part of permission does not, of course, dictate the outcome of that application. It simply means that the application can be entertained. Any such application would then fall to be determined on its planning merits. In this case, for example, the Inspector considered there to be a fundamental difference in the proposed aesthetics of the design shown in the drawings identified in Condition 10 and the proposed plans. That may well be the inevitable result of an application made under s.73. But provided there is no inherent conflict or inconsistency with the “operative part” of the planning permission – in this case the construction of a single dwelling – the planning merits of that proposed change can be assessed on its merits. No such assessment has occurred. As part of that assessment, the decision-maker will be able to consider whether the proposed change (fundamental or otherwise) is acceptable or not in planning terms, taking account of any representations received.

In this respect, I recognise that in Finney, arguments as to the ability to consider the merits of s.73 application in this way (with attendant publicity) was not seen as a factor justifying giving s.73 the more expanded interpretation that the developer and Welsh Ministers had advocated in that case. There is an important difference. There, such arguments were advanced to try and justify giving s.73 a more extended interpretation than its words supported so as to permit effective changes to the operative part of a planning permission. Here, the situation is reversed. The ability to consider the merits of any change to a condition that falls within the ordinary and natural scope of the language used in s.73 points away from the need to read in additional restrictions to the scope of the statutory provision.

Sixth, I do not consider that any of the caselaw materially supports the Defendant’s attempt to restricting the scope of s.73 to “minor material amendments” or non-fundamental variations where there is no conflict with the operative part of the permission. To the contrary, it is more consistent with giving the words of s.73 their plain and ordinary meaning.

….

Seventh, if I am wrong and section 73 is implicitly qualified so as to preclude applications which do not involve any conflict with the operative part of a permission, but do involve what the decision maker considered to be a fundamental variation, I am not convinced that the Inspector has properly addressed the question of what would constitute a fundamental variation in this context.

…

Eighth, even if a test of fundamental variation is a lawful one to apply, I am not persuaded that the Inspector applied such a test in this case. In my judgment there is more than sufficient doubt about that to justify quashing the decision on the basis that he misdirected himself by reference to the PPG and its concept of “minor material amendments”.”

The inspector’s decision letter was quashed and the appeal will now be redetermined. Stick with it, Mr Armstrong.

NB For further background on the procedures available for amending schemes, see my 14 January 2023 blog post Greater Flexibility For Planning Permissions (Now I’m Just Showing My Age).

Simon Ricketts, 28 January 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Greater Flexibility For Planning Permissions (Now I’m Just Showing My Age)

Such a lot of hyperbolic talk and not enough doing.

The Conservatives’ Open Source Planning 2009 manifesto document started with this passage:

“The planning system is vital for a strong economy, for an attractive and sustainable environment, and for a successful economy. At present, the planning system in England achieves none of these goals. It is broken”.

And then Boris Johnson in the foreword to Planning for the Future (August 2020):

“…we approach the second decade of the 21st century [the incredible potential of this country] is being artificially constrained by a relic from the middle of the 20th – our outdated and ineffective planning system.”

Well fix it, dear Henry, dear Henry, as the old song went. But, of course, it wasn’t broken in 2009 and it – just about – wasn’t outdated or ineffective in 2020. In 2023? I’m not so sure.

Given that the Government is currently refusing to accept there is an NHS crisis, I wonder if it would still accept that there is a housing crisis? Is it concerned by the number of local authorities deciding to pause or abandon preparation of their local plans? I’m genuinely unsure.

But let’s ignore for the moment the political direction in which this old vehicle should be headed and look instead at how the engine is working – can it actually deliver us to wherever it is we want to go?

Instead, let’s just focus on development management for a moment. In what should be a straightforward matter of processing, in accordance with statutory timescales, planning applications so as hold firm against the unacceptable and to approve the rest without delay , in form that that can lead to development taking place, and the public benefits which flow from that, there are currently at least two really horrible feedback loops, or vicious circles, that are holding back even the best projects:

Under-resourced planning departments, precautionary in nature, burdened with being the custodians of so many different policy objectives (climate change, health, building safety, beauty, air quality – you name it), take increasingly longer to process applications and their members’ decision-making is increasingly unpredictable (heads turned by lobby groups and hints from Government as to changing approaches). This leads to more applicants deciding to appeal so as to achieve a certain timescale and objective consideration of the issues. This places more work on officers, slowing down consideration of other applications. Which then also end up at appeal. And the slower the application and appeal process, the more likely that new issues arise, sending the applicant back to an earlier stage in the process again.

