Month: August 2025

Court of Appeal Cuts Down Epping Forest

It was interesting YouTube viewing this afternoon (29 August 2025) wasn’t it? A press summary has been released, which is what Bean LJ read out. A longer full text judgment will be published later today or Monday.

I cover Eyre J’s first instance ruling in my 20 August 2025 blog post Planning Law Is Being Used For Politicking About Asylum Seekers. But we can now forget about that ruling. The Court of Appeal has overturned it, with robust criticism both of Eyre J’s approach and, it must be said, that of Epping Forest District Council.

Kemi Badenoch, leader of the Conservative Party, has subsequently issued a statement urging council’s seeking similar injunctions to “KEEP GOING!”. That is reckless advice.

Nigel Farage, leader of Reform, has Xed:

“The government has used ECHR against the people of Epping.

Illegal migrants have more rights than the British people under Starmer”

Again, recklessly wrong, inflammatory even. And, as you will see, the rights of asylum seekers (not “illegal”, not “migrants”) under the European Convention on Human Rights played no part in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning.

Eyre J’s rulings in Epping Forest District Council v Somani Hotels Limited (19 August 2025) were:

  • To refuse to allow the Home Secretary to be joined as a party to the proceedings
  • To grant an interim injunction requiring the hotel to be vacated of asylum seekers by 12 September, until a final ruling in the proceedings at a full hearing which will take place in mid-October 2025
  • To refuse an interim declaration that the use of the hotel for asylum seekers’ accommodation is a breach of planning control (Epping Forest District Council subsequently, wrongly, represented in its subsequent press statement that the declaration had been granted but had to retract that when contacted by Planning magazine!).

Today’s appeals by the Home Secretary and Somani Hotels Limited were in respect of the first two matters and were successful.

Home Secretary to be joined as a party

From the press summary of the Court of Appeal’s judgment:

“The judge denied himself the opportunity to consider the wider range of public interest factors which would be relevant to this application; these, in our view, rendered it more than just merely ‘desirable’ that the Home Secretary be enabled to participate in the court process.  The judge needed to put himself in a position to determine the application from the most informed perspective.”

Grant of the temporary injunction

The Court of Appeal found that although the question of  whether to grant an interim injunction is a matter for the discretion of the judge, only to be set aside where the appeal court identifies “a flaw or flaws in the judge’s treatment of the question to be decided, such as an error of law, a gap in logic, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion”, the judge had made “a number of errors of principle which undermine his decision.”:

(from the press summary:)

  • “The provision of accommodation for asylum seekers pursuant to the Home Secretary’s statutory duty is a national issue requiring a structured response. Ad hoc interim injunction applications seeking closure of particular sites may each have some individual merit, but the judge’s approach ignores the obvious consequence that closure of one site means that capacity needs to be identified elsewhere in the system, and may incentivise local planning authorities who wish to remove asylum accommodation from their area to apply to the court urgently before capacity elsewhere in the system becomes exhausted. The potential cumulative impact of such ad hoc applications was a material consideration within the balance of convenience, but was not considered by the judge, perhaps because he did not have the advantage in reaching his decision of evidence and submissions from the Home Office.”

Incidentally, the Court of Appeal goes on to describe as “unattractive” an argument raised by the Home Secretary as to a hierarchy of human rights with particular weight to be given to the fact that “the Home Secretary’s statutory duty is a manifestation of the UK’s obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights”. Even if in Farage language the government “used ECHR”, this is no basis for the Court of Appeal’s ruling.

  • “The fact that the judge gave even limited weight to the fact of protests occurring, including unlawful protests, outside the hotel, were “worrying aspects of the judgment. If an outbreak of protests enhances the case for a planning injunction, this runs the risk of acting as an impetus or incentive for further protests, some of which may be disorderly, around asylum accommodation. At its worst, if even unlawful protests are to be treated as relevant, there is a risk of encouraging further lawlessness. The judge does not appear to have considered this risk, again perhaps because he had denied himself the advantage of hearing submissions on the merits from counsel for the Home Secretary.”

