…because surely much of their value lies in guiding participants in future appeals as to the conduct that is expected of them – whether appellants, local planning authorities or third parties?
Ironically, the thought occurred to me due to an unusual headline in yesterday’s Planning magazine update, Inspector awards costs against both housebuilder and objectors for ‘unreasonable behaviour’ after allowing 1,730-home appeal (30 May 2024, paywall). Following on from the news on 24 May 2024 that inspector Christina Downes had allowed Taylor Wimpey’s long-running appeal in relation to up to 1,730 dwellings and associated development at Wisley Airfield, Guildford, I hadn’t been aware of her decisions the same day in relation to an application for costs made by Wisley Action Group, Ockham Parish Council and RHS Wisley against Taylor Wimpey and an application for costs made by Taylor Wimpey against Wisley Action Group, Ockham Parish Council and RHS Wisley.
The inspector made a partial award of costs against Taylor Wimpey on the basis of an error in modelling contained in a transport assessment which was not addressed until it was the basis for cross-examination at the inquiry. The inspector found that the objectors were put to unnecessary expense identifying the error, preparing written notes and extra evidence, recalling their highway witness and preparing and delivering cross-examination which all took an extra inquiry day.
Going the other way, the inspector also made a partial award of costs against the objectors, finding that there had been “unreasonable behaviour in the following respects:
• In the ecology evidence insofar as it related to matters that had already been addressed by previous decision makers; and in raising issues about the surveys, other than in relation to bats.
• In the highway evidence insofar as it related to the difference between the TA and ES in respect of peak traffic flows.
• In the planning evidence insofar as it persisted in raising issues about the principle of the development, but the costs limited to the cross-examination of this point and its preparation.”
In the context of an inquiry which ran to (by my reckoning) 32 days this may all be small beer but is an interesting indication of the extent to which parties may be prepared to put the behaviour of their opponents under the microscope.
There is of course detailed Planning Practice Guidance as to the award of costs in planning appeals, the basic principle being that costs may be awarded, either on the application of any party or at the instigation of the inspector, where a party has behaved unreasonably and the unreasonable behaviour has directly caused another party to incur unnecessary or wasted expense in the appeal process. I often have to explain to clients that, no, they can’t cover their wider commercial losses caused by that unreasonable behaviour…
My colleague Jack Curnow ran a search of appeal decisions today – there have been around 93 costs award decisions in the last 12 months. How much more might we learn if the key findings were made available, in the way that the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman provides a comprehensive database of its rulings?
A couple of other interesting costs decisions spotted in the wild (on LinkedIn that is):
- First of all, as with that first costs award at Wisley, a reminder that a party may end up winning the appeal but being on the receiving end of an award of costs for unreasonable behaviour. On 16 May 2024 Bellway Homes lost a planning appeal for a proposed development of 148 dwellings in County Durham, but (perhaps small comfort) secured an award of costs against Durham County Council on the basis that it had not substantiated three of its reasons for refusal (on effect on countryside, unacceptable harm to the landscape and on design). In relation to the remaining reasons for refusal – on planning and transport, where the relevant LPA witnesses appear to have made significant concessions under cross-examination, there is an interesting passage:
“In my view, the concessions made by the sustainable transport and planning witnesses rather than being a deficiency in the Council’s case were the result of a series of subtly directed questions by a skilled advocate and the inability of the witnesses to grasp the direction of the examinations. That said concessions made by witnesses are material considerations in concluding on a proposal and I did not ignore them. However, as the decisionmaker, whether I am bound by them is not, in my view, a binary choice. As the various examples of Case Law referred to show, I am entitled to bring to bear my own judgement, both as a planning professional and an Inspector, to weigh the written and oral evidence before me. This is particularly so where, as in this case, the final decision turned on a matter of planning judgement i.e., whether the proposal represented sustainable development and the relevant witness’s failure to grapple with the basis of their own evidence. In this context, despite the direction that the cross-examinations took the witnesses, I consider the Council was able to substantiate its case in relation to the second main issue, sustainability. On this basis, I consider that, continuing the case in the face of the planning witness’s concessions, the Council did not act unreasonably.”
[Who might that “skilled advocate” be, Hashi…?]
- Secondly, an example of an appeal in relation to non-determination of the application within the statutory period (in this case an appeal, which was allowed on 2 April 2024, for up to 540 dwellings and associated development at Yarnton, Oxfordshire, where both the local planning authority and county education and highways authority were the subject of full costs awards in favour of the appellant, through not having resolved matters, ultimately conceded in the immediate run-up to the inquiry, far earlier in the process.
From the award against Cherwell District Council:
“The concerns of the Council set out in the putative reasons for refusal should have been addressed early in the life of the application; some of them, in particular those relating to green infrastructure, could have been dealt with as conditions on a planning permission or as part of a planning obligation. The fact that all the objections were withdrawn by the Council prior to the opening of the inquiry demonstrates that there was nothing substantive in the Council’s reasons for refusal that could not have been agreed much earlier in the process. As it was, the applicant was forced to address these matters through an appeal, and to produce revised material and re-consult at the appeal stage. It had to produce evidence on the reasons for refusal and, given that this was an appeal against non-determination, it had to produce adequate evidence on all matters relevant to the planning application to enable the decision-maker to reach a decision.
Although costs can only be awarded in relation to unnecessary or wasted expense at the appeal, the behaviour and actions of the Council at the time of the planning application can be taken into account in the consideration of whether or not costs should be awarded. The Council acted unreasonably in its handling of the planning application and the application should not have needed to come to an appeal. The Council delayed development that should clearly have been permitted, failed to produce evidence that substantiated each putative reason for refusal, and issued putative reasons for refusal on grounds that were capable of being dealt with by planning condition or in an obligation. The Council’s unreasonable behaviour led the applicant to the unnecessary costs of an appeal with the consequent need to maintain an appeal team with legal representation and to produce evidence on a wide range of matters.