The demands on an applicant to tie down elements of a project at too early a stage, together with short implementation timescales and uncertain processes for processing scheme changes, lead to much unnecessary activity both in (a) keeping planning permissions alive with relatively minor works so that a permission that has taken years and a huge amount of money to achieve is not prematurely lost before the development is in a position to proceed and in (b) using clunky work-arounds – various combinations of section 96A, section 73 and/or drop-in applications – in order to refine proposals so that the permission is for a development which can actually be built. The longer the process for securing planning permission in the first place, the more likely that the resultant planning permission will need to be varied. The more certainty that the authority seeks to achieve with tightly drawn development parameters and a long list of planning conditions, the more likely that changes will be required.

I suspect that the Government is unaware of the true extent of the issue. I was looking at the latest statistics from December 2022. 86% of major applications last year were apparently determined “within 13 weeks or agreed time limit”. “or agreed time limit” is the clue, with time extensions routinely agreed so as to safeguard against premature refusal. Can anyone find where in the tables one might find how long an application for planning permission takes on average, from submission (usually after a lengthy and expensive pre-app process) to completion of section 106 agreement?

Another awkward reality to introduce at this point: projects need to be viable in order to proceed. Private sector development will not take place unless, broadly speaking, (1) the land owner will be paid by the developer an amount sufficiently above existing use value to make it make it worth his or her while to sell, and above what the land may be worth for any other development which could be carried out on the land (2) the developer can achieve a profit which makes undertaking the development commercially worthwhile, having regard to the financial risks inherent in the project, and can be sufficiently confident that there will be a market for the end product and (3) the capital deployed can achieve a better return than if it were to be deployed elsewhere. At present, with construction cost inflation, increased political risks, uncertainties as to the economy, is it any wonder when development is stalled; when development projects which may previously have been viable no longer make any financial sense on the terms negotiated, or when scheme changes are needed to reflect changing commercial (or indeed Building Regulations) requirements? I focus on private sector development given how reliant as a country we are on the private sector to deliver housing in particular, but of course most of the same economic realities apply, or should apply, to development carried out by the public sector.

None of this appears to be recognised in current Government announcements. Far from it. Instead, the rhetoric is to double down on developers who do not build out quickly, in genuflection to the myth of land-banking – with the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill’s provisions about development commencement notices, changes to the completion notices regime and even a power for local planning authorities to decline to determine applications in cases of earlier implementation. As if these measures were ever going to force a developer to build out a permission for a scheme where the funding wasn’t yet in place, where there was not yet a ready market or where the project was no longer viable! Instead, these measures will simply discourage many from entering the process in the first place, rather than risk abortive expenditure, even if the odds are that the scheme will go ahead. Why take the additional risk?

To people like me, the 2007 – 2008 global financial crisis seems like yesterday. Development almost came to a halt. Whilst it seemed too slow at the time, the then Government responded with measures that were summarised in its guidance document, Greater Flexibility For Planning Permissions, published first in 23 November 2009 and revised 1 October 2010). Look at the 2009 impact assessment:

“In current economic circumstances, there is a reduced take-up of existing permissions. Where permissions lapse, there are costs and delays associated with providing and processing an application for a fresh planning permission.

There is also a broader need for added flexibility to allow developers and local planning authorities to make non-material amendments to existing planning permissions and to clarify and streamline the process for making minor material amendments. There is currently a lack of clarity about what can be done, which is resulting in unnecessary expense and time for both parties.”

The guidance:

set out the temporary arrangements that had been brought in to extend the life of planning permissions. “This measure has been introduced in order to make it easier for developers and local planning authorities to keep planning permissions alive for longer during the economic downturn so that they can more quickly be implemented when economic conditions improve.”

explained about the then new section 96A process for non-material amendments to planning permissions, introduced on 1 October 2009 pursuant to the Planning Act 2008.

was encouraging as to the use of section 73 for “minor material amendments” to planning permissions, following the specific recommendations in the Killian Pretty Review: Planning Applications – A Faster and More Responsive System: Final Report (November 2008) that “Government should take steps to allow a more proportionate approach to minor material changes in development proposals after permission has been granted”.

The guidance was withdrawn on 7 March 2014 and replaced with the Flexible options for planning permissions section of what was then the new Planning Practice Guidance. In the transition, somehow the policy thrust of the earlier guidance was lost – the notion that flexibility can be a good or even necessary thing.

If you recall, the coalition Government subsequently introduced by way of the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 new sections 106BA, BB and BC into the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, providing a new application and appeal procedure, to review affordable housing obligations on the grounds of viability. Whilst helpful in some situations, it was certainly abused in others, and it was then repealed in 2016.

More recently of course, during the pandemic there were temporary measures to allow for the extension of time limits on planning permissions.

The Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill has its second reading in the House of Lords on 17 January 2023 and, when it comes to greater flexibility for planning permissions, clause 102 (introducing new Section 73B into the Town and Country Planning Act) remains as a small step in the right direction. Section 73 will continue to exist but section 73B provides for an alternative procedure for amending schemes, given that as a result of the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Finney, section 73 cannot be used for amending the description of development on a planning permission. Section 73B will allow for an application to be made for planning permission to be granted for an amended form of a previous planning permission. Planning permission will only be able to be granted “if the local planning authority is satisfied that its effect will not be substantially different from that of the existing permission”. It will not be able to be applied for in relation to a section 73 permission. The local planning authority “must limit its consideration to those respects in which the permission would, if granted…differ in effect from…the existing permission”.

My worry with section 73B is that unless there is really encouraging guidance from DLUHC, local planning authorities will be cautious as to the “not substantially different” test. After all, where does it rest on the spectrum between “non-material amendment” and “fundamental alteration”?

It seems to be that we will now have the following procedural options:

Section 96A for non-material amendments

Section 73 for amendments which may be material but which are not a fundamental alteration to the approved scheme and which do not necessitate a change to the description of development on the face of the original planning permission.

Section 73B for amendments which do not approve development whose effect will be substantially different from that of the existing planning permission

A fresh application for planning permission (encompassing also the Supreme Court’s suggested solution given in paragraph 74 of its Hillside judgment: “Despite the limited power to amend an existing planning permission, there is no reason why an approved development scheme cannot be modified by an appropriately framed additional planning permission which covers the whole site and includes the necessary modifications”)

In a case where the existing planning permission is, in the words of the Supreme Court in Hillside, “severable”, our old friend the “drop-in permission”. Unmentioned in Hillside, not to be found in legislation or guidance but still in my view clearly possible in the right situation.

Wouldn’t it be useful for DLUHC to publish a document now with the can-do tone of Greater Flexibility for Planning Permissions, recognising the obstacles in the way of achieving timely development, and encouraging local planning authorities to use these procedural tools available to them where necessary, so as not to delay or frustrate development, with suggestions as to how the appropriate tests should be approached? At present the whole thing is a lottery, dependent on the particular views of individual planning departments and even individual officers.

And wouldn’t it be useful if, instead of the hyperbole, there could be an honest look at the real stresses and strains the current system is under and if there could be a tightening of processes in the same way as Rosewell achieved for the planning appeals system? And above all, if planning departments could have available to them sufficient staff: well-trained, well-managed and well-motivated?

And now the prospect of strikes at the Planning Inspectorate. An interesting year ahead, folks.

Simon Ricketts, 14 January 2023

Personal views, et cetera

Running Down That Hillside

We now have the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hillside Parks Limited v Snowdonia National Park Authority (2 November 2022).

The case concerns the relationship between successive grants of planning permission for development on the same land and, in particular, about the effect of implementing one planning permission on another planning permission relating to the same site.

The facts concerned, in basic summary, a full planning permission for the development of 401 dwellings at Balkan Hill, near Aberdyfi in the Snowdonia National Park, granted in 1967. Development was to be in accordance with a detailed “master plan” showing the proposed location of each house and the layout of a road system for the estate.

Only 41 of the dwellings have been built to date, none in accordance with the masterplan. The developer, Hillside Parks Limited, has applied for and been granted a series of additional planning permissions permitting development which has taken place on parts of the site.

The Supreme Court has followed the Court of Appeal and High Court in concluding that development pursuant to the 1967 planning permission cannotlawfully be continued:

“The courts below were right to hold that the 1967 permission was a permission to carry out a single scheme of development on the Balkan Hill site and cannot be construed as separately permitting particular parts of the scheme to be built alongside development on the site authorised by independent permissions. It is possible in principle for a local planning authority to grant a planning permission which approves a modification of such an entire scheme rather than constituting a separate permission referable just to part of the scheme. The Developer has failed to show, however, that the additional planning permissions under which development has been carried out on the Balkan Hill site since 1987 should be construed in this way. Therefore, that development is inconsistent with the 1967 permission and has had the effect that it is physically impossible to develop the Balkan Hill site in accordance with the Master Plan approved by the 1967 permission (as subsequently modified down to 1987). Furthermore, other development has been carried out for which the Developer has failed to show that any planning permission was obtained. This development also makes it physically impossible to develop the site in accordance with the Master Plan approved by the 1967 permission (as subsequently modified).” (paragraph 100).

Whilst the specific facts of the case are unusual (including a degree of uncertainty as to the intended procedural status and effect of the subsequent planning permissions, several of which on their face are described as “variations” of the 1967 planning permission) the Supreme Court sets down some general principles to be applied to situations concerning overlapping permissions. The judgment clarifies some ambiguities arising from the earlier Court of Appeal judgment, although ambiguities remain.

One ambiguity indeed is as to the extent to which the principles set out apply to outline planning permissions, given passages such as paragraph 20:

“In this case, we are concerned with grants of full planning permission, in relation to which it is to be expected that a reasonable reader would understand that the detailed plans submitted with the application have particular significance.”