By judicial standards this again is trenchant criticism by the Court of Appeal of Eyre J’s approach.

  • Epping’s previous delays in taking any steps whatsoever:

“For much of the period of four years from 2020-2024 Somani had been running the Hotel as accommodation for asylum seekers without enforcement action from the Council.  When, in 2023, Somani sought planning consent to change its use, for over a year Epping did not process the application, notwithstanding the statutory duty upon it to do so within eight weeks.   The Council was aware by February 2025 that the Hotel was once again to be used to house asylum seekers, and by its letter of 15 May 2025 Somani made clear that it had been advised by the Home Office that a planning application was unnecessary.

The Council took no steps in response to this letter whether by issuing an enforcement notice or otherwise.  There was no threat of court proceedings.

Somani was first made aware of any step of this kind when it received the court papers and a court bundle running to over 1600 pages together with a detailed skeleton argument prepared by leading and junior counsel.  The tactics used on the Council’s behalf in this regard were not only procedurally unfair to Somani,  but ought to have reinforced the argument that the delay was a significant factor in the balance against the grant of interim relief.”

  • The hotel’s actions were wrongly characterised as “deliberate”:

“The judge found as a fact that Somani had acted “deliberately” in declining to seek change of use permission under planning law after April 2025; he was critical of them for taking this line.  He was wrong in both respects.  Those undeserved criticisms (which were repeated several times in the judgment) plainly played a material part in the judge’s ultimate decision. If the Council had considered Somani to be in breach of planning laws, it could have taken enforcement measures provided for within the 1990 Act.  It did not do so.  In short, the judge’s exercise of discretion in this case was seriously flawed by his erroneous reliance on the “deliberate breach” as a significant factor in favour of the grant of an interim injunction.”

  • The temporary nature of the injunction

“We emphasise here, as we did at the outset, that the issue for the judge in August was whether to grant a temporary injunction until the trial in October.  The judge appears to have given very little weight to the desirability of preserving the status quo until that point.  The risk of injustice to the residents of the Hotel by being dispersed by 12 September, when the trial of the claim was to take place only some six weeks later, seems to have had oddly little resonance with the judge.”

What now?

We now await the full hearing of the case in mid-October, where a central issue will be whether there is a breach of planning control in the first place. For the avoidance of doubt that question is not addressed by the Court of Appeal in its judgment – and did not need to be at this stage. Of course, it is conceivable that there will never be a full hearing if the Home Office decides no longer to use the Bell Hotel in any event.

It is inconceivable that any council would now succeed with an application for an interim injunction, save in the most extreme circumstances, ahead of a ruling following that final hearing, or a final hearing in any future case that is brought. There would be significant cost risks for any council that took that “KEEP GOING!” advice seriously.

Finally, as the court made clear, this case (like this blog post) is “not concerned with the merits of Government policy in relation to the provision of accommodation for asylum seekers, in hotels or otherwise.”

Simon Ricketts, 29 August 2025

Personal views, et cetera

Planning Law Is Being Used For Politicking About Asylum Seekers

The sheer extent of coverage, and speculation as to the implications, of Eyre J’s ruling in Epping Forest District Council v Somani Hotels Limited (19 August 2025) has a whiff of the silly season about it: the principles in the case law have not moved on substantively since my 14 January 2024 blog post Accommodating Asylum Seekers: Some Recent Planning Law Cases.

Eyre J’s judgment is a useful analysis of familiar principles. Why is it headline news then?

A whiff of the silly season but an even more pungent and worrying whiff of political opportunism – the Conservative party leader tonight (20 August 2025) encouraging all Tory-led local authorities to follow Epping Forest’s lead (despite the previous Government having set up this whole arrangement in the first place whereby hotels are block-booked by the Home Office via intermediary companies) and the Reform party leader encouraging more protests.

My personal view is that I’m not at all sure that we in the planning world should accept the planning system being used by politicians like this – whether to bash the government or to pursue largely misguided or misdirected campaigns against those who beyond doubt are vulnerable and in need. This is an issue for government to address, rather than to be fought out hotel by hotel via arguments about whether there has been a material change of use, based on old and inadequate case law. Particularly given that, if the statistics are to be believed, the use of hotels for asylum seeker accommodation is being reduced in any event and, to state the obvious, whilst the processing of asylum claims still needs to be sped up, these people need to be accommodated somewhere!

For those wanting to rely on the case, I draw attention to three key points:

This judgment is about an application for an interim injunction

The issue before Eyre J, as was the position in the Great Yarmouth and other cases mentioned in that January 2024 blog post, was whether to grant an interim injunction ahead of a full hearing of the case – and it is crucial to remember that the question of whether an interim injunction is to be ordered is down to the judge determining the “balance of convenience” on the specific facts of the particular case. Lawyers will be familiar with the American Cyanamid [1975] AC 396 test, which Eyre J summarises by reference to the later Sabmiller Africa v East African Breweries case [2009] EWHC 2140: “If the court is satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried, it must go on to consider whether the claimant would be adequately compensated in damages and whether the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them. If the answer to both of those questions is in the affirmative, no injunction should normally be granted. If not the court must consider whether the defendant would be adequately compensated under the claimants undertaking as to damages in the event of his succeeding at trial. If the answer to that question is “yes” the fact that the defendant may succeed at trial is no bar to the grant of an injunction. Where there is doubt as to the adequacy of damages for both parties the court must determine where the balance of convenience lies. If matters are evenly balanced it may be wise to take such measures as are calculated to preserve the status quo…A fundamental principle is that the court should take whatever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been the “wrong” course – in the sense that the court either grants an injunction which should have been refused or refuses to grant an injunction that should have been granted.”

Eyre J weighs up the factors in favour of an interim injunction at paragraphs 105 to 112 and those against at 114 to 116. The factors that weighed in favour included that the defendant hotel company had not made an application for planning permission or for a certificate of lawful use. The judge gave limited weight to “the fear of crime resulting from the use of the Bell; the need to address lawful protests; and the consequences of the actions taken to address unlawful activity.”

There is no final judgment as to whether there was a material change of use requiring planning permission

The court has expressly not reached any final judgment as to whether the accommodation of asylum seekers at the hotel amounted to a material change of use. Indeed, the council sought an interim declaration to that effect, which the court refused: “Although, as will be seen below, there is considerable force in the Claimant’s arguments that there has been a change of use the Defendant has counter-arguments which cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. In addition, as I have already explained, the question of the proper characterization of the use is fact-sensitive and for that reason alone this is not a case where an interim declaration is appropriate. Further, the second element of the proposed declaration, namely that the current use is not a permitted use, does not follow from the first element, namely that the current use is not use as a hotel. As Holgate J explained in Ipswich there will only have been development if there has not only be a change of use but if that change of use has been material. It follows that a declaration that the current use was not use as a hotel would not resolve matters and the court is not in a position at this stage to make a declaration that any change has been material.”

Eyre J does embark upon some analysis, although subject to this health warning:

“In doing so I am mindful that the case remains at the interim stage where there is limited evidence (and markedly less detailed evidence than could be expected at a final hearing and even more so than would be available if the matter were being considered at a planning appeal before an inspector); where the parties have had limited opportunity to advance detailed arguments; where the court’s opportunity for mature reflection is limited; and where the issues involve questions not only of fact but also of planning judgement.”

“There are a number of factors which operate against a finding that there has been a change of use. The principal ones are:

i) There have been no internal structural changes in the Bell.

ii) The external appearance of the Bell is unaltered – the presence of security fencing erected to address recent unlawful hostile activity is to be disregarded for these purposes.

iii) The Defendant’s staff continue to operate the facilities at the Bell and to provide the services there.

iv) Catering, cleaning, and related services are provided for those accommodated at the Bell in the same way as they previously were for hotel guests.”

There are, however, other factors which would support a finding of a change of use namely:

i)Those accommodated are all of one category of person namely single male asylum seekers.

ii) The entirety of the Bell is devoted to providing accommodation for those persons pursuant to an agreement with CTM and is to be so devoted for a significant period of time (it is the latter element which distinguishes the situation from that of a block booking of a hotel for conference or training course).

iii) Those accommodated have no choice in the location of the premises in which they are placed. They did not choose to come to the Bell and have no control over how long they are to stay there.

iv) None of those accommodated are paying for themselves.

v) Those accommodated have no choice as to their rooms nor as to those with whom they are to share. In most cases they will be sharing rooms with persons with whom they were not previously acquainted.

vi) None of those accommodated in the Bell has anywhere else to live in the United Kingdom.

vii) The Defendant is required to follow the instructions of the Home Office (presumably mediated through CTM) as to the room in which and with whom the asylum seekers are to be placed. The Defendant is expressly prohibited from agreeing to any requests for an upgrade of accommodation.

viii) Those accommodated in the Bell may come and go as they please but any of them who intends to leave for more than one day must obtain prior authorisation from the Home Officer. In addition if any resident is not seen for more than one day the Defendant is required to notify CTM and the Home Office. The Defendant is also required to obtain a signature from each resident each day.

ix) Security staff and a welfare officer are present to protect the residents and to attend to their welfare needs.

x) None of the facilities of the Bell are available for use by non-residents.

In considering the strength of the Claimant’s case on this question I have had regard to Holgate J’s reminder that the Court of Appeal has said that the distinction between hotel and hostel use is a fine one. Although a fine one the distinction is a real one and I come back to the point that the question is not whether the current use is as a hostel but whether there has been a change from use as a hotel. In light of the factors I have just set out there is very considerable force in the contention that there has been such a change here. Mr Coppel’s point that “the Bell is not a hotel for those who are placed there” is a powerful one.

I turn to the question of whether such change of use as there has been was material for the relevant planning purposes. In that regard it is “relevant to consider not only the on- site but also the off-site effects of the character of the use of the land” (Holgate J in Ipswich at [69]. There are a number of factors which support the Claimant’s contention that the change was a material one:

i) The nature of the on-site operation has changed in the extensive ways I have set out above.

ii) The opportunity for use of the Bell by members of the wider community has gone. It no longer provides a resource for dining, receptions, functions, and the like. I do not overlook the fact that such use has been very markedly reduced for a number of years but any scope for such use has totally gone for the duration of the use of the Bell under the contract with CTM.

iii) In addition, it is at least arguable that the contribution which those currently resident at the Bell can make to the local community will be different from that which could have been made by visitors to a hotel. Those currently resident there are all single males who will be resident for a significant period of time; who are resident there without choice; and who ex hypothesi are destitute or at risk of destitution (otherwise the Secretary of State would not be under a duty to accommodate them). Through no fault of theirs the contribution they can make (particularly in the form of the use of local services) and the role they can play in the community is different from that of those visiting a hotel in a particular place for business or leisure purposes.

I remind myself of the limitations of the material before me and of the need for considerable caution in making an assessment of the prospects at the interim stage. Nonetheless, the strength of the Claimant’s contention that there has been a material change of use is such that it operates as a factor in favour of the grant of an injunction in assessing where the balance of convenience falls.”

Each case is to be approached on its own facts

“… the outcome of this application turns on technical issues about the rules of Planning law and on the application of the established principles governing the circumstances in which a court should grant or refuse interim relief. It will be seen from the analysis I set out below that the application of those rules and principles to particular circumstances is acutely fact sensitive.”

The hotel and the Home Office (which sought to participate in this case at a late stage) are reportedly applying for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Will we now see other local planning authorities seeking to take similar action? Politics, politics. Will they succeed? Whether or not Eyre J’s interim injunction is allowed to stand, we still await the final High Court ruling later this year (assuming the case does not become academic in the meantime).

Simon Ricketts, 20 August 2025

Personal Views, et cetera

Picking Up The Bill: What Are We Now Thinking About Part 3?

As in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. And as in how much is the bill and who pays it?

There has been much noise over Part 3 of the Planning and Infrastructure Bill (“development and nature recovery”) since the Bill was introduced into Parliament on 11 March 2025. For what it’s worth (maybe not a lot), I’ve been trying to work out what I think.

If you would like a summary of Part 3 as introduced, please see colleague Susie Herbert’s 13 March 2025 guest blog post PI Bill Guest Post – Some Early Thoughts On The Bill’s Nature Recovery Provisions. I then summarised some of the criticism of Part 3 in my 11 May 2025 blog post, Nature Recovery Position.

On the day that the Lords Committee stage started, 17 July 2025, the Government tabled a series of amendments to Part 3, seeking to strengthen it – see Summary: Planning and Infrastructure Bill, Government Amendments to Part 3 (Lords Committee Stage) (17 July 2025) and the amendments themselves tabled for Committee on 17 September (those tabled by Baroness Taylor relating to clauses 55 to 85).

The amendments had followed discussions with conservation groups and environmental bodies (see e.g. UK government putting pressure on nature groups to drop opposition to planning bill (16 July 2025)). The Office for Environmental Protection welcomed the proposed amendments in a statement  published that same day, 17 July 2025:

“The Office for Environmental Protection (OEP) has written to government to welcome its proposed changes to the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. 

In advice to government on the Bill in May, the OEP identified a number of areas where it advised environmental protections should be strengthened, while recognising the government’s intent to secure ‘win-win’ outcomes for development and for nature. 

Government has now published details of a series of proposed amendments to the Bill. 

OEP Chair Dame Glenys Stacey said: “The government’s amendments go a long way towards addressing the issues we raised in our advice. 

“I have written to Matthew Pennycook, Minister for Housing and Planning, to acknowledge the significant extent to which government has taken positive steps in response to our advice. 

“The Bill sets out government’s intention to strike a different balance between risk and opportunity for nature protection and for development. 

“While it is our view that, even after the material amendments the government proposes, the Bill would, in some respects, lower environmental protection on the face of the law, we think that, in the round, the additional safeguards proposed today make government’s intended “win-win” for nature and the economy a more likely prospect.

“Should the Bill receive Royal Assent, the practical implementation of the new measures will be key. We will continue to watch closely and to scrutinise how this significant change in environmental law is implemented.” 

That may be said to be a rather limp thumbs-up, but it is certainly a thumbs-up. Given that the Environment Act 2021 gave the OEP the principal objective, in exercising its functions, of contributing to environmental protection and the improvement of the natural environment, and given that its role includes giving advice as to proposed changes in environmental law, and given that the OEP will, I have no doubt, scrutinise implementation every step of the way, one might take some comfort from that position.

However, the amendments haven’t completely quelled concerns. For example, see the statement by CIEEM (i.e. the Chartered Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management) published on 18 July 2025:

“We believe that the Government’s proposed amendments still fall short. They fail to guarantee the vital safeguards nature needs, fail to preserve hard-won protections for species and habitats, and overall, still represent a step backwards for environmental standards in England.  And let us not forget that these environmental standards deliver significant economic, health and wellbeing benefits for us all. This battle has not just been about protecting nature for nature’s sake, but also protecting the vital benefits and services that nature provides.

While the proposed improvements to Environmental Delivery Plans (EDPs) are a step in the right direction, major flaws do remain.

Most notable is the glaring absence of the mitigation hierarchy – a cornerstone of current environmental protections. Without it – and the imperative to avoid adverse impacts on biodiversity from occurring in the first place – the Bill opens the door to the devastation of some of our most important natural sites and species. And whilst we note the Ministerial Statement recognises the use of the mitigation hierarchy in EDP development, such Statements are too easily reversed and do not have the strength of primary legislation.

Equally important, is the need for EDPs to guarantee that environmental compensation and enhancement happen before any damage is done – so as to avoid a dangerous nature deficit and to protect vulnerable species from local extinctions.”

One of the Part 3’s most vocal critics is solicitor Alexa Culver, legal counsel at RSK Wilding, a company which uses “habitat restoration as a means of offsetting clients’ biodiversity and carbon impacts while concurrently generating other environmental and social benefits”. Alexa certainly knows her stuff and posted on LinkedIn on 18 July 2025 her “Legal Analysis of Government’s Proposed Concessions to Part 3 of the Planning and Infrastructure Bill”. It is worth a read but in summary her concerns assert the lack of “any legally meaningful protections for habitats and species, or our environment”;  that Part 3 would “override any requirement for a “mitigation hierarchy”; that “irreplaceable habitats remain unprotected”, that there “remains no legal liability on any party to deliver compensation measures under an EDP”, creating “unacceptable risks for developers, who may see planning permissions refused because EDPs are failing”, and that in the case of a failing EDP “remedial action may not take place until 10 years after unmitigated harms to nature have occurred”.

The Chancellor possibly didn’t calm the debate by then positing the issue as people in housing need versus snails; Rachel Reeves defends retreat over planning bill as tactical move to speed up reforms (FT, 22 July 2025):

“Chancellor Rachel Reeves has claimed the UK government made a tactical retreat over its flagship planning bill in an attempt to speed it on to the statute book.

Ministers have been accused of watering down provisions in the bill, but Reeves on Tuesday said she hoped that the concessions would help “shave off a couple of months” of parliamentary wrangling in the House of Lords.

“I care more about the young family getting on the housing ladder than I do about protecting some snails,” she told an end-of-term hearing of the Lords economic affairs committee.”

The Lords Committee stage hasn’t yet reached Part 3; this will not be until September.

It’s interesting and, I would say positive, that the OEP posits that the “the additional safeguards proposed … make government’s intended “win-win” for nature and the economy a more likely prospect.” The truth is surely that without these measures we just carry on in a lose-lose position? We’re not really protecting or improving the environment; we’re not building homes.

Bear with me:

First of all, what is the issue which I think that the government is trying to solve by way of Part 3, or at least what I think Part 3 should be focusing on?

There is a lot of abstract talk, but surely at the heart of it all is the specific “appropriate assessment” test in regulation 63 of the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017: basically prohibiting an authority from approving “a plan or project that is likely to have a significant effect (either alone or in combination with other plans or projects)” on a European site or a European offshore marine site (i.e. basically a special area of conservation or special protection area) unless it has “ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the European site or the European offshore marine site (as the case may be).”  The only exception is almost impossible to meet – if the authority:

“is satisfied that, there being no alternative solutions, the plan or project must be carried out for imperative reasons of overriding public interest (which, subject to paragraph (2), may be of a social or economic nature), it may agree to the plan or project notwithstanding a negative assessment of the implications for the European site or the European offshore marine site (as the case may be).

(2) Where the site concerned hosts a priority natural habitat type or a priority species, the reasons referred to in paragraph (1) must be either—

  1. reasons relating to human health, public safety or beneficial consequences of primary importance to the environment; or
  1. any other reasons which the competent authority, having due regard to the opinion of the appropriate authority, considers to be imperative reasons of overriding public interest.”

So (1) we have a test which, unusually, is substantive rather than just procedural – there is no such “pass/fail” test in relation to anything to do with, say, approving projects which may endanger human health or the most precious and unique of heritage assets.

(2) We have a test which has come to be interpreted extremely strictly by way of European and domestic case law – see e.g. the 2018 CJEU Dutch nitrates deposition cases (concerning authorisations for schemes for schemes for agricultural activities in sites protected by the Habitats Directive and where nitrogen deposition levels already exceeded the critical load) and all that has followed.  

(3) Largely due to systematic under-investment and mismanagement by successive governments in relation to the regulation of the water industry, of farming processes and of the use of fossil fuels, the ecological integrity of various special areas of conservation and special protection areas is already at or beyond tipping point, leading to the various de facto recommended vetoes on development by way of advice from English Nature: nutrient neutrality requirements in some areas, water neutrality requirements in others (NB the Chancellor’s “homes vs snails” comment is directly relevant to the north Sussex situation), restrictions on additional traffic generating development due to issues of nitrogen deposition in others and in yet others restrictions on homes due to the risk of additional recreational pressure on specific protected sites.

(4) Due to organisational inertia and possibly the lack of prioritised resources, authorities, often working with Natural England and/or the Environment Agency and other bodies, have been slow (at best – sometimes AWOL) in arriving at strategic schemes to mitigate or avoid adverse effects, meaning these vetoes on house building  as well as, often, other forms of development, stay in place for years, with only the largest of individual projects able to arrive at a site-specific means of passing the “appropriate assessment” test, often with a consequent hit to viability affecting for instance the level of affordable housing that can be provided. Maybe – local politics – it even suits some local authorities to have those vetoes remaining in place?

I have written about this repeatedly. Stuck record.

29 June 2019 Another Green World: The South Coast Nitrate Crisis

9 October 2021 Development Embargos: Nitrate, Phosphate & Now Water

18 March 2022 New NE Nutrient Neutrality & Recreational Impact Restrictions (+ DEFRA Nature Recovery Green Paper)  

26 March 2022 More On That Natural England Advice

16 July 2022 Neutrality

All this time, a lose-lose.

The previous government snatched at a solution to the nutrients issue, which I described in my 29 August 2023 blog post The Government’s Big Move On Nutrient Neutrality – Now We Have Seen The Government’s LURB Amendment – which envisaged simply excluding from the “appropriate assessment” test any “potentially adverse effect on a relevant site caused by nutrients in urban waste water, whether alone or in combination with other factors.” This was so much more radical – and environmentally regressive – than anything proposed within Part 3 of the current Bill. Of course, it was decisively defeated in the Lords – see my 16 September 2023 blog post NN No.

We do need a solution! The Conservatives’ solution was never going to work. To the extent that Part 3 would enable the Secretary of State to give Natural England the role of coming up with tested plans, with strategic solutions to secure the recovery of special areas of conservation and special protection areas and to arrive at mechanisms for securing contributions from developers towards those measures – allowing individual developers having diffuse off-site impacts of the ecological condition of those sites to know that the “appropriate assessment” test is not for them to address (unless they want to embark on a site-specific solution) and that they can simply pay their way – I am supportive of Part 3. As OEP concludes, a win-win.

My concerns are probably coming from a different place to some of the opponents to Part 3:

  • I have deep scepticism as to how quickly or pragmatically these plans will in fact be delivered by Natural England, without a significant ramping-up of the organisation’s capacity and capability. And notwithstanding environmental campaigners’ concerns that Natural England will in some way, without specific legal duties, be soft as to what they require, the reality is surely that, far from for instance not applying the mitigation hierarchy or allowing irreplaceable habitats to be harmed, there is surely as much of a risk that they will “gold plate” what is required.
  • Is the Government being too ambitious in its framing of Part 3 as enabling EDPs not just to address these specific “diffuse off-site impacts” situations I have focused on in this post, but enabling them to address the ecological value of the particular development site itself, reducing the amount of on-site assessment required? For myself, I do still wonder whether this goes too far and whether, in any event, this will not in practice be the focus of initial EDPs.

Agree or disagree? Planning lawyer blog writers are certainly not a species with any form of protection so please do your worst.

Simon Ricketts, 3 August 2025

Personal views, et cetera