For the reasons given above, unreasonable behaviour resulting in unnecessary or wasted expense has occurred and an award of costs against Cherwell District Council is therefore warranted, covering all the costs relating to the appeal, with the exception of the two matters which are the subject of the costs claim against Oxfordshire County Council.”
From the award against Oxfordshire County Council:
“Costs should only be awarded against a third party in exceptional circumstances. In this case those circumstances exist. The County Council’s position was critical to the progress of the planning application and subsequent appeal because of its role as a main party to the s106 obligation, and it bears full responsibility for the delay and costs incurred in addressing the matters discussed above. The matter of the playing field access was capable of being addressed much earlier as part of the planning application if the County Council had taken a reasonable approach, and should never have had to come to appeal. The County Council did not defend its position at the inquiry. The request for a contribution for the Cassington Road to Peartree Interchange highways works should never have been made. The County Council behaved unreasonably in both respects and caused the applicant to incur unnecessary expense in addressing these issues in respect of legal representation, expert witnesses, the preparation of statements of case, proofs and rebuttals, and in having to seek information and prepare a legal opinion to inform the inquiry. A partial award of costs is therefore warranted.”
[NB the highways contribution point may be of wider interest: the county council had sought a contribution towards highways works “which were not dependent on the development and which had already been funded from the public purse and built”!]
Some other costs decisions this year that may be of interest:
- An award in favour of Bellway Homes in relation to an appeal in Stroud, where planning permission was granted for 54 dwellings. In his decision letter dated 20 May 2024 the inspector awards costs against Stroud District Council largely through its failure to grapple properly with biodiversity net gain issues:
“In a large part, the reason for the appeal is because the Council failed to review, accept and liaise with the appellant on the Mitigation Hierarchy Review. In my view, this necessitated the submission of the appeal. In addition, the
Council’s lack of engagement added unnecessary time at the hearing and necessitated further time being given to the main parties to agree the wording of a Grampian condition after the close of the hearing.
I am cognisant that the position on the value of high value habitats has been clarified with the statutory metric coming into force and has confirmed the basis on which such units can be traded and that this has been a recent change that the Council has not been obliged to accept. However, given that the Council were not seeking to resist the principle of development, the absence of indication that the appellant had met the expectations of the hierarchical approach should have been provided at an earlier point in time to have paved the way for more meaningful negotiations on the mitigation package. This concession was only made at the hearing in person, with the written evidence still having largely maintained a defensive position.
In view of this, my conclusion is that the Council has behaved unreasonably, for reasons including its failure to determine a planning application based on an issue that was capable of being dealt with by condition and failing to review and clarify its case promptly following the lodging of an appeal.”
- A full award of costs in favour of the promoter of a solar farm in Rayleigh. The appeal was allowed on 11 March 2024 and full costs were awarded against Rochford District Council. The decision to refuse the application had been made by members against officers’ recommendations. The inspector concluded:
“Overall, I consider that the Council has not produced relevant evidence at appeal stage to support their decision to refuse planning permission and has therefore delayed a development that should have been permitted, having regard to the development plan and other material considerations. It has also been inconsistent in its decision making. I therefore consider that the Council’s approach does represent unreasonable behaviour, and this has resulted directly in the need for this appeal.”
The council tried to make the case that it was difficult to find private sector consultants to support them. The inspector didn’t think much to that excuse!
“In the rebuttal to the cost claim it was suggested that it is difficult for members to provide a substantial evidence base as few consultancies will take on such work as it would be likely to lose them future work as they would be known as “Council lovers”. Whilst in my experience consultancies quite regularly support Council’s at appeal, even if that were the case this does not absolve the Council from the need to substantiate the reasons for refusal at appeal.”
- Finally, a reminder to councils of the need to engage in pre-app discussions. An appeal in Mole Valley was dismissed on 28 February 2024, but with the appellant awarded its costs due to the council’s failure to engage at pre-application stage:
“In respect of the appellant’s attempt to engage with the Council at the pre-application stage, I note that the Council suspended these services due to resourcing limitations. Although not binding, this process, if it had been available, would have been an opportunity for the Council to raise any concerns at an early stage in respect of design, living conditions and affordable housing provision. The appellant, therefore, would have been well-informed and provided with the opportunity to amend the scheme as necessary.
The Council’s resourcing is not a matter for the appellant, who sought an effective, positive and pro-active approach at an early stage. Given that the Council has an established pre-application function, which was suspended for a time, and which did not allow the appellant to use it, amounts to unreasonable behaviour. This is my view, irrespective of the Council’s communications later in the process.
For the reasons given above, unreasonable behaviour resulting in unnecessary or wasted expense has occurred in respect of pre-application advice and a partial award of costs is therefore warranted.”
I could go on, and on. There are so many. There’s a lesson in each decision – whether as to how parties should behave or as to how the system itself, under-resourced as it is, may be failing us all. After all, perhaps penalising authorities with costs awards is simply adding to the resourcing problem – it certainly is if costs awards do not influence future behaviour. So as well as my suggestion that these decisions should be more widely publicised, I would go further: when an award is made against an authority and the amount of costs payable has been determined, by negotiation or following reference to a High Court costs judge, why shouldn’t authorities be under a duty to publicise to their members and to their local electorate the financial consequences of what has happened and why?
Simon Ricketts, 31 May 2024
Personal views, et cetera

Extract from photograph by Elena Mozhvilo courtesy of Unsplash