On first reading, I draw the following principles from the judgment:

Approval of the Pilkington principle

“In essence, the principle illustrated by the Pilkington case [[1973] 1 WLR 1527, Divisional Court] is that a planning permission does not authorise development if and when, as a result of physical alteration of the land to which the permission relates, it becomes physically impossible to carry out the development for which the permission was granted (without a further grant of planning permission) … Where the test of physical impossibility is met, the reason why further development carried out in reliance on the permission is unlawful is simply that the development is not authorised by the terms of the permission, with the result that it does not comply with section 57(1).” (paragraph 45)

“…([I]n the absence of clear express provision making it severable) a planning permission is not to be construed as authorising further development if at any stage compliance with the permission becomes physically impossible.” (see paragraph 68)

(my emboldening).

Interpretation of planning permissions for multi-unit developments

A planning permission for a multi-unit development is unlikely properly to be interpreted as severable into a set of discrete permissions to construct each individual element of the scheme.

However, see the reference above to the possibility of “clear express provision making it severable”. An early thought in reaction to the judgment is that in relation to large multi-phased planning permissions this may already be the case. Where it is not, it may often be useful in the future for it to be introduced.

The whole development is not unlawful if a proposed development cannot be completed fully in accordance with the planning permission

The Supreme Court doubted that it was correct that “in carrying out a building operation, any deviation from the planning permission automatically renders everything built unlawful, even in relation to a single building” and considered that it was certainly not the case that failure to complete a building operation for which planning permission has been granted renders the whole operation including any development carried out unlawful (To that extent the Supreme Court disagreed with remarks of Lord Hobhouse in Sage v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] UKHL 22).

Under the Pilkington principle, departures must be material

“The Pilkington principle should not be pressed too far. Rightly in our view, the Authority has not argued on this appeal that the continuing authority of a planning permission is dependent on exact compliance with the permission such that any departure from the permitted scheme, however minor, has the result that no further development is authorised unless and until exact compliance is achieved or the permission is varied. That would be an unduly rigid and unrealistic approach to adopt and, for that reason, would generally be an unreasonable construction to put on the document recording the grant of planning permission – all the more so where the permission is for a large multi-unit development. The ordinary presumption must be that a departure will have this effect only if it is material in the context of the scheme as a whole: see Lever Finance Ltd v Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 QB 222, 230. What is or is not material is plainly a matter of fact and degree” (paragraph 69)

How to vary a planning permission

Aside from the specific statutory procedures (section 73 and section 96A – and potentially in due course the additional procedure proposed in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill), what else can a developer do where it wishes to depart from the planning permission it has been granted?

“73 … [Counsel for Hillside] also submitted that it would cause serious practical inconvenience if a developer who, when carrying out a large development, encounters a local difficulty or wishes for other reasons to depart from the approved scheme in one particular area of the site cannot obtain permission to do so without losing the benefit of the original permission and having to apply for a fresh planning permission for the remaining development on other parts of the site.

74. In our view, that is indeed the legal position where, as here, a developer has been granted a full planning permission for one entire scheme and wishes to depart from it in a material way. It is a consequence of the very limited powers that a local planning authority currently has to make changes to an existing planning permission. But although this feature of the planning legislation means that developers may face practical hurdles, the problems should not be exaggerated. Despite the limited power to amend an existing planning permission, there is no reason why an approved development scheme cannot be modified by an appropriately framed additional planning permission which covers the whole site and includes the necessary modifications. The position then would be that the developer has two permissions in relation to the whole site, with different terms, and is entitled to proceed under the second.

75. The Authority has argued that, because the planning legislation does not confer any power on a local planning authority to make a material change to an existing planning permission, a later planning permission cannot have the effect of modifying in any material way the development scheme authorised by an earlier permission.

76. The trial judge, HHJ Keyser QC, did not find this argument persuasive and nor do we…”

(my emboldening).

If I have this right, this would be a procedure to fall back on in a situation where the Pilkington principle would otherwise bite i.e. where, even though development will be unchanged pursuant to part of the planning permission (1) that part can’t be shown to be clearly severable from the remainder (or presumably amended via section 96A or section 73 so as to be clearly severable) and (2) it would now be physically impossible to complete the planning permission in accordance with its terms (its original terms or presumably as amended via section 96A or section 73) if a separate permission were to be granted in relation to part of the development area covered by the permission.

No principle of abandonment of planning permissions

The developer’s argument that Pilkington should be analysed as a case resting on a principle of abandonment was rejected. The Supreme Court does not accept “that there is any principle in planning law whereby a planning permission can be abandoned” (paragraph 35).

I hope this brief initial run down is a helpful introduction to what will in due course be a very familiar text for all of us. More anon I’m sure.

Simon Ricketts, 2 November 2022

Personal views, et cetera

Courtesy Mel Poole on Unsplashed

